If the total property affected in violation of sub. (1)
is reduced in value by more than $2,500. For the purposes of this paragraph, property is reduced in value by the amount which it would cost to repair or replace it or to remove the marking, drawing, writing or etching, whichever is less.
The property affected is on state-owned land and is listed on the registry under s. 943.01
“Family member" means a spouse, child, stepchild, foster child, parent, sibling, or grandchild.
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class I felony:
Intentionally marks, draws or writes with paint, ink or another substance on or intentionally etches into, or threatens to mark, draw or write on or etch into, any physical property owned by a person who is or was a witness by reason of the owner having attended or testified as a witness and without the owner's consent.
Intentionally marks, draws or writes with paint, ink or another substance on or intentionally etches into, or threatens to mark, draw or write on or etch into, any physical property owned by a family member of a witness or by a person sharing a common domicile with a witness by reason of the witness having attended or testified as a witness and without the owner's consent.
In addition to any other penalties that may apply to a crime under this section, the court may require that a convicted defendant perform 100 hours of community service work for an individual, a public agency or a nonprofit charitable organization. The court may order community service work that is designed to show the defendant the impact of his or her wrongdoing. The court shall allow the victim to make suggestions regarding appropriate community service work. If the court orders community service work, the court shall ensure that the defendant receives a written statement of the community service order and that the community service order is monitored.
Any individual, organization or agency acting in good faith to whom or to which a defendant is assigned pursuant to an order under this subsection has immunity from any civil liability in excess of $25,000 for acts or omissions by or impacting on the defendant.
This subsection applies whether the court imposes a sentence or places the defendant on probation.
If the defendant is not placed on probation and the court orders community service work, the court shall specify in its order under this subsection the method of monitoring the defendant's compliance with this subsection and the deadline for completing the work that is ordered. The court shall inform the defendant of the potential penalties for noncompliance that would apply under s. 973.07
If more than one item of property is marked, drawn or written upon or etched into under a single intent and design, the markings, drawings or writings on or etchings into all of the property may be prosecuted as a single crime.
In any case under this section involving more than one act of marking, drawing, writing or etching but prosecuted as a single crime, it is sufficient to allege generally that unlawful marking, drawing or writing on or etching into property was committed between certain dates. At the trial, evidence may be given of any such unlawful marking, drawing, writing or etching that was committed on or between the dates alleged.
Arson of buildings; damage of property by explosives. 943.02(1)(1)
Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class C felony:
By means of fire, intentionally damages any building of another without the other's consent; or
By means of fire, intentionally damages any building with intent to defraud an insurer of that building; or
By means of explosives, intentionally damages any property of another without the other's consent.
In this section “building of another" means a building in which a person other than the actor has a legal or equitable interest which the actor has no right to defeat or impair, even though the actor may also have a legal or equitable interest in the building. Proof that the actor recovered or attempted to recover on a policy of insurance by reason of the fire is relevant but not essential to establish the actor's intent to defraud the insurer.
A mortgagee's interest is protected under sub. (1) (a); evidence of fire insurance was admissible to prove a violation of sub. (1) (a). State v. Phillips, 99 Wis. 2d 46
, 298 N.W.2d 239
(Ct. App. 1980).
Criminal damage to property under s. 943.01 is a lesser-included offense of arson. State v. Thompson, 146 Wis. 2d 554
, 431 N.W.2d 716
(Ct. App. 1988).
For purposes of this section, an explosive is any chemical compound, mixture, or device, the primary purpose for which is to function by explosion. An explosion is a substantially instantaneous release of both gas and heat. State v. Brulport, 202 Wis. 2d 505
, 551 N.W.2d 824
(Ct. App. 1996), 95-1687
Arson of property other than building.
Whoever, by means of fire, intentionally damages any property of another without the person's consent, if the property is not a building and has a value of $100 or more, is guilty of a Class I felony.
Arson with intent to defraud.
Whoever, by means of fire, damages any property, other than a building, with intent to defraud an insurer of that property is guilty of a Class H felony. Proof that the actor recovered or attempted to recover on a policy of insurance by reason of the fire is relevant but not essential to establish the actor's intent to defraud the insurer.
Placing of combustible materials an attempt.
Whoever places any combustible or explosive material or device in or near any property with intent to set fire to or blow up such property is guilty of an attempt to violate either s. 943.01
, depending on the facts of the particular case.
History: 1987 a. 348
; 1993 a. 50
Molotov cocktails. 943.06(1)(1)
As used in this section, “fire bomb" means a breakable container containing a flammable liquid with a flash point of 150 degrees Fahrenheit or less, having a wick or similar device capable of being ignited, but does not mean a device commercially manufactured primarily for the purpose of illumination.
Whoever possesses, manufactures, sells, offers for sale, gives or transfers a fire bomb is guilty of a Class H felony.
This section shall not prohibit the authorized use or possession of any such device by a member of the armed forces or by fire fighters or law enforcement officers.
Injury caused by arson: treble damages. 943.065(1)(1)
Any person who incurs injury to his or her person or his, her or its business or property by reason of a violation of s. 943.02
, including the state or any municipality which incurs costs in extinguishing or investigating the cause of a fire under those circumstances, may sue the person convicted of the violation for damages. A court shall award treble damages, plus costs and attorney fees, to a person, including the state or a municipality, proving injury under this section. The damages, costs and fees are payable only by the person convicted of the violation. This section does not impose any duty upon a company providing insurance coverage to defend its insured in any action brought under this section.
The treble damages requirement under sub. (1)
applies in any wrongful death action under s. 895.03
based on a violation specified in sub. (1)
History: 1981 c. 78
Criminal damage to railroads. 943.07(1)
Whoever intentionally causes damage or who causes another person to damage, tamper, change or destroy any railroad track, switch, bridge, trestle, tunnel or signal or any railroad property used in providing rail services, which could cause an injury, accident or derailment is guilty of a Class I felony.
Whoever intentionally shoots a firearm at any portion of a railroad train, car, caboose or engine is guilty of a Class I felony.
Whoever intentionally throws, shoots or propels any stone, brick or other missile at any railroad train, car, caboose or engine is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
Whoever intentionally throws or deposits any type of debris or waste material on or along any railroad track or right-of-way which could cause an injury or accident is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
“Boat" means any ship or vessel that has sleeping quarters.
Whoever intentionally enters any of the following places without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal or commit a felony in such place is guilty of a Class F felony:
A locked enclosed cargo portion of a truck or trailer; or
A motor home or other motorized type of home or a trailer home, whether or not any person is living in any such home; or
Whoever violates sub. (1m)
under any of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class E felony:
The person is unarmed, but arms himself with a dangerous weapon or a device or container described under s. 941.26 (4) (a)
while still in the burglarized enclosure.
While the person is in the burglarized enclosure, he or she opens, or attempts to open, any depository by use of an explosive.
While the person is in the burglarized enclosure, he or she commits a battery upon a person lawfully therein.
The burglarized enclosure is a dwelling, boat, or motor home and another person is lawfully present in the dwelling, boat, or motor home at the time of the violation.
For the purpose of this section, entry into a place during the time when it is open to the general public is with consent.
Stolen items may be introduced in evidence in a burglary prosecution as the items tend to prove that entry was made with intent to steal. Abraham v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 44
, 176 N.W.2d 349
Since attempted robbery requires proof of elements in addition to those elements required to prove burglary, they are separate and distinct crimes. State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565
, 182 N.W.2d 466
The state need not prove that the defendant knew that his or her entry was without consent. Hanson v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 396
, 190 N.W.2d 129
The unexplained possession of recently stolen goods raises an inference that the possessor is guilty of theft, and also of burglary if the goods were stolen in a burglary, and calls for an explanation of how the possessor obtained the property. Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 489
, 190 N.W.2d 542
An information is defective if it charges entry into a building with intent to steal or to commit a felony, since these are different offenses. Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751
, 193 N.W.2d 868
While intent to steal will not be inferred from the fact of entry alone, additional circumstances such as time, nature of place entered, method of entry, identity of the accused, conduct at the time of arrest, or interruption, and other circumstances, without proof of actual losses, can be sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant entered with an intent to steal. State v. Barclay, 54 Wis. 2d 651
, 196 N.W.2d 745
Evidence that the defendant walked around a private dwelling knocking on doors, then broke the glass in one, entered, and when confronted offered no excuse, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for burglary. Raymond v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 482
, 198 N.W.2d 351
A burglary is completed after a door is pried open and entry made. It was no defense that the defendant had changed his mind and started to leave the scene when arrested. Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544
, 213 N.W.2d 31
Hiding in the false ceiling of the men's room, perfected by false pretenses and fraud, rendered an otherwise lawful entrance into a restaurant unlawful. Levesque v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 412
, 217 N.W.2d 317
Failure to allege lack of consent in an information charging burglary was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. Schleiss v. State, 71 Wis. 2d 733
, 239 N.W.2d 68
In a burglary prosecution, ordinarily once proof of entry is made, it is the defendant's burden to show consent. When a private residence is broken into at night, little evidence is required to support an inference of intent to steal. LaTender v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 383
, 253 N.W.2d 221
Entry into a hotel lobby open to the public, with intent to steal, is not burglary. Champlin v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 621
, 267 N.W.2d 295
Section 939.72 (3) does not bar convictions for possession of burglarious tools and burglary arising out of a single transaction. Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518
, 280 N.W.2d 310
(Ct. App. 1979).
Intent to steal is capable of being gleaned from the defendant's conduct and the circumstances surrounding it. State v. Bowden, 93 Wis. 2d 574
, 288 N.W.2d 139
Under the facts of the case, the defendant's employer did not give the defendant consent to enter the employer's premises after hours by providing the defendant with a key to the premises. State v. Schantek, 120 Wis. 2d 79
, 353 N.W.2d 832
(Ct. App. 1984).
Felonies that form the basis of burglary charges include only offenses against persons and property. State v. O'Neill, 121 Wis. 2d 300
, 359 N.W.2d 906
To negate the intent to steal through the defense of “self-help" repossession of property stolen from the defendant, the money repossessed must consist of the exact coins and currency owed to him or her. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627
, 492 N.W.2d 633
(Ct. App. 1992).
As used in sub. (2) (d), “battery" applies only to simple battery. Convictions for both intermediate battery under s. 940.19 (3) and burglary/battery under sub. (2) (d) did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Reynolds, 206 Wis. 2d 356
, 557 N.W.2d 821
(Ct. App. 1996), 96-0265
A firearm with a trigger lock is within the applicable definition of a dangerous weapon under s. 939.22 (10). State v. Norris, 214 Wis. 2d 25
, 571 N.W.2d 857
(Ct. App. 1997), 96-2158
Sub. (1) [now sub. (1m)] requires only an intent to commit a felony. There is not a unanimity requirement that the jury agree on the specific felony that was intended. State v. Hammer, 216 Wis. 2d 214
, 576 N.W.2d 285
(Ct. App. 1997), 96-3084