The failure or refusal of any guest at a campground, hotel, motel, boarding or lodging house, or restaurant, to pay, upon written demand, the established charge for any beverage, food, lodging or other service or accommodation actually rendered.
The giving of false information on a lodging registration form or the giving of false information or presenting of false or fictitious credentials for the purpose of obtaining any beverage or food, lodging or credit.
The drawing, endorsing, issuing or delivering to any campground, hotel, motel, boarding or lodging house, or restaurant, of any check, draft or order for payment of money upon any bank or other depository, in payment of established charges for any beverage, food, lodging or other service or accommodation, knowing at the time that there is not sufficient credit with the drawee bank or other depository for payment in full of the instrument drawn.
If a person has obtained a ticket, another means of admission, or an accommodation or service provided by the recreational attraction, his or her failure or refusal to pay a recreational attraction the established charge for the ticket, other means of admission, or accommodation or service provided by the recreational attraction constitutes prima facie evidence of an intent to abscond without payment.
The refusal to pay a taxicab operator the established charge for transportation service provided by the operator constitutes prima facie evidence of an intent to abscond without payment.
The failure or refusal to pay a service station, garage, or other place where gasoline or diesel fuel is sold at retail or offered for sale at retail the established charge for gasoline or diesel fuel provided by the service station, garage, or other place constitutes prima facie evidence of an intent to abscond without payment.
Is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor when the value of any beverage, food, lodging, accommodation, transportation or other service is $2,500 or less.
Is guilty of a Class I felony when the value of any beverage, food, lodging, accommodation, transportation or other service exceeds $2,500.
"Repeat offense" means a violation of sub. (1m) (d)
that occurs after a person has been found by a court to have violated sub. (1m) (d)
Driver's license suspension; 2nd offense.
Subject to pars. (c)
, if a person commits a repeat offense, the court, in addition to imposing any penalty under sub. (3) (bm)
, may suspend the person's operating privilege for not more than 6 months.
Driver's license suspension; 3rd offense.
Subject to par. (d)
, if a person violates sub. (1m) (d)
after having been found by a court to have committed an offense that constitutes a repeat offense, the court, in addition to imposing any penalty under sub. (3) (bm)
, shall suspend the person's operating privilege for not more than 6 months.
Driver's license suspension; 4th offense.
If a person violates sub. (1m) (d)
after having his or her operating privilege suspended under par. (c)
, the court, in addition to imposing any penalty under sub. (3) (bm)
, shall suspend the person's operating privilege for one year.
In addition to the other penalties provided for violation of this section, a judge may order a violator to pay restitution under s. 973.20
. A victim may not be compensated under this section and s. 943.212
This subsection is applicable in actions concerning violations of ordinances in conformity with this section.
A judgment may not be entered for a violation of this section or for a violation of an ordinance adopted in conformity with this section, regarding conduct that was the subject of a judgment including exemplary damages under s. 943.212
Fraud on hotel or restaurant keeper, recreational attraction, taxicab operator, or gas station; civil liability. 943.212(1)(1)
Any person who incurs injury to his or her business or property as a result of a violation of s. 943.21
may bring a civil action against any adult or emancipated minor who caused the loss for all of the following:
The retail value of the beverage, food, lodging, accommodation, ticket or other means of admission, gasoline or diesel fuel, transportation, or service involved in the violation. A person may recover under this paragraph only if he or she exercises due diligence in demanding payment for the beverage, food, lodging, accommodation, ticket or other means of admission, gasoline or diesel fuel, transportation, or service.
In addition to sub. (1)
, if the person who incurs the injury prevails, the judgment in the action may grant any of the following:
Exemplary damages of not more than 3 times the amount under sub. (1) (a)
. No additional proof is required for an award of exemplary damages under this paragraph. Exemplary damages may not be granted for conduct that was the subject of a judgment for violation of s. 943.21
or an ordinance adopted in conformity with that section.
Notwithstanding the limitations of s. 814.04
, reasonable attorney fees for actions commenced under ch. 801
Notwithstanding sub. (2)
, the total amount awarded for exemplary damages and attorney fees may not exceed $300.
At least 20 days prior to commencing an action, as specified in s. 801.02
, under this section, the plaintiff shall notify the defendant, by mail, of his or her intent to bring the action and of the acts constituting the basis for the violation of s. 943.21
. The plaintiff shall send the notice by regular mail supported by an affidavit of service of mailing or by a certificate of mailing obtained from the U.S. post office from which the mailing was made. The plaintiff shall mail the notice to the defendant's last-known address or to the address provided on the check or order. If the defendant pays the amount due for the beverage, food, lodging, accommodation, ticket or other means of admission, transportation, or service prior to the commencement of the action, he or she is not liable under this section.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred under s. 943.21
. A conviction under s. 943.21
is not a condition precedent to bringing an action, obtaining a judgment or collecting that judgment under this section.
A person is not criminally liable under s. 943.30
for any civil action brought in good faith under this section.
Nothing in this section precludes a plaintiff from bringing the action under ch. 799
if the amount claimed is within the jurisdictional limits of s. 799.01 (1) (d)
Absconding without paying rent. 943.215(1)
Whoever having obtained the tenancy, as defined in s. 704.01 (4)
, of residential property he or she is entitled to occupy, intentionally absconds without paying all current and past rent due is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
A person has a defense to prosecution under sub. (1)
if he or she has provided the landlord with a security deposit that equals or exceeds the amount that the person owes the landlord regarding rent and damage to property.
A person has a defense to prosecution under sub. (1)
if, within 5 days after the day he or she vacates the rental premises, he or she pays all current and past rent due or provides to the landlord, in writing, a complete and accurate forwarding address.
When the existence of a defense under sub. (2)
has been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting the defense do not exist in order to sustain a finding of guilt under sub. (1)
(5) Subsection (1)
does not apply to any tenant against whom a civil judgment has been entered for punitive damages because the tenant left the premises with unpaid rent.
History: 1989 a. 336
Use of cheating tokens.
Whoever obtains the property or services of another by depositing anything which he or she knows is not lawful money or an authorized token in any receptacle used for the deposit of coins or tokens is subject to a Class C forfeiture.
History: 1977 c. 173
Refusal to pay for a motor bus ride. 943.225(2)
Whoever intentionally enters a motor bus that transports persons for hire and refuses to pay, without delay, upon demand of the operator or other person in charge of the motor bus, the prescribed transportation fare is subject to a Class E forfeiture.
History: 1987 a. 171
Operating vehicle without owner's consent. 943.23(1)(a)
"Drive" means the exercise of physical control over the speed and direction of a vehicle while it is in motion.
"Major part of a vehicle" means any of the following:
Each door allowing entrance to or egress from the passenger compartment.
The frame or, in the case of a unitized body, the supporting structure which serves as the frame.
"Operate" includes the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a vehicle necessary to put it in motion.
Whoever, while possessing a dangerous weapon and by the use of, or the threat of the use of, force or the weapon against another, intentionally takes any vehicle without the consent of the owner is guilty of a Class C felony.
Except as provided in sub. (3m)
, whoever intentionally takes and drives any vehicle without the consent of the owner is guilty of a Class H felony.
Except as provided in sub. (3m)
, whoever intentionally drives or operates any vehicle without the consent of the owner is guilty of a Class I felony.
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a violation of sub. (2)
if the defendant abandoned the vehicle without damage within 24 hours after the vehicle was taken from the possession of the owner. An affirmative defense under this subsection mitigates the offense to a Class A misdemeanor. A defendant who raises this affirmative defense has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Whoever knows that the owner does not consent to the driving or operation of a vehicle and intentionally accompanies, as a passenger in the vehicle, a person while he or she violates sub. (1g)
, or (3m)
is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
Whoever intentionally removes a major part of a vehicle without the consent of the owner is guilty of a Class I felony. Whoever intentionally removes any other part or component of a vehicle without the consent of the owner is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
In addition to the other penalties provided for violation of this section, a judge may require a violator to pay restitution to or on behalf of a victim regardless of whether the violator is placed on probation under s. 973.09
. If restitution is ordered, the court shall consider the financial resources and future ability of the violator to pay and shall determine the method of payment. Upon the application of any interested party, the court may schedule and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the value of the victim's pecuniary loss resulting from the offense.
To sustain a conviction for operating a car without the owner's consent, it is not necessary that the driver be the person who actually took the car. Edwards v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 249
, 174 N.W.2d 269
Leaving a vehicle because of the threat of imminent arrest is involuntary relinquishment, not abandonment under sub. (2). State v. Olson, 106 Wis. 2d 572
, 317 N.W.2d 448
Restitution under sub. (6) (b) is analyzed in the same manner as restitution under the general statute, s. 973.20. A defendant is entitled to a hearing, although it may be informal, to challenge the existence of damage to the victim, as well as the amount of damage. If damage results from a criminal episode in which the defendant played any part, the defendant is jointly and severally liable in restitution for the amount of damages. State v. Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d 324
, 602 N.W.2d 104
(Ct. App. 1999), 98-2718
Sub. (1r) is applicable if the taking of the vehicle is a substantial factor in the victim's death. A substantial factor is not only the primary or immediate cause, but includes other significant factors. State v. Miller, 231 Wis. 2d 447
, 605 N.W.2d 567
(Ct. App. 1999), 98-2089
Separate prosecutions for a carjacking in violation of sub. (1g), which occurred on one day, and operating the same car without the owner's consent in violation of sub. (3), which occurred on the next day, did not violate s. 939.66 (2r) or the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. State v. McKinnie, 2002 WI App 82
, 252 Wis. 2d 172
, 642 N.W.2d 617
Although the standard jury instruction provides that "[a] firearm is a weapon that acts by force of gunpowder," the state was not required to present evidence that a firearm operated by force of gunpowder. Essentially, both the supreme court and court of appeals have taken judicial notice of the fact that it is common knowledge that the guns at issue in previous cases operated as dangerous weapons because they used gunpowder to fire projectiles. State v. Powell, 2012 WI App 33
, 340 Wis. 2d 423
,812 N.W.2d 520
Issue of worthless check. 943.24(1)
Whoever issues any check or other order for the payment of not more than $2,500 which, at the time of issuance, he or she intends shall not be paid is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
Whoever issues any single check or other order for the payment of more than $2,500 or whoever within a 90-day period issues more than one check or other order amounting in the aggregate to more than $2,500 which, at the time of issuance, the person intends shall not be paid is guilty of a Class I felony.