Unauthorized placement for adoption.
Unauthorized interstate placements of children.
Abduction of another's child; constructive custody.
Interference with custody by parent or others.
Contributing to the delinquency of a child.
Contributing to truancy.
Strip search by school employee.
Child unattended in child care vehicle.
Leaving or storing a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a child.
Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18.
Gun-free school zones.
Dangerous weapons other than firearms on school premises.
Receiving stolen property from a child.
Receiving property from a child.
Tattooing of children.
Ch. 948 Cross-reference
See definitions in s. 939.22
In this chapter, the following words and phrases have the designated meanings unless the context of a specific section manifestly requires a different construction:
“Child" means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years, except that for purposes of prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a state or federal criminal law, “child" does not include a person who has attained the age of 17 years.
“Exhibit," with respect to a recording of an image that is not viewable in its recorded form, means to convert the recording of the image into a form in which the image may be viewed.
“Mental harm" means substantial harm to a child's psychological or intellectual functioning which may be evidenced by a substantial degree of certain characteristics of the child including, but not limited to, anxiety, depression, withdrawal or outward aggressive behavior. “Mental harm" may be demonstrated by a substantial and observable change in behavior, emotional response or cognition that is not within the normal range for the child's age and stage of development.
“Person responsible for the child's welfare" includes the child's parent; stepparent; guardian; foster parent; an employee of a public or private residential home, institution, or agency; other person legally responsible for the child's welfare in a residential setting; or a person employed by one legally responsible for the child's welfare to exercise temporary control or care for the child.
“Recording" includes the creation of a reproduction of an image or a sound or the storage of data representing an image or a sound.
“Sadomasochistic abuse" means the infliction of force, pain or violence upon a person for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.
“Sexual contact" means any of the following:
Any of the following types of intentional touching, whether direct or through clothing, if that intentional touching is either for the purpose of sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant:
Intentional touching by the defendant or, upon the defendant's instruction, by another person, by the use of any body part or object, of the complainant's intimate parts.
Intentional touching by the complainant, by the use of any body part or object, of the defendant's intimate parts or, if done upon the defendant's instructions, the intimate parts of another person.
Intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate or intentional emission of urine or feces by the defendant or, upon the defendant's instruction, by another person upon any part of the body clothed or unclothed of the complainant if that ejaculation or emission is either for the purpose of sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.
For the purpose of sexually degrading or humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant, intentionally causing the complainant to ejaculate or emit urine or feces on any part of the defendant's body, whether clothed or unclothed.
“Sexual intercourse" means vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal opening either by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction. The emission of semen is not required.
“Sexually explicit conduct" means actual or simulated:
Sexual intercourse, meaning vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal opening either by a person or upon the person's instruction. The emission of semen is not required;
Sexual sadism or sexual masochistic abuse including, but not limited to, flagellation, torture or bondage; or
Instructions were proper that told the jury that “lewd" under sub. (7) (e), when applied to photographs, is not mere nudity but requires the display of the genital area and sexual suggestiveness as determined by the jury in the use of common sense. State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530
, 468 N.W.2d 676
When a defendant allows sexual contact initiated by a child, the defendant is guilty of intentional touching as defined in sub. (5). State v. Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d 393
, 489 N.W.2d 626
(Ct. App. 1992).
The definition of “parent" in sub. (3) is all-inclusive; a defendant whose paternity was admitted but had never been adjudged was a “parent." State v. Evans, 171 Wis. 2d 471
, 492 N.W.2d 141
A live-in boyfriend can be a person responsible for the welfare of a child if he was used by the child's legal guardian as a caretaker for the child. State v. Sostre, 198 Wis. 2d 409
, 542 N.W.2d 774
The phrase “by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction" in sub. (6) modifies the entire list of acts and establishes that for intercourse to occur the defendant either had to perform one of the actions on the victim or instruct the victim to perform one of the actions on himself or herself. State v. Olson, 2000 WI App 158
, 238 Wis. 2d 74
, 616 N.W.2d 144
A person under 18 years of age employed by his or her parent to care for a child for whom the parent was legally responsible can be a person responsible for the welfare of the child under sub. (3). State v. Hughes, 2005 WI App 155
, 285 Wis. 2d 388
, 702 N.W.2d 87
established guidelines for defining “lewd" and “sexually explicit." It did not require that a child be “unclothed" in order for a picture to be lewd. Instead, the visible display of the child's pubic area and posing the child as a sex object with an unnatural or unusual focus on the child's genitalia should inform the common sense determination by the trier of fact regarding the pornographic nature of the image. It follows that when a child's pubic area is visibly displayed, the lack of a full opaque covering is a proper consideration that should inform the common sense determination by the trier of fact. State v. Lala, 2009 WI App 137
, 321 Wis. 2d 292
, 773 N.W.2d 218
Other offenses against children.
In addition to the offenses under this chapter, offenses against children include, but are not limited to, the following:
, relating to furnishing alcohol beverages to underage persons.
, relating to applying lead-bearing paints or selling or transferring a fixture or other object containing a lead-bearing paint.
Sections 961.01 (6)
, relating to delivering and distributing controlled substances or controlled substance analogs to children.
Section 961.573 (3) (b) 2.
, relating to the use or possession of methamphetamine-related drug paraphernalia in the presence of a child who is 14 years of age or younger.
Sexual assault of a child. 948.02(1)(am)(am)
Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years and causes great bodily harm to the person is guilty of a Class A felony.
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years is guilty of a Class B felony.
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years by use or threat of force or violence is guilty of a Class B felony.
Whoever has sexual contact with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years by use or threat of force or violence is guilty of a Class B felony if the actor is at least 18 years of age when the sexual contact occurs.
Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony.
(2) Second degree sexual assault.
Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony. This subsection does not apply if s. 948.093
(3) Failure to act.
A person responsible for the welfare of a child who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class F felony if that person has knowledge that another person intends to have, is having or has had sexual intercourse or sexual contact with the child, is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent the intercourse or contact from taking place or being repeated, fails to take that action and the failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may occur between the child and the other person or facilitates the intercourse or contact that does occur between the child and the other person.
(4) Marriage not a bar to prosecution.
A defendant shall not be presumed to be incapable of violating this section because of marriage to the complainant.
(5) Death of victim.
This section applies whether a victim is dead or alive at the time of the sexual contact or sexual intercourse.
Relevant evidence in child sexual assault cases is discussed. In Interest of Michael R.B. 175 Wis. 2d 713
, 499 N.W.2d 641
Limits relating to expert testimony regarding child sex abuse victims is discussed. State v. Hernandez, 192 Wis. 2d 251
, 531 N.W.2d 348
(Ct. App. 1995).
The criminalization, under sub. (2), of consensual sexual relations with a child does not violate the defendant's constitutionally protected privacy rights. State v. Fisher, 211 Wis. 2d 665
, 565 N.W.2d 565
(Ct. App. 1997), 96-1764
Second degree sexual assault under sub. (2) is a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault under sub. (1). State v. Moua, 215 Wis. 2d 510
, 573 N.W.2d 210
(Ct. App. 1997).
For a guilty plea to a sexual assault charge to be knowingly made, a defendant need not be informed of the potential of being required to register as a convicted sex offender under s. 301.45 or that failure to register could result in imprisonment, as the commitment is a collateral, not direct, consequence of the plea. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6
, 232 Wis. 2d 561
, 605 N.W.2d 199
Expert evidence of sexual immaturity is relevant to a preadolescent's affirmative defense that he or she is not capable of having sexual contact with the purpose of becoming sexually aroused or gratified. State v. Stephen T. 2002 WI App 3
, 250 Wis. 2d 26
, 643 N.W.2d 151
That the intended victim was actually an adult was not a bar to bringing the charge of attempted 2nd degree sexual assault of a child. The fictitiousness of the victim is an extraneous factor beyond the defendant's control within the meaning of the attempt statute. State v. Grimm, 2002 WI App 242
, 258 Wis. 2d 166
, 653 N.W.2d 284
Section 939.22 (19) includes female and male breasts as each is “the breast of a human being." The touching of a boy's breast constitutes “sexual contact" under sub. (2). State v. Forster, 2003 WI App 29
, 260 Wis. 2d 149
, 659 N.W.2d 144
Sub. (2), in conjunction with ss. 939.23 and 939.43 (2), precludes a defense predicated on a child's intentional age misrepresentation. The statutes do not violate an accused's rights under the 14th amendment to the U. S. Constitution. State v. Jadowski 2004 WI 68
, 272 Wis. 2d 418
, 680 N.W.2d 418
The consent of the child in a sub. (2) violation is not relevant. Yet if the defendant asserts that she did not consent to the intercourse and that she was raped by the child, the issue of her consent becomes paramount. If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74
, 301 Wis. 2d 418
, 734 N.W.2d 23
“Sexual intercourse" as used in this section does not include bona fide medical, health care, and hygiene procedures. This construction cures the statute's silence regarding medically appropriate conduct. Thus the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. State v. Lesik, 2010 WI App 12
, 322 Wis. 2d 753
, 780 N.W.2d 210
The elements of the offense under sub. (1) (e), are: 1) that the defendant had sexual contact with the victim; and 2) that the victim was under the age of 13 years at the time of the alleged sexual contact. It is these elements that the jury must unanimously agree upon. The exact location of the assault is not a fact necessary to prove the sexual contact and does not require jury unanimity. State v. Badzinski, 2014 WI 6
, 352 Wis. 2d 329
, 843 N.W.2d 29
Defendant's convictions for both failure to protect a child from sexual assault contrary to sub. (3) and first-degree sexual assault of a child under 13 as a party to a crime contrary to sub. (1) (e) and s. 939.05 were not multiplicitous. The 2 convictions were supported by different conduct and were not identical in fact. State v. Steinhardt, 2017 WI 62
, 375 Wis. 2d 712
, 896 N.W.2d 700
The constitutionality of this statute is upheld. Sweeney v. Smith, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1026
Statutory Rape in Wisconsin: History, Rationale, and the Need for Reform. Olszewski. 89 MLR 693 (2005).
Engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child.