Due process requires that the juvenile be afforded a copy of hearing examiner's report recommending revocation and the opportunity to object thereto by written submission prior to the decision of the H & S S department secretary. State ex rel. R. R. v. Schmidt, 63 W (2d) 82, 216 NW (2d) 18.
Circumstances to be considered in determining whether the delay between alleged commission of a crime and arrest denies a defendant due process of law include: (1) The period of the applicable statute of limitations; (2) prejudice to the conduct of the defense; (3) intentional prosecution delay to gain some tactical advantage; and (4) the loss of evidence or witnesses, and the dimming of memories; but the mere possibility of prejudice from these factors is not alone sufficient to demonstrate that a fair trial is impossible--actual prejudice must be shown. State v. Rogers, 70 W (2d) 160, 233 NW (2d) 480.
Photo identification of accused discussed. Mentek v. State, 71 W (2d) 799, 238 NW (2d) 752.
Mere fact that accused who demanded jury trial received a substantially greater sentence than an accomplice who pleaded guilty does not constitute punishment for exercising right to jury trial or denial of either due process or equal protection. Drinkwater v. State, 73 W (2d) 674, 245 NW (2d) 664.
Persons committed under ch. 975 are entitled to periodic review hearings which afford the same minimal requirements of due process as in parole determinations. Habeas corpus is appropriate remedy. State ex rel. Terry v. Schubert, 74 W (2d) 487, 247 NW (2d) 109.
Sentencing judge does not deny due process by considering pending criminal charges in determining sentence. Handel v. State, 74 W (2d) 699, 247 NW (2d) 711.
Due process requires that prosecutor sua sponte disclose highly exculpatory evidence which would raise a reasonable doubt where none existed before. Ruiz v. State, 75 W (2d) 230, 249 NW (2d) 277.
Trial court did not err in refusing mistrial where police reports concerning unrelated pending charge against defendant and defendant's mental history were accidentally sent to jury room. Johnson v. State, 75 W (2d) 344, 249 NW (2d) 593.
Defendant received fair, although not perfect, trial where prosecution witness attempted to ingratiate self with jury prior to trial and another prosecution witness violated sequestration order. Nyberg v. State, 75 W (2d) 400, 249 NW (2d) 524.
Defendant's refusal to name accomplices was properly considered by sentencing judge. Because defendant had pleaded guilty to crime, self-incrimination would not have resulted from requested cooperation. Holmes v. State, 76 W (2d) 259, 251 NW (2d) 56.
Parole revocation hearing is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights, including Miranda warnings and the exclusionary rule, are not applicable. State ex rel. Struzik v. H&SS Dept. 77 W (2d) 216, 252 NW (2d) 660.
Due process does not require that a person know with certainty which crime, among several, the person is committing, at least until the prosecution exercises its discretion under 939.65. Harris v. State, 78 W (2d) 357, 254 NW (2d) 291.
Due process rationale of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) is limited to prosecutorial use of defendants' custodial interrogation silence to impeach exculpatory statements made during trial. Rudolph v. State, 78 W (2d) 435, 254 NW (2d) 471.
Due process does not require that a John Doe witness be advised of the nature of the proceeding or that the witness is a "target" of the investigation. Ryan v. State, 79 W (2d) 83, 255 NW (2d) 910.
Discussion of due process requirements where administrative body imposes regulatory or remedial sanctions upon conduct also, and incidentally, subject to criminal punishment. Layton School of Art & Design v. WERC, 82 W (2d) 324, 262 NW (2d) 218.
Right to fair trial does not entitle defendant to inspect entire file of prosecutor. Matter of State ex rel. Lynch v. County Ct. 82 W (2d) 454, 262 NW (2d) 773.
Under "totality of circumstances" test, lineup and in-court identifications were properly admitted, although earlier photographic identification was unnecessarily suggestive. Simos v. State, 83 W (2d) 251, 265 NW (2d) 278 (1978).
See note to Art. I, sec. 7, citing State v. Wollman, 86 W (2d) 459, 273 NW (2d) 225 (1979).
Accused has right to answer some questions after Miranda warning and then to reassert privilege and break off all questioning. Odell v. State, 90 W (2d) 149, 279 NW (2d) 706 (1979).
Trial courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to convict defendants under unconstitutionally vague statutes. Right to raise issue on appeal cannot be waived, regardless of guilty plea. State ex rel. Skinkis v. Treffert, 90 W (2d) 528, 280 NW (2d) 316 (Ct. App. 1979).
Probationer's due process right to prompt revocation proceedings was not triggered where probationer was detained as result of unrelated criminal proceedings. State ex rel. Alvarez v. Lotter, 91 W (2d) 329, 283 NW (2d) 408 (Ct. App. 1979).
Before "totality of circumstances" analysis is applied to confrontation identification, it must first be determined whether police deliberately contrived confrontation between witness and defendant. State v. Marshall, 92 W (2d) 101, 284 NW (2d) 592 (1979).
Due process requires that evidence reasonably supports finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Stawicki, 93 W (2d) 63, 286 NW (2d) 612 (Ct. App. 1979).
Eight-month delay between date of alleged offense and filing of complaint did not violate defendant's due process rights. State v. Davis, 95 W (2d) 55, 288 NW (2d) 870 (Ct. App. 1980).
Exculpatory hearsay lacked assurances of trustworthiness and was properly excluded. State v. Brown, 96 W (2d) 238, 291 NW (2d) 528 (1980).
Use of unsworn prior inconsistent statement of a witness as substantive evidence did not deprive criminal defendant of due process. Vogel v. State, 96 W (2d) 372, 291 NW (2d) 838 (1980).
Inmate in administrative confinement has state-created interest protected by due process in inmate's eventual return to general prison population. State ex rel. Irby v. Israel, 100 W (2d) 411, 302 NW (2d) 517 (Ct. App. 1981).
Discussion of factors which court should consider when defendant requests to be tried after trial of codefendant in order to secure testimony of codefendant. State v. Anastas, 107 W (2d) 270, 320 NW (2d) 15 (Ct. App. 1982).
Revocation of probation was denial of due process by lack of notice of total extent and nature of alleged violations of probation. State ex rel. Thompson v. Riveland, 109 W (2d) 580, 326 NW (2d) 768 (1982).
Continued questioning after accused mentioned word "attorney" was prejudicial error. Harmless error analysis discussed. State v. Billings, 110 W (2d) 661, 329 NW (2d) 192 (1983).
Double jeopardy was not violated where trial court imposed illegal sentences then, in resentencing on valid conviction, imposed increased sentence. State v. Martin, 121 W (2d) 670, 360 NW (2d) 43 (1985).
Due process requires state to preserve evidence which (1) possesses exculpatory value apparent to custodian and (2) is of such nature that defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. State v. Oinas, 125 W (2d) 487, 373 NW (2d) 463 (Ct. App. 1985).
Where 2 statutes have identical criminal elements but different penalties, state does not deny equal protection or due process by charging defendants with the more serious crime. State v. Cissel, 127 W (2d) 205, 378 NW (2d) 691 (1985).
See note to 48.18, citing State v. Montgomery, 148 W (2d) 593, 436 NW (2d) 303 (1989).
Lineup and in-court identification of defendant may be suppressed as fruit of illegal arrest under appropriate circumstances. State v. Walker, 154 W (2d) 158, 453 NW (2d) 127 (1990).
Once defendant makes prima facie showing that prosecutor used peremptory challenges in purposefully discriminatory manner, burden shifts to prosecution to provide neutral explanation for challenging jurors. Discussion of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986) provided. State v. Walker, 154 W (2d) 158, 453 NW (2d) 127 (1990).
Comment during closing argument on defendant's courtroom demeanor where evidence of the demeanor was adduced during trial does not violate Fifth Amendment rights. State v. Norwood, 161 W (2d) 676, 468 NW (2d) 741 (Ct. App. 1991).
Evidence favorable to defendant must be disclosed if there is a "reasonable probability" that disclosure would have resulted in different trial outcome. State v. Garrity, 161 W (2d) 842, 469 NW (2d) 219 (Ct. App. 1991).
Where prior convictions are used to enhance minimum penalty, collateral attack of prior convictions must be allowed. State v. Baker, 165 W (2d) 42, 477 NW (2d) 292 (Ct. App. 1991).
Denial of a change of venue for local prejudice solely because the offense is a misdemeanor is unconstitutional. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 US 505.
The retention of 10% of a partial bail deposit, with no penalty for release on recognizance or where full bail is given, does not violate equal protection requirements. Schilb v. Kuebel, 403 US 357.
Defendant convicted of selling heroin supplied by undercover police was not entrapped. Hampton v. United States, 425 US 484.
Prisons must provide inmates with law library or legal advisers. Bounds v. Smith, 430 US 817.
Due process was not denied when prosecutor carried out threat to reindict defendant on more serious charge if defendant did not plead guilty to original charge. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357 (1978).
Plaintiff was not deprived of liberty without due process of law when arrested and detained pursuant to lawful warrant, even though police mistook identity of plaintiff. Baker v. McCollan, 443 US 137 (1979).
Sentencing judge properly considered defendant's refusal to cooperate with police by naming co-conspirators. Roberts v. United States, 445 US 552 (1980).
Federal constitution does not prohibit electronic media coverage of trial over defendant's objections. Chandler v. Florida, 449 US 560 (1981).
Due process does not require police to preserve breath samples in order to introduce breath-analysis test results at trial. California v. Trombetta, 467 US 479 (1984).
After retrial and conviction following defendant's successful appeal, sentencing authority may justify increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to original sentencing. Wasman v. U.S., 468 US 559 (1984).
Where indigent defendant's sanity at time of murder was seriously in question, due process required access to psychiatrist and assistance necessary to prepare effective defense based on mental condition. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (1985).
Prosecutor's use of defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of defendant's sanity violated due process clause. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 US 284 (1986).
Due process wasn't violated when trial judge imposed longer sentence on retrial. Texas v. McCullough, 475 US 134 (1986).
Black defendant was denied equal protection through state's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from jury. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986).
Coercive police activity is necessary predicate to finding that confession isn't "voluntary" within meaning of due process clause. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157 (1986).
Defendant who denies elements of offense is entitled to entrapment instruction as long as there is sufficient evidence from which jury could find entrapment. Mathews v. United States, 485 US 58 (1988).
Unless defendant shows bad faith on part of law enforcement, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not violate due process. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 US 51, 102 LEd 2d 281 (1988).
Revocation of probation without a hearing is a denial of due process. Hahn v. Burke, 430 F (2d) 100.
Pretrial publicity; the Milwaukee 14. 1970 WLR 209.
Due process; revocation of a juvenile's parole. Sarosiek, 1973 WLR 954.
HABEAS CORPUS AND BAIL
Habeas corpus is a proper remedy with which to challenge the personal jurisdiction of a trial court over a criminal defendant and to challenge a ruling on motion to suppress evidence where constitutional issues are involved. State ex rel. Warrender v. Kenosha County Ct. 67 W (2d) 333, 227 NW (2d) 450.
Scope of inquiry in extradition habeas corpus cases discussed. State v. Ritter 74 W (2d) 227, 246 NW (2d) 552.
Relief under habeas corpus is not limited to release of person confined. State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 W (2d) 276, 249 NW (2d) 573.
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND CONFESSION
Granting a witness immunity and ordering him to answer questions does not violate his constitutional rights. State v. Blake, 46 W (2d) 386, 175 NW (2d) 210.
A hearing to determine the voluntariness of a confession is not necessary where a defendant knowingly fails to object to the evidence for purposes of trial strategy. Police officers need not stop all questioning after defendant requests an attorney, since a defendant can change his mind and volunteer a statement. Sharlow v. State, 47 W (2d) 259, 177 NW (2d) 88.
Admission of evidence of spending of money after a burglary is not unconstitutional as requiring a defendant to testify against himself in order to rebut it. State v. Heidelbach, 49 W (2d) 350, 182 NW (2d) 497.
Where defendant volunteered an incriminatory statement outside the presence of retained counsel the statement is admissible. State v. Chabonian, 50 W (2d) 574, 185 NW (2d) 289.
There is no requirement that a hearing as to the voluntariness of a confession be separated into 2 stages, i.e., as to the circumstances leading up to it and then as to its content. Content of Miranda warning discussed. Bohachef v. State, 50 W (2d) 694, 185 NW (2d) 339.
Argument by the district attorney that certain evidence was uncontroverted does not amount to a comment on defendant's failure to testify. Bies v. State, 53 W (2d) 322, 193 NW (2d) 46.
Questions of investigational versus custodial interrogation in relation to a confession discussed. Mikulovsky v. State, 54 W (2d) 699, 196 NW (2d) 748.
Where defendant, believing he was seriously wounded, began to tell what happened and was then given the Miranda warnings, his further continuation amounted to a waiver of his rights. He need not expressly state that he was waiving them, where the record shows he was conscious and alert and said he understood his rights. State v. Parker, 55 W (2d) 131, 197 NW (2d) 742.
The privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to the production of corporate records by their custodian, even though they may tend to incriminate him personally. State v. Balistrieri, 55 W (2d) 513, 201 NW (2d) 18.
A defendant who waived counsel and who agreed to sign a confession admitting 18 burglaries in return for an agreement that he would be prosecuted for only one, cannot claim that the confession was improperly induced. The state has the burden of showing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. Pontow v. State, 58 W (2d) 135, 205 NW (2d) 775.
Administration of a blood or breathalyzer test does not violate defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Driver, 59 W (2d) 35, 207 NW (2d) 850.
Factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary discussed. State v. Wallace, 59 W (2d) 66, 207 NW (2d) 855.
A voluntary confession is not rendered inadmissible although the arrest was made outside the statutory jurisdictional limits of the arresting officer. State v. Ewald, 63 W (2d) 165, 216 NW (2d) 213.
While Miranda does require that, upon exercise of the defendant's 5th amendment privilege, the interrogation must cease, Miranda does not explicitly state that the defendant may not, after again being advised of his rights, be interrogated in the future. State v. Estrada, 63 W (2d) 476, 217 NW (2d) 359.
Requirements of claim of immunity discussed. State v. Hall, 65 W (2d) 18, 221 NW (2d) 806.
The validity of a juvenile confession is determined by an analysis of the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession, and the presence of parent, guardian or attorney is not an absolute requirement for the juvenile to validly waive right to remain silent but only one of the factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the confession. Theriault v. State, 66 W (2d) 33, 223 NW (2d) 850.
A written confession is admissible in evidence although it is not signed by the defendant, so long as the defendant has read the statement and adopted it as his own. Kutchera v. State, 69 W (2d) 534, 230 NW (2d) 750.
State may compel probationer's testimony in revocation proceeding if probationer is first advised that such testimony will be inadmissible in criminal proceedings arising out of alleged probation violation, except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal. State v. Evans, 77 W (2d) 225, 252 NW (2d) 664.
Volunteered confession while in custody and prior to Miranda warning held admissible despite earlier inadmissible statement in response to custodial interrogation. LaTender v. State, 77 W (2d) 383, 253 NW (2d) 221.
No restrictions of the 4th and 5th amendments preclude enforcement of an order for handwriting exemplars directed by presiding judge in John Doe proceeding. State v. Doe, 78 W (2d) 161, 254 NW (2d) 210.
Due process does not require that a John Doe witness be advised of the nature of the proceeding or that the witness is a "target" of the investigation. Ryan v. State, 79 W (2d) 83, 255 NW (2d) 910.
Defendant's confession was admissible although obtained through custodial interrogation following defendant's request for a lawyer. Leach v. State, 83 W (2d) 199, 265 NW (2d) 495 (1978).
Where "conversational" visit was not custodial interrogation, defendant's voluntary statement was admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings. State v. Hockings, 86 W (2d) 709, 273 NW (2d) 339 (1979).
Confession after 28-hour post-arrest detention was admissible. Wagner v. State, 89 W (2d) 70, 277 NW (2d) 849 (1979).
Immunity for compelled testimony contrary to Fifth Amendment privilege extends to juvenile court proceeding. State v. J.H.S. 90 W (2d) 613, 280 NW (2d) 356 (Ct. App. 1979).
