Inmate in administrative confinement has state-created interest protected by due process in inmate's eventual return to general prison population. State ex rel. Irby v. Israel, 100 W (2d) 411, 302 NW (2d) 517 (Ct. App. 1981).
Discussion of factors which court should consider when defendant requests to be tried after trial of codefendant in order to secure testimony of codefendant. State v. Anastas, 107 W (2d) 270, 320 NW (2d) 15 (Ct. App. 1982).
Revocation of probation was denial of due process by lack of notice of total extent and nature of alleged violations of probation. State ex rel. Thompson v. Riveland, 109 W (2d) 580, 326 NW (2d) 768 (1982).
Continued questioning after accused mentioned word "attorney" was prejudicial error. Harmless error analysis discussed. State v. Billings, 110 W (2d) 661, 329 NW (2d) 192 (1983).
Due process requires state to preserve evidence which (1) possesses exculpatory value apparent to custodian and (2) is of such nature that defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. State v. Oinas, 125 W (2d) 487, 373 NW (2d) 463 (Ct. App. 1985).
Where 2 statutes have identical criminal elements but different penalties, state does not deny equal protection or due process by charging defendants with the more serious crime. State v. Cissel, 127 W (2d) 205, 378 NW (2d) 691 (1985).
If state shows that delay in charging offense committed by adult defendant while still a juvenile was not with manipulative intent, due process does not require dismissal. State v. Montgomery, 148 W (2d) 593, 436 NW (2d) 303 (1989).
Lineup and in-court identification of defendant may be suppressed as fruit of illegal arrest under appropriate circumstances. State v. Walker, 154 W (2d) 158, 453 NW (2d) 127 (1990).
Comment during closing argument on defendant's courtroom demeanor where evidence of the demeanor was adduced during trial does not violate Fifth Amendment rights. State v. Norwood, 161 W (2d) 676, 468 NW (2d) 741 (Ct. App. 1991).
Evidence favorable to defendant must be disclosed if there is a "reasonable probability" that disclosure would have resulted in different trial outcome. State v. Garrity, 161 W (2d) 842, 469 NW (2d) 219 (Ct. App. 1991).
Where prior convictions are used to enhance minimum penalty, collateral attack of prior convictions must be allowed. State v. Baker, 165 W (2d) 42, 477 NW (2d) 292 (Ct. App. 1991).
Defense of outrageous governmental conduct may arise where the government violates a specific constitutional right and was itself so enmeshed in the criminal activity that prosecution of the defendant would be repugnant to the criminal justice system. State v. Hyndman, 170 W (2d) 198, 488 NW (2d) 111 (Ct. App. 1992).
Where the argument of the defense invited and provoked an otherwise improper remark of the prosecutor, the question is whether, taken in context, the "invited remark" unfairly prejudiced the defendant. State v. Wolff, 171 W (2d) 161, 491 NW (2d) 498 (Ct. App. 1992).
Due process is not violated when a burden of production is placed on a defendant to come forward with some evidence of a negative defense. State v. Pettit, 171 W (2d) 627, 492 NW (2d) 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
To sustain a conviction when alternative methods of proof resting upon different evidentiary facts are presented to the jury the evidence must be sufficient to convict beyond a reasonable doubt upon both of the alternative modes of proof. State v. Chambers, 173 W (2d) 237, 496 NW (2d) 191 (Ct. App. 1992).
Due process rights of a probationer at a hearing to modify probation enumerated. State v. Hayes, 173 W (2d) 439, 496 NW (2d) 645 (Ct. App. 1992).
The interval between an arrest and an initial appearance is never unreasonable where the arrested suspect is already in the lawful physical custody of the state. State v. Harris, 174 W (2d) 367, 497 NW (2d) 742 (Ct. App. 1993).
The admissibility of an out-of-court identification rests on whether the procedure was impermissibly suggestive and whether under all the circumstances the identification was reliable despite any suggestiveness; that another procedure might have been better does not render the identification inadmissible. State v. Ledger, 175 W (2d) 116, 499 NW (2d) 199 (Ct. App. 1993).
A defendant has a fundamental right to testify in his or her own behalf; waiver of the right must be supported by a record of a knowing and voluntary waiver. State v. Wilson, 179 W (2d) 660, 508 NW (2d) 44 (Ct. App. 1993).
An executory plea bargain is without constitutional significance and a defendant has no right to require the performance of an executory agreement, but upon entry of a plea due process requires the defendant's expectations to be fulfilled. State v. Wills, 187 W (2d) 528, 523 NW (2d) 569 (Ct. App. 1994).
The good or bad faith of police in destroying apparently exculpatory evidence is irrelevant, but in absence of bad faith, destruction of evidence which only provides an avenue of investigation does not violate due process protections. State v. Greenwold, 181 W (2d) 881, 512 NW (2d) 237 (Ct. App. 1994). Bad faith can only be shown if the officers were aware of the potentially exculpatory value of evidence they fail to preserve, and the officers must have acted with animus or made a conscious effort to suppress the evidence. State v. Greenwold, 189 W (2d) 59, 525 NW (2d) 294 (Ct. App. 1994).
A prosecutor's closing argument is impermissible where it goes beyond reasoning drawn from the evidence and suggests that the verdict should be arrived at by considering other factors. Substantially misstating the law and appearing to speak for the trial court was improper and required court intervention in the absence of an objection. State v. Neuser, 191 W (2d) 131, 528 NW (2d) 49 (Ct. App. 1995).
Denial of a change of venue for local prejudice solely because the offense is a misdemeanor is unconstitutional. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 US 505.
The retention of 10% of a partial bail deposit, with no penalty for release on recognizance or where full bail is given, does not violate equal protection requirements. Schilb v. Kuebel, 403 US 357.
Defendant convicted of selling heroin supplied by undercover police was not entrapped. Hampton v. United States, 425 US 484.
Prisons must provide inmates with law library or legal advisers. Bounds v. Smith, 430 US 817.
Due process was not denied when prosecutor carried out threat to reindict defendant on more serious charge if defendant did not plead guilty to original charge. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357 (1978).
Plaintiff was not deprived of liberty without due process of law when arrested and detained pursuant to lawful warrant, even though police mistook identity of plaintiff. Baker v. McCollan, 443 US 137 (1979).
Sentencing judge properly considered defendant's refusal to cooperate with police by naming co-conspirators. Roberts v. United States, 445 US 552 (1980).
Federal constitution does not prohibit electronic media coverage of trial over defendant's objections. Chandler v. Florida, 449 US 560 (1981).
Due process does not require police to preserve breath samples in order to introduce breath-analysis test results at trial. California v. Trombetta, 467 US 479 (1984).
After retrial and conviction following defendant's successful appeal, sentencing authority may justify increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to original sentencing. Wasman v. U.S., 468 US 559 (1984).
Where indigent defendant's sanity at time of murder was seriously in question, due process required access to psychiatrist and assistance necessary to prepare effective defense based on mental condition. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (1985).
Prosecutor's use of defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of defendant's sanity violated due process clause. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 US 284 (1986).
Due process wasn't violated when trial judge imposed longer sentence on retrial. Texas v. McCullough, 475 US 134 (1986).
Coercive police activity is necessary predicate to finding that confession isn't "voluntary" within meaning of due process clause. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157 (1986).
Defendant who denies elements of offense is entitled to entrapment instruction as long as there is sufficient evidence from which jury could find entrapment. Mathews v. United States, 485 US 58 (1988).
Unless defendant shows bad faith on part of law enforcement, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not violate due process. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 US 51, 102 LEd 2d 281 (1988).
Revocation of probation without a hearing is a denial of due process. Hahn v. Burke, 430 F (2d) 100.
Pretrial publicity; the Milwaukee 14. 1970 WLR 209.
Due process; revocation of a juvenile's parole. Sarosiek, 1973 WLR 954.
HABEAS CORPUS AND BAIL
Habeas corpus is a proper remedy with which to challenge the personal jurisdiction of a trial court over a criminal defendant and to challenge a ruling on motion to suppress evidence where constitutional issues are involved. State ex rel. Warrender v. Kenosha County Ct. 67 W (2d) 333, 227 NW (2d) 450.
Scope of inquiry in extradition habeas corpus cases discussed. State v. Ritter 74 W (2d) 227, 246 NW (2d) 552.
Relief under habeas corpus is not limited to release of person confined. State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 W (2d) 276, 249 NW (2d) 573.
Application of bail posted by third parties to defendant's fines was not unconstitutional. State v. Iglesias, 185 W (2d) 118, 517 NW (2d) 175 (1994).
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND CONFESSION
Granting a witness immunity and ordering him to answer questions does not violate his constitutional rights. State v. Blake, 46 W (2d) 386, 175 NW (2d) 210.
A hearing to determine the voluntariness of a confession is not necessary where a defendant knowingly fails to object to the evidence for purposes of trial strategy. Police officers need not stop all questioning after defendant requests an attorney, since a defendant can change his mind and volunteer a statement. Sharlow v. State, 47 W (2d) 259, 177 NW (2d) 88.
Admission of evidence of spending of money after a burglary is not unconstitutional as requiring a defendant to testify against himself in order to rebut it. State v. Heidelbach, 49 W (2d) 350, 182 NW (2d) 497.
Where defendant volunteered an incriminatory statement outside the presence of retained counsel the statement is admissible. State v. Chabonian, 50 W (2d) 574, 185 NW (2d) 289.
There is no requirement that a hearing as to the voluntariness of a confession be separated into 2 stages, i.e., as to the circumstances leading up to it and then as to its content. Content of Miranda warning discussed. Bohachef v. State, 50 W (2d) 694, 185 NW (2d) 339.
Argument by the district attorney that certain evidence was uncontroverted does not amount to a comment on defendant's failure to testify. Bies v. State, 53 W (2d) 322, 193 NW (2d) 46.
Questions of investigational versus custodial interrogation in relation to a confession discussed. Mikulovsky v. State, 54 W (2d) 699, 196 NW (2d) 748.
Where defendant, believing he was seriously wounded, began to tell what happened and was then given the Miranda warnings, his further continuation amounted to a waiver of his rights. He need not expressly state that he was waiving them, where the record shows he was conscious and alert and said he understood his rights. State v. Parker, 55 W (2d) 131, 197 NW (2d) 742.
The privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to the production of corporate records by their custodian, even though they may tend to incriminate him personally. State v. Balistrieri, 55 W (2d) 513, 201 NW (2d) 18.
A defendant who waived counsel and who agreed to sign a confession admitting 18 burglaries in return for an agreement that he would be prosecuted for only one, cannot claim that the confession was improperly induced. The state has the burden of showing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. Pontow v. State, 58 W (2d) 135, 205 NW (2d) 775.
Administration of a blood or breathalyzer test does not violate defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Driver, 59 W (2d) 35, 207 NW (2d) 850.
Factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary discussed. State v. Wallace, 59 W (2d) 66, 207 NW (2d) 855.
A voluntary confession is not rendered inadmissible although the arrest was made outside the statutory jurisdictional limits of the arresting officer. State v. Ewald, 63 W (2d) 165, 216 NW (2d) 213.
While Miranda does require that, upon exercise of the defendant's 5th amendment privilege, the interrogation must cease, Miranda does not explicitly state that the defendant may not, after again being advised of his rights, be interrogated in the future. State v. Estrada, 63 W (2d) 476, 217 NW (2d) 359.
Requirements of claim of immunity discussed. State v. Hall, 65 W (2d) 18, 221 NW (2d) 806.
The validity of a juvenile confession is determined by an analysis of the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession, and the presence of parent, guardian or attorney is not an absolute requirement for the juvenile to validly waive right to remain silent but only one of the factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the confession. Theriault v. State, 66 W (2d) 33, 223 NW (2d) 850.
A written confession is admissible in evidence although it is not signed by the defendant, so long as the defendant has read the statement and adopted it as his own. Kutchera v. State, 69 W (2d) 534, 230 NW (2d) 750.
Where defendant claimed to understand Miranda rights but agreed to talk to police without counsel because of stated inability to afford a lawyer, further questioning by police was improper and resulting confession was inadmissible. Micale v. State, 76 W (2d) 370, 251 NW (2d) 458.
State may compel probationer's testimony in revocation proceeding if probationer is first advised that such testimony will be inadmissible in criminal proceedings arising out of alleged probation violation, except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal. State v. Evans, 77 W (2d) 225, 252 NW (2d) 664.
Volunteered confession while in custody and prior to Miranda warning held admissible despite earlier inadmissible statement in response to custodial interrogation. LaTender v. State, 77 W (2d) 383, 253 NW (2d) 221.
No restrictions of the 4th and 5th amendments preclude enforcement of an order for handwriting exemplars directed by presiding judge in John Doe proceeding. State v. Doe, 78 W (2d) 161, 254 NW (2d) 210.
Due process does not require that a John Doe witness be advised of the nature of the proceeding or that the witness is a "target" of the investigation. Ryan v. State, 79 W (2d) 83, 255 NW (2d) 910.
Defendant's confession was admissible although obtained through custodial interrogation following defendant's request for a lawyer. Leach v. State, 83 W (2d) 199, 265 NW (2d) 495 (1978).
Where "conversational" visit was not custodial interrogation, defendant's voluntary statement was admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings. State v. Hockings, 86 W (2d) 709, 273 NW (2d) 339 (1979).
Confession after 28-hour post-arrest detention was admissible. Wagner v. State, 89 W (2d) 70, 277 NW (2d) 849 (1979).
Immunity for compelled testimony contrary to Fifth Amendment privilege extends to juvenile court proceeding. State v. J.H.S. 90 W (2d) 613, 280 NW (2d) 356 (Ct. App. 1979).
Defendant's voluntary statements were admissible for impeachment even though they were obtained in violation of Miranda. State v. Mendoza, 96 W (2d) 106, 291 NW (2d) 478 (1980).
Where accused cut off initial interrogation but was interrogated by another officer 9 minutes later following fresh Miranda warning, confession was admissible. State v. Shaffer, 96 W (2d) 531, 292 NW (2d) 370 (Ct. App. 1980).
By testifying as to his actions on day murder was committed, defendant waived self-incrimination privilege on cross-examination as to previous actions, related to the murder, which were subject of pending prosecution. Neely v. State, 97 W (2d) 38, 292 NW (2d) 859 (1980).
Miranda warnings were unnecessary where officer entered defendant's home, in belief that defendant might have killed wife 4 days earlier, and asked "Where is your wife?". State v. Kraimer, 99 W (2d) 306, 298 NW (2d) 568 (1980).
Prosecutor's comment on failure of alibi witness to come forward with alibi story immediately did not infringe on defendant's right of silence. State v. Hoffman, 106 W (2d) 185, 316 NW (2d) 143 (Ct. App. 1982).
Defendant's silence both before and after Miranda warning may not be referred to at trial by prosecution. State v. Fencl, 109 W (2d) 224, 325 NW (2d) 703 (1982).
Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show physical manifestation of defendant driver's intoxication. State v. Haefer, 110 W (2d) 381, 328 NW (2d) 894 (Ct. App. 1982).
John Doe subpoena requiring production of income tax returns violated self-incrimination right. B. M. v. State, 113 W (2d) 183, 335 NW (2d) 420 (Ct. App. 1983).
Statement given police, without Miranda warnings, while accused was in emergency room, that accused was driver in fatal crash, was admissible. State v. Clappes, 117 W (2d) 277, 344 NW (2d) 141 (1984).
After guilty plea, privilege against self-incrimination continues at least until sentencing. State v. McConnohie, 121 W (2d) 57, 358 NW (2d) 256 (1984).
Where defendant does not testify but presents own argument to jury, prosecutor may caution jury that defendant's statements are not evidence. State v. Johnson, 121 W (2d) 237, 358 NW (2d) 824 (Ct. App. 1984).
Where relative of accused contacted police and asked if anything could be done to help accused, subsequent confession elicited from accused by relative was inadmissible. Court lists factors to consider in determining when civilian becomes agent of police. State v. Lee, 122 W (2d) 266, 362 NW (2d) 149 (1985).
Where police knew that suspect had asked wife to contact attorney and didn't inform suspect when that attorney arrived at police station, confession obtained after attorney's arrival was inadmissible. State v. Middleton, 135 W (2d) 297, 399 NW (2d) 917 (Ct. App. 1986).
Police had no duty to inform suspect during custodial interrogation that lawyer retained by suspect's family was present. State v. Hanson, 136 W (2d) 195, 401 NW (2d) 771 (1987).
Incriminating statement by intoxicated defendant undergoing medical treatment for painful injuries was voluntary since there was no affirmative police misconduct compelling defendant to answer police questioning. State v. Clappes, 136 W (2d) 222, 401 NW (2d) 759 (1987).
"Rescue doctrine" exception to Miranda rule discussed. State v. Kunkel, 137 W (2d) 172, 404 NW (2d) 69 (Ct. App. 1987).
