Administration of a blood or breathalyzer test does not violate defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Driver, 59 W (2d) 35, 207 NW (2d) 850.
Factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary discussed. State v. Wallace, 59 W (2d) 66, 207 NW (2d) 855.
A voluntary confession is not rendered inadmissible although the arrest was made outside the statutory jurisdictional limits of the arresting officer. State v. Ewald, 63 W (2d) 165, 216 NW (2d) 213.
While Miranda does require that, upon exercise of the defendant's 5th amendment privilege, the interrogation must cease, Miranda does not explicitly state that the defendant may not, after again being advised of his rights, be interrogated in the future. State v. Estrada, 63 W (2d) 476, 217 NW (2d) 359.
Requirements of claim of immunity discussed. State v. Hall, 65 W (2d) 18, 221 NW (2d) 806.
The validity of a juvenile confession is determined by an analysis of the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession, and the presence of parent, guardian or attorney is not an absolute requirement for the juvenile to validly waive right to remain silent but only one of the factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the confession. Theriault v. State, 66 W (2d) 33, 223 NW (2d) 850.
A written confession is admissible in evidence although it is not signed by the defendant, so long as the defendant has read the statement and adopted it as his own. Kutchera v. State, 69 W (2d) 534, 230 NW (2d) 750.
Where defendant claimed to understand Miranda rights but agreed to talk to police without counsel because of stated inability to afford a lawyer, further questioning by police was improper and resulting confession was inadmissible. Micale v. State, 76 W (2d) 370, 251 NW (2d) 458.
State may compel probationer's testimony in revocation proceeding if probationer is first advised that such testimony will be inadmissible in criminal proceedings arising out of alleged probation violation, except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal. State v. Evans, 77 W (2d) 225, 252 NW (2d) 664.
Volunteered confession while in custody and prior to Miranda warning held admissible despite earlier inadmissible statement in response to custodial interrogation. LaTender v. State, 77 W (2d) 383, 253 NW (2d) 221.
No restrictions of the 4th and 5th amendments preclude enforcement of an order for handwriting exemplars directed by presiding judge in John Doe proceeding. State v. Doe, 78 W (2d) 161, 254 NW (2d) 210.
Due process does not require that a John Doe witness be advised of the nature of the proceeding or that the witness is a "target" of the investigation. Ryan v. State, 79 W (2d) 83, 255 NW (2d) 910.
Defendant's confession was admissible although obtained through custodial interrogation following defendant's request for a lawyer. Leach v. State, 83 W (2d) 199, 265 NW (2d) 495 (1978).
Where "conversational" visit was not custodial interrogation, defendant's voluntary statement was admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings. State v. Hockings, 86 W (2d) 709, 273 NW (2d) 339 (1979).
Confession after 28-hour post-arrest detention was admissible. Wagner v. State, 89 W (2d) 70, 277 NW (2d) 849 (1979).
Immunity for compelled testimony contrary to Fifth Amendment privilege extends to juvenile court proceeding. State v. J.H.S. 90 W (2d) 613, 280 NW (2d) 356 (Ct. App. 1979).
Defendant's voluntary statements were admissible for impeachment even though they were obtained in violation of Miranda. State v. Mendoza, 96 W (2d) 106, 291 NW (2d) 478 (1980).
Where accused cut off initial interrogation but was interrogated by another officer 9 minutes later following fresh Miranda warning, confession was admissible. State v. Shaffer, 96 W (2d) 531, 292 NW (2d) 370 (Ct. App. 1980).
By testifying as to his actions on day murder was committed, defendant waived self-incrimination privilege on cross-examination as to previous actions, related to the murder, which were subject of pending prosecution. Neely v. State, 97 W (2d) 38, 292 NW (2d) 859 (1980).
Miranda warnings were unnecessary where officer entered defendant's home, in belief that defendant might have killed wife 4 days earlier, and asked "Where is your wife?". State v. Kraimer, 99 W (2d) 306, 298 NW (2d) 568 (1980).
Prosecutor's comment on failure of alibi witness to come forward with alibi story immediately did not infringe on defendant's right of silence. State v. Hoffman, 106 W (2d) 185, 316 NW (2d) 143 (Ct. App. 1982).
Defendant's silence both before and after Miranda warning may not be referred to at trial by prosecution. State v. Fencl, 109 W (2d) 224, 325 NW (2d) 703 (1982).
Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show physical manifestation of defendant driver's intoxication. State v. Haefer, 110 W (2d) 381, 328 NW (2d) 894 (Ct. App. 1982).
John Doe subpoena requiring production of income tax returns violated self-incrimination right. B. M. v. State, 113 W (2d) 183, 335 NW (2d) 420 (Ct. App. 1983).
Statement given police, without Miranda warnings, while accused was in emergency room, that accused was driver in fatal crash, was admissible. State v. Clappes, 117 W (2d) 277, 344 NW (2d) 141 (1984).
After guilty plea, privilege against self-incrimination continues at least until sentencing. State v. McConnohie, 121 W (2d) 57, 358 NW (2d) 256 (1984).
Where defendant does not testify but presents own argument to jury, prosecutor may caution jury that defendant's statements are not evidence. State v. Johnson, 121 W (2d) 237, 358 NW (2d) 824 (Ct. App. 1984).
Where relative of accused contacted police and asked if anything could be done to help accused, subsequent confession elicited from accused by relative was inadmissible. Court lists factors to consider in determining when civilian becomes agent of police. State v. Lee, 122 W (2d) 266, 362 NW (2d) 149 (1985).
Where police knew that suspect had asked wife to contact attorney and didn't inform suspect when that attorney arrived at police station, confession obtained after attorney's arrival was inadmissible. State v. Middleton, 135 W (2d) 297, 399 NW (2d) 917 (Ct. App. 1986).
Police had no duty to inform suspect during custodial interrogation that lawyer retained by suspect's family was present. State v. Hanson, 136 W (2d) 195, 401 NW (2d) 771 (1987).
Incriminating statement by intoxicated defendant undergoing medical treatment for painful injuries was voluntary since there was no affirmative police misconduct compelling defendant to answer police questioning. State v. Clappes, 136 W (2d) 222, 401 NW (2d) 759 (1987).
"Rescue doctrine" exception to Miranda rule discussed. State v. Kunkel, 137 W (2d) 172, 404 NW (2d) 69 (Ct. App. 1987).
Probationer's answers to probation agent's questions are "compelled" and may not be used for any purpose in criminal trial. State v. Thompson, 142 W (2d) 821, 419 NW (2d) 564 (Ct. App. 1987).
Prosecution may comment on accused's pre-Miranda silence when accused elects to testify on own behalf. State v. Sorenson, 143 W (2d) 226, 421 NW (2d) 77 (1988).
"Functional equivalent" of direct custodial interrogation discussed. State v. Cunningham, 144 W (2d) 272, 423 NW (2d) 862 (1988).
Admission of involuntary or coerced confession is subject to harmless error test. State v. Childs, 146 W (2d) 116, 430 NW (2d) 353 (Ct. App. 1988).
Use of Goodchild testimony to impeach defendant's trial testimony does not violate privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Schultz, 152 W (2d) 408, 448 NW (2d) 424 (1989).
Unconstitutionally obtained confession may be admitted and serve as sole basis for bindover at preliminary examination. State v. Moats, 156 W (2d) 74, 457 W (2d) 299 (1990).
Where psychiatrist did not comply with Miranda, constitution does not require exclusion of results of interview with defendant from competency phase of trial. State v. Lindh, 161 W (2d) 324, 468 NW (2d) 168 (1991).
Miranda does not require warning suspect that he has the right to stop answering questions. State v. Mitchell, 167 W (2d) 672, 482 NW (2d) 364 (1992).
Miranda safeguards are not required where a suspect is simply in custody, but are where the suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. State v. Coulthard, 171 W (2d) 573, 492 NW (2d) 329 (Ct. App. 1992).
A criminal defendant may be compelled to submit a voice sample consisting of specific words for purposes of identification. The words do not require a revelation of the contents of the mind to impart an admission of or evidence of guilt. Comment on a refusal to give a sample does not violate the right against self-incrimination. State v. Hubanks, 173 W (2d) 1, 496 NW (2d) 96 (Ct. App. 1992).
Miranda safeguards are applicable to questions during booking concerning name and residence where the questions relate to an element of the crime. State v. Stevens, 173 W (2d) 290, 496 NW (2d) 201 (Ct. App. 1992).
A waiver of Miranda rights needs to be made knowingly and intelligently as well as voluntarily; knowing and intelligent waiver must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence as determined from an objective assessment of the circumstances. State v. Lee, 175 W (2d) 348, 499 NW (2d) 258 (Ct. App. 1993).
If police do not use coercive tactics, that a defendant is undergoing medical treatment or experiencing pain is not determinative on the issue of voluntariness. State v. Schambow, 176 W (2d) 286, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
When defendant pleads guilty then appeals the denial of a suppression motion under s. 971.31 (10), the harmless error rule may not be applied where a motion to suppress was erroneously denied. State v. Pounds, 176 W (2d) 315, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
Miranda protections come into play when a reasonable person in the defendant's position would consider himself to be in custody. State v. Pounds, 176 W (2d) 315, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
Failure to give Miranda warnings during a telephone conversation initiated to encourage the defendant's surrender following an armed robbery police suspected was committed by the defendant did not require suppression of admissions made to police. State v. Stearns, 178 W (2d) 845, 506 NW (2d) 165 (Ct. App. 1993).
Defendant's intoxication for purposes of motor vehicle statutes did not per se demonstrate an inability to knowingly waive Miranda rights. State v. Beaver, 181 W (2d) 959, 512 NW (2d) 254 (Ct. App. 1994).
Suspect's question to interrogator, ``Do you think I need an attorney?", was an equivocal question insufficient to invoke the right to counsel. Such an equivocal statement requires the police to cease all interrogation except to attempt to clarify the suspect's desire for counsel. State v. Walkowiak, 183 W (2d) 478, 515 NW (2d) 863 (1994). But see the note to Davis v. United States, 129 LEd 2d 362 below. See also State v. Long, 190 W (2d) 387, 526 NW (2d) 826 (Ct. App. 1994).
Coercive police activity is a predicate to establishing involuntariness but does not itself establish involuntariness. Officer dissatisfaction with a defendant's answers and statements by the officer that cooperation would benefit the defendant is not coercion without a promise of leniency. State v. Deets, 187 W (2d) 629, 523 NW (2d) 180 (Ct. App. 1994).
A refusal to perform a field sobriety test is not testimony and not protected by the constitution. Refusal to submit to a field sobriety test was properly admitted as evidence to determine probable cause for arrest for intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle. State v. Babbit, 188 W (2d) 349, 525 NW (2d) 102 (Ct. App. 1994).
Edwards v. Arizona requires interrogation to cease once a suspect requests an attorney. It does not prohibit questions designed to accommodate the request. When in response to being asked his attorney's name a suspect gave a name and then stated that the person was not an attorney, the interrogating officer was not prevented from continuing interrogation. State v. Lagar, 190 W (2d) 423, 526 NW (2d) 836 (Ct. App. 1994).
A forced confession as a condition of probation does not violate the right against self-incrimination; the constitution protects against the use of confessions in subsequent criminal prosecutions but does not protect against the use of such statements in a revocation proceeding. State v. Carrizales, 191 W (2d) 85, 528 NW (2d) 29 (Ct. App. 1995).
A suspect's reference to an attorney who had represented or is presently representing the suspect in another matter is not a request for counsel requiring the cessation of questioning. State v. Jones, 192 W (2d) 78, 532 NW (2d) 79 (1995).
The right to counsel and right to remain silent are the defendant's. An attorney not requested by the defendant could not compel the police to end questioning by stating that no questioning was to take place outside his presence. State v. Jones, 192 W (2d) 78, 532 NW (2d) 79 (1995).
Once given, it is not necessary to repeat the Miranda warnings during an investigation of the same person for the same crime. State v. Jones, 192 W (2d) 78, 532 NW (2d) 79 (1995).
The privilege against self-incrimination extends beyond sentencing as long as a defendant has a real fear of further incrimination, as where an appeal is pending, before an appeal as of right or plea withdrawal has expired, or where the defendant intends or is in the process of moving for sentence modification and shows a reasonable chance of success. State v. Marks, 194 W (2d) 79, 533 NW (2d) 730 (1995).
A defendant may selectively waive Miranda rights. Refusal to answer specific questions does not assert an overall right to to silence, if there is an unequivocal expression of selective invocation. State v. Wright, 196 W (2d) 149, 537 NW (2d) 134 (Ct. App. 1995).
Whether incriminating statements made following an illegal arrest are admissible depends on whether the statements were obtained by means sufficiently attenuated from the illegal act. The factors to be considered are voluntariness, proximity of conduct to the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances and flagrancy of the misconduct. State v. Tobias, 196 W (2d) 537, 538 NW (2d) 843 (Ct. App. 1995).
A trial court must consider a defendant's language in determining if under the totality of the circumstances the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights. State v. Santiago, 198 W (2d) 82, 542 NW (2d) 466 (Ct. App. 1995).
The right to counsel under Miranda must be personally invoked by the suspect. Simply retaining counsel is not an unequivocal statement that the suspect wishes to deal with the police only in the presence of counsel. State v. Coerper, 199 W (2d) 216, 544 NW (2d) 423 (1996).
Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel judicial inquiry into voluntariness is beside the point. Physical evidence derived from statements made in violation of the asserted right must be suppressed. However, evidence admitted in violation of this rule is subject to a harmless error analysis. State v. Harris, 199 W (2d) 227, 544 NW (2d) 545 (1996).
Prosecution comments on a defendant's claimed lack of memory and subsequent silence during a police interview conducted shortly after the incident when the defendant testified at length at trial on the same subject did not violate the right against self-incrimination where the comments were intended to impeach the defendant's testimony and not to ask the jury to infer guilt from the defendant's silence. State v. Wulff, 200 W (2d) 318, 546 NW (2d) 522 (Ct. App. 1996).
A suspect's declaration that he did not wish to speak to a specific police officer is not an invocation of the right to remain silent. Police adoption of "good cop/bad cop" roles did not render an interrogation coercive and its results inadmissible. State v. Owen, 202 W (2d) 621, 551 NW (2d) 50 (Ct. App. 1996).
Statement made after Miranda warnings but before contact with requested counsel is admissible for impeachment. Oregon v. Hass, 420 US 714.
Witness who refuses to testify on self-incrimination grounds after judge grants immunity may summarily be found in criminal contempt. United States v. Wilson, 421 US 309.
Use of defendant's income tax returns to prove gambling charge did not deny self-incrimination protection. Garner v. United States, 424 US 648.
Accused's silence during police interrogation lacked probative value for impeachment of alibi at trial. United States v. Hale, 422 US 171. See: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610.
Voluntary interview at police station was not "custodial interrogation". Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492.
Instruction given to jury over defense objection not to draw adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify did not violate self-incrimination right. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 US 333 (1978).
While statements made by defendant in circumstances violating Miranda protections are admissible for impeachment if their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards, any criminal trial use against defendant of involuntary statements is denial of due process. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385 (1978).
Testimony before grand jury under grant of immunity could not constitutionally be used for impeachment purposes in later criminal trial. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 US 450 (1979).
Explicit statement of waiver is not necessary to support finding that defendant waived Miranda rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US 369 (1979).
Voluntary confession obtained during custodial interrogation following illegal arrest was inadmissible. Dunaway v. New York, 442 US 200 (1979).
Witness compelled by grant of immunity to testify despite claim of self-incrimination privilege was property prosecuted for perjured testimony. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 US 115 (1980).
Officer's comment that child might find loaded gun was not functional equivalent of questioning in violation of Miranda rights. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291 (1980).
Right of self-incrimination was not violated when defendant who testifies in own defense is impeached by use of defendant's prearrest silence. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 US 231 (1980).
Upon defendant's request, judge must instruct jury not to infer guilt from defendant's failure to testify. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 US 288 (1981).
Accused who requests counsel may not be interrogated without counsel unless accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981).
Where for impeachment purposes prosecution cross-examined defendant as to postarrest silence before defendant received Miranda warnings, due process was not violated. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 US 603 (1982).
Where prosecutor improperly commented to jury that defendants did not challenge certain accusations against them, court erred in reversing conviction on appeal without determining whether error was harmless. U.S. v. Hasting, 461 US 499 (1983).
Probationer under obligation to appear before probation officer and answer questions truthfully was not entitled to Miranda warnings; confession was, therefore, admissible. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 US 420 (1984).
Court adopts "inevitable discovery" exception to exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431 (1984).
Court adopts "public safety" exception to Miranda rule. Where accused, known to have had gun, did not have gun at time of arrest in supermarket, officer properly asked where the gun was before giving Miranda warnings. New York v. Quarles, 467 US 649 (1984).
Person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to Miranda warnings regardless of nature or severity of offense. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984).
Suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning may later waive rights and confess after Miranda warnings are given. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298 (1985).
Police's failure to inform defendant that third party had retained counsel didn't invalidate defendant's waiver of Miranda rights. Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986).
Where no evidence is present suggesting that police officers sent suspect's wife in to see him with the hope of obtaining incriminating information, no "interrogation" was undertaken even though detective was present and tape recorded conversation. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 US 520 (1987).
