CONSENT AND STANDING

The fact that consent to the search of a car was given while defendant was in custody does not establish involuntariness. It is not improper for the police to tell defendant that if a search did not produce stolen goods he would be released. Gautreaux v. State, 52 W (2d) 489, 190 NW (2d) 542.

Where police opened a package in possession of an express company without a warrant or the consent of the addressee, persons later arrested in possession of the package, other than the addressee, have no standing to challenge the evidence on the ground of illegal search. Defendants would have to establish a possessory interest in the package at the time of the search. State v. Christel, 61 W (2d) 143, 211 NW (2d) 801.

Defendant qualified as a person aggrieved under the Jones "automatic" standing doctrine to challenge admissibility of evidence taken from his wife, it appearing that he and his wife were in each other's presence in his automobile when arrested for the same crime; a search of her person at that time would have been at a place where defendant had a legitimate right to be; the object of the search, incident to the arrest for robbery could only be for weapons and incriminating evidence against him and his wife; and this situation carried over into a custodial search of the wife which was thereafter conducted at the police station. State v. Mabra, 61 W (2d) 613, 213 NW (2d) 545.

Sons of murdered property owner did not as such have authority to consent to search of premises. Kelly v. State, 75 W (2d) 303, 249 NW (2d) 800.

Person living in tent in yard of house had no authority to grant consent to warrantless search of house. Police officer's observation through a window of cigarette being passed in the house did not constitute probable cause for warrantless search of house for marijuana. "Plain view" doctrine discussed. State v. McGovern, 77 W (2d) 203, 252 NW (2d) 365.

Under facts of case, estranged wife had no authority to consent to warrantless search of property owned jointly with defendant husband. State v. Verhagen, 86 W (2d) 262, 272 NW (2d) 105 (Ct. App. 1978).

Paramour whose access to premises was at whim of lover had no legitimate expectation of privacy necessitating search warrant. State v. Fillyaw, 104 W (2d) 700, 312 NW (2d) 795 (1981).

Impoundment and subsequent warrantless inventory search of car, including locked glove box, were not unconstitutional. Automatic standing discussed. State v. Callaway, 106 W (2d) 503, 317 NW (2d) 428 (1982).

Defendant had no standing to contest legality of search of van because of lack of dominion and control over van. State v. Wisurmerski, 106 W (2d) 722, 317 NW (2d) 484 (1982).

Where defendant's mother admitted police into home to talk to her son, subsequent arrest of son was valid. State v. Rodgers, 119 W (2d) 102, 349 NW (2d) 453 (1984).

Where police reentered home to recreate crime 45 hours after consent to enter, evidence seized was properly suppressed. State v. Douglas, 123 W (2d) 13, 365 NW (2d) 580 (1985).

A person who borrows a car with the owner's permission has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. State v. Dixon, 177 W (2d) 461, 501 NW (2d) 442 (1993).

In a consent search, voluntariness and freedom from coercion, not fully informed consent, must be shown; language and cultural background are relevant in determining whether the police took advantage in gaining consent. State v. Xiong, 178 W (2d) 525, 504 NW (2d) 428 (Ct. App. 1993).

All occupants of a vehicle in a police-initiated stop are seized and have standing to challenge the the lawfulness of the seizure. To establish lawfulness, the state must establish only that the police possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize someone in the vehicle. State v. Harris, 206 W (2d) 242, 557 NW (2d) 247 (1996).

A defendant's consent to a search obtained following illegal police activity may be admissible. The court must consider the temporal proximity of the misconduct to the statements by the defendant, the presence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct. State v. Phillips, 209 W (2d) 559, 563 NW (2d) 573 (Ct. App. 1997).

Consent to a search must be knowledgeably and voluntarily given. When consent is not requested, it cannot be knowledgeably and voluntarily given. State v. Kiekhefer, 212 W (2d) 460, 569 NW (2d) 316 (Ct. App. 1997).

Passengers had no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in glove box or under seat of car. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128 (1978).

Airport stop of person fitting drug courier profile was reasonable and subsequent search was pursuant to voluntary consent. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 US 544 (1980).

Court may not suppress otherwise admissible evidence on ground that it was seized unlawfully from 3rd party not before court. United States v. Payner, 447 US 727 (1980).

Defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim benefits of exclusionary rule if their own 4th amendment rights have in fact been violated. United States v. Salvucci, 448 US 83 (1980).

Where police entered 3rd party's house to execute arrest warrant, evidence discovered during search was inadmissible. Steagald v. United States, 451 US 204 (1981).

Prisoner has no constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 US 517 (1984).

State need not prove that defendant consenting to search knew of right to withhold consent. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 US 1 (1984).

Warrantless entry to premises is permitted under fourth amendment where entry is based upon third party consent and where officers reasonably believed third party to possess authority to consent. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 US 177, 111 LEd 2d 148 (1990).

A defendant can urge suppression of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional protections only if that defendant's rights were violated. U.S. v. Padilla, 508 US 954, 123 LEd 2d 635 (1993).

The 4th amendment does not require that a seized person must be advised that he is free to go before his consent to a search can be recognized as voluntary. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 US 33, 136 LEd 2d 347 (1996).

As a matter of federal law, appellant cannot assert an alleged violation of his wife's Fourth Amendment rights as a basis for suppression, at his trial, of evidence taken from his wife. Mabra v. Gray, 518 F (2d) 512.

Zurcher: third party searches and freedom of the press. Cantrell. 62 MLR 35 (1978).

State v. Stevens: Consent by deception in the context of garbage searches. 1987 WLR 191.

PROBABLE CAUSE AND WARRANTS

Probable cause meeting constitutional requirements for issuance of the search warrant of defendant's premises was not established by testimony of a police officer that a youth found in possession of amphetamines informed the officer that a shipment of marijuana was being delivered to defendant's premises, where it was established that the officer had had no previous dealings with the informant and could not personally attest to the informant's reliability; hence the search warrant was invalid. State ex rel. Furlong v. Waukesha County Court, 47 W (2d) 515, 177 NW (2d) 333.

Probable cause for arrest without a warrant under the 4th amendment of the U.S. constitution is applicable in this state. Tests for probable cause discussed. A citizen informer is not subject to the requirement that the officer show prior reliability of his informant. State v. Paszek, 50 W (2d) 619, 184 NW (2d) 836.

Probable cause must exist prior to a search of body orifices. State v. Guy, 55 W (2d) 83, 197 NW (2d) 774.

An affidavit reciting that a reliable informant had reported seeing a large quantity of heroin in defendant's apartment is sufficient to support a search warrant. State v. Mansfield, 55 W (2d) 274, 198 NW (2d) 634.

Unauthorized out-of-court disclosures of private marital communications may not be used in a proceeding to obtain a search warrant. Muetze v. State, 73 W (2d) 117, 243 NW (2d) 393.

Search warrant designating entire farmhouse occupied by accused and "other persons unknown" was not invalid despite multiple occupancy. State v. Suits, 73 W (2d) 352, 243 NW (2d) 206.

Warrant authorizing search of "entire first-floor premises" encompassed balcony room which was part and parcel of first floor. Rainey v. State, 74 W (2d) 189, 246 NW (2d) 529.

Search warrant obtained on affidavit containing misrepresentations by police officer as to reliability of unnamed informant is invalid. Where search was conducted within reasonable time following arrest based on probable cause, search will be sustained even though it was conducted in execution of invalid warrant. Schmidt v. State, 77 W (2d) 370, 253 NW (2d) 204.

Affidavits for search warrants need not be drafted with technical specificity nor demonstrate quantum of probable cause required in a preliminary examination; the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence are permissible, and doubtful or marginal cases should be resolved by the preference to be accorded to warrants. State v. Starke, 81 W (2d) 399, 260 NW (2d) 739.

Probable cause for arrest on charge of homicide by intoxicated use of motor vehicle justified taking blood sample without search warrant or arrest. State v. Bentley, 92 W (2d) 860, 286 NW (2d) 153 (Ct. App. 1979).

Defect in portion of search warrant did not invalidate entire search warrant. State v. Noll, 116 W (2d) 443, 343 NW (2d) 391 (1984).

"No knock" warrant to search drug dealer's house was invalid because of lack of specific information to indicate evidence would be destroyed otherwise. State v. Cleveland, 118 W (2d) 615, 348 NW (2d) 512 (1984).

At "Franks hearing" challenging veracity of statement supporting search warrant, defendant must prove that falsehood was intentional or with reckless disregard for truth and that false statement was necessary to finding probable cause. State v. Anderson, 138 W (2d) 451, 406 NW (2d) 398 (1987).

Under "independent source doctrine" court examines whether agent would have sought warrant had it not been for illegal entry, and if information obtained during entry affected decision to issue warrant. State v. Lange, 158 W (2d) 609, 463 W (2d) 390 (Ct. App. 1990).

Status check of driver's license arising out of police exercise of community care taker function is not a stop and does not require reasonable suspicion of crime. State v. Ellenbecker, 159 W (2d) 91, 464 NW (2d) 427 (Ct. App. 1990).

Seizure of package delivered to third party for limited investigative detention requires reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. State v. Gordon, 159 W (2d) 335, 464 NW (2d) 91 (Ct. App. 1990).

Evidentiary search of person not named in search warrant but present during search of residence reasonably suspected of being drug house, held to be reasonable. State v. Jeter, 160 W (2d) 333, 466 NW (2d) 211 (Ct. App. 1991).

Discussion of "staleness" as relates to information supporting search warrant. State v. Ehnert, 160 W (2d) 464, 466 NW (2d) 237 (Ct. App. 1991).

Warrant for seizure of film authorized seizure, removal and development of undeveloped film. State v. Petrone, 161 W (2d) 530, 468 NW (2d) 676 (1991).

Knowledge that dealer operating ongoing drug business was armed in his residence satisfied requirements for "no knock" search; reasonable belief that weapon will be used need not be shown. State v. Watkinson, 161 W (2d) 750, 468 NW (2d) 763 (Ct. App. 1991), State v. Williams, 168 W (2d) 970, 485 NW(2d) 42 (1992).

Warrantless search of apartment for evidence of occupancy where police reasonably believed tenant had vacated and occupants were not legitimately on premises was not unreasonable; defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment or in property kept there. State v. Whitrock, 161 W (2d) 960, 468 NW (2d) 696 (1991).

Informant need not have a "track record" established with police if totality of the circumstances indicate probable cause for search exists. State v. Hanson, 163 W (2d) 420, 471 NW (2d) 301 (Ct. App. 1991).

Severability rule under Noll applies where description of premises to be searched is over broad. State v. Marten, 165 W (2d) 70, 477 NW (2d) 304 (Ct. App. 1991).

If old information contributes to an inference that probable cause exists at the time of the application for a warrant, its age is no taint. State v. Moley, 171 W (2d) 207, 490 NW (2d) 764 (Ct. App. 1992).

Police serving a warrant are not required to ring a doorbell before forcing entry. State v. Greene, 172 W (2d) 43, 491 NW (2d) 181 (Ct. App. 1992).

Use of ruse to gain entry in execution of warrant where "no-knock" was not authorized does not violate announcement rule; special authorization is not required for the use of a ruse. State v. Moss, 172 W (2d) 110, 492 NW (2d) 627 (1992).

Discussion of period police must wait after announcing presence before making forcible entry to execute search warrant where "no knock" is not authorized. State v. Stevens, 173 W (2d) 290, 496 NW (2d) 201 (Ct. App. 1992).

Failure to comply with announcement rule was allowable where officers reasonably believed further announcement was futile. State v. Berry, 174 W (2d) 28, 496 NW (2d) 746 (Ct. App. 1993).

Compliance with announcement rule must be determined at time of execution: while advance request for "no-knock" authority is preferable if police at time of execution have grounds, failure to seek authorization is not fatal. State v. Kerr, 174 W (2d) 55, 496 NW (2d) 742 (Ct. App. 1993).

The incorrect identification of a building's address in the warrant did not render the resulting search unreasonable when the search made was of the building identified by the informant which was otherwise correctly identified in the warrant. State v. Nicholson, 174 W (2d) 542, 497 NW (2d) 791 (Ct. App. 1993).

Federal magistrate's decision on fourth amendment suppression hearing is not binding on state trial court where the state was not a party nor in privity with a party to the federal action and the federal case did not review errors in the proceeding. State v. Mechtel, 176 W (2d) 87, 499 NW (2d) 662 (1993).

The use of an infrared sensing device to detect heat emanating from a residence does not constitute a search within the meaning of the proscription of unlawful searches. State v. McKee, 181 W (2d) 354, 510 NW (2d) 807 (Ct. App. 1993).

An investigatory stop of an automobile based solely on the fact that the vehicle bore "license applied for" plates, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, was justified by reasonable suspicion. State v. Griffin, 183 W (2d) 327, 515 NW (2d) 535 (Ct. App. 1994).

For a violation of the requirement that a warrant be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, actual bias and not the appearance of bias must be shown. State v. McBride, 187 W (2d) 408, 523 NW (2d) 106 (Ct. App. 1994).

An "anticipatory search warrant", a warrant issued before the necessary events have occurred which will allow a constitutional search, is subject to the same probable cause determination as a conventional search warrant. State v. Falbo, 190 W (2d) 328, 526 NW (2d) 814 (Ct. App. 1994).

That a person was a passenger in a vehicle in which cocaine was found in the trunk was not of itself sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the person for being a part of a conspiracy to possess or sell the cocaine. State v. Riddle, 192 W (2d) 470, 531 NW (2d) 408 (Ct. App. 1995).

A search warrant authorizing the search of certain premises and "all occupants" was not unconstitutional where there was probable cause to believe that persons on the premises were engaged in illegal activities. State v. Hayes, 196 W (2d) 753, 540 NW (2d) 1 (Ct. App. 1995).

Probable cause is not required to justify a search conducted on school grounds by a police officer at the request of and in conjunction with with school authorities. A lesser "reasonable grounds" standard applies. State v. Angelia D.B. 211 W (2d) 140, 564 NW (2d) 682 (1997).

A request to perform field sobriety tests does not convert an otherwise lawful investigatory stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. County of Dane v. Campshure, 204 W (2d) 27, 552 NW (2d) 876 (Ct. App. 1996)

A suspect's seeming reluctance to have the front of his boxer shorts patted at or below the waist did not give rise to probable cause to search inside the shorts where no specific suspicion of a crime was focused on the suspect and no weapon or contraband had been plainly felt in a Terry pat down search. State v. Ford, 211 W (2d) 739, 565 NW (2d) 286 (Ct. App. 1997).

It is not necessary that a warrant explicitly state that delivery of the sought after contraband must take place before the search is initiated when the requirement is sufficiently implied. It is not necessary to describe in the affidavit in support of the warrant the exact role the police wil play in delivering the contraband. State v. Ruiz, 213 W (2d) 200, 570 NW (2d) 556 (Ct. App. 1997).

A no-knock search cannot be founded on generalized knowledge. Fruits of an invalid no-knock search must be suppressed. State v. Stevens, 213 W (2d) 324, 570 NW (2d) 593 (Ct. App. 1997).

The showing required to sustain an unannounced entry parallels the reasonable suspicion standard for justifying investigative stops. The police must have reasonable suspicions based on specific articulable facts that announcing their presence will endanger safety or present an opportunity to destroy evidence. State v. Larson, 215 W (2d) 154, 572 NW (2d) 127 (Ct. App. 1997).

There is no constitutional requirement that an anticipatory search warrant contain explicit conditional language limiting the execution of the warrant until after delivery of the contraband. State v. Meyer, 216 W (2d) 729, 576 NW (2d) 260 (1998).

To dispense with the rule of announcement in executing a warrant, particular facts must be shown in each case that support an officer's reasonable suspicion that exigent circumstances exist. An officer's experience and training are valid relevant considerations. State v. Meyer, 216 W (2d) 729, 576 NW (2d) 260 (1998).

Anonymous telephone tip that specified vehicle was driven by unlicensed person did not create articulable and reasonable suspicion of illegality justifying investigatory stop of auto and driver. 68 Atty. Gen. 347.

Where defendant makes substantial preliminary showing that affiant's false statement, knowingly or recklessly made, was basis of probable cause finding in search warrant affidavit, hearing must be held. Franks v. Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978).

"Open-ended" search warrant was unconstitutional. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 US 319 (1979).

Warrant to search premises for contraband implicitly carries with it limited authority to detain occupants during search. Michigan v. Summers, 452 US 692 (1981).

Where officer, after stopping defendant's car at routine driver's license checkpoint, saw tied-off party balloon in plain sight, officer had probable cause to believe balloon contained illicit substance. Hence, warrantless seizure of balloon was legal. Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730 (1983).

Court abandons "two-pronged" test of Aguilar and Spinelli and replaces it with "totality of the circumstances" approach in finding probable cause based on informer's tips. Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213 (1983).

Under new "totality of circumstances" test, informant's tip met probable cause standards. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 US 727 (1984).

Probable cause is required to invoke plain view doctrine. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 US 321 (1987).

Evidence seized in reliance on a police record incorrectly indicating an outstanding arrest warrant was not subject to suppression where the error was made by court clerk personnel. Arizona v. Evans, 514 US 1, 131 LEd 2d 34 (1994).

There is no blanket exception to the knock and announce requirement for executing warrants. To justify no-knock entry, a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing will be dangerous or futile or will inhibit the effective investigation of a crime must exist. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 US 385, 137 LEd 2d 615 (1997).

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE

An officer who is making an arrest for a traffic violation, after defendant opens his door, can arrest for a narcotics violation based on narcotics in plain sight in the room. Schill v. State, 50 W (2d) 473, 184 NW (2d) 858.

Police officers properly in an apartment where drugs were discovered may pat down the pockets of a stranger who walks in and may seize a large, hard object felt, in order to protect themselves. State v. Chambers, 55 W (2d) 289, 198 NW (2d) 377.

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Wisconsin Constitution updated by the Legislative Reference Bureau. Published May 10, 2024. Click for the Coverage of Annotations for the Annotated Constitution. Report errors at 608.504.5801 or lrb.legal@legis.wisconsin.gov.