The constitutional guaranty of a remedy for injuries to person and property does not give a constitutional right to sue the state in tort, because there is no right of a citizen to hold his sovereign substantively liable therefor, and the state, being immune from suit without its consent, may define the conditions under which it will permit actions against itself. Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 214 N.W.2d 405.
The action for common-law seduction is extended to allow recovery against the seducer by the woman herself. Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9.
The constitution does not entitle state litigants to the exact remedy they desire, but merely to their day in court. Wiener v. J.C. Penney Co. 65 Wis. 2d 139, 222 N.W.2d 149.
Illegal aliens have the right to sue in Wisconsin for injuries negligently inflicted upon them. Arteaga v. Literski, 83 Wis. 2d 128, 265 N.W.2d 148 (1978).
No legal rights are conferred by this section. Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp. 95 Wis. 2d 173, 290 N.W.2d 176 (1980).
Pre-1981 statutory paternity proceedings, which vested exclusive authority in district attorney to commence paternity action, unconstitutionally denied the child "day in court". Accordingly, child's action was not barred by any statute of limitations. In re Paternity of R.W.L. 116 Wis. 2d 150, 341 N.W.2d 682 (1984).
When an adequate remedy or forum does not exist to resolve disputes or provide due process, the courts can fashion an adequate remedy. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
The state is not entitled to protection under this section. State v. Halverson, 130 Wis. 2d 300, 387 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1986).
A register in probate's fee based on the value of the estate does not violate this section. Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987).
A court faced with a litigant who has engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has the authority to implement a remedy that may include restrictions on the litigant's access to the court. Village of Tigerton v. Minniecheske, 211 Wis. 2d 775, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997).
I,9m Victims of crime. Section 9m. [As created April 1993] This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy. This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections as provided by law: timely disposition of the case; the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from the accused throughout the criminal justice process; notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a statement to the court at disposition; restitution; compensation; and information about the outcome of the case and the release of the accused. The legislature shall provide remedies for the violation of this section. Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law. [1993 J.R. 2, vote April 1993]
I,10 Treason. Section 10. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against the same, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
I,11 Searches and seizures. Section 11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
GENERAL
Electronic eavesdropping, done with the consent of one of the parties, does not violate the U.S. constitution. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354.
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to criminal cases. It applies in forfeiture actions arising out of ordinance violations. Milwaukee v. Cohen, 57 Wis. 2d 38, 203 N.W.2d 633.
An inspection by police of a basement storage room accessible to the public and the observation of evidence found there in open view that was later seized under a search warrant does not amount to an improper invasion of the defendant's privacy. Watkins v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 514 (1973).
Police have a right to lock a car to protect its contents after arresting the driver, but if it is already locked they cannot enter it on the pretense of locking it and thus discover contraband. Where the car was borrowed, consent by the lawful user of the car was sufficient to allow a search and any containers found could be opened and examined. Soehle v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 72, 208 N.W.2d 341.
When officers, armed with a search warrant, knocked on a door, pushed it open when the defendant opened it 2 inches, and put him under restraint before showing the warrant, they acted legally. State v. Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452, 210 N.W.2d 685.
The observation of tools in a car by police officers did not constitute a search, and the tools could be seized and were properly admissible into evidence. Anderson v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 233, 223 N.W.2d 879.
Pertinent to the validity of an investigative stop is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Wendricks v. State, 72 Wis. 2d 717, 242 N.W.2d 187.
Where an abused child, an occupant of defendant's house, was accompanied to the house by social workers to recover the child's belongings and exhibited to the workers the instruments used to inflict punishment, a subsequent search warrant was not tainted by an unconstitutional search. State v. Killory, 73 Wis. 2d 400, 243 N.W.2d 475.
Where evidence seized in an illegal search was admitted, no reversible error resulted since other evidence uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence was sufficient to convict. Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800.
The drawing and testing of blood solely for diagnostic and not government-instigated purposes is not a "search or seizure" even if the testing physician testifies at negligent homicide trial. State v. Jenkins, 80 Wis. 2d 426, 259 N.W.2d 109.
A stop and frisk was not an unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983).
A person who is lawfully in custody for a civil offense may be required to participate in a lineup for an unrelated criminal offense. State v. Wilks, 121 Wis. 2d 93, 358 N.W.2d 273 (1984).
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage once it has been routinely collected by garbage collectors. State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 367 N.W.2d 788 (1985).
An unlawful arrest does not deprive a court of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).
Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence seized under a defective search warrant was admissible because a later inventory search would have discovered it. State v. Kennedy, 134 Wis. 2d 308, 396 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1986).
The reasonableness of an investigative stop depends on facts and circumstances present at the time of the stop. State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).
Where an officer observed a traffic violation but stopped the vehicle merely to render assistance, inadvertently discovered criminal evidence was admissible. State v. Baudhuin, 141 Wis. 2d 642, 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987).
The trial court is permitted to consider suppressed evidence at sentencing where nothing suggests consideration will encourage illegal searches. State v. Rush, 147 Wis. 2d 225, 432 N.W.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1988).
An escapee does not have a legitimate privacy expectation in premises other than the penal institution he or she is sent to. State v. Amos, 153 Wis. 2d 257, 450 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1989).
Aerial surveillance using standard binoculars and cameras with generally available standard and zoom lenses from an airplane flying no lower than 800 feet was reasonable. State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990).
The statutory privilege protecting an informer protects the contents of a communication that will tend to reveal the identity of the informant. The trial court may rely on the redacted information in determining the informant's reliability and credibility in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion justifying the warrantless seizure of a package. State v. Gordon, 159 Wis. 2d 335, 464 NW 91 (Ct. App. 1990).
Evidence obtained from a legal search following 2 prior illegal searches was not suppressed where the 3rd search was sufficiently attenuated from the prior 2. State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991).
Factors used to determine the extent of a home's curtilage discussed. State v. Moley, 171 Wis. 2d 207, 490 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1992).
Bank customers have no protectable privacy interest in bank records relating to accounts. State v. Swift, 173 Wis. 2d 870, 496 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1993).
The use of an infrared sensing device to detect heat emanating from a residence does not constitute a search within the meaning of the proscription of unlawful searches. State v. McKee, 181 Wis. 2d 354, 510 N.W.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1993).
A defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a porch through which the door to the living area was visible and which was entered through an unlocked screen door. Where an officer came to the defendant's residence for a legitimate purpose, observation of contraband from the porch through a window in the interior door was not a search. State v. Edgeberg, 188 Wis. 2d 339, 524 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1994).
The use of a police dog to sniff an automobile parked in a motel parking did not constitute a search. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the air space around a car in a motel parking lot. State v. Garcia, 195 Wis. 2d 68, 535 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1995).
Although a vehicle had been improperly seized, evidence obtained in a later search of the vehicle under a warrant which was not based on information gathered from the illegal seizure was not subject to suppression. State v. Gaines, 197 Wis. 2d 102, 539 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1995).
When executing a search warrant for private premises, the belongings of a visitor on the premises which are plausible repositories for the objects of the search, except those worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant, may be searched. State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996).
Presence in a high drug-trafficking area, a brief meeting of individuals on a sidewalk in the afternoon and the officer's experience that drug transactions take place in that neighborhood which involve brief meetings on the street, without more, is not particularized suspicion justifying an investigative stop. State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997).
A prison inmate does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in his body that permits a 4th amendment challenge to strip searches. Prisoners convicted of crimes are protected from cruel and unusual treatment that prohibits prison officials from utilizing strip searches to punish, harass, humiliate or intimidate inmates regardless of their status in the institution. Al Ghashhiyah v. McCaughtry, 230 Wis. 2d 587, 602 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999).
Police failure to comply with the rule of announcement in violation of the 4th amendment and Art. I, s. 11, did not require suppression of the evidence seized when the officers relied, in objective good faith, upon the pronouncements of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. as no remedial purpose would be served. State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.
A curtilage determination is a question of constitutional fact subject to a 2-step review. The findings of evidentiary or historical fact are reviewed for clear error to determine if they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The ultimate determination of constitutional fact is reviewed de novo. State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.
Generally a premises warrant authorizes the search of all items that are plausible receptacles of the objects of the search. When currency was an object, looking through documents for hidden currency was appropriate. When the incriminating nature of the document was apparent upon brief perusal, its seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.
When a person turns material over to a 3rd party, the person who turned over the material has no 4th amendment protection if the 3rd party reveals or conveys the material to governmental authorities, whether or not the person who turned over the material had a subjective belief that the 3rd party would not betray him or her. State v. Knight, 2000 WI 16, 232 Wis. 2d 305, 605 N.W.2d 291.
Arson investigations under s. 165.55 (9) and (10) are subject to search warrant requirements set forth in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). Consent to search discussed. 68 Atty. Gen. 225.
In-custody statements stemming from an illegal arrest are not admissible merely because Miranda warnings were given. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590.
Bank records are not private papers protected by a legitimate "expectation of privacy". United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435.
Standard procedure inventory of any container impounded by police is reasonable search. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364.
Standards for application of exclusionary rule to live-witness testimony discussed. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
A newspaper office may be searched for evidence of a crime even though the newspaper is not suspected of a crime. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
Stopping a car for no other reason than to check the license and registration was unreasonable under Fourth amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
In-court identification of the accused was not suppressed as the fruit of unlawful arrest. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
Illegally seized evidence was properly admitted to impeach the defendant's false trial testimony, given in response to proper cross-examination, where the evidence did not squarely contradict the defendant's testimony on direct examination. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
Arcane concepts of property law do not control the ability to claim 4th amendment protections. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
Resemblance to "drug courier profile" was insufficient basis for seizure. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
Objective facts and circumstantial evidence justified an investigative stop of a smuggler's vehicle. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
The automobile exception does not extend to a closed, opaque container located in the luggage compartment. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
Police placement of aa beeper in a container of precursor chemical used to manufacture an illicit drug and the subsequent surveillance of the defendant's car by monitoring beeper transmission was not prohibited by the 4th amendment. U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
The detention and interrogation of an airline passenger fitting a "drug courier profile" was unconstitutional. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Under the "independent source" doctrine, evidence discovered during a valid search was admissible regardless of whether initial entry was illegal. Segura v. U.S. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule allowed the admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, later found to be unsupported by probable cause. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule discussed. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
If a "wanted flyer" has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a wanted person has committed a crime, other officers may rely on the flyer to stop and question that person. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
In assessing whether detention is too long to be justified as an investigative stop, it is appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
Proposed surgery under general anesthetic to recover a bullet from an accused robber's body was an unreasonable search. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
Fingerprints were not admissible where the police transported the suspect to a station house for fingerprinting without consent, probable cause, or prior judicial authorization. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
Apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Where an officer stopped a car for traffic violations and reached into the car to move papers obscuring the vehicle ID number, discovered evidence was admissible. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
The reasonable expectation of privacy was not violated when police, acting on an anonymous tip, flew over the defendant's enclosed backyard and observed marijuana plants. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
Defendants have no reasonable privacy interest in trash left on a curb for pick-up. Therefore, a warrantless search is not prohibited under federal law. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
The use of a roadblock to halt a suspect's automobile constituted a seizure. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989).
The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule does not extend to the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach testimony of defense witnesses other than the defendant. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 107 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1990).
For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or where that is absent, submission to an officer's "show of authority". California v. Hodari D. 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).
Where an officer has no articulable suspicion regarding a person, but requests that person to allow the search of his luggage, there is no seizure of the person if a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request or end the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991).
Fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures extend to civil matters. The illegal eviction of a trailer home from a private park with deputy sheriffs present to prevent interference was an unconstitutional seizure of property. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992).
Whether police must "knock and announce" prior to entering a residence in executing a warrant is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 4th amendment. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995).
Public school students are granted lesser privacy protections than adults, and student athletes even less. Mandatory drug testing of student athletes did not violate the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. School Dist. 475 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995).
It is a violation of the 4th amendment for police to bring members of the media or other 3rd persons into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the 3rd persons in the home is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. Wilson v. Layne, 526 US 603, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999).
The "reasonableness" of the investigative detention: An "ad hoc" constitutional test. Wiseman. 67 MLR 641 (1984).
The exclusionary rule and the 1983-1984 term. Gammon. 68 MLR 1 (1984).
The constitutionality of the canine sniff search: From Katz to dogs. Fitzgerald. 68 MLR 57 (1984).
Analyzing the reasonableness of bodily intrusions. Sarnacki. 68 MLR 130 (1984).
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule: The latest example of "new federalism" in the states. 71 MLR 166 (1987).
Search and seizure—abandonment. 1974 WLR 212.
