EQUAL PROTECTION
The fact that there is no mandatory release date for persons convicted of 1st degree murder as there is for other crimes does not amount to denial of equal protection. Bies v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 322, 193 N.W.2d 46.
Legislative classifications violate equal protection only if they are irrational or arbitrary. Any reasonable basis for the classification for the classification validates the statute. There is a five point test to determine reasonableness. Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 218 Wis. 2d 734 (1974).
There is a meaningful distinction between governmental employes and nongovernmental employes. The statutory strike ban imposed on public employes is based upon a valid classification and the legislation creating it is not unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. Hortonville Ed. Asso. v. Jt. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658.
The statutory distinction between parolees out of state under 57.13, 1987 stats. [now 304.13] and absconding parolees, denying extradition to the former but not the latter, is a constitutionally valid classification. State ex rel. Niederer v. Cady, 72 Wis. 2d 311, 240 N.W.2d 626.
In order for a female prostitute to avoid prosecution upon equal protection grounds, it must be shown that the failure to prosecute male patrons was selective, persistent, discriminatory and without justifiable prosecutorial discretion. State v. Johnson, 74 Wis. 2d 169, 246 N.W.2d 503.
Equal protection does not require symmetry in probation and parole systems. State v. Aderhold, 91 Wis. 2d 306, 284 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1979).
Discriminatory prosecution discussed. Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 287 N.W.2d 785 (1980).
A gender based rule must serve important governmental objectives and the means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The common law doctrine of necessaries does not deny equal protection. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982).
It does not violate equal protection to classify employes according to retirement date for purpose of pension benefits. Bence v. Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 2d 469, 320 N.W.2d 199 (1982).
A grandfather clause granting a perpetual exception from police power regulation for certain persons for purely economic reasons denies equal protection. Wis. Wine & Spirit Institute v. Ley, 141 Wis. 2d 958, 416 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1987).
A prostitution raid focusing only on female participants amounts to selective prosecution in violation of equal protection; in depth discussion of constitutional analysis. State v. McCollum, 159 Wis. 2d 184, 464 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1990).
A prisoner who is a defendant in a civil tort action is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard; where no liberty interest is at stake there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel, and there is a rebuttable presumption against such appointment. Piper v. Popp, 167 Wis. 2d 633, 482 N.W.2d 353 (1992).
The defense of discriminatory prosecution requires showing the prosecution is selective and intended to deny a constitutional right or motivated by the prosecutor's personal vindictiveness. Upon such a showing, the state has the burden of showing a reasonable basis for the classification. State v. Barman, 183 Wis. 2d 180, 515 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1994).
A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. To do so constitutes practicing law without a license in violation of s. 757.30 and voids the appeal. Requiring a lawyer to represent a corporation in filing the notice does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 209 Wis. 2d 187, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997).
"Selective prosecution" when referring to the failure to prosecute all known lawbreakers has no standing in equal protection law. Only "selective prosecution" when referring to the decision to prosecute in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right gives rise to an actionable right under the constitution. County of Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).
The state and federal constitutions provide identical procedural due process and equal protection safeguards. County of Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).
Although counties may charge reasonable fees for the use of facilities in their county parks, they may not charge such fees only to out-of-state residents while allowing all Wisconsin residents to utilize such facilities free of charge simply because ORAP or ORAP-200 funds are involved. Such action would create an arbitrary and unreasonable distinction based on residence and unconstitutionally deny residents of other states equal protection of the laws. 60 Atty. Gen. 18.
Requirement that deputy sheriffs and police officers be citizens does not deny equal protection to resident aliens. 68 Atty. Gen. 61.
Classifications by gender must serve important government objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
Citizenship requirement for public teachers in New York did not violate equal protection. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
Massachusetts civil service preference for veterans did not deny equal protection to women. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Worker's compensation law that required men, but not women, to prove disability or dependence on deceased spouse's earnings violated equal protection. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
Racial classification did not violate equal protection clause. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Statutory rape law applicable only to males had "fair and substantial relationship" to legitimate state ends. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
A state university open only to women violated equal protection. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
A layoff plan giving preference on basis of race to accomplish affirmative action goals wasn't sufficiently narrowly tailored and, therefore, violated equal protection. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
There is no equal protection violation in a state classifying as nonresidents for tuition purposes persons who are residents for all other purposes. Lister v. Hoover, 655 F.2d 123 (1981).
The postconviction detention of a person in county jail is a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment if it is occasioned by the prisoner's indigency. Taylor v. Gray, 375 F. Supp. 790.
The contrast between percentage of black population of city, 17.2%, and percentage of black composition of "fixed wage" skilled craft positions available in city, 3.1%, evidenced a substantial disparity between proportion of minorities in general population and proportion in a specific job classification and was such as to establish a prima facie case of unlawful racial discrimination, absent a showing by city that statistical discrepancy resulted from causes other than racial discrimination. Crockett v. Grun, 388 F. Supp. 912.
Civil rights actions against municipalities discussed. Starstead v. City of Superior, 533 F. Supp. 1365 (1982).
Zoning—Equal protection. 1976 WLR 234.
Equal protection—Sex discrimination. 1976 WLR 330.
DUE PROCESS
Although a person may invoke the Fifth amendment in a civil case in order to protect himself from the use of such evidence against him in a subsequent criminal action, if he does so an inference against his interest may be drawn as a matter of law based upon an implied admission that a truthful answer would tend to prove that the witness had committed the criminal act or might constitute a criminal act, and is not based upon the condition that the witness is seeking relief or ought not to receive relief because he has invoked the privilege. Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292.
A school board's refusal to renew of a teacher' coaching duties in addition his to full-time teaching duties, without notice and hearing, did not violate his right to due process where no charge was made that reflected on him and invoked a protected liberty interest and where no legal right in the job gave rise to a protected property interest. Richards v. Board of Education, 58 Wis. 2d 444, 206 N.W.2d 597.
A property interest in employment conferred by state law is protected by the due process provisions of both the state and federal constitutions. State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis. 2d 672, 242 N.W.2d 689.
The due process standard in juvenile proceeding is fundamental fairness. Basic requirements are discussed. In Interest of D.H. 76 Wis. 2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196.
A permanent status public employe forfeits due process property interests in a job by accepting an inter-departmental promotion. DH&SS v. State Personnel Board, 84 Wis. 2d 675, 267 N.W.2d 644 (1978).
Where an attorney is permitted to withdraw on the day of trial without notice, due process requires granting a continuance. Sherman v. Heiser, 85 Wis. 2d 246, 270 N.W.2d 397 (1978).
Liberty interests in public employment are discussed. Nufer v. Village Bd. of Village of Palmyra, 92 Wis. 2d 289, 284 N.W.2d 649 (1979).
Where a city ordinance specified narrow grounds upon which civil service applicants may be screened out, an applicant had no right to know grounds for screen-out. Taplick v. City of Madison Personnel Board, 97 Wis. 2d 162, 293 N.W.2d 173 (1980).
Due process rights of a student at expulsion hearing are discussed. Racine Unified School Dist. v. Thompson, 107 Wis. 2d 657, 321 N.W.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1982).
Due process was not violated where a defendant was illegally arrested in an asylum state and involuntarily brought to trial. State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 325 N.W.2d 695 (1982).
Due process rights of a tenured professor who was alleged to have resigned were not protected by a hearing to determine eligibility for unemployment compensation. Patterson v. University Board of Regents, 119 Wis. 2d 570, 350 N.W.2d 612 (1984).
Attributes of property interests protected by due process are discussed. Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59, 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986).
Due process rights of a probationer at a hearing to modify probation enumerated. State v. Hayes, 173 Wis. 2d 439, 496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992).
The tort of intentional denial of due precess is discussed. Old Tuckaway Assoc. v. City of Greenfield, 180 Wis. 2d 254, 509 N.W.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1993).
An inmate has a protected liberty interest in earned good-time credits and in not being placed in segregation. Post deprivation remedies provided by the state are adequate. Irby v. Macht, 184 Wis. 2d 831, 522 N.W.2d 9 (1994).
A property interest conferred by a statute subsequently amended to make an appointed governmental position at-will is terminated upon the conclusion of the appointing official's term of office. Unertl v. Dane County, 190 Wis. 2d 145, 526 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1994).
A procedural due process claim arises when there is a deprivation of a right without sufficient process. Generally a predeprivation hearing is required, but when a deprivation results form a random act of a state employe the question becomes the adequacy of postdeprivation remedies. Jones v. Dane County, 195 Wis. 2d 892, 537 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995).
Substantive due process requires the state not to deprive its citizens of life, liberty and property without due process. Absent a special relationship, it does not impose an affirmative obligation upon the state to ensure the protection of those rights from a private actor, even when governmental aid may be necessary to secure a person's life, liberty or property. Jones v. Dane County, 195 Wis. 2d 892, 537 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995).
Where a prisoner could not show that a period of segregated confinement which exceeded the time allowed by rule was not atypical of his prison life generally, there was no unconstitutional due process deprivation. The only time factor which courts will be concerned with in determining a procedural due process deprivation is the time the inmate is ultimately required to spend confined under the authority of the state. Chaney v. Renteria, 203 Wis. 2d 310, 554 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1996).
Foster children have a constitutional right under the due process clause to safe and secure placement in a foster home. Whether a public official violated that right will be determined based on a professional judgment standard. Kara B. v. Dane County, 205 Wis. 2d 140, 555 N.W.2d 630 (1996).
An inmate has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in not having his mandatory release date extended. Due process is violated in a prison discipline case when guilt is found if there is not "some evidence" that supports the finding of guilt. Santiago v. Ware, 205 Wis. 2d 295, 556 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1996).
A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. To do so constitutes practicing law without a license in violation of s. 757.30 and voids the appeal. Requiring a lawyer to represent a corporation in filing the notice does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 209 Wis. 2d 187, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997).
Whether to proceed with civil litigation or to hold it in abeyance while a party is incarcerated depends on the nature of the case, the practical concerns raised by the prisoner's appearance and the alternative methods available to provide the prisoner with access to the hearing. Marriage of Schmidt v. Schmidt, 212 Wis. 2d 405, 569 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1997).
The state and federal constitutions provide identical procedural due process and equal protection safeguards. County of Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).
In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property without due process of law. Arneson v. Jezwinski, 225 Wis. 2d 371, 592 N.W.2d 606 (1999).
Substantive due process guarantees protect citizens against arbitrary action of government. To violate substantive due process guarantees a decision must involve more than simple errors in law or an improper exercise of discretion; it must shock the conscience. Eternalist Foundation, Inc. v. City of Platteville, 225 Wis. 2d 759, 593 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1999).
A criminal proceeding may be conclusive against a 3rd party only if the 3rd party and criminal defendant have sufficient identity of interest so that in the prior proceeding the 3rd party had a full opportunity to fairly adjudicate the issues leading to the conviction. If not the 3rd party's due process rights would be violated by application of issue preclusion. Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B. 226 Wis. 2d 210, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999).
A deprivation of the due process right of a fair warning can occur, not only from vague statutory language, but also from unforeseeable and retroactive interpretation of that statutory language. Elections Board v. Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 597 N.W.2d 721 (1999).
The retroactive application of a substantive statute must meet the test of due process determined by by balancing the public interest served by retroactive application against the private interests that are overturned. Neiman v. American National Property & Casualty Co. 2000 WI 83, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160.
Prisoners' due process rights are discussed. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539.
Public high school students facing temporary suspension have property and liberty interests protected by due process. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565.
Garnishment of corporate bank accounts must comply with due process protections of Fuentes and Sniadach. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U.S. 601.
Wisconsin medical examining board does not deny due process by both investigating and adjudicating charge of professional misconduct. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35.
States may deny benefits to those who fail to prove they did not quit a job in order to obtain benefits. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577.
Due process does not disqualify an agency as a decision-maker merely because of familiarity with the facts of a case. Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Asso. 426 U.S. 482.
Dismissal from medical school for academic deficiencies without a hearing did not violate the due process clause. Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
Utility customers' due process rights were violated where the utility shut off service for nonpayment without advising the customers of available administrative procedures. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
A father's acquiescence in his daughter's desire to live with her mother in California did not confer jurisdiction over father in California courts. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
The due process clause was not violated when the IRS monitored a conversation with the defendant in violation of IRS rules. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
A state may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant having no forum contacts by attacking the contractual obligation of defendant's insurer licensed in the state. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
Involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital implicated protected liberty interests. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
The termination of appointed assistant public defenders, who were neither policymakers nor confidential employes, solely on grounds of political affiliation was a denial of first and fourteenth amendment rights. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Segregation confinement of a prisoner without prior hearing may violate due process if postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980).
Where an accident involving only Wisconsin residents occurred in Wisconsin, the fact that the decedent had been employed in Minnesota conferred jurisdiction on Minnesota courts and Minnesota insurance law was applicable. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
The national democratic party has a protected right of political association and may not be compelled to seat delegates chosen in an open primary in violation of the party's rules. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
A statute which required a putative father in a paternity suit to pay for blood tests denied due process to indigent putative fathers. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
Due process does not require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
A life prisoner had no due process right to a statement of reasons why the board did not commute his life sentence. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
An ordinance regulating sale of drug paraphernalia was constitutional. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
Revocation of probation for failure to pay a fine, without a determination that the probationer had not made a bona fide effort to pay or that alternate forms of punishment did not exist, denied due process and equal protection. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
Notice by publication did not satisfy due process requirements in a tax sale. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
A state's policy of preserving county boundaries in a reapportionment plan justified a population deviation averaging 13%. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
Discussion of a minority set-aside program held to violate due process. Richmond v. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1989).
Discussion of abortion restrictions held to comply with constitutional protections. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv. 492 U.S. 490, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1989).
Assuming that a competent person has a constitutional right to refuse treatment, a state may require clear and convincing evidence that incompetent patient desired withdrawal of treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dept. 497 U.S. 261, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990).
