DOTDepartment of Transportation
DPIDepartment of Public Instruction
DRLDepartment of Regulation and Licensing
DVADepartment of Veterans Affairs
DWDDepartment of Workforce Development
JCFJoint Committee on Finance
OCIOffice of the Commissioner of Insurance
PSCPublic Service Commission
UWUniversity of Wisconsin
WHEDAWisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority
WHEFAWisconsin Health and Educational Facilities Authority
_____________________________________________________________
agriculture
Current law authorizes DATCP to grant $240,000 in each fiscal year to Dane
County to assist in paying the costs of operating an exposition center and of hosting
the World Dairy Expo at the exposition center. This bill eliminates the authority and
the funding for those grants.
Commerce and economic development
Economic development
This bill requires the department of commerce to establish a grants
management office to identify public and private sources of grants, act as a
clearinghouse for those sources of grants, and offer to governmental agencies,
nonprofit organizations, school boards, charter schools, and private schools training
and assistance in pursuing grants.
Under the Business Development Initiative Program, the department of
commerce provides technical assistance and grants to individuals, small businesses,
and nonprofit organizations for developing and planning the start-up or expansion
of a business that is expected to provide job opportunities for persons with severe
disabilities. This bill eliminates the Business Development Initiative Program.
Commerce
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
Currently, various state and federal laws govern the use of electronic
documents and signatures, the most significant one being the federal Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, or "E-sign." E-sign generally
preempts inconsistent state laws.
This bill enacts a version of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),
which was approved and recommended for enactment by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999. Although enactments of this
approved version of UETA are not preempted by E-sign, because this bill makes
certain substantive changes to the approved version of UETA that render the bill
inconsistent with the approved version, it is difficult to determine whether a court
would consider the bill preempted by E-sign. Because some of the unchanged UETA
provisions are ambiguous, this analysis does not cover all potential legal effects of
these ambiguous provisions.
Like E-sign, the bill primarily affects the use of electronic documents and
electronic signatures in transactions. Under the bill's broad definitions, such things
as information stored on a computer disk or a voice mail recording would likely
qualify for use as an electronic document. However, like E-sign, this bill does not
apply to the execution of wills, to testamentary trusts, or to a transaction governed
by any chapter of this state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code other than the
chapter dealing with sales of goods. Unlike current law under E-sign and the version
of UETA recommended for enactment in all of the states, the bill also specifically
exempts deeds and cancellation notices for local telecommunications services.
Like E-sign, this bill specifies that a document or signature may not be denied
legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form. Unlike E-sign,
this bill provides that an electronic document satisfies any law requiring a document
to be in writing and that an electronic signature satisfies any law requiring a
signature. The bill does not require the use of electronic documents or electronic
signatures. Rather, the bill applies only to transactions between parties each of
which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means. However, unlike
current law under E-sign, this bill does not contain any protections that specifically
apply only to consumer transactions. The consumer protections currently in effect
under E-sign would arguably have no effect in this state upon the enactment of this
bill.
Under this bill, a person may use an electronic document in a transaction to
satisfy any law requiring the person to provide, send, or deliver information in
writing to another person, if the electronic document satisfies certain conditions.
Although the bill also states that a document relating to a transaction may not be
denied legal effect solely because it is in electronic form, the bill likely permits a
person to deny the legal effect of an electronic document that does not satisfy these
conditions. The bill also appears to require the parties to a transaction to comply
with any legal requirement relating to the provision of information
other than a
requirement that the information be provided on paper.
The bill establishes the time and location of the sending and receipt of an
electronic document, although the parties to a transaction may agree to alter the
effect of these provisions. The bill also permits a sender to expressly provide in an
electronic document that the document is deemed to be sent from a different location.
The bill also establishes the legal effects of any change or error in an electronic
document that occurs in a transmission between the parties to a transaction. These
effects depend in part upon whether the parties have consented to the use of a
security procedure and whether the transaction is an automated transaction
involving an individual.
This bill generally permits the use of an electronic document to satisfy any law
that requires document retention. An electronic document retained in compliance
with these provisions has the same legal status as the original document and need
not contain any information the sole purpose of which is to enable the document to
be sent, communicated, or received. Under current law, this ancillary information
is normally required to be retained if the document to which it is attached is required
to be retained.
The bill does not apply to any new laws enacted by this state, after enactment
of this bill, that prohibit a person from using an electronic document to satisfy any
requirement that the person retain a document for evidentiary, audit, or like
purposes.
In addition, the bill does not preclude a governmental unit of this state from
imposing additional requirements for the retention of any document on another
governmental unit subject to its jurisdiction. It is unclear how this provision relates
to other provisions of the bill which provide that an electronic document satisfies any
retention requirement as long as specified requirements relating to accuracy and
accessibility are also satisfied. This provision is narrower than the corresponding
provision included in the version of UETA recommended for enactment in all the
states in that the corresponding provision is not specifically limited in its application
to documents of governmental units.
Like E-sign, this bill also permits electronic notarization, acknowledgement,
or verification of a signature or document relating to a transaction, as long as the
electronic signature of the person performing the notarization, acknowledgement, or
verification is accompanied by all other information required by law. Unlike current
law under E-sign and the version of UETA recommended for enactment in all the
states, an electronic notarization under this bill must also comply with rules
promulgated by DEG and the secretary of state. In addition, unlike the version of
UETA recommended for enactment in all the states, this bill provides that public
records retention requirement currently in effect in this state continue to apply. The
bill also permits the public records board to promulgate rules prescribing additional
records retention standards and DEG to promulgate rules with regard to the use of
electronic documents and signatures by governmental units.
Electronic mail prohibitions
This bill prohibits the user of an electronic mail service from sending an
electronic mail solicitation or chain letter that uses the service provider's equipment
in a manner that violates the provider's solicitation or chain letter policy. The bill
also prohibits any person from sending an electronic mail message or chain letter to
an Internet user that uses the equipment of the Internet user's electronic mail
service provider in a manner that violates the provider's solicitation or chain letter
policy.
These prohibitions apply only if the electronic mail service provider displays
the solicitation or chain letter policy on the home page of its Internet Web site and
makes printed copies of the policy available at no charge. The bill provides for
damages for an electronic mail service provider injured by a person who violates
either prohibition more than 30 days after the policy is displayed on the home page.
The bill also prohibits a person from sending an electronic mail solicitation
unless the person includes, with the solicitation, a return electronic mail address or
notice of a toll-free telephone number that the recipient may use to notify the person
that the recipient does not want to receive solicitations. If the recipient notifies the
person, the person may not send another solicitation to the recipient. In addition,
the bill prohibits a person from knowingly sending an electronic mail message that
represents that the message is from another person without the consent of that
person or that the message is from an Internet domain name without the consent of
the person that registered the name.
Internet privacy
This bill imposes certain requirements on a person that maintains Web sites to
conduct business in Wisconsin. First, the person may not disclose, in exchange for
anything of value, information about a state resident that is obtained from the
resident's use of the Internet, unless the resident consents to the disclosure. Second,
the person may not request a child to provide, through the Internet, personal
information about the child, unless the person makes a reasonable effort to obtain
the consent of the child's parent or legal guardian.
The bill also requires the person maintaining the Web site to display on the
home page of the Web site a description of any information that the person collects
about visitors to the Web site, including any information that is sold or provided to
third parties. If the person sells or provides information to third parties, the person
must allow a visitor to the Web site to notify the person whether or not the visitor
consents to the sale or provision of information. If the visitor does not consent, the
person may not sell or provide the information.
Correctional system
This bill reduces the funding and position authorization for DOC for the
purpose of delaying the opening of the New Lisbon Correctional Institution,
Highview Correctional Institution, the Oshkosh Correctional Institution
segregation unit, the Winnebago and Sturtevant workhouses, and the Racine
probation and parole holding facilities that were authorized in
2001 Wisconsin Act
16.
Under current law, DOC may establish a secure work program for inmates,
under which the inmates are assigned to work away from the grounds of their
institution but are restrained and required to wear distinctively colored clothing.
This bill eliminates DOC's authority to operate such a program.
Under current law, DOC may require, as a condition of probation, that a serious
child sex offender (a person who has been convicted of sexual assault of a child under
the age of 13) who is on or being placed on probation undergo antiandrogen treatment
(pharmacological treatment using a substance that inhibits the biological effects of
male hormones such as testosterone). DOC or the parole commission may also
impose such a requirement as a condition of parole, but may not base a decision to
parole the offender on the offender's suitability or willingness to undergo the
treatment.
A person confined in a state prison for an offense committed before December
31, 1999, is generally entitled to be released on his or her mandatory release date;
that is, once he or she has served two-thirds of his or her sentence. However, if a
person is sentenced to imprisonment for certain serious felonies, including sexual
assault of a child, the mandatory release date is merely a presumptive mandatory
release date. The parole commission may deny such a person presumptive
mandatory release if, among other things, the person is a child sex offender who
refuses to participate in recommended antiandrogen treatment.
This bill eliminates the antiandrogen treatment program.
Under current law, DOC must provide adequate health care to an inmate but
must generally require the inmate to pay a charge of at least $2.50 for each request
for health services. This bill requires DOC to promulgate emergency rules
increasing the charge to at least $7.50 for each request.
Under current law, DOC must charge a fee to each person on probation, parole,
or extended supervision to partially reimburse DOC for providing supervision and
services. If the person is subject to medium, maximum, or high risk supervision by
DOC, DOC must have a goal of receiving at least $1 per day, if appropriate, from the
person. This bill requires DOC to promulgate emergency rules requiring DOC to
have a goal of receiving at least $2 per day.
Courts and procedure
Under current law, generally, when a person files a civil action or appeal in
circuit court, the person must pay a court support services fee of $40 in addition to
the regular filing fee. This bill raises the fee to $52. If the amount of the recovery
sought exceeds $5,000 (the limit in small claims actions), a person must pay a court
support services fee of $100 in addition to the regular filing fee. This bill raises the
fee to $130. If the amount of the recovery sought is no more than $5,000, the person
must pay a court support services fee of $30 in addition to the regular filing fee. This
bill raises the $30 filing fee to $39.
Crimes
Felony penalties
Under current law, crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than one year
are felonies. Virtually every felony created in the criminal code is put in one of six
classes (Class A, B, BC, C, D, or E), and each class has a specific maximum term of
imprisonment and a maximum fine. Class A felonies are punishable by life
imprisonment. For other classified felonies committed on or after December 31,
1999, the maximum terms of imprisonment are as follows:
-
See PDF for table 
Except for Class A and Class B felonies, which are not punishable by a fine, each
classified felony has a maximum fine of $10,000.
This bill does the following with respect to criminal offenses and penalties for
them:
1.
New felony classes. The bill expands the number of felony classes from six
to nine and, except for Class A and Class B felonies, creates new maximum terms of
imprisonment and new maximum fines, as follows:
-
See PDF for table
2. Classification of felonies. The bill places felony offenses classified under
current law into the new felony classes, with the exception of a few classified felony
offenses that are reduced to misdemeanor offenses. In addition, the bill places
unclassified felony offenses (including all felonies created outside of the criminal
code) into the new felony classes, with the exception of certain unclassified felony
offenses that are reduced to misdemeanor offenses and offenses that are felonies only
because of the application of a penalty enhancer.
As a general rule, the bill places a felony offense into a felony class based on the
maximum amount of time that a person committing the offense before December 31,
1999, could serve in prison before being released on parole under the mandatory
release law (see below, item 1 under The structure of felony sentences, item 1).
However, in some cases a felony is placed in a higher or lower felony class than the
one based on the mandatory release date for a maximum sentence for an offence
committed before December 31, 1999. For those felony offenses that are reduced to
misdemeanor offenses under the bill, the new penalty for the offense is a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than nine months or both.
3.
Changes in property offenses. Under current law, the penalties for certain
property offenses in the criminal code (such as theft, criminal damage to property,
receiving stolen property, issuing worthless checks, and various kinds of fraud) are
based on the value of the property stolen or damaged. Before the enactment of
2001
Wisconsin Act 16, the threshold between misdemeanor and felony penalties for most
of these crimes was $1,000. Thus, if the value of the property involved was $1,000
or less, the crime was a misdemeanor, and if the value of the property involved was
more than $1,000 the crime was a felony. For some crimes, the severity of the felony
penalties also depends on the dollar value of the property involved. Thus, before the
enactment of Act 16, if a person committed the offense of theft and the value of the
property involved was more than $1,000 but not more than $2,500, the person was
guilty of a Class E felony. If the value of the property involved exceeded $2,500, the
person was guilty of a Class C felony. Act 16, however, set the threshold between
misdemeanors and felonies for most property offenses in the criminal code that are
based on the dollar value of the property involved at $2,500.
This bill restores the thresholds between misdemeanors and felonies for
criminal code property offenses that are based on the dollar value of the property
involved to their pre-Act 16 levels.
The bill also assigns new classifications for these property offenses based on the
value of the property involved. To illustrate, under the bill, theft is penalized as
follows:
-
See PDF for table
4. Felony murder. Under current law, a person commits felony murder if he or
she causes the death of another while committing or attempting to commit certain
felonies (such as sexual assault, arson or armed robbery). If a person commits felony
murder, the maximum period of imprisonment for the felony the person committed
or attempted to commit is increased by not more 20 years. This bill provides that the
maximum period of imprisonment for the felony the person committed or attempted
to commit is increased by not more 15 years.
5. Changes to the crime of carjacking. Under current law, a person is guilty of
carjacking if he or she intentionally takes any vehicle without the consent of the
owner while possessing a dangerous weapon and by using or threatening the use of
force or the weapon against another. This bill classifies every carjacking offense,
including an offense resulting in a person's death (currently a Class A felony), as a
Class C felony and adds carjacking to the list of offenses subject to the felony murder
statute (see item 4 above, Felony murder).
6. Increase in certain misdemeanor penalties. The bill increases penalties for
a few misdemeanor offenses by classifying them as felony offenses. The
misdemeanor offenses that are changed to felony offenses by the bill (and the
classification into which the offense is placed) are as follows:
A) Stalking (Class I felony).
B) Criminal damage to railroad property (Class I felony).
C) Possession of a firearm in a school zone (Class I felony).
D) Discharge of a firearm in a school zone (Class G felony).
7. Elimination of certain minimum penalty provisions. Current law requires
a court to impose a minimum sentence of imprisonment in certain cases. In other
cases current law specifies a minimum sentence of imprisonment but also allows a
court, in the exercise of its discretion, to impose a lesser sentence of imprisonment
or no imprisonment at all (a presumptive minimum prison sentence). For the most
part, this bill eliminates both mandatory and presumptive minimum prison
sentences for felony offenses. The bill, however, does not eliminate mandatory prison
sentence requirements for Class A felonies, which carry a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment (see below, Sentences of life imprisonment), nor does it change the
persistent repeater penalty enhancers (often called the "three strikes, you're out"
and "two strikes, you're out" laws), which require a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of release. It also does not change the requirement that a person
be given a minimum sentence of imprisonment if he or she is convicted of a repeat
serious sex crime or a repeat violent crime, although the bill provides that, instead
of a minimum sentence of five years, the court must impose a bifurcated sentence
that includes a minimum term of confinement in prison of three years and six months
(see below, The structure of felony sentences, item 2, for a description of
bifurcated sentences). In addition, the bill does not change the minimum mandatory
sentence of six months for fifth and subsequent offenses of operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated.
8. Elimination of mandatory consecutive sentences. Under current law, a court
sentencing a person convicted of a crime generally may provide that any sentence
imposed run concurrent with or consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the
same time or any sentence imposed previously. However, a court must impose a
consecutive sentence if the person was convicted of certain escape offenses,
possession or discharge of a firearm in a school zone, using or possessing a handgun
and an armor-piercing bullet while committing another crime, or violating
conditions of lifetime supervision by committing another crime. This bill eliminates
the requirement that consecutive sentences be imposed in these cases. The bill also
imposes new requirements relating to bifurcated sentences and sentences imposed
under current law that are ordered to run consecutively to each other (see below, The
structure of felony sentences, item 3-C).
Penalty enhancers
Current law contains various penalty enhancers if the crime is committed
under certain circumstances. For instance, current law provides penalty enhancers
for committing a crime using a dangerous weapon or committing a crime against a
victim chosen because of his or her race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, or ancestry (the "hate crime" enhancer). Current law also provides
for penalty enhancers that may be triggered by the defendant's status at the time he
or she committed the crime. For instance, current law provides a penalty enhancer
for habitual criminals and for persons responsible for the welfare of a child who
commit certain crimes against the child.
The bill retains the current penalty enhancers for: habitual criminals; using a
dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime; committing a violent crime in a
school zone; committing certain domestic abuse offenses within 72 hours after an
arrest for a domestic abuse incident; committing a "hate crime"; distributing a
controlled substance to a person under the age of 17; and distributing a controlled
substance within 1,000 feet of a school, park, correctional institution, or certain other
facilities. The bill eliminates the remaining penalty enhancers and instead includes
them in a list of aggravating factors that a court must consider when sentencing a
person.
In addition, under current law, if a person violates certain prohibitions relating
to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and, at the time of the offense, a child
under the age of 16 is in the vehicle, the penalties for the offense double. This bill
retains this penalty enhancer for most of the offenses involving operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated, but the bill eliminates the enhancer for the crimes of
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle.
The structure of felony sentences (other than life sentences)
1. The structure of prison sentences for felony offenses committed before
December 31, 1999. If a person is sentenced to prison for a felony committed before
December 31, 1999, the person will usually have three possible ways of being
released from prison on parole: discretionary parole granted by the parole
commission (for which a person is usually eligible after serving 25% of the sentence
or six months, whichever is greater); mandatory release on parole (usually granted
automatically after the person serves two-thirds of the sentence); or special action
parole release by the secretary of corrections (a program designed to relieve prison
crowding). However, the person could be subject to more restrictive discretionary
parole eligibility provisions or to restrictions on mandatory release under certain
circumstances (for example, if the person has one or more prior convictions for
certain serious felonies).
2.
The structure of prison sentences for felony offenses committed on or after
December 31, 1999. Under
1997 Wisconsin Act 283, if a court chooses to sentence a
felony offender to a term of imprisonment in state prison for a felony committed on
or after December 31, 1999, the court must do so by imposing a bifurcated sentence
that includes a term of confinement in prison followed by a term of community
supervision (called "extended supervision"). The offender is not eligible for parole.
A bifurcated sentence imposed under
1997 Wisconsin Act 283 must be structured as
follows:
A) The total length of the bifurcated sentence may not exceed the maximum
term of imprisonment allowable for the felony.
B) The court must set the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence
to be at least one year but not more than 40 years for a Class B felony, 20 years for
a Class BC felony, ten years for a Class C felony, five years for a Class D felony, or
two years for a Class E felony. If the person is being sentenced to prison for a felony
that is not in one of these classes, the term of confinement in prison portion of the
sentence must be at least one year but not more than 75% of the total length of the
bifurcated sentence.
C) The term of extended supervision must equal at least 25% of the length of
the term of confinement in prison. There is no limit on the length of the term of
extended supervision, other than the limit that results from the requirements that
the term of confinement in prison portion of a bifurcated sentence be at least one year
and that the total bifurcated sentence not exceed the maximum term of
imprisonment specified by law for the crime.
During the term of extended supervision, the person is subject to supervision
by DOC and is subject to conditions set by both the court and DOC. If a person
violates a condition of, or DOC rule related to, extended supervision, the person's
extended supervision may be revoked in an administrative proceeding and the
person may be returned to serve a period of time in prison.
3. The changes made by this bill. This bill makes the following changes relating
to the imposition of bifurcated sentences:
A) The bill establishes new maximum terms of confinement in prison for all
felony classes, except for Class A and Class B. The bill also limits the amount of
extended supervision that a court can impose for classified felonies. The maximum
term of confinement in prison and the maximum term of extended supervision for
each classified felony (other than Class A felonies) is as follows:
-
See PDF for table
B) When a court is imposing a bifurcated sentence it must consider any
advisory sentencing guidelines for the offense adopted by the sentencing commission
(see below,
Sentencing commission) or, if the sentencing commission has not
adopted guidelines for the offense, the temporary advisory guidelines adopted by the
criminal penalties study committee (created by
1997 Wisconsin Act 283). In
addition, the bill requires the sentencing court to consider the protection of the
public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, along
with any applicable mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The bill includes a
partial list of aggravating circumstances that a court must consider, which
incorporates the provisions of current penalty enhancers eliminated by the bill (see
above,
Penalty enhancers). The bill also generally requires the court to state the
reasons for its sentencing decision in open court and on the record.
C) When a court imposes a bifurcated sentence on a person who is also subject
to a prison sentence for a crime committed before December 31, 1999 (an
indeterminate sentence), the court must specify all of the following: 1) whether the
confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence is to run concurrent with or
consecutively to the imprisonment portion of the indeterminate sentence; and 2)
whether the period of parole under the indeterminate sentence is to run concurrent
with or consecutively to the term of extended supervision portion of the bifurcated
sentence. The court must make the same specifications when imposing an
indeterminate sentence on a person who is also subject to a bifurcated sentence.
D) The bill allows DOC to take custody of a person who is on extended
supervision in order to investigate an alleged violation of a condition of extended
supervision. If a person on extended supervision admits that he or she has violated
a condition or rule of extended supervision, DOC may confine the person for not more
than 90 days in a DOC regional detention facility or, with the consent of the sheriff,
in a county jail.
E) The bill changes the procedure for revoking extended supervision by
requiring that a court determine how long to send a person back to prison after his
or her extended supervision is revoked. DOC or the administrative law judge who
made the revocation decision must make a recommendation to the court concerning
the amount of time for which the person should be returned to prison. The court then
reviews the recommendation and makes the final decision as to the amount of time
for which the person is returned to prison.
F) DOC or a person on extended supervision may petition a court to modify the
conditions of extended supervision set by the court. The court may hold a hearing
on a petition to modify extended supervision and may grant the petition if it
determines that the requested modification would meet the needs of DOC and the
public and would be consistent with the objectives of the person's bifurcated
sentence.
G) Older prisoners who have been given a bifurcated sentence may petition the
sentencing court for a modification of the terms of the sentence if they are 65 years
of age or older and have served at least five years of the term of confinement in prison
portion of their bifurcated sentence or are 60 years of age or older and have served
at least ten years of the term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated
sentence. The prisoner files a petition with the prison's program review committee,
which may then refer the petition to the sentencing court if it finds that the public
interest would be served by a modification of the prisoner's bifurcated sentence. If
a petition is referred to a sentencing court, the court must determine whether the
public interest would be served by a modification of the prisoner's bifurcated
sentence. The victim of the prisoner's crime has a right to provide a statement
concerning the modification of the sentence.
If the court decides that the public interest would be served by such a
modification, the court must modify the sentence by: 1) reducing the term of
confinement in prison portion of the sentence to a number that provides for the
release of the prisoner to extended supervision; and 2) increasing the term of
extended supervision of the prisoner by the same number, so that the total length of
the bifurcated sentence does not change.
H) A prisoner who has been given a bifurcated sentence and who has a terminal
condition (defined as an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, as
a result of which the person has a medical prognosis that his or her life expectancy
is 6 months or less) may petition the sentencing court for a modification of the terms
of the sentence. The conditions under which and the manner by which a court may
modify a bifurcated sentence for such a person are identical to those that are
described in the second and third paragraphs of item 3-G, except that the prisoner
must submit affidavits from two physicians setting forth a diagnosis that the
prisoner has a terminal condition.
I) If a misdemeanor offender may be sentenced to prison because of the
application of a sentence enhancer and the court decides to sentence the person to
prison, the court must impose a bifurcated sentence. In sentencing a person to prison
in such a case, the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence may not
constitute more than 75% of the total bifurcated sentence.
