Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence seized under a defective search warrant was admissible because a later inventory search would have discovered it. State v. Kennedy, 134 Wis. 2d 308, 396 N.W.2d 765 (Ct. App. 1986).
The reasonableness of an investigative stop depends on facts and circumstances present at the time of the stop. State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987).
Where an officer observed a traffic violation but stopped the vehicle merely to render assistance, inadvertently discovered criminal evidence was admissible. State v. Baudhuin, 141 Wis. 2d 642, 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987).
The trial court is permitted to consider suppressed evidence at sentencing where nothing suggests consideration will encourage illegal searches. State v. Rush, 147 Wis. 2d 225, 432 N.W.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1988).
An escapee does not have a legitimate privacy expectation in premises other than the penal institution he or she is sent to. State v. Amos, 153 Wis. 2d 257, 450 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1989).
Aerial surveillance using standard binoculars and cameras with generally available standard and zoom lenses from an airplane flying no lower than 800 feet was reasonable. State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990).
The statutory privilege protecting an informer protects the contents of a communication that will tend to reveal the identity of the informant. The trial court may rely on the redacted information in determining the informant's reliability and credibility in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion justifying the warrantless seizure of a package. State v. Gordon, 159 Wis. 2d 335, 464 NW 91 (Ct. App. 1990).
Evidence obtained from a legal search following 2 prior illegal searches was not suppressed where the 3rd search was sufficiently attenuated from the prior 2. State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991).
Factors used to determine the extent of a home's curtilage discussed. State v. Moley, 171 Wis. 2d 207, 490 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1992).
Bank customers have no protectable privacy interest in bank records relating to accounts. State v. Swift, 173 Wis. 2d 870, 496 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1993).
A defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a porch through which the door to the living area was visible and which was entered through an unlocked screen door. Where an officer came to the defendant's residence for a legitimate purpose, observation of contraband from the porch through a window in the interior door was not a search. State v. Edgeberg, 188 Wis. 2d 339, 524 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1994).
The use of a police dog to sniff an automobile parked in a motel parking did not constitute a search. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the air space around a car in a motel parking lot. State v. Garcia, 195 Wis. 2d 68, 535 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1995).
Although a vehicle had been improperly seized, evidence obtained in a later search of the vehicle under a warrant which was not based on information gathered from the illegal seizure was not subject to suppression. State v. Gaines, 197 Wis. 2d 102, 539 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1995).
When executing a search warrant for private premises, the belongings of a visitor on the premises which are plausible repositories for the objects of the search, except those worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant, may be searched. State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996).
Presence in a high drug-trafficking area, a brief meeting of individuals on a sidewalk in the afternoon and the officer's experience that drug transactions take place in that neighborhood which involve brief meetings on the street, without more, is not particularized suspicion justifying an investigative stop. State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997).
A prison inmate does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in his body that permits a 4th amendment challenge to strip searches. Prisoners convicted of crimes are protected from cruel and unusual treatment that prohibits prison officials from utilizing strip searches to punish, harass, humiliate or intimidate inmates regardless of their status in the institution. Al Ghashhiyah v. McCaughtry, 230 Wis. 2d 587, 602 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999).
Police failure to comply with the rule of announcement in violation of the 4th amendment and Art. I, s. 11, did not require suppression of the evidence seized when the officers relied, in objective good faith, upon the pronouncements of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. as no remedial purpose would be served. State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517.
A curtilage determination is a question of constitutional fact subject to a 2-step review. The findings of evidentiary or historical fact are reviewed for clear error to determine if they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The ultimate determination of constitutional fact is reviewed de novo. State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.
Generally a premises warrant authorizes the search of all items that are plausible receptacles of the objects of the search. When currency was an object, looking through documents for hidden currency was appropriate. When the incriminating nature of the document was apparent upon brief perusal, its seizure was justified under the plain view doctrine. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.
When a person turns material over to a 3rd party, the person who turned over the material has no 4th amendment protection if the 3rd party reveals or conveys the material to governmental authorities, whether or not the person who turned over the material had a subjective belief that the 3rd party would not betray him or her. State v. Knight, 2000 WI 16, 232 Wis. 2d 305, 605 N.W.2d 291.
A pretrial detainee, including the subject of an arrest, is entitled to receive medical attention. The scope of this due process protection is not specifically defined, but is at least as great as the 8th amendment protection available to a convicted prisoner. Robinson v. City of West Allis, 2000 WI 126, 239 Wis. 2d 595, 619 N.W.2d 692.
While the subtleties of police practice in some cases necessitate an expert witness, there is no per se requirement that there be expert testimony to prove an excessive use of force claim. Robinson v. City of West Allis, 2000 WI 126, 239 Wis. 2d 595, 619 N.W.2d 692.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject to 4th amendment protection. An inner tube rental and campground business did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas open to the public. Float-Rite Park, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 2001 WI App 113, 244 Wis. 2d 34, 629 N.W.2d 818.
The use of an infrared sensing device to detect heat emanating from a residence constitutes a search requiring a warrant. State v. Lorager, 2002 WI App 5, 250 Wis. 2d 198, 640 N.W.2d 555. See also Kyllo v. U.S. 533 U.S. 27, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001).
Arson investigations under s. 165.55 (9) and (10) are subject to search warrant requirements set forth in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). Consent to search discussed. 68 Atty. Gen. 225.
In-custody statements stemming from an illegal arrest are not admissible merely because Miranda warnings were given. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590.
Bank records are not private papers protected by a legitimate "expectation of privacy". United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435.
Standard procedure inventory of any container impounded by police is reasonable search. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364.
Standards for application of exclusionary rule to live-witness testimony discussed. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
A newspaper office may be searched for evidence of a crime even though the newspaper is not suspected of a crime. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
Stopping a car for no other reason than to check the license and registration was unreasonable under Fourth amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
In-court identification of the accused was not suppressed as the fruit of unlawful arrest. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
Illegally seized evidence was properly admitted to impeach the defendant's false trial testimony, given in response to proper cross-examination, where the evidence did not squarely contradict the defendant's testimony on direct examination. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
Arcane concepts of property law do not control the ability to claim 4th amendment protections. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
Resemblance to "drug courier profile" was insufficient basis for seizure. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
Objective facts and circumstantial evidence justified an investigative stop of a smuggler's vehicle. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
The automobile exception does not extend to a closed, opaque container located in the luggage compartment. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
Police placement of aa beeper in a container of precursor chemical used to manufacture an illicit drug and the subsequent surveillance of the defendant's car by monitoring beeper transmission was not prohibited by the 4th amendment. U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
The detention and interrogation of an airline passenger fitting a "drug courier profile" was unconstitutional. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Under the "independent source" doctrine, evidence discovered during a valid search was admissible regardless of whether initial entry was illegal. Segura v. U.S. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule allowed the admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, later found to be unsupported by probable cause. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule discussed. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
If a "wanted flyer" has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a wanted person has committed a crime, other officers may rely on the flyer to stop and question that person. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
In assessing whether detention is too long to be justified as an investigative stop, it is appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
Proposed surgery under general anesthetic to recover a bullet from an accused robber's body was an unreasonable search. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
Fingerprints were not admissible where the police transported the suspect to a station house for fingerprinting without consent, probable cause, or prior judicial authorization. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
Apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Where an officer stopped a car for traffic violations and reached into the car to move papers obscuring the vehicle ID number, discovered evidence was admissible. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
The reasonable expectation of privacy was not violated when police, acting on an anonymous tip, flew over the defendant's enclosed backyard and observed marijuana plants. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
Defendants have no reasonable privacy interest in trash left on a curb for pick-up. Therefore, a warrantless search is not prohibited under federal law. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
The use of a roadblock to halt a suspect's automobile constituted a seizure. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989).
The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule does not extend to the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach testimony of defense witnesses other than the defendant. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 107 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1990).
For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or where that is absent, submission to an officer's "show of authority". California v. Hodari D. 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).
Where an officer has no articulable suspicion regarding a person, but requests that person to allow the search of his luggage, there is no seizure of the person if a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request or end the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991).
Fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures extend to civil matters. The illegal eviction of a trailer home from a private park with deputy sheriffs present to prevent interference was an unconstitutional seizure of property. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992).
Whether police must "knock and announce" prior to entering a residence in executing a warrant is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 4th amendment. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995).
Public school students are granted lesser privacy protections than adults, and student athletes even less. Mandatory drug testing of student athletes did not violate the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. School Dist. 475 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995).
It is a violation of the 4th amendment for police to bring members of the media or other 3rd persons into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the 3rd persons in the home is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999).
The "reasonableness" of the investigative detention: An "ad hoc" constitutional test. Wiseman. 67 MLR 641 (1984).
The exclusionary rule and the 1983-1984 term. Gammon. 68 MLR 1 (1984).
The constitutionality of the canine sniff search: From Katz to dogs. Fitzgerald. 68 MLR 57 (1984).
Analyzing the reasonableness of bodily intrusions. Sarnacki. 68 MLR 130 (1984).
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule: The latest example of "new federalism" in the states. 71 MLR 166 (1987).
Search and seizure—abandonment. 1974 WLR 212.
Terry revisited: Critical update on recent stop-and-frisk developments. 1977 WLR 877.
The future of the exclusionary rule and the development of state constitutional law. 1987 WLR 377.
Search and Seizure of Computer Data. McChrystal, Gleisner, Kuborn. Wis. Law. Dec. 1998.
The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Wiseman. WBB Aug. 1986.
CONSENT AND STANDING
The fact that consent to the search of a car was given while the defendant was in custody does not establish involuntariness. It was not improper for the police to tell the defendant that if a search did not produce stolen goods he would be released. Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 489, 190 N.W.2d 542.
Where police opened a package in the possession of an express company without a warrant or the consent of the addressee, persons later arrested in possession of the package, other than the addressee, have no standing to challenge the evidence on the ground of illegal search. Defendants would have to establish a possessory interest in the package at the time of the search. State v. Christel, 61 Wis. 2d 143, 211 N.W.2d 801.
The defendant was qualified to challenge the admissibility of evidence taken from his wife, where he and his wife were in each other's presence when arrested for the same crime, a search of her person at that time would have been at a place where the defendant had a legitimate right to be; the object of the search, incident to the arrest for robbery could only be for weapons and incriminating evidence against him and his wife; and this situation carried over into a custodial search of the wife which was thereafter conducted at the police station where the search occurred. State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 213 N.W.2d 545.
Sons of a murdered property owner did not as such have authority to consent to a search of the premises. Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800.
A person living in a tent in the yard of a house had no authority to grant consent to a warrantless search of the house. A police officer's observation through a window of a cigarette being passed in the house did not constitute probable cause for a warrantless search of the house for marijuana. "Plain view" doctrine discussed. State v. McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d 203, 252 N.W.2d 365.
An estranged wife had no authority to consent to the warrantless search of property she owned jointly with her defendant husband but did not occupy at that time. State v. Verhagen, 86 Wis. 2d 262, 272 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1978).
Paramour whose access to premises was at whim of lover had no legitimate expectation of privacy necessitating search warrant. State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981).
Impoundment and subsequent warrantless inventory search of car, including locked glove box, were not unconstitutional. Automatic standing discussed. State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982).
Defendant had no standing to contest legality of search of van because of lack of dominion and control over van. State v. Wisurmerski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982).
Where defendant's mother admitted police into home to talk to her son, subsequent arrest of son was valid. State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 349 N.W.2d 453 (1984).
Where police reentered home to recreate crime 45 hours after consent to enter, evidence seized was properly suppressed. State v. Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985).
A person who borrows a car with the owner's permission has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. State v. Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d 461, 501 N.W.2d 442 (1993).
In a consent search, voluntariness and freedom from coercion, not fully informed consent, must be shown; language and cultural background are relevant in determining whether the police took advantage in gaining consent. State v. Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d 525, 504 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1993).
All occupants of a vehicle in a police-initiated stop are seized and have standing to challenge the the lawfulness of the seizure. To establish lawfulness, the state must establish only that the police possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize someone in the vehicle. State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 242, 557 N.W.2d 247 (1996).
Consent to a search must be knowledgeably and voluntarily given. When consent is not requested, it cannot be knowledgeably and voluntarily given. State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997).
A defendant's consent to a search obtained following illegal police activity may be admissible. The court must consider the temporal proximity of the misconduct to the statements by the defendant, the presence of intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct. Application discussed. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). See also State v. Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 338, 585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1998).
Suddenly placing a police officer at each side of a vehicle just prior to asking for consent to search cannot be said to create or to be intended to create a coercive situation. State v. Stankus, 220 Wis. 2d 232, 582 N.W.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1998).
A person with no property interest who may have entered the premises legitimately but did not have permission to remain to the time of a search is without standing to challenge the search. State v. McCray, 220 Wis. 2d 705, 583 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998).
To have standing to challenge the pre-delivery seizure of a package not addressed to the defendant, the defendant has the burden of establishing some reasonable expectation of privacy in the package, which will be determined on a case-by-case basis. State v. Ramirez, 228 Wis. 2d 561, 598 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1999).
Non-objected to warrantless entry by police into living quarters is entry demanded under color of office granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right. If consent is granted only in acquiescence to an unlawful assertion of authority, the consent is invalid. Moreover, an initial refusal to permit a search when asked militates against a finding of voluntariness. State v. Munroe, 2001 WI App 104, 244 Wis. 2d 1, 630 N.W.2d 223.
