The privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to the production of corporate records by their custodian, even though the records may tend to incriminate the custodian personally. State v. Balistrieri, 55 Wis. 2d 513, 201 N.W.2d 18.
A defendant who waived counsel and who agreed to sign a confession admitting 18 burglaries in return for an agreement that he would be prosecuted for only one, could not claim that the confession was improperly induced. The state has the burden of showing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. Pontow v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 135, 205 N.W.2d 775.
The administration of a blood or breathalyzer test does not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Driver, 59 Wis. 2d 35, 207 N.W.2d 850.
Factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary are discussed. State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d 66, 207 N.W.2d 855.
A voluntary confession is not rendered inadmissible because the arrest was made outside the statutory jurisdictional limits of the arresting officer. State v. Ewald, 63 Wis. 2d 165, 216 N.W.2d 213.
While Miranda does require that upon exercise of the defendant's 5th amendment privilege the interrogation must cease, Miranda does not explicitly state that the defendant may not, after again being advised of his rights, be interrogated in the future. State v. Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d 476, 217 N.W.2d 359.
Statements given to police without Miranda warnings, while the defendant was injured and in bed that he was the driver and had been drinking, while voluntary, were inadmissible since at that time accusatorial attention had focused on him. Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286.
The voluntariness of a confession must be determined by examining all the surrounding facts under a totality of circumstances test. Brown v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 581, 219 N.W.2d 373.
Requirements of a claim of immunity are discussed. State v. Hall, 65 Wis. 2d 18, 221 N.W.2d 806.
The validity of a juvenile confession is determined by an analysis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. The presence of a parent, guardian, or attorney is not an absolute requirement for the juvenile to validly waive the right to remain silent but only one of the factors to be considered in determining voluntariness. Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850.
A written confession is admissible in evidence, although it is not signed by the defendant, so long as the defendant has read the statement and adopted it as his or her own. Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 230 N.W.2d 750.
When the defendant claimed to understand his Miranda rights but agreed to talk to police without counsel because of a stated inability to afford a lawyer, further questioning by police was improper and the resulting confession was inadmissible. Micale v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 370, 251 N.W.2d 458.
The state may compel a probationer's testimony in a revocation proceeding if the probationer is first advised that the testimony will be inadmissible in criminal proceedings arising out of the alleged probation violation, except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal. State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664.
A volunteered confession made while in custody and prior to Miranda warnings was held to be admissible despite an earlier inadmissible statement in response to custodial interrogation. LaTender v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 383, 253 N.W.2d 221.
No restrictions of the 4th and 5th amendments preclude enforcement of an order for handwriting exemplars directed by a presiding judge in a John Doe proceeding. State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 254 N.W.2d 210.
Due process does not require that a John Doe witness be advised of the nature of the proceeding or that the witness is a "target" of the investigation. Ryan v. State, 79 Wis. 2d 83, 255 N.W.2d 910.
The defendant's confession was admissible although it was obtained through custodial interrogation following the defendant's request for a lawyer. Leach v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 199, 265 N.W.2d 495 (1978).
When a "conversational" visit was not a custodial interrogation, the defendant's voluntary statement was admissible despite a lack of Miranda warnings. State v. Hockings, 86 Wis. 2d 709, 273 N.W.2d 339 (1979).
A confession after a 28-hour post-arrest detention was admissible. Wagner v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 70, 277 N.W.2d 849 (1979).
Immunity for compelled testimony contrary to the 5th amendment privilege extends to juvenile court proceedings. State v. J.H.S. 90 Wis. 2d 613, 280 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1979).
The defendant's voluntary statements were admissible for impeachment even though they were obtained in violation of Miranda. State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d 106, 291 N.W.2d 478 (1980).
When the accused cut off the initial interrogation but was interrogated by another officer 9 minutes later following fresh Miranda warnings, the confession was admissible. State v. Shaffer, 96 Wis. 2d 531, 292 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1980).
By testifying as to his actions on the day a murder was committed, the defendant waived his self-incrimination privilege on cross-examination as to prior actions related to the murder that were the subject of the pending prosecution. Neely v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 38, 292 N.W.2d 859 (1980).
Miranda warnings were unnecessary when an officer entered the defendant's home in the belief that the defendant might have killed his wife 4 days earlier, and asked, "Where is your wife?" State v. Kraimer, 99 Wis. 2d 306, 298 N.W.2d 568 (1980).
A prosecutor's comment on the failure of an alibi witness to come forward with an alibi story did not infringe on the defendant's right of silence. State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982).
The defendant's silence both before and after Miranda warnings may not be referred to at trial by the prosecution. State v. Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982).
Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show physical manifestations of the defendant driver's intoxication. State v. Haefer, 110 Wis. 2d 381, 328 N.W.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1982).
A John Doe subpoena requiring the production of income tax returns violated the self-incrimination right. B. M. v. State, 113 Wis. 2d 183, 335 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1983).
A statement given to police, without Miranda warnings, while the accused was in an emergency room that the accused was the driver in a fatal crash was admissible. State v. Clappes, 117 Wis. 2d 277, 344 N.W.2d 141 (1984).
After a guilty plea the privilege against self-incrimination continues at least until sentencing. State v. McConnohie, 121 Wis. 2d 57, 358 N.W.2d 256 (1984).
When the defendant does not testify but presents his own argument to the jury, the prosecutor may caution the jury that the defendant's statements are not evidence. State v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 358 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1984).
When a relative of the accused contacted police and asked if anything could be done to help the accused, a subsequent confession elicited from the accused by the relative was inadmissible. Factors to be considered in determining when a civilian becomes an agent of the police are discussed. State v. Lee, 122 Wis. 2d 266, 362 N.W.2d 149 (1985).
When police knew that a suspect had asked his wife to contact an attorney and did not inform the suspect when the attorney arrived at the police station, a confession obtained after the attorney's arrival was inadmissible. State v. Middleton, 135 Wis. 2d 297, 399 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1986).
Police had no duty to inform a suspect during custodial interrogation that a lawyer retained by the suspect's family was present. State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 401 N.W.2d 771 (1987).
Incriminating statements by an intoxicated defendant undergoing medical treatment for painful injuries was voluntary since there was no affirmative police misconduct compelling the defendant to answer police questioning. State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987).
The "rescue doctrine" exception to the Miranda rule is discussed. State v. Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d 172, 404 N.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1987).
A probationer's answers to a probation agent's questions are "compelled" and may not be used for any purpose in a criminal trial. State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 419 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987).
The prosecution may comment on an accused's pre-Miranda silence when the accused elects to testify on his own behalf. State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988).
The "functional equivalent" of direct custodial interrogation is discussed. State v. Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d 272, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988).
The admission of an involuntary or coerced confession is subject to the harmless error test. State v. Childs, 146 Wis. 2d 116, 430 N.W.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1988).
The use of Goodchild testimony to impeach the defendant's trial testimony does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Schultz, 152 Wis. 2d 408, 448 N.W.2d 424 (1989).
An unconstitutionally obtained confession may be admitted and serve as the sole basis for a bindover at a preliminary examination. State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990).
When a psychiatrist did not comply with Miranda, the constitution does not require exclusion of the results of the interview with the defendant from the competency phase of the trial. State v. Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d 324, 468 N.W.2d 168 (1991).
Miranda does not require warning a suspect that he has the right to stop answering questions. State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992).
Miranda safeguards are not required when a suspect is simply in custody, but are required when the suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. State v. Coulthard, 171 Wis. 2d 573, 492 N.W.2d 329 (Ct. App. 1992).
A criminal defendant may be compelled to submit a voice sample consisting of specific words for purposes of identification. The words do not require a revelation of the contents of the mind to impart an admission of or evidence of guilt. Commenting on a refusal to give a sample does not violate the right against self-incrimination. State v. Hubanks, 173 Wis. 2d 1, 496 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1992).
A waiver of Miranda rights must be made knowingly and intelligently, as well as voluntarily. A knowing and intelligent waiver must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence as determined from an objective assessment of the circumstances. State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 499 N.W.2d 258 (Ct. App. 1993).
If police do not use coercive tactics, that a defendant is undergoing medical treatment or experiencing pain is not determinative on the issue of voluntariness. State v. Schambow, 176 Wis. 2d 286, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993).
When a defendant pleads guilty then appeals the denial of a suppression motion under s. 971.31 (10), the harmless error rule may not be applied when a motion to suppress was erroneously denied. State v. Pounds, 176 Wis. 2d 315, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993).
Miranda protections come into play when a reasonable person in the defendant's position would consider himself to be in custody. State v. Pounds, 176 Wis. 2d 315, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993).
Failure to give Miranda warnings during a telephone conversation initiated to encourage the defendant's surrender following an armed robbery police suspected was committed by the defendant did not require suppression of admissions made to the police. State v. Stearns, 178 Wis. 2d 845, 506 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1993).
Routine booking questions, such as the defendant's name and address, that are not intended to elicit incriminating responses are exempted from the coverage of Miranda. Miranda safeguards are applicable to questions asked during an arrest or concerning name and residence when the questions relate to an element of the crime. State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994).
The defendant's intoxication for purposes of motor vehicle statutes did not per se demonstrate an inability to knowingly waive Miranda rights. State v. Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 959, 512 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994).
Coercive police activity is a predicate to establishing involuntariness but does not itself establish involuntariness. Officer dissatisfaction with a defendant's answers and statements by the officer that cooperation would benefit the defendant is not coercion without a promise of leniency. State v. Deets, 187 Wis. 2d 629, 523 N.W.2d 180 (Ct. App. 1994).
A refusal to perform a field sobriety test is not testimony and not protected by the constitution. The refusal to submit to the test was properly admitted as evidence to determine probable cause for arrest for intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle. State v. Babbit, 188 Wis. 2d 349, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994).
Edwards v. Arizona requires interrogation to cease once a suspect requests an attorney. It does not prohibit questions designed to accommodate the request. When in response to being asked his attorney's name a suspect gave a name and then stated that the person was not an attorney, the interrogating officer was not prevented from continuing interrogation. State v. Lagar, 190 Wis. 2d 423, 526 N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1994).
A forced confession as a condition of probation does not violate the right against self-incrimination. The constitution protects against the use of confessions in subsequent criminal prosecutions but does not protect against the use of those statements in a revocation proceeding. State v. Carrizales, 191 Wis. 2d 85, 528 N.W.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1995).
A suspect's reference to an attorney who had represented or is presently representing the suspect in another matter is not a request for counsel requiring the cessation of questioning. State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995).
The rights to counsel and to remain silent are the defendant's. An attorney not requested by the defendant could not compel the police to end questioning by stating that no questioning was to take place outside his presence. State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995).
Once given, it is not necessary to repeat the Miranda warnings during an investigation of the same person for the same crime. State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995).
While polygraph tests are inadmissible, post-polygraph interviews, found distinct both as to time and content from the examination that preceded them and the statements made therein, are admissible. State v. Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d 382, 535 Wis. 2d 441 (Ct. App. 1995). See also State v. Greer, 2003 WI App 112, 265 Wis. 2d 463, 666 N.W.2d 518, 01-2591 and State v. Davis, 2008 WI 71 ___ Wis. 2d ___, 751 N.W.2d 332, 06-1954.
The privilege against self-incrimination extends beyond sentencing as long as a defendant has a real fear of further incrimination, as when an appeal is pending, before an appeal of right or plea withdrawal has expired, or when the defendant intends or is in the process of moving for sentence modification and shows a reasonable chance of success. State v. Marks, 194 Wis. 2d 79, 533 N.W.2d 730 (1995).
A defendant may selectively waive Miranda rights. Refusal to answer specific questions does not assert an overall right to to silence, if there is an unequivocal expression of selective invocation. State v. Wright, 196 Wis. 2d 149, 537 N.W.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-3004.
Whether incriminating statements made following an illegal arrest are admissible depends on whether the statements were obtained by means sufficiently attenuated from the illegal act. The factors to be considered are voluntariness, proximity of conduct to the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and flagrancy of the misconduct. State v. Tobias, 196 Wis. 2d 537, 538 N.W.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1995), 95-0324.
The right to counsel under Miranda must be personally invoked by the suspect. Simply retaining counsel is not an unequivocal statement that the suspect wishes to deal with the police only in the presence of counsel. State v. Coerper, 199 Wis. 2d 216, 544 N.W.2d 423 (1996), 94-2791.
Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, judicial inquiry into voluntariness is beside the point. Physical evidence derived from statements made in violation of the asserted right must be suppressed. However, evidence admitted in violation of this rule is subject to a harmless error analysis. State v. Harris, 199 Wis. 2d 227, 544 N.W.2d 545 (1996), 93-0730.
Prosecution comments on a defendant's claimed lack of memory and subsequent silence during a police interview conducted shortly after the incident when the defendant testified at length at trial on the same subject did not violate the right against self-incrimination when the comments were intended to impeach the defendant's testimony and not to ask the jury to infer guilt from the defendant's silence. State v. Wulff, 200 Wis. 2d 318, 546 N.W.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1732.
A suspect's declaration that he did not wish to speak to a specific police officer is not an invocation of the right to remain silent. Police adoption of "good cop/bad cop" roles did not render an interrogation coercive and its results inadmissible. State v. Owen, 202 Wis. 2d 620, 551 N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-2631.
A suspect's silence, standing alone, is insufficient to unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent. State v. Ross, 203 Wis. 2d 66, 552 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1671.
A suspect's statement to his mother during an arrest that she should call a lawyer was not an unequivocal statement that the suspect wished to deal with the police only in the presence of counsel. State v. Rodgers, 203 Wis. 2d 83, 552 N.W.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-2570.
The sufficiency of Miranda warnings given by the police in a foreign language and a subsequent waiver of those rights may be challenged. If timely notice of the challenge is given the state has the burden to produce evidence to show that the foreign language words reasonably conveyed the rights and that waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996), 94-1200.
The privilege against self-incrimination may be replaced by a grant of immunity, which has the same scope and effect as the privilege itself. The immunity must protect against derivative use of compelled information that could lead to evidence that could be used in a criminal prosecution as well as information that could be used directly. State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997), 94-2848.
A defendant's refusal to submit to a field sobriety test is not protected by the right against self-incrimination and is admissible as evidence. State v. Mallick, 210 Wis. 2d 427, 565 N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-3048.
Evidence of why a defendant did not testify has no bearing on guilt or innocence, is not relevant, and is inadmissible. State v. Heuer, 212 Wis. 2d 58, 567 N.W.2d 638 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-3594.
A CHIPS proceeding is not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the 5th amendment. Miranda warnings are not required to be given to the CHIPS petition subject, even though the individual is in custody and subject to interrogation, in order for the subject's statements to be admissible. State v. Thomas J.W. 213 Wis. 2d 264, 570 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0506.
That the defendant is detained in a temporary Terry stop does not automatically mean Miranda warnings are not required. Whether the warnings are required depends on whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have considered himself or herself to be in custody. State v. Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d 581, 582 N.W.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1998), 96-2588.
Use of prearrest silence is barred if it is induced by governmental action. The right to silence was not implicated by a governmental employee defendant's refusal to meet with his supervisors to discuss employment issues. The prosecution was free to comment on that refusal. State v. Adams, 221 Wis. 2d 1, 584 N.W.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-1926.
That a police officer intentionally withheld information that she had a warrant for the defendant's arrest and intended to arrest him at some point was irrelevant to whether the defendant was in custody when he made incriminating statements without having received Miranda warnings. State v. Mosher, 221 Wis. 2d 203, 584 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3535.
There are 4 requirements that together trigger the privilege against self-incrimination. The information sought must be: 1) incriminating; 2) personal to the defendant; 3) obtained by compulsion; and 4) testimonial or communicative in nature. Discovery of information not meeting these criteria is not barred. State v. Revels, 221 Wis. 2d 315, 585 N.W.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3148.
The application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to violations of Miranda that are not also violations of the 5th or 14th amendment is improper. A failure to administer Miranda warnings that was unaccompanied by any actual coercion is insufficient to result in an imputation of taint to subsequent statements. State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999), 97-0925.
The state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was voluntarily made. Whether a confession is true or false cannot play a part in determining whether it was voluntary. A relevancy objection to questioning regarding the truthfulness of a confession was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999), 96-3406.
If a statement secured by the police is voluntary, although in violation of Miranda, it may be used to impeach the defendant's conflicting testimony, although it is inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Whether the statement is voluntary depends on whether it was compelled by coercive means or improper police practices, as indicated by the totality of the circumstances. State v. Franklin, 228 Wis. 2d 408, 596 N.W.2d 855 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2420.
When a criminal defendant objects to testimony of his or her out-of-court statement as incomplete or attempts to cross-examine the witness on additional parts of the statement, the court must make a discretionary determination regarding whether the additional portions are required for completeness. Additional portions of the defendant's statement are not inadmissible solely because the defendant chooses not to testify. State v. Anderson, 230 Wis. 2d 121, 600 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3639.
Miranda warnings need not be given in the suspect's language of choice, but the warnings must be given in a language in which the suspect is proficient enough to to understand the concepts that are involved in the warnings. State v. Hindsley, 2000 WI App 130, 237 Wis. 2d 358, 614 N.W.2d 48, 99-1374.
Whether a suspect knowingly and intelligently waived Miranda rights is a separate inquiry from whether the statement was voluntary. State v. Hindsley, 2000 WI App 130, 237 Wis. 2d 358, 614 N.W.2d 48, 99-1374.
Whether an interrogation that resumed after an invocation of the right to remain silent violated the right against self-incrimination is analyzed based on whether: 1) the original interrogation was promptly terminated; 2) it was resumed after a significant amount of time; 3) Miranda warnings were given at the beginning of the subsequent interrogation; 4) a different officer resumed the questioning; and 5) the subsequent interrogation was limited to a different crime. These factors are not exclusively controlling, however, and should not be woodenly applied. State v. Badker, 2001 WI App 27, 240 Wis. 2d 460, 623 N.W.2d 142, 99-2943.
There is an exception to the application of Miranda for routine booking questions. The questions must be asked: 1) by an agency ordinarily involved in booking suspects; 2) during a true booking; and 3) shortly after the suspect is taken into custody. The test of whether questioning constitutes interrogation and is not covered by the exception if in light of all the circumstances the police should have known that the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. State v. Bryant, 2001 WI App 554, 241 Wis. 2d 554, 624 N.W.2d 865, 00-0686.
When the defendant's plea put his mental competency at issue and his attorney consented to 2 competency examinations and had actual notice of them, the use of those reports during sentencing did not violate the right against self-incrimination. State v. Slagoski, 2001 WI App 112, 244 Wis. 2d 49, 629 N.W.2d 50, 00-1586.
If the defendant opens the door to government questioning by the defendant's own remarks about post-arrest behavior or by defense counsel's questioning, the state may use the defendant's silence for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony. When defense counsel asked leading questions of the officer who conducted a post-Miranda interview of the defendant that implied the defendant had actively denied the crime charged, the state was permitted to clarify that defendant had not answered all questions asked of him. State v. Nielsen, 2001 WI App 192, 247 Wis. 2d 466, 634 N.W.2d 325, 00-3224.
