Under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect. At the same time, in a collective knowledge situation, if a defendant moves to suppress, the prosecutor must prove the collective knowledge that supports the stop. Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer. Such testimony provides no basis for the court to assess the validity of the police suspicion. The testimony contains no specific, articulable facts to which the court can apply the reasonable suspicion standard. State v. Pickens,
2010 WI App 5,
323 Wis. 2d 226,
779 N.W.2d 1,
08-1514.
When a temporary detention is justified, the court will still examine the circumstances of the detention to determine whether the investigative means used in a continued seizure are the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion and whether it lasted no longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. It was an unreasonable seizure when a suspect was handcuffed based on the bare fact that the officer knew the suspect was suspected in a prior shooting when no specific, articulable facts were presented to support that position under the collective knowledge doctrine. State v. Pickens,
2010 WI App 5,
323 Wis. 2d 226,
779 N.W.2d 1,
08-1514.
Although a person sharing a hotel room was found to have apparent authority over the room authorizing her to consent to a search of the room, she did not have actual or apparent authority over the inside of the safe when the safe was locked, she could not open the safe, and she did not even know it was in the room. Even if the scope of her consent to search the room included the safe, the search of the safe was unreasonable if she had no authority to grant that consent. State v. Pickens,
2010 WI App 5,
323 Wis. 2d 226,
779 N.W.2d 1,
08-1514.
In a search incident to an arrest, an officer may only search that area within the "immediate control" of the arrestee. In a no-arrest case, the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists since the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle when the interrogation is completed. Because the defendant was not under arrest, the officers had an immediate safety interest in verifying that that the defendant did not have a gun or other weapon under his immediate control. Therefore, the search of the defendant's vehicle console was not prohibited. State v. Williams,
2010 WI App 39,
323 Wis. 2d 460,
781 N.W.2d 495,
09-0501.
Soldal, 506 U.S. 56, recognized that there could be a seizure of property in violation of the 4th amendment even though the seizure was not preceded or accompanied by a search.
Soldal also specifically recognized that a valid consent permits a lawful 4th amendment seizure. Here computers owned by one tenant were legally seized when another tenant, who had permission to use those computers, specifically gave the detective the right to "conduct a complete search of [m]y premises, and all property found therein, located at" the apartment and to take the computers away for further analysis. State v. Ramage,
2010 WI App 77, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
09-0784.
The holding of
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___, that
Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle is adopted as the proper interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Dearborn,
2010 WI 84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
07-1894.
Federal case law does not limit an officer's community caretaker functions to incidents involving automobiles, but instead counsels a cautious approach when the exception is invoked to justify law enforcement intrusion into a home. State v. Pinkard,
2010 WI 81, ___ Wis. 2d___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
08-1204.
In light of
Gant v. Arizona, 556 U.S. ___, the broad rule adopted in
Fry,
131 Wis. 2d 153, is no longer good law.
Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. State v. Bauer,
2010 WI App 93, ___ Wis. 2d___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
09-1367.
Police cannot conduct warrantless searches pursuant to a probation apprehension request. Warrantless searches conducted by police, as opposed to probation agents, are prohibited. State v. Bauer,
2010 WI App 93, ___ Wis. 2d___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
09-1367.
A warrantless, non-exigent, felony arrest in public was constitutional despite the opportunity to obtain a warrant. United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411.
When a driver was stopped because of expired license plates, a police order to get out of the car was reasonable and a subsequent "pat down" based on an observed bulge under the driver's jacket resulted in the legal seizure of an unlicensed revolver. Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977).
A burning building clearly presents an exigency rendering a warrantless entry reasonable, and fire officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the fire after it is extinguished. Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499 (1978)
The warrantless installation of a pen register, that recorded telephone numbers called but not the contents of the calls, did not violate the 4th amendment. Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
A warrantless search of a suitcase in the trunk of a taxi was unconstitutional. Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979).
Police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
That police had lawful possession of pornographic film boxes did not give them authority to search their contents. Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649 (1980).
An officer who accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman,
455 U.S. 1 (1982).
Officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
When an officer, after stopping a defendant's car at a routine driver's license checkpoint, saw a tied-off party balloon in plain sight, the officer had probable cause to believe the balloon contained an illicit substance. Hence, a warrantless seizure of the balloon was legal. Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730 (1983).
A warrantless search by arson investigators of the defendant's fire-damaged home that was not a continuation of an earlier search was unconstitutional. Michigan v. Clifford,
464 U.S. 287 (1984).
When a damaged shipping package was examined by company employees who discovered white powder, a subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. U.S. v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
The "open fields" doctrine is discussed. Oliver v. U.S.
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
The warrantless, nighttime entry of the defendant's home for arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under the "hot pursuit" doctrine or the preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740 (1984).
School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student. The legality of the search depends on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. New Jersey v. T. L. O.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
When officers were entitled to seize packages in a vehicle and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, a warrantless search of the packages 3 days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns,
469 U.S. 478 (1985).
The vehicle exception for warrantless searches applies to motor homes. California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when an officer reasonably relies upon a statute allowing a warrantless administrative search that was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
A protective sweep of a residence in conjunction with an arrest is permissible if police reasonably believe that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325,
108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990).
For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or when force is absent, submission to an officer's "show of authority." California v. Hodari D.
499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).
A determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest generally meets the promptness requirement. If a hearing is held more than 48 hours following the arrest the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate an emergency or extraordinary circumstances. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44,
114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991).
There shall be one rule governing all automobile searches. The police may search the car and all containers within it without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained in either. California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565,
114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991).
If during a lawful weapons pat down an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized. Minnesota v. Dickerson,
508 U.S. 366,
124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993).
An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408,
137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997).
Persons observed through a window in a home where they were not overnight guests but were present for a short period to engage in a primarily commercial illegal drug transaction, had no expectation of privacy in the home and the observation of those persons was not a constitutionally prohibited search. Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83,
142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998).
The issuance of a traffic citation without an arrest did not authorize a full search of the vehicle. Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113,
142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998).
When there is probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband officers may examine containers in the vehicle without a showing of individualized probable cause for each container. The container may be searched whether or not it's owner is present as a passenger, or otherwise, because it may contain contraband that the officers reasonably believe is in the car. Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295,
143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999).
Police need not obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband. Florida v. White,
526 U.S. 559,
143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999).
The exception to the requirement of a warrant for automobiles does not require a separate finding of exigency, in addition to a finding of probable cause. Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465,
144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
When there is probable cause to search a motor vehicle, the search is not unreasonable if the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, although a warrant was not obtained. No separate finding of exigent circumstances is required. Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465,
144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119,
145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).
An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, is insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of a person. The tip must bear indicia of reliability. Reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of criminal activity, not just in its tendency to to identify a person. Florida v. J.L.
529 U.S. 266,
146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000).
Stopping vehicles at highway checkpoints without any individualized suspicion to interdict illegal drugs was an unreasonable seizure under the 4th amendment because the primary purpose was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, unlike checkpoints to check for drunk driving or illegal immigrants. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32,
148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000).
The police acted reasonably when, with probable cause to believe that the defendant had hidden drugs in his home, they prevented the man from entering the home for about 2 hours until a search warrant could be obtained. Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U.S. 326, 148 LEd2d 838 (2001).
A state hospital could not test maternity patients for cocaine and then turn the results over to law enforcement authorities without patient consent. The interest of using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine does not justify a departure from the rule that a nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a warrant. Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
525 U.S. 67, 149 LEd 2d 205 (2001).
If an officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed even a very minor criminal offense that does not breach the peace, the officer may, without violating the 4th amendment, arrest the offender without the need to balance the circumstances involved in the particular situation. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318,
149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001)
Obtaining, by sense-enhancing technology like infrared imaging, information regarding the interior of a home that could otherwise not be obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area is a search presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Kyllo v. U.S.
533 U.S. 27,
150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001).
A warrantless search of a probationer's residence founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and authorized as a condition of probation was reasonable. Such a search is not restricted to monitoring whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions. U.S. v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112,
151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001).
Police officers may approach bus riders at random to ask questions and to request consent to search luggage without advising the passengers of their right to not cooperate. U.S. v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194,
153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002).
A school district policy of requiring all participants in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing was a reasonable means of furthering the district's interest in preventing drug use among students and was not an unreasonable search. Board of Education of Independent School District. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. White,
536 U.S. 822,
153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002).
A highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run was reasonable. The arrest of a drunk driver arrested when his vehicle swerved nearly hitting an officer at the checkpoint was constitutional. Illinois v. Lidster,
540 U.S. 419,
157 L. Ed 2d 843,
124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the 4th amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest whether the officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has exited the vehicle. Thornton v. U.S.
541 U.S. 615,
158 L. Ed 2d 905,
124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
The principles of
Terry permit a state to require a suspect to disclose his or her name in the course of a
Terry stop and allow imposing criminal penalties for failing to do so. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County,
542 U.S. 177,
159 L. Ed 2d 292,
124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
The 4th amendment does not requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop. The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405,
160 L. Ed. 2d 842,
125 S. Ct. 834 (2004).
Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. An action is reasonable under the 4th amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, "as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398,
164 L. Ed. 2d 650,
126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006).
Warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the U.S. constitution, and while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the 4th amendment's protections. Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164,
128 S. Ct. 1598,
170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008).
In a traffic-stop setting, the first
Terry condition — a lawful investigatory stop — is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. ___,
129 S. Ct. 781,
172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009).
Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. Consistent with
Thornton, circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___,
129 S. Ct. 1710,
173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009).
The
New Jersey v. T. L. O. concern to limit a school search to a reasonable scope requires reasonable suspicion of danger or a resort to hiding evidence of wrongdoing in underwear before a searcher can reasonably make the quantum leap from a search of outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. ___,
129 S. Ct. 2633,
174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009).
A government employer had the right, under the circumstances of the case, to read text messages sent and received on a pager the employer owned and issued to an employee. The privacy of the messages was not protected by the ban on "unreasonable searches and seizures" found in the 4th amendment. Because the search was motivated by a legitimate work related purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable. Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. ___,
130 S. Ct. 2366;
176 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2010).
Within the meaning of the 4th amendment, domestic animals are effects and the killing of a companion dog constitutes a seizure, which is constitutional only if reasonable. Viilo v. Eyre,
547 F.3d 707 (2008).
State v. Seibel: Wisconsin Police Now Need Only a Reasonable Suspicion to Search a Suspect's Blood Incident to an Arrest. Armstrong. 1993 WLR 563.
But What of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule? The Wisconsin Supreme Court Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless Searches. Schmidt. 83 MLR 299.
But What of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule? The Wisconsin Supreme Court Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless Searches. Schmidt. 83 MLR 299 (1999).
I,12
Attainder; ex post facto; contracts. Section 12
. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
Section 45.37 (9), Stats. 1963, constituted a contract as to the property an applicant for admission to the Grand Army Home had to surrender, and to apply a later amendment would be unconstitutional. Estate of Nottingham,
46 Wis. 2d 580,
175 N.W.2d 640.
Although the obligation of a contract is not an absolute right but one that may yield to the compelling interest of the public, the public purpose served by a law mandating rent reductions due to property tax relief is not so vital so as to permit such an impairment of contract. State ex rel. Bldg. Owners v. Adamany,
64 Wis. 2d 280,
219 N.W.2d 274.
Retroactive application of s. 57.06, 1987 stats. [now s. 304.06], as amended in 1973, increasing the period to be served by state prison inmates imposed an additional penalty and violated the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. State ex rel. Mueller v. Powers,
64 Wis. 2d 643,
221 N.W.2d 692.
The legislative preclusion against the State Medical Society's divesting itself of control of ch. 148, disability plans did not constitute any impairment of the society's charter because: 1) the grant of ch. 148 powers is permissive and voluntarily exercised by the society; 2) the ch. 148 grant is in the nature of a franchise rather than a contract and cannot be viewed as unalterable or it would constitute a delegation of inalienable legislative power; and 3) the constitutional interdiction against statutes impairing contracts does not prevent the state from exercising its police powers for the common good. State Medical Society v. Comm. of Insurance,
70 Wis. 2d 144,
233 N.W.2d 470.
When a probation statute was amended after a crime was committed but before the accused pled guilty and was placed on probation, application of the amended statute to probation revocation proceedings offended the ex post facto clause. State v. White,
97 Wis. 2d 517,
294 N.W.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1979).
A challenge to legislation must prove: 1) the legislation impairs an existing contractual relationship; 2) the impairment is substantial; and 3) if substantial, the impairment is not justified by the purpose of the legislation. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette,
108 Wis. 2d 637,
323 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1982).
The ex post facto prohibition applies to judicial pronouncements as well as legislative acts. The question to be addressed is whether the new law criminalizes conduct that was innocent when committed. State v. Kurzawa,
180 Wis. 2d 502,
509 N.W.2d 712 (1993).
Legislation creating penalty enhancers resulting from convictions prior to the effective date does not run afoul of the ex post facto clause. State v. Schuman,
186 Wis. 2d 213,
520 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1994).
An ex post facto law is one that punishes as a crime an act previously committed, that: 1) was innocent when done; 2) makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or 3) deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available at the time the act was committed. State v. Thiel,
188 Wis. 2d 695,
524 N.W.2d 641 (1994).
Retroactive application of a new statute of limitations, enacted at a time when the old limitations period has not yet run, does not violate the ex post facto clause. State v. Haines,
2003 WI 39,
261 Wis. 2d 139,
661 N.W.2d 72,
01-1311.
Constitutionality of rent control discussed. 62 Atty. Gen. 276.
I,13
Private property for public use. Section 13
. The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor.
The dismissal of an appeal for lack of prosecution in a condemnation action did not violate the condemnee's right to just compensation. Taylor v. State Highway Comm.
45 Wis. 2d 490,
173 N.W.2d 707.
The total rental loss occasioned by a condemnation is compensable, and a limitation to one year's loss was invalid. Luber v. Milwaukee County,
47 Wis. 2d 271,
177 N.W.2d 380.
A prohibition against filling in wetlands pursuant to an ordinance adopted under ss. 59.971 and 144.26 [now ss. 59.692 and 281.31] does not amount to a taking of property. Police powers and eminent domain are compared. Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7,
201 N.W.2d 761.
A special assessment against a railroad for a sanitary sewer laid along the railroad's right-of-way, admittedly of no immediate use or benefit to the railroad, did not constitute a violation of this section. Soo Line RR. Co v. Neenah,
64 Wis. 2d 665,
221 N.W.2d 907.
In order for the petitioner to succeed in the initial stages of an inverse condemnation proceeding, it must allege facts that, prima facie at least, show there has been either an occupation of its property under s. 32.10, or a taking, which must be compensated under the constitution. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm.
66 Wis. 2d 720,
226 N.W.2d 185.
The owners of private wells ordered by the department of natural resources to seal them because of bacteriological danger are not entitled to compensation because such orders are a proper exercise of the state's police power to prevent a public harm, for which compensation is not required. Village of Sussex v. Dept. of Natural Resources,
68 Wis. 2d 187,
228 N.W.2d 173.
Ordering a utility to place its power lines under ground in order to expand an airport constituted a taking because the public benefited from the enlarged airport. Public Service Corp. v. Marathon County,
75 Wis. 2d 442,
249 N.W.2d 543.
For inverse condemnation purposes, a taking can occur absent a physical invasion only when there is a legally imposed restriction upon the property's use. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm.
92 Wis. 2d 74,
284 N.W.2d 887 (1979).