A requirement that deputy sheriffs and police officers be citizens does not deny equal protection to resident aliens. 68 Atty. Gen. 61 (1979).
A worker's compensation law that required men, but not women, to prove disability or dependence on a deceased spouse's earnings violated equal protection. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co.
446 U.S. 142,
100 S. Ct. 1540,
64 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1980).
A layoff plan giving preference on the basis of race to accomplish affirmative action goals was not sufficiently narrowly tailored and, therefore, violated equal protection. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
476 U.S. 267,
106 S. Ct. 1842,
90 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1986).
Student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions. A race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system, but may consider race or ethnicity as a plus factor for an applicant, without insulating the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats. An admissions program must be flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight. Race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306,
123 S. Ct. 2325,
156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003). See also Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244,
123 S. Ct. 2411,
156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003).
Strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review for an equal protection challenge to a California corrections policy of racially segregating prisoners in double cells each time they enter a new correctional facility. All racial classifications imposed by government must be analyzed under strict scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally. There is no exception to the rule that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications in the prison context. Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499,
125 S. Ct. 1141,
160 L. Ed 2d 2949 (2004).
It is impermissible for a school district to rely upon an individual student's race in assigning that student to a particular school so that the racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the racial composition of the school district as a whole. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
551 U.S. 701,
127 S. Ct. 2738,
168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2007).
A public employee cannot state a claim under the equal protection clause by alleging that he or she was arbitrarily treated differently from other similarly situated employees, with no assertion that the different treatment was based on the employee's membership in any particular class. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture,
553 U.S. 591,
128 S. Ct. 2146,
170 L. Ed. 2d 975 (2008).
Under
Grutter, strict scrutiny must be applied to any university admissions program using racial categories or classifications. Once the university has established that its goal of diversity is consistent with strict scrutiny, however, there must still be a further judicial determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation. The university must prove that the means chosen by the university to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal. Strict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.
Grutter did not hold that good faith would forgive an impermissible consideration of race. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. ___,
133 S. Ct. 2411,
186 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2013).
There is no equal protection violation in a state classifying as nonresidents for tuition purposes persons who are residents for all other purposes. Lister v. Hoover,
655 F.2d 123 (1981).
The postconviction detention of a person is a violation of equal protection if it is occasioned by the prisoner's indigency. Taylor v. Gray,
375 F. Supp. 790 (1974).
The contrast between the percentage of the black population of a city, 17.2%, and the percentage of black composition of "fixed wage" skilled craft positions available in the city, 3.1%, evidenced a substantial disparity between the proportion of minorities in the general population and the proportion in a specific job classification and established a prima facie case of unlawful racial discrimination, absent a showing by the city that the statistical discrepancy resulted from causes other than racial discrimination. Crockett v. Grun,
388 F. Supp. 912 (1975).
Civil rights actions against municipalities are discussed. Starstead v. City of Superior,
533 F. Supp. 1365 (1982).
Zoning—Equal protection. 1976 WLR 234.
Equal protection—Sex discrimination. 1976 WLR 330.
DUE PROCESS
Although a person may invoke the right against self incrimination in a civil case in order to protect himself in a subsequent criminal action, an inference against the person's interest may be drawn as a matter of law based upon an implied admission that a truthful answer would tend to prove that the witness had committed the criminal act or what might constitute a criminal act. Molloy v. Molloy,
46 Wis. 2d 682,
176 N.W.2d 292 (1970).
A school board's refusal to renew a teacher's coaching duties in addition to full-time teaching duties, without notice and hearing, did not violate the right to due process when no charge was made that reflected on an invoked a protected liberty interest and when no legal right in the job gave rise to a protected property interest. Richards v. Board of Education,
58 Wis. 2d 444,
206 N.W.2d 597 (1973).
A property interest in employment conferred by state law is protected by the due process provisions of both the state and federal constitutions. State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council,
72 Wis. 2d 672,
242 N.W.2d 689 (1976).
The due process standard in juvenile proceedings is fundamental fairness. Basic requirements are discussed. In Interest of D.H.
76 Wis. 2d 286,
251 N.W.2d 196 (1977).
A permanent status public employee forfeits due process property interests in a job by accepting an inter-departmental promotion. DH&SS v. State Personnel Board,
84 Wis. 2d 675,
267 N.W.2d 644 (1978).
If an attorney is permitted to withdraw on the day of trial without notice, due process requires granting a continuance. Sherman v. Heiser,
85 Wis. 2d 246,
270 N.W.2d 397 (1978).
When a city ordinance specified narrow grounds upon which civil service applicants may be screened out, an applicant had no right to know the grounds for being screened out. Taplick v. City of Madison Personnel Board,
97 Wis. 2d 162,
293 N.W.2d 173 (1980).
Due process rights of students at expulsion hearings are discussed. Racine Unified School Dist. v. Thompson,
107 Wis. 2d 657,
321 N.W.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1982).
Due process was not violated when a defendant was illegally arrested in an asylum state and involuntarily brought to trial. State v. Monje,
109 Wis. 2d 138,
325 N.W.2d 695 (1982).
Due process rights of a tenured professor who was alleged to have resigned were not protected by a hearing to determine eligibility for unemployment compensation. Patterson v. University Board of Regents,
119 Wis. 2d 570,
350 N.W.2d 612 (1984).
Attributes of property interests protected by due process are discussed. Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR,
128 Wis. 2d 59,
381 N.W.2d 318 (1986).
Due process rights of a probationer at a hearing to modify probation are enumerated. State v. Hayes,
173 Wis. 2d 439,
496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992).
The tort of intentional denial of due process is discussed. Old Tuckaway Assoc. v. City of Greenfield,
180 Wis. 2d 254,
509 N.W.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1993).
An inmate has a protected liberty interest in earned good-time credits and in not being placed in segregation. Post-deprivation remedies provided by the state are adequate. Irby v. Macht,
184 Wis. 2d 831,
522 N.W.2d 9 (1994). But see Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
A property interest conferred by a statute subsequently amended to make an appointed governmental position at-will is terminated upon the conclusion of the appointing official's term of office. Unertl v. Dane County,
190 Wis. 2d 145,
526 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1994).
A procedural due process claim arises when there is a deprivation of a right without sufficient process. Generally a predeprivation hearing is required, but when a deprivation results from a random act of a state employee, the question becomes the adequacy of postdeprivation remedies. Jones v. Dane County,
195 Wis. 2d 892,
537 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995),
92-0946.
Substantive due process requires that the state not deprive its citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process. Absent a special relationship, it does not impose an affirmative obligation upon the state to ensure the protection of those rights from a private actor, even when governmental aid may be necessary to secure a person's life, liberty, or property. Jones v. Dane County,
195 Wis. 2d 892,
537 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995),
92-0946.
When a prisoner could not show that a period of segregated confinement that exceeded the time allowed by rule was not atypical of his prison life generally, there was no unconstitutional due process deprivation. The only time factor that courts will be concerned with in determining a procedural due process deprivation is the time the inmate is ultimately required to spend confined under the authority of the state. Chaney v. Renteria,
203 Wis. 2d 310,
554 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1996),
94-2557.
Foster children have a constitutional right under the due process clause to safe and secure placement in a foster home. Whether a public official violated that right will be determined based on a professional judgment standard. Kara B. v. Dane County,
205 Wis. 2d 140,
555 N.W.2d 630 (1996),
94-1081.
An inmate has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in not having his mandatory release date extended. Due process is violated in a prison discipline case when guilt is found if there is not "some evidence" that supports the finding of guilt. Santiago v. Ware,
205 Wis. 2d 295,
556 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1996),
95-0079.
A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. To do so constitutes practicing law without a license in violation of s. 757.30 and voids the appeal. Requiring a lawyer to file the notice does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.
209 Wis. 2d 187,
561 N.W.2d 718 (1997),
95-1946.
Whether to proceed with civil litigation or to hold it in abeyance while a party is incarcerated depends on the nature of the case, the practical concerns raised by the prisoner's appearance, and the alternative methods available to provide the prisoner with access to the hearing. Schmidt v. Schmidt,
212 Wis. 2d 405,
569 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-3699.
The state and federal constitutions provide identical procedural due process and equal protection safeguards. County of Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc.
223 Wis. 2d 373,
588 N.W.2d 236 (1999),
97-0642.
In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation without due process of law. Arneson v. Jezwinski,
225 Wis. 2d 371,
592 N.W.2d 606 (1999),
97-1867.
Substantive due process guarantees protect citizens against arbitrary action of government. To violate substantive due process guarantees, a decision must involve more than simple errors in law or an improper exercise of discretion; it must shock the conscience. Eternalist Foundation, Inc. v. City of Platteville,
225 Wis. 2d 759,
593 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1999),
98-1944.
A criminal proceeding may be conclusive against a 3rd party only if the 3rd party and criminal defendant have sufficient identity of interest so that in the prior proceeding the 3rd party had a full opportunity to fairly adjudicate the issues leading to the conviction. If not, the 3rd party's due process rights would be violated by the application of issue preclusion. Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B.
226 Wis. 2d 210,
594 N.W.2d 370 (1999),
97-0873.
A deprivation of the due process right of a fair warning can occur, not only from vague statutory language, but also from unforeseeable and retroactive interpretation of that statutory language. Elections Board v. Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce,
227 Wis. 2d 650,
597 N.W.2d 721 (1999),
98-0596.
The retroactive application of a substantive statute must meet the test of due process determined by balancing the public interest served by retroactive application against the private interests that are overturned. Neiman v. American National Property & Casualty Co.
2000 WI 83,
236 Wis. 2d 411,
613 N.W.2d 160,
99-2554.
The imposition of liability without fault, even when the statute imposes punitive sanctions, does not in itself violate due process. Statutes that are within the police power of the state may impose even criminal liability on a person whose acts violate the statute, even if the person did not intend to do so. Gross v. Woodman's Food Market, Inc.
2002 WI App 295,
259 Wis. 2d 181,
655 N.W.2d 718,
01-1746.
A parent who has a substantial relationship with his or her child has a fundamental liberty interest in parenting the child. It is fundamentally unfair to terminate parental rights based solely on a parent's status as a victim of incest. Monroe County DHS v. Kelli B.
2004 WI 48,
271 Wis. 2d 51,
678 N.W.2d 831,
03-0060.
The due process clause of the 14th amendment includes the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children, including the right to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control, but that right is neither absolute nor unqualified. Parents do not have a fundamental right to direct how a public school teaches their child or to dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their child. Larson v. Burmaster,
2006 WI App 142,
295 Wis. 2d 333,
720 N.W.2d 134,
05-1433.
A prisoner has a liberty interest in avoiding forced nutrition and hydration, but department of corrections may infringe on the prisoner's liberty interest by forcing him or her to ingest food and fluids against his or her will. A court may enter a temporary ex parte order for involuntarily feeding and hydration, if exigent circumstances require immediate involuntary treatment in order to avoid serious harm to or the death of an inmate. If a prisoner disputes the department of corrections' allegations, a circuit court may not continue the order for involuntary feeding and hydration without providing the prisoner an opportunity to meaningfully participate in an evidentiary hearing. The order for involuntary feeding and hydration cannot be of indefinite or permanent duration without a mechanism for periodic review. Department of Corrections v. Saenz,
2007 WI App 25,
299 Wis. 2d 486,
728 N.W.2d 765,
05-2750.
The Due Process clause protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Nevertheless, a parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning his or her child is not unlimited. The parents' fundamental right to make decisions for their children about religion and medical care does not prevent the state from imposing criminal liability on a parent who fails to protect the child when the parent has a legal duty to act. State v. Neumann,
2013 WI 58,
348 Wis. 2d 455,
832 N.W.2d 560,
11-1044.
Prisoners' due process rights are discussed. Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
Public high school students facing temporary suspension have property and liberty interests protected by due process. Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975).
Garnishment of corporate bank accounts must comply with due process protections of
Fuentes and
Sniadach. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.
419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975).
The Wisconsin medical examining board does not deny due process by both investigating and adjudicating charge of professional misconduct. Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975).
States may deny benefits to those who fail to prove they did not quit a job in order to obtain benefits. Lavine v. Milne,
424 U.S. 577, 96 S.Ct. 1010, 47 L.Ed.2d 249 (1976).
Due process does not disqualify an agency as a decision maker merely because of familiarity with the facts of a case. Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Asso.
426 U.S. 482, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976).
Dismissal from medical school for academic deficiencies without a hearing did not violate the due process clause. Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978).
Utility customers' due process rights were violated when the utility shut off service for nonpayment without advising the customers of available administrative procedures. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978).
A father's acquiescence in his daughter's desire to live with her mother in California did not confer jurisdiction over father in California courts. Kulko v. California Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978).
The due process clause was not violated when the IRS monitored a conversation with the defendant in violation of IRS rules. United States v. Caceres,
440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979).
A state may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant having no forum contacts by attacking the contractual obligation of the defendant's insurer licensed in the state. Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980).
Involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital implicated protected liberty interests. Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980).
The termination of appointed assistant public defenders, who were neither policymakers nor confidential employees, solely on grounds of political affiliation was a denial of 1st and 14th amendment rights. Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980).
Segregation confinement of a prisoner without prior hearing may violate due process if postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions. Hughes v. Rowe,
449 U.S. 5, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980).
When an accident involving only Wisconsin residents occurred in Wisconsin, the fact that the decedent had been employed in Minnesota conferred jurisdiction on Minnesota courts and Minnesota insurance law was applicable. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981).
A statute that required a putative father in a paternity suit to pay for blood tests denied due process to indigent putative fathers. Little v. Streater,
452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981).
Due process does not require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981).
A life prisoner had no due process right to a statement of reasons why the board did not commute his life sentence. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat,
452 U.S. 458, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981).
An ordinance regulating the sale of drug paraphernalia was constitutional. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).
Revocation of probation for failure to pay a fine, without a determination that the probationer had not made a bona fide effort to pay or that alternate forms of punishment did not exist, denied due process and equal protection. Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983).
Notice by publication did not satisfy due process requirements in a tax sale. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,
462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983).
Abortion restrictions complied with constitutional protections. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv.
492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040,
106 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1989).
Assuming that a competent person has a constitutional right to refuse treatment, a state may require clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent patient desired withdrawal of treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dept.
497 U.S. 261, 110 S.Ct. 2841,
111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990).
Substantive due process is not violated by a police officer who causes death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high speed chase aimed at apprehending a suspect. Only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest satisfies the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience necessary for a due process violation. County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708,
140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998).
In lieu of exclusive reliance on a judge's personal inquiry into his or her actual bias, or on appellate review of the judge's determination respecting actual bias, the due process clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias. In defining these standards the U.S. Supreme Court has asked whether, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.
556 U.S. 868,
129 S. Ct. 2252,
175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2009).
There is a serious risk of actual bias, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on a case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign while the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect the contribution had on the outcome of the election. Whether campaign contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of a judge's victory is not the proper inquiry. Due process requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor's influence on the election under all the circumstances would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead the judge not to hold the balance "nice, clear, and true." Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.
556 U.S. 868,
129 S. Ct. 2252,
175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2009).
It is not a violation of the due process clause to tow an illegally parked car without first giving the owner notice and opportunity to be heard regarding the lawfulness of the towing. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee,
672 F.2d 644 (1982).
A village board's denial of an application for a liquor license did not deprive the applicant of either liberty or property. Scott v. Village of Kewaskum,
786 F.2d 338 (1986).
A teacher's alleged de facto tenure is not a protected property interest. Liberty interests are discussed. Stevens v. Jt. School Dist. No. 1, Tony, Etc.
429 F. Supp. 477 (1977).
A sheriff violated a tenant's protectible property interest by executing a stale writ of restitution. Wolf-Lillie v. Kenosha Cty. Sheriff,
504 F. Supp. 1 (1980).
One cannot have a constitutionally protected interest solely in a state law procedure; a separate property interest must also be present. Molgaard v. Town of Caledonia,
527 F. Supp. 1073 (1981).
Demon rum and the dirty dance: reconsidering government regulation of live sex entertainment after California v. La Rue. 1975 WLR 161.
Reasonable corporal punishment by school official over parental objection is constitutional. 1976 WLR 689.
