Under the totality of the circumstances, the trooper's observation of the defendant's furtive movements and visible nervousness, a record of arrests for violent crimes, and a drug delivery arrest that had occurred nearby a short time before the stop constituted specific and articulable facts that, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, created reasonable suspicion and justified a protective search for the officer's safety. State v. Buchanan,
2011 WI 49,
334 Wis. 2d 379,
799 N.W.2d 775,
09-2934.
As a general matter, it is unacceptable for a member of the public to enter a home's attached garage uninvited regardless of whether an overhead or entry door is open. Thus, generally, an attached garage will never be impliedly open to public, i.e., police entry. There may be an exception to that general rule if, in a given circumstance, it reasonably appears that entry into the attached garage is the least intrusive means of attempting contact with persons inside the home. State v. Davis,
2011 WI App 74,
333 Wis. 2d 490,
798 N.W.2d 902,
10-2191.
Randolph held that in co-habitation cases, if both parties are present, a search is unlawful when one consents but the other expressly refuses to consent.
Randolph did not apply when one co-habitant consented and the other did not object. State v. Pirtle,
2011 WI App 89,
334 Wis. 2d 211,
799 N.W.2d 492,
10-1363.
Under circumstances where: 1) a man in a high-crime area; 2) late at night; 3) wearing a ski mask that covered his face below his eyes; 4) wearing a hoodie; 5) had an ambiguous but "unusual"-appearing encounter with a woman walking by herself, the police reasonably and based on their experience could objectively see that further investigation was warranted to ensure that criminal activity was not afoot. State v. Matthews,
2011 WI App 92,
334 Wis. 2d 455,
799 N.W.2d 911,
10-1712.
It was reasonable for the officers to conclude that the leaseholder of a property had the authority to consent to them proceeding up the property's stairs to look for another tenant who was not present to either consent or refuse consent when: 1) a third non-leaseholder tenant refused to consent; 2) the officers were aware that the tenant granting consent was the leaseholder of the property; and 3) the person refusing consent had not previously lived there and had left the room to wake up the subject of the police inquiry after the officers arrived. State v. Lathan,
2011 WI App 104,
335 Wis. 2d 234,
801 N.W.2d 772,
10-1228.
Under
Arizona v. Johnson,
555 U.S. 323, a lawful roadside stop "ordinarily" begins when a vehicle is pulled over for a traffic violation and ends when the police no longer have further need to control the scene, at which time the driver and passengers are free to leave.
Johnson does not create a bright-line rule that police always have the authority to detain passengers for the duration of a roadside stop.
Johnson leaves the door open for exceptions to the general rule that passengers are reasonably detained for the duration of a stop. Nonetheless, the stop in this case was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Salonen,
2011 WI App 157,
338 Wis. 2d 104,
808 N.W.2d 162,
10-2504.
The plain view doctrine did not justify opening opaque cylinders that were in plain view, but the contents were not, and the containers, as indicated by their size or shape, could hold a weapon. State v. Sutton,
2012 WI App 7,
338 Wis. 2d 338,
808 N.W.2d 411,
11-0036.
If a third party has mutual use of a property and joint access or control for most purposes, then the third party may consent to a search of the property regardless of whether he or she owns the property. While a mere guest in a home may not ordinarily consent to a search of the premises, the analysis is different when the guest is more than a casual visitor but instead has the run of the house. A weekend house guest who was permitted to stay in the home by herself and had the authority to receive people into the home had the authority to permit an officer to enter. Similarly, when the defendant gave his guest permission to use his computer, the guest had the authority to consent to the officer's search and seizure of that item. State v. Sutton,
2012 WI App 7,
338 Wis. 2d 338,
808 N.W.2d 411,
11-0036.
When police have probable cause to arrest before an unlawful entry and warrantless arrest from a defendant's home, this violation of
Payton,
445 U.S. 573, does not require the suppression of evidence obtained from a defendant outside of the home. This rule applies when the only illegal police conduct is an unlawful entry and arrest in violation of
Payton, not when the evidence may be tied to an unlawful search by police. State v. Felix,
2012 WI 36,
339 Wis. 2d 670,
811 N.W.2d 775,
10-0346.
Under the totality of the circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that the defendant was driving based on reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity may be afoot." The police had the requisite reasonable suspicion primarily based on the reliability of their final informant and the information provided by him when the information was supported by the prior tips to police. While the initial tips were of limited reliability, the final informant and his tips had significant indicia of reliability because the informant provided self-identifying information that made him more reliable than a truly anonymous informant and the final informant provided details and accurate future predictions that police were able to corroborate. State v. Miller,
2012 WI 61,
341 Wis. 2d 307,
815 N.W.2d 349,
10-0557.
Under
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115-17, an individual can retain a legitimate expectation of privacy after a private individual conducts a search. However, additional invasions of that individual's privacy by a government agent must be tested by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search. The officer's search in this case did not exceed the original search by the private individual who after discovering and reviewing child pornography, placed it in a duffel bag and invited the officer to view the contents of the bag. State v. Cameron,
2012 WI App 93,
344 Wis. 2d 101,
820 N.W.2d 433,
11-1368.
Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 663, forged a list of factors to be considered in determining reasonable suspicion that a person or vehicle was the one connected to a reported crime: 1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle in which he or she fled; 2) the size of the area in which the offender might be found, as indicated by such facts as the elapsed time since the crime occurred; 3) the number of persons about in that area; 4) the known or probable direction of the offender's flight; 5) observed activity by the particular person stopped; and 6) knowledge or suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in other criminality of the type presently under investigation. State v. Rissley,
2012 WI App 112,
344 Wis. 2d 422,
824 N.W.2d 853,
11-1789.
The administration of a preliminary breath test by a police officer, at the request and on behalf of a probation agent during a probation meeting in the probation office, for probation purposes and for no independent police purpose, was a probation search, not a police search, and was lawful. State v. Devries,
2012 WI App 119,
344 Wis. 2d 726,
824 N.W.2d 913,
10-0429.
The test applied in determining whether an officer has sufficient reasonable suspicion under
Terry is objective — "would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search `warrant a man of reasonable caution' in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Backing away from a police officer is not sufficient objective evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot or that a person is a threat. A person approached by a law-enforcement officer need not answer any question put to him or her, may decline to listen to the questions, and may go on his or her way. Naming a movement that would accompany any walking away adds nothing to the calculus except a false patina of objectivity. State v. Pugh,
2013 WI App 12,
345 Wis. 2d 832,
826 N.W.2d 418,
12-0481.
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, when a person came down the staircase between a building's upper unit and a common entrance and opened the door for the police, identified herself, expressly stated that she lived in the upper unit, granted consent to search both verbally and in writing, and acted as though she had access to the landlord by pretending to call him or her, that person had apparent authority to consent to the warrantless search of the upper unit and the police were reasonable in reaching the same conclusion. State v. Wheeler,
2013 WI App 53,
347 Wis. 2d 426,
830 N.W.2d 278,
12-1291.
A seizure following a "dog sniff" is subject to the
Terry test — that a seizure is reasonable only if it is justified at its inception and is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Here, unlike in
Arias, the dog sniff attendant to defendant's seizure occurred after the initial stop had been completed and undisputed facts established that the reasons justifying the initial stop ceased to exist. The continued detention of the defendant to conduct the dog sniff was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the stop. State v. House,
2013 WI App 111,
350 Wis. 2d 478,
837 N.W.2d 645,
12-2414.
Permitting
Terry stops of a person observed momentarily patting the outside of his or her clothing when the only additional facts are that the person is in a high crime area and has seen a cruising police car would expand the individualized "reasonable suspicion" requirement so far so as to negate it. State v. Gordon,
2014 WI App 44,
353 Wis. 2d 468,
846 N.W.2d 483,
13-1878.
When an officer parks near a person's vehicle, gets out, and knocks on the person's window, the officer has not necessarily displayed sufficient authority to cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she was not free to leave. While a person is not automatically seized by a knock on the window, or even a supplementary request, the seizure inquiry looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer has effected a detention. County of Grant v. Vogt,
2014 WI 76, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
850 N.W.2d 253,
12-1812.
The trial court's denial of the defendant's suppression motion arguing that the warrantless obtaining of of his cell phone's location data from his cell phone provider violated his 4th Amendment rights was upheld by a divided court. State v. Subdiaz-Osorio,
2014 WI 87, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
849 N.W.2d 748,
10-3016.
Ordinary citizens, even citizens who are subject to diminished privacy interests because they have been detained, have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of their electronic devices. This interest, however, is undercut when the electronic device in question is contraband. In this case, the defendant was prohibited from using a computer. It was irrelevant whether specific images were prohibited by the defendant's probationary terms or otherwise illegal to possess; the use of computers was itself prohibited, and the agent had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant had impermissibly used them. Thus, the probation search of the contents of the defendant's computers did not violate the 4th Amendment or Article I, Section 11. State v. Purtell,
2014 WI 101, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
851 N.W.2d 417,
12-1307.
While exigent circumstances may justify entry, the fact that entry has already been made does not necessarily invalidate reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine. In this case, the officer had already stepped into the apartment when the exigent circumstances arose. Whether or not the apartment occupants' behavior constituted consent to the officer's entry, so long as the officer was standing in the vicinity of the occupants when she received the information that they might possess a backpack with loaded weapons in it, her search for and seizure of the backpack was, at that moment, justified by exigent circumstances. State v. Kirby,
2014 WI App 74, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
13-0896.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved into two seemingly different, but somewhat interrelated, methods of identifying protectable interests relating to the home. One focuses on a person's expectation of privacy, where a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The other, known as the intrusion or trespass test, focuses on whether government agents engaged in an unauthorized physical penetration into a constitutionally protected area. Officers in this case conducted an illegal search by trespassing on the defendants' property when they, without permission, went onto the porch of the defendants' trailer to peer into a window, had no other reason for being in those areas, and acknowledged that they could not have seen what they saw within the trailer if they had not been standing in the yard or on the porch. State v. Popp,
2014 WI App 100, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
13-1916.
A warrantless, non-exigent, felony arrest in public was constitutional despite the opportunity to obtain a warrant. United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411.
When a driver was stopped because of expired license plates, a police order to get out of the car was reasonable and a subsequent "pat down" based on an observed bulge under the driver's jacket resulted in the legal seizure of an unlicensed revolver. Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977).
A burning building clearly presents an exigency rendering a warrantless entry reasonable, and fire officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the fire after it is extinguished. Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499 (1978)
The warrantless installation of a pen register, that recorded telephone numbers called but not the contents of the calls, did not violate the 4th amendment. Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
A warrantless search of a suitcase in the trunk of a taxi was unconstitutional. Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979).
Police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980).
That police had lawful possession of pornographic film boxes did not give them authority to search their contents. Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649 (1980).
An officer who accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman,
455 U.S. 1 (1982).
Officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
When an officer, after stopping a defendant's car at a routine driver's license checkpoint, saw a tied-off party balloon in plain sight, the officer had probable cause to believe the balloon contained an illicit substance. Hence, a warrantless seizure of the balloon was legal. Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730 (1983).
A warrantless search by arson investigators of the defendant's fire-damaged home that was not a continuation of an earlier search was unconstitutional. Michigan v. Clifford,
464 U.S. 287 (1984).
When a damaged shipping package was examined by company employees who discovered white powder, a subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. U.S. v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
The "open fields" doctrine is discussed. Oliver v. U.S.
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
The warrantless, nighttime entry of the defendant's home for arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under the "hot pursuit" doctrine or the preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740 (1984).
School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student. The legality of the search depends on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. New Jersey v. T. L. O.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
When officers were entitled to seize packages in a vehicle and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, a warrantless search of the packages 3 days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns,
469 U.S. 478 (1985).
The vehicle exception for warrantless searches applies to motor homes. California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when an officer reasonably relies upon a statute allowing a warrantless administrative search that was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
A protective sweep of a residence in conjunction with an arrest is permissible if police reasonably believe that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325,
108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990).
For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or when force is absent, submission to an officer's "show of authority." California v. Hodari D.
499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).
A determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest generally meets the promptness requirement. If a hearing is held more than 48 hours following the arrest the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate an emergency or extraordinary circumstances. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44,
114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991).
There shall be one rule governing all automobile searches. The police may search the car and all containers within it without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained in either. California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565,
114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991).
If during a lawful weapons pat down an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized. Minnesota v. Dickerson,
508 U.S. 366,
124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993).
An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408,
137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997).
Persons observed through a window in a home where they were not overnight guests but were present for a short period to engage in a primarily commercial illegal drug transaction, had no expectation of privacy in the home and the observation of those persons was not a constitutionally prohibited search. Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83,
142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998).
The issuance of a traffic citation without an arrest did not authorize a full search of the vehicle. Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113,
142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998).
When there is probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband officers may examine containers in the vehicle without a showing of individualized probable cause for each container. The container may be searched whether or not it's owner is present as a passenger, or otherwise, because it may contain contraband that the officers reasonably believe is in the car. Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295,
143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999).
Police need not obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband. Florida v. White,
526 U.S. 559,
143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999).
The exception to the requirement of a warrant for automobiles does not require a separate finding of exigency, in addition to a finding of probable cause. Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465,
144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
When there is probable cause to search a motor vehicle, the search is not unreasonable if the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, although a warrant was not obtained. No separate finding of exigent circumstances is required. Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465,
144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119,
145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).
An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, is insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of a person. The tip must bear indicia of reliability. Reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of criminal activity, not just in its tendency to to identify a person. Florida v. J.L.
529 U.S. 266,
146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000).
Stopping vehicles at highway checkpoints without any individualized suspicion to interdict illegal drugs was an unreasonable seizure under the 4th amendment because the primary purpose was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, unlike checkpoints to check for drunk driving or illegal immigrants. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32,
148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000).
The police acted reasonably when, with probable cause to believe that the defendant had hidden drugs in his home, they prevented the man from entering the home for about 2 hours until a search warrant could be obtained. Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U.S. 326, 148 LEd2d 838 (2001).
A state hospital could not test maternity patients for cocaine and then turn the results over to law enforcement authorities without patient consent. The interest of using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine does not justify a departure from the rule that a nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a warrant. Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
525 U.S. 67, 149 LEd 2d 205 (2001).
If an officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed even a very minor criminal offense that does not breach the peace, the officer may, without violating the 4th amendment, arrest the offender without the need to balance the circumstances involved in the particular situation. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318,
149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001)
Obtaining, by sense-enhancing technology like infrared imaging, information regarding the interior of a home that could otherwise not be obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area is a search presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Kyllo v. U.S.
533 U.S. 27,
150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001).
A warrantless search of a probationer's residence founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and authorized as a condition of probation was reasonable. Such a search is not restricted to monitoring whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions. U.S. v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112,
151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001).
Police officers may approach bus riders at random to ask questions and to request consent to search luggage without advising the passengers of their right to not cooperate. U.S. v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194,
153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002).
A school district policy of requiring all participants in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing was a reasonable means of furthering the district's interest in preventing drug use among students and was not an unreasonable search. Board of Education of Independent School District. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. White,
536 U.S. 822,
153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002).
A highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run was reasonable. The arrest of a drunk driver arrested when his vehicle swerved nearly hitting an officer at the checkpoint was constitutional. Illinois v. Lidster,
540 U.S. 419,
157 L. Ed 2d 843,
124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the 4th amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest whether the officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has exited the vehicle. Thornton v. U.S.
541 U.S. 615,
158 L. Ed 2d 905,
124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
The principles of
Terry permit a state to require a suspect to disclose his or her name in the course of a
Terry stop and allow imposing criminal penalties for failing to do so. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County,
542 U.S. 177,
159 L. Ed 2d 292,
124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
The 4th amendment does not requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop. The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405,
160 L. Ed. 2d 842,
125 S. Ct. 834 (2004).
Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. An action is reasonable under the 4th amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, "as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398,
164 L. Ed. 2d 650,
126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006).
Warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the U.S. constitution, and while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the 4th amendment's protections. Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164,
128 S. Ct. 1598,
170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008).
In a traffic-stop setting, the first
Terry condition — a lawful investigatory stop — is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson,
555 U.S. 323,
129 S. Ct. 781,
172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009).
Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. Consistent with
Thornton, circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332,
129 S. Ct. 1710,
173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009).
The
New Jersey v. T. L. O. concern to limit a school search to a reasonable scope requires reasonable suspicion of danger or a resort to hiding evidence of wrongdoing in underwear before a searcher can reasonably make the quantum leap from a search of outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,
557 U.S. 364,
129 S. Ct. 2633,
174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009).
A government employer had the right, under the circumstances of the case, to read text messages sent and received on a pager the employer owned and issued to an employee. The privacy of the messages was not protected by the ban on "unreasonable searches and seizures" found in the 4th amendment. Because the search was motivated by a legitimate work related purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable. Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. ___,
130 S. Ct. 2366;
176 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2010).
Warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the 4th amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. The exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. When the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the 4th amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed. Kentucky v. King, 564 U.S. ___,
177 L. Ed. 2d 1150,
131 S. Ct. 61 (2011).
Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken. When an alleged 4th amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner. There is a narrow exception allowing suit when it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. ___,
182 L. Ed. 2d 47,
132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012).
Generally, every detainee who will be admitted to the general jail population may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed. Undoubted security imperatives involved in jail supervision override the assertion that some detainees must be exempt from these invasive procedures absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband. Deference must be given to the officials in charge of the jail unless there is substantial evidence demonstrating their response to the situation is exaggerated. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. ___,
182 L. Ed. 2d 937,
132 S. Ct. 2044 (2012).
Within the meaning of the 4th amendment, domestic animals are effects and the killing of a companion dog constitutes a seizure, which is constitutional only if reasonable. Viilo v. Eyre,
547 F.3d 707 (2008).
The categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a search warrant must be limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. A spatial constraint defined by the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched is therefore required for detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant. Limiting the rule in
Summers to the area in which an occupant poses a real threat to the safe and efficient execution of a search warrant ensures that the scope of the detention incident to a search is confined to its underlying justification. Once an occupant is beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, the search-related law enforcement interests are diminished and the intrusiveness of the detention is more severe. Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. ___,
133 S. Ct. 1031,
185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013).
Natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a
per se exigency that justifies an exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. Consistent with general 4th amendment principles, exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ____,
133 S. Ct. 1552,
185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013).
The search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, although other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone. "The answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is simple — get a warrant." Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___ (2014).
State v. Seibel: Wisconsin Police Now Need Only a Reasonable Suspicion to Search a Suspect's Blood Incident to an Arrest. Armstrong. 1993 WLR 563.
But What of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule? The Wisconsin Supreme Court Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless Searches. Schmidt. 83 MLR 299.
But What of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule? The Wisconsin Supreme Court Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless Searches. Schmidt. 83 MLR 299 (1999).
I,12
Attainder; ex post facto; contracts. Section 12
. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
Section 45.37 (9), Stats. 1963, constituted a contract as to the property an applicant for admission to the Grand Army Home had to surrender, and to apply a later amendment would be unconstitutional. Estate of Nottingham,
46 Wis. 2d 580,
175 N.W.2d 640.
