An ordinance that placed substantial restrictions on billboards other than those used for onsite commercial advertising violated the free speech clause. Metromedia v. San Diego,
453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981).
A public university that provided a forum to many student groups but excluded religious student groups violated the principle that state regulation of speech should be content neutral. Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981).
An ordinance regulating the sale of drug paraphernalia was constitutional. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).
There are constitutional limits on the state's power to prohibit candidates from making promises in the course of an election campaign. Some promises are universally acknowledged as legitimate, indeed indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy. Brown v. Hartlage,
456 U.S. 45, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 71 L.Ed.2d 732 (1982).
A school board's discretion to determine the contents of school libraries may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner. Board of Education v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982).
States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children. New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982).
The discharge of a public employee did not deny free speech rights, under the facts of the case. Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).
A sidewalk is a "public forum". The prohibition of leaflets denied free speech. U.S. v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983).
The government's substantial interest in maintaining the park in the heart of the capital in an attractive condition sustained a regulation against camping or overnight sleeping in public parks. Free speech was not denied. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence,
468 U.S. 288, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984).
A school district did not violate the free speech clause by disciplining a student for giving an offensively lewd and indecent speech at a school assembly. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986).
School administrators may exercise control over style and content of student speech in school-sponsored activities as long as control is reasonably related to "legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988).
A state may not categorically ban targeted, direct-mail advertising by attorneys. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn.
486 U.S. 466, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d 475 (1988).
A Brookfield ordinance prohibiting picketing of individuals' residences was not facially invalid. Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988).
A protester's conviction for flag desecration violated the right of free speech. Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533,
105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989).
The 1st amendment prohibits employment decisions concerning low-level public employees from being based upon political patronage. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729,
111 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1990).
A public indecency statute barring public nudity and requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings did not violate the right of free expression. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456,
115 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1991).
Press freedom does not confer a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforceable under state law. A possible promissory estoppel action for breaching an agreement to keep a source confidential was not barred. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
501 U.S. 663, 111 S.Ct. 2513,
115 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1991).
A county ordinance requiring permits for all parades, public assemblies, and other private uses of public property that gave the county administrator the power to adjust permit fees to meet police expenses incident to the permitted activity violated the 1st amendment because the ordinance lacked narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite standards guiding the administrator and because it impermissibly required an analysis of the content of the applicant's message. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,
505 U.S. 123, 112 S.Ct. 2395,
120 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1992).
Exclusion of "fighting words" from free speech protections did not justify a city ordinance banning displays that convey messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance. A city may not selectively ban fighting words based on the particular idea expressed. R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538,
120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992).
A city ban on newsracks for commercial publications violated the right to free speech when the city failed to establish a "reasonable fit" between its legitimate interest in safety and aesthetics and the ban. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505,
123 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1993).
Denial of the use of a school building to a church seeking to exhibit a film when a nonsectarian group would have been allowed the use of the building to show a secular film on the same topic violated the right of free speech. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 113 S.Ct. 2141,
124 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1993).
For a government employee's speech to be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern and the employee's interest in expressing himself or herself on the matter must outweigh the injury the speech could cause the employer in providing public services through its employees. Waters v. Churchill,
511 U.S. 661, 114 S.Ct. 1878,
128 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1994). See also
Burkes v. Klauser,
185 Wis. 2d 309,
517 N.W.2d 502 (1994).
A city's ban on almost all residential signs violated the right of free speech. City of LaDue v. Gilleo,
512 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994).
An Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violated the right of free speech. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,
514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511,
131 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1995).
The selection of the makeup a parade is entitled to free speech protection. A parade sponsor's free speech rights include the right to deny a group's participation who intends to convey a message contrary to the sponsor's. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group,
515 U.S. 557, 115 S.Ct. 2338,
132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995).
A state university that funded printing a broad range of student publications but denied funding for a student religious group's publication violated free speech guarantees and was not excused by the need to comply with the establishment of religion clause. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,
515 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d (1995).
As with government employees whose employment may not be terminated for exercising 1st amendment rights, independent contractors may not have their government contracts terminated for refusing to support a political party or its candidates or for exercising free speech rights. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,
518 U.S. 668, 116 S.Ct. 2342,
135 L. Ed. 2d 843 (1996) and O'Hare Truck Service v. Northlake,
518 U.S. 712, 116 S.Ct. 2353,
135 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1996).
Content-neutral size restrictions placed on a banner proclaiming "Church/State — Separate," after it was hung in the state capitol rotunda, served the state's significant interest in protecting the capitol from visual degradation. That a Christmas tree and Menorah in the rotunda were allowed to remain without restriction did not prove content-based discrimination. Gaylor v. Thompson, 939 F. Supp. 1363 (1996).
The constitutionality of injunctions restraining actions by abortion clinic protesters is discussed. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
519 U.S. 357, 117 S.Ct. 855,
137 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997). But see McCullen v. Coakley, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 189 L.E.2d 502 (2014).
Assessments against commodity producers under an agricultural marketing order to pay for the costs of generic advertising did not violate the producers' free speech rights. Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliot, Inc.
521 U.S. 457, 117 S.Ct. 2130,
138 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1997).
A public broadcasting network's decision to exclude from a televised debate an independent political candidate who had little public support was a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion. Arkansas Educational TV v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 118 S.Ct. 1633,
140 L. Ed. 2d 875 (1998).
It is a violation of the 4th amendment for police to bring members of the media or other 3rd persons into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the 3rd persons in the home is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 119 S.Ct. 1692,
143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999).
Generally, the 1st amendment protects a person from being removed from public employment for purely political reasons. However, exemptions from the patronage dismissal ban are allowed on the theory that a newly elected administration has a legitimate interest in implementing the broad policies it was elected to implement without interference from disloyal employees. Pleva v. Norquist,
195 F.3d 905 (1999).
The financing of student organizations through mandatory student fees does not violate the 1st amendment if viewpoint neutrality is the operational principal. Board of Regents v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 120 S.Ct. 1346,
146 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2000).
An ordinance prohibiting public nudity was valid when the government's asserted interest was combating the secondary effect associated with adult entertainment and was unrelated to suppression of the erotic message of nude dancing. Erie v. Pap's A.M.
529 U.S. 277120 S.Ct. 1382,
146 L. Ed. 2d 265 (2000).
A statute that makes it unlawful within regulated areas near a health care facility for any person to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person is constitutional. Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480,
147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000)
Inmate to inmate correspondence that includes legal assistance does not receive more 1st amendment protection than other correspondence. Shaw v. Murphy,
532 U.S. 223, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 149 L.Ed.2d 420 (2001).
The 1st amendment protects speech that discloses the content of an illegally intercepted telephone call when that speech was by a person not a party to the interception. Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514, 121 S.Ct. 1753,
149 L. Ed. 2d 787 (2001).
Speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum, such as a school, on the grounds that it is discussed from a religious viewpoint. A club's meetings, held after school, not sponsored by the school, and open to any student who obtained parental consent, did not raise an establishment of religion violation that could to justify content-based discrimination against the club. Good News Club v. Milford Central School,
533 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 2093,
150 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2001).
A village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the village and obtaining a permit violated the 1st amendment. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 122 S.Ct. 2080,
153 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2002).
With one exception, the university's system, as required by
Southworth, for distributing compelled fees collected from university students to student groups that delegates funding decisions to the student government was subject to sufficient limits. Southworth v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System,
307 F.3d 566 (2002).
A state, consistent with the 1st amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, but a Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate was unconstitutional. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, a state may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burnings' long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343,
123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L.E.2d 535 (2003).
Regulation of charitable subscriptions, barring fees in excess of a prescribed level, effectively imposes prior restraints on fundraising, and is incompatible with the 1st amendment. However, any and all reliance on the percentage of charitable donations fundraisers retain for themselves is not prohibited. While bare failure to disclose that information to potential donors does not establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, a fraud claim is permissible. Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.
538 U.S. 600,
123 S. Ct. 1829,
155 L. Ed. 2d 793 (2003).
A regulation prohibiting the sale of liquor on the premises of adult entertainment establishments is constitutional if: 1) the state is regulating pursuant to a legitimate governmental power; 2) the regulation does not completely prohibit adult entertainment; 3) the regulation is aimed at combating the negative effects caused by the establishments, not the suppression of expression; and 4) the regulation is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest, is narrowly tailored, and reasonable avenues of communication remain; or alternatively the regulation furthers substantial governmental interests and the restriction is no greater than is essential to further that interest. Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset,
316 F.3d 702 (2003).
The 1st amendment requires that an adult business licensing scheme assure prompt judicial review of an administrative decision denying a license. An ordinance providing that the city's final decision may be appealed to state court pursuant to state rules of civil procedure did not violate the 1st amendment. City of Littleton v. Z. J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C,
541 U.S. 774,
124 S. Ct. 2219,
159 L. Ed 2d 84 (2004).
While a governmental employer may impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public, the courts have recognized the right of employees to speak on matters unrelated to their employment and to speak on matters of public concern. Because a police officer's off-duty activities were not related to a matter of public concern and were designed to exploit his employer's image, they were not protected under the 1st amendment. San Diego v. Roe,
543 U.S. 77,
125 S. Ct. 521,
160 L. Ed 2d 410 (2004).
When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 1st amendment purposes, and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created. Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410,
126 S. Ct. 1951,
164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006).
Schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use. School officials did not violate the 1st amendment by confiscating a pro-drug banner and suspending the student responsible for it. Morse v. Frederick,
551 U.S. 393,
127 S. Ct. 2618,
168 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2007).
Enforcement of a rule adopted by a statewide membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members that prohibited high school coaches from recruiting middle school athletes did not violate the 1st amendment. There is a difference of constitutional dimension between rules prohibiting appeals to the public at large and rules prohibiting direct, personalized communication in a coercive setting. Bans on direct solicitations are more akin to a conduct regulation than a speech restriction, but restrictions are limited to conduct that is inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy,
551 U.S. 291,
127 S. Ct. 2489,
168 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2007).
Offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically excluded from the 1st amendment. Offers to deal in illegal products or otherwise engage in illegal activity do not acquire 1st amendment protection when the offeror is mistaken about the factual predicate of his or her offer. Impossibility of completing the crime because the facts were not as the defendant believed is not a defense. U.S. v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285,
128 S. Ct. 1830; 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008).
The free speech clause of the 1st amendment restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. Although a park is a traditional public forum for speeches and other transitory expressive acts, the display of a permanent monument in a public park is not a form of expression to which forum analysis applies. Instead, the placement of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the free speech clause of the 1st amendment. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,
555 U.S. 460,
129 S. Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009).
The government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether. Federal law prohibiting corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an "electioneering communication" or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate is unconstitutional. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
558 U.S. 310,
130 S. Ct. 876,
175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010).
While the prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, depictions of animal cruelty are not outside the reach of the 1st amendment altogether. The guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. A federal statute that criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty, which encompassed common depictions of ordinary and lawful activities and required merely that the conduct be "illegal" where the alleged violation took place, was substantially overbroad and therefore facially invalid under the 1st amendment. United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460,
130 S. Ct. 1577,
176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010).
A public university may condition its official recognition of a student group, and the attendant use of school funds and facilities, on the organization's agreement to open eligibility for membership and leadership to all students. In requiring a student religious group, in common with all other student organizations, to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, a school did not transgress constitutional limitations. The 1st amendment shields groups against state prohibition of the organization's expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be, but a group enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity. Christian Legal Society Chapter of Univ. of California, Hastings College of Law v. Martinez,
561 U.S. 661,
130 S. Ct. 2971,
177 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2010).
Although the 1st amendment establishment clause of the U.S. constitution neither compels nor authorizes the University to categorically exclude funding of activities related to worship, proselytizing, and sectarian religious instruction with segregated fees, the University may nevertheless be able to exclude some or all of the activities to which it objects. The University is free to enact viewpoint neutral rules restricting access to segregated fees, for it may create what is tantamount to a limited public forum if the principles of viewpoint neutrality are respected. However, before excluding an activity from the segregated fee forum pursuant to a content-based distinction, the University must explain specifically why that particular activity, viewed as a whole, is outside the forum's purposes. Roman Catholic Foundation v. The Regents of the University of Wisconsin System,
578 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (2008). Affirmed.
620 F.3d 775 (2010).
The 1st amendment shielded church members from tort liability for their speech when they picketed near a soldier's funeral service and their picket signs reflected the church's view that the United States is overly tolerant of sin and that God kills American soldiers as punishment. Whether the amendment prohibits liability for speech in this type of case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ___,
131 S. Ct. 1207,
179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011).
A state cannot create new categories of unprotected speech by applying a simple balancing test that weighs the value of a particular category of speech against its social costs and then punishes that category of speech if it fails the test. Without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content, such as restrictions on selling or lending "violent" video games to children, is part of a long, if heretofore unrecognized, tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the judgment of the American people, embodied in the 1st amendment, that the benefits of its restrictions on the government outweigh the costs. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. ___,
180 L. Ed. 2d 708,
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
The 1st amendment does not permit a public-sector union to adopt procedures that have the effect of requiring objecting nonmembers to lend the union money to be used for political, ideological, and other purposes not germane to collective bargaining. The 1st amendment does not allow a public-sector union to require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee or dues increase that is levied to meet expenses for the purpose of financing the union's political and ideological activities that were not disclosed when the amount of the regular assessment was set. Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012).
A public employer may choose not to hire a particular applicant for a nonpartisan position because of the applicant's history of partisan political activity. This is an appropriate exception to the general rule that public employers may not make employment decisions on the basis of protected 1st amendment activities. However, an applicant's political affiliation and the applicant's history of partisan activities are two distinct considerations. Albers-Anders v. Pocan,
905 F. Supp. 2d 944 (2012).
The federal statute at issue in this case imposed two types of limits on campaign contributions: 1) base limits that restrict how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, and 2) aggregate limits that restrict how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. Base limits were previously upheld as serving the permissible objective of combatting corruption. The aggregate limits do little, if anything, to address that concern, while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process. The aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the 1st amendment. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U. S. ___,
134 S. Ct. 1434,
188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014)
A Massachusetts act that made it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any reproductive health care facility violated the 1st amendment. Although the act was content neutral, it was not narrowly tailored because it burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. ___ (2014).
Behind the Curtain of Privacy: How Obscenity Law Inhibits the Expression of Ideas About Sex and Gender. Peterson. 1998 WLR 625.
Testimonial privilege of newsmen. Baxter, 55 MLR 184 (1972).
Academic freedom; some tentative guidelines. Keith, 55 MLR 379 (1972).
Protection of commercial speech. 60 MLR 138 (1976).
Zurcher: third party searches and freedom of the press. Cantrell. 62 MLR 35 (1978).
A newspaper cannot constitutionally be compelled to publish a paid advertisement designed to be an editorial response to previous newspaper reports. 64 MLR 361 (1980).
Granting access to private shopping center property for free speech purposes on the basis of a state constitutional provision does not violate owner's federal constitutional property rights or first amendment free speech rights. 64 MLR 507 (1981).
First amendment and freedom of press: A revised approach to marketplace of ideas concept. Gary. 72 MLR 187 (1989).
Architectural Appearances Ordinances and the 1st Amendment. Rice. 76 MLR 439 (1992).
Hate Crimes: New Limits on the Scope of the 1st Amendment. Resler. 77 MLR 415 (1994).
Improving the Odds of the Central Balancing Test; Restricting Commercial Speech as a Last Resort. Gulling. 81 MLR 873 (1998).
Researcher-subject testimonial privilege. Newels and Lehman, 1971 WLR 1085.
Freedom of speech, expression and action. Hilmes, 1971 WLR 1209.
Free speech on premises of privately owned shopping center. Felsenthal, 1973 WLR 612.
Constitutional protection of critical speech and the public figure doctrine: Retreat by reaffirmation. 1980 WLR 568.
Corporate "persons" and freedom of speech: The political impact of legal mythology. Payton and Bartlett, 1981 WLR 494.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Mortices Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protection for Religious Speech Through the Illusion of Public Forum Analysis. Ehrmann. 1994 WLR 965.
The Journalist's Privilege. Kassel. Wis. Law. Feb. 1996.
The Price of Free Speech: Regents v. Southworth. Furlow. Wis. Law. June 2000.
LIBEL
In a libel action involving a public figure or a matter of public concern, the defendant is entitled to the "clear and convincing" burden of proof and also to a finding of the type of malice involved. Polzin v. Helmbrecht,
54 Wis. 2d 578,
196 N.W.2d 685 (1972).
In determining punitive damages in libel cases, it is relevant to consider the maximum fine for a similar offense under the criminal code. Wozniak v. Local 1111 of UE,
57 Wis. 2d 725,
205 N.W.2d 369 (1973).
The executive committee of the medical staff of a private hospital is not a quasi-judicial body so as to render a letter to it privileged. DiMiceli v. Klieger,
58 Wis. 2d 359,
206 N.W.2d 184 (1973).
"Public figure" is defined. The constitutional protections of news media and individual defamers are discussed. Denny v. Mertz,
106 Wis. 2d 636,
318 N.W.2d 141 (1982).
A private citizen may become a public figure regarding a particular issue that is of substantial public interest and must prove actual malice to prevail in a libel action. Weigel v. Capital Times Co.
145 Wis. 2d 71,
426 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1988).
Judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are protected by absolute privilege, subject to 2 restrictions: 1) the statement must be in a procedural context recognized as privileged; and 2) it must be relevant to the matter under consideration. Rady v. Lutz,
150 Wis. 2d 643,
444 N.W.2d 58 (Ct. App. 1989).
A fire department captain with considerable power and discretion is a public official who must meet the malice requirement. Defendant firefighters had a common law privilege to comment in writing on the captain's fitness for office. Miller v. Minority Brotherhood,
158 Wis. 2d 589,
463 N.W.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1990).
