102.18(1)(c)
(c) If 2 or more examiners have conducted a formal hearing on a claim and are unable to agree on the order or award to be issued, the decision shall be the decision of the majority. If the examiners are equally divided on the decision, the department may appoint an additional examiner who shall review the record and consult with the other examiners concerning their personal impressions of the credibility of the evidence. Findings of fact and an order or award may then be issued by a majority of the examiners.
102.18(1)(d)
(d) Any award which falls within a range of 5% of the highest or lowest estimate of permanent partial disability made by a practitioner which is in evidence is presumed to be a reasonable award, provided it is not higher than the highest or lower than the lowest estimate in evidence.
102.18(1)(e)
(e) Except as provided in
s. 102.21, if the department orders a party to pay an award of compensation, the party shall pay the award no later than 21 days after the date on which the order is mailed to the last-known address of the party, unless the party files a petition for review under
sub. (3). This paragraph applies to all awards of compensation ordered by the department, whether the award results from a hearing, the default of a party, or a compromise or stipulation confirmed by the department.
102.18(2)
(2) The department shall have and maintain on its staff such examiners as are necessary to hear and decide disputed claims and to assist in the effective administration of this chapter. These examiners shall be attorneys and may be designated as administrative law judges. These examiners may make findings and orders, and approve, review, set aside, modify or confirm stipulations of settlement or compromises of claims for compensation.
102.18(3)
(3) A party in interest may petition the commission for review of an examiner's decision awarding or denying compensation if the department or commission receives the petition within 21 days after the department mailed a copy of the examiner's findings and order to the party's last-known address. The commission shall dismiss a petition which is not timely filed unless the petitioner shows probable good cause that the reason for failure to timely file was beyond the petitioner's control. If no petition is filed within 21 days from the date that a copy of the findings or order of the examiner is mailed to the last-known address of the parties in interest, the findings or order shall be considered final unless set aside, reversed or modified by the examiner within that time. If the findings or order are set aside by the examiner the status shall be the same as prior to the findings or order set aside. If the findings or order are reversed or modified by the examiner the time for filing a petition commences with the date that notice of reversal or modification is mailed to the last-known address of the parties in interest. The commission shall either affirm, reverse, set aside or modify the findings or order in whole or in part, or direct the taking of additional evidence. This action shall be based on a review of the evidence submitted.
102.18(4)(b)
(b) Within 28 days after a decision of the commission is mailed to the last-known address of each party in interest, the commission may, on its own motion, set aside the decision for further consideration.
102.18(4)(c)
(c) On its own motion, for reasons it deems sufficient, the commission may set aside any final order or award of the commission or examiner within one year after the date of the order or award, upon grounds of mistake or newly discovered evidence, and, after further consideration, do any of the following:
102.18(4)(c)1.
1. Affirm, reverse or modify, in whole or in part, the order or award.
102.18(4)(c)3.
3. Remand the case to the department for further proceedings.
102.18(4)(d)
(d) While a petition for review by the commission is pending or after entry of an order or award by the commission but before commencement of an action for judicial review or expiration of the period in which to commence an action for judicial review, the commission shall remand any compromise presented to it to the department for consideration and approval or rejection pursuant to
s. 102.16 (1). Presentation of a compromise does not affect the period in which to commence an action for judicial review.
102.18(5)
(5) If it shall appear to the department that a mistake may have been made as to cause of injury in the findings, order or award upon an alleged injury based on accident, when in fact the employee was suffering from an occupational disease, the department may upon its own motion, with or without hearing, within 3 years from the date of such findings, order or award, set aside such findings, order or award, or the department may take such action upon application made within such 3 years. Thereafter, and after opportunity for hearing, the department may, if in fact the employee is suffering from disease arising out of the employment, make new findings and award, or it may reinstate the previous findings, order or award.
102.18(6)
(6) In case of disease arising out of the employment, the department may from time to time review its findings, order or award, and make new findings, order or award, based on the facts regarding disability or otherwise as they may then appear. This subsection shall not affect the application of the limitation in
s. 102.17 (4).
102.18 Cross-reference
Cross-reference: See also LIRC and s.
DWD 80.05, Wis. adm. code.
102.18 Annotation
Committee Note, 1971: The intent is to authorize the commission within its absolute discretion to reopen final orders on the basis of mistake or newly discovered evidence within a period of one year from the date of such order where this is found to be just. It is intended that the commission have authority to grant or deny compensation, including the right to increase or to decrease benefits previously awarded. [Bill 371-A]
102.18 Annotation
Interlocutory orders issued by the department in worker's compensation cases are not res judicata. Worsch v. DILHR,
46 Wis. 2d 504,
175 N.W.2d 201 (1970).
102.18 Annotation
When the department reverses an examiner's findings and makes independent findings, the latter should be accompanied by a memorandum opinion indicating not only prior consultation with the examiner and review of the record, but a statement or statements of the reasons for reaching a different result or conclusion, particularly when the credibility of witnesses is involved. Transamerica Insurance Co. v. DILHR,
54 Wis. 2d 272,
195 N.W.2d 656 (1972). See also Mervosh v. LIRC,
2010 WI App 36,
324 Wis. 2d 134,
781 N.W.2d 236,
09-0271.
102.18 Annotation
The department could properly find no permanent disability in the case of a successful fusion of vertebrae and still retain jurisdiction to determine future disability when doctors testified that there might be future effects. Vernon County v. DILHR,
60 Wis. 2d 736,
211 N.W.2d 441 (1973).
102.18 Annotation
In a case involving conflicting testimony in which the department reverses an examiner's findings, fundamental fairness requires a separate statement by the department explaining why it reached its decision, as well as specifically setting forth in the record its consultation with the examiner with respect to impressions or conclusions in regard to the credibility of witnesses. Simonton v. DILHR,
62 Wis. 2d 112,
214 N.W.2d 302 (1974).
102.18 Annotation
Sub. (5) is inapplicable if at the original hearing the examiner considered the possibility of both accidental injury and injury caused by occupational disease and denied the applicant benefits. Murphy v. DILHR,
63 Wis. 2d 248,
217 N.W.2d 370 (1974).
102.18 Annotation
An award will be affirmed if it is supported by any credible evidence. When there are inconsistencies or conflicts in medical testimony, it is for the department and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies. Theodore Fleisner, Inc. v. DILHR,
65 Wis. 2d 317,
222 N.W.2d 600 (1974).
102.18 Annotation
The authority granted under sub. (3) to modify the findings of a hearing examiner does not extend to the making of findings and an order on an alternative basis of liability neither tried by the parties nor ruled on by the examiner. When another basis of liability is applicable, the examiner's findings must be set aside and an order directing the taking of additional testimony entered, directing the examiner to make new findings as to the substituted basis. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. DILHR,
67 Wis. 2d 185,
226 N.W.2d 492 (1975).
102.18 Annotation
The dismissal of an application that was neither based upon a stipulation or compromise nor entered after a hearing was void. The original application was valid though made many years earlier. Kohler Co. v. DILHR,
81 Wis. 2d 11,
259 N.W.2d 695 (1977).
102.18 Annotation
The department is not required to make specific findings as to a defense to a worker's claim, but it is better practice to either make findings or state why none were made. Universal Foundry Co. v. DILHR,
82 Wis. 2d 479,
263 N.W.2d 172 (1978).
102.18 Annotation
Commission guidelines, formulated as internal standards of credibility in worker's compensation cases, are irrelevant to a court's review of the commission's findings. E. F. Brewer Co. v. DILHR,
82 Wis. 2d 634,
264 N.W.2d 222 (1978).
102.18 Annotation
A general finding by the department implies all facts necessary to support it. A finding not explicitly made may be inferred from other properly made findings and from findings that were not made if there is evidence that would support those findings. Valadzic v. Briggs & Stratton Corp.
92 Wis. 2d 583,
286 N.W.2d 540 (1979).
102.18 Annotation
An employer was penalized for denying a claim that was not "fairly debatable" under sub. (1) (bp). Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. LIRC,
138 Wis. 2d 58,
405 N.W.2d 684 (Ct. App. 1987).
102.18 Annotation
Sub. (4) (c) grants the review commission exclusive authority to set aside findings due to newly discovered evidence. The trial court does not possess that authority. Hopp v. LIRC,
146 Wis. 2d 172,
430 N.W.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1988).
102.18 Annotation
To show bad faith under sub. (1) (bp) a claimant must show that the employer acted without a reasonable basis for the delay and with knowledge or a reckless disregard of the lack of reasonable basis for the delay. North American Mechanical v. LIRC,
157 Wis. 2d 801,
460 N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1990).
102.18 Annotation
After the commission makes a final order and the review period has passed, the commission's decision is final for all purposes. Kwaterski v. LIRC,
158 Wis. 2d 112,
462 N.W.2d 534 (Ct. App. 1990).
102.18 Annotation
Sub. (3) does not authorize LIRC to take administrative notice of any fact; review is limited to the record before the hearing examiner. Amsoil, Inc. v. LIRC,
173 Wis. 2d 154,
496 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1992).
102.18 Annotation
The commission may not reject a medical opinion absent something in the record to support the rejection; countervailing expert testimony is not required in all cases. Leist v. LIRC,
183 Wis. 2d 450,
515 N.W.2d 268 (Ct. App. 1994).
102.18 Annotation
Issuance of a default order under sub. (1) (a) is discretionary. Rules of civil procedure do not apply to administrative proceedings. Nothing in the law suggests a default order must be issued in the absence of excusable neglect. Verhaagh v. LIRC,
204 Wis. 2d 154,
554 N.W.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1996),
96-0470.
102.18 Annotation
The commission may not rule on and consider issues on appeal that were not litigated and may not consider evidence not considered by the administrative law judge unless the parties are allowed to offer rebuttal evidence. Wright v. LIRC,
210 Wis. 2d 289,
565 N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-1024.
102.18 Annotation
LIRC's authority under s. 102.17 (1) (a) to control its calendar and manage its internal affairs necessarily implies the power to deny an applicant's motion to withdraw an application for hearing. An appellant's failure to appear at a hearing after a motion to withdraw the application was denied was grounds for entry of a default judgment under sub. (1) (a). Baldwin v. LIRC,
228 Wis. 2d 601,
599 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1999),
98-3090.
102.18 Annotation
Under s. 102.23 (1) (a), judicial review is available only from an order or award granting or denying compensation. Judicial review by common law certiorari was not available for a claim that LIRC failed to act within the statutory time limitations under sub. (4), which would be subject to judicial review of any subsequent order or award granting or denying compensation in that case. Vidal v. LIRC,
2002 WI 72,
253 Wis. 2d 426,
645 N.W.2d 870,
00-3548.
102.18 Annotation
To demonstrate bad faith under sub. (1) (bp), a claimant must show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim. Brown v. LIRC,
2003 WI 142,
267 Wis. 2d 31,
671 N.W.2d 279,
02-1429.
102.18 Annotation
Because sub. (1) (bp) specifically allows for the imposition of bad faith penalties on an employer for failure to pay benefits, and because s. 102.23 (5) specifically directs the employer to pay benefits pending an appeal when the only issue is who will pay benefits, an employer may be subject to bad faith penalties under sub. (bp), independent from its insurer, when it fails to pay benefits in accordance with s. 102.23 (5). Bosco v. LIRC,
2004 WI 77,
272 Wis. 2d 586,
681 N.W.2d 157,
03-0662.
102.18 Annotation
Sub. (1) (d) does not prohibit determinations in excess of the highest medical assessment in evidence, but rather creates a presumption of reasonableness for awards that fall within the prescribed range. The statute does not state that an award outside of the prescribed range is unreasonable and does not prohibit DWD from setting minimum loss of use percentages by administrative rule. Daimler Chrysler v. LIRC,
2007 WI 15,
299 Wis. 2d 1,
727 N.W.2d 311,
05-0544.
102.18 Annotation
Sub. (1) (bp) does not govern the conduct of the department or its agent and does not impose any penalty on the department or its agent for bad faith conduct in administering the uninsured employers fund. Sub. (1) (bp) constitutes the exclusive remedy for the bad faith conduct of an employer or an insurance carrier. Because sub. (1) (bp) does not apply to the department's agent, it does not provide an exclusive remedy for the agent's bad faith. Moreover, s. 102.81 (1) (a) exempts the department and its agent from paying an employee the statutory penalties and interest imposed on an employer or an insurance carrier for their misdeeds, but nothing in s. 102.81 (1) (a) exempts the department or its agent from liability for its bad faith conduct in processing claims. Aslakson v. Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc.
2007 WI 39,
300 Wis. 2d 92,
729 N.W.2d 712,
04-2588.
102.18 Annotation
Because the parties explicitly stated the only claim against the employer was for accidental injury, the employer could not "know the charges or claims" against it included an occupational disease claim. It never had an opportunity to be heard on "the probative force of the evidence adduced by both sides" as applied to the occupational disease claim, or on the law applicable to the occupational disease claim, either during the hearing or in its brief to the commission. As such, the employer was denied both due process and a "fair hearing" under sub. (1) (a). Waste Management Incorporated v. LIRC,
2008 WI App 50,
308 Wis. 2d 763,
747 N.W.2d 782,
07-2405.
102.18 Annotation
Once a permanent partial disability award is made, the worker's compensation statutes provide only limited provision for reopening. The statutes do not provide for the reopening of a final award two years after it is rendered in the event the employer rehires the employee. Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. LIRC,
2009 WI App 40,
316 Wis. 2d 516,
765 N.W.2d 850,
08-1977.
102.18 Annotation
Case law appears to define an order "awarding or denying compensation" in sub. (3) synonymously with an order reaching the merits of the applicant's claim. Although the administrative decisions in this case contemplated the possibility of future action by the claimant, the dismissal was not procedural or rooted in standing doctrines like ripeness but based on a finding that the claimant presented insufficient evidence to substantiate it and did reach the merits. LaBeree v. Wausau Insurance Companies,
2010 WI App 148,
330 Wis. 2d 101,
793 N.W.2d 77,
09-1628.
102.18 Annotation
The automatic-stay provisions of the federal bankruptcy code froze an employer's obligation to pay claims, including worker's compensation, that were not due at the time of the employer's bankruptcy filing. Accordingly, obligations that became due after filing were not in default and no late-payment penalty could be assessed under sub. (1) (bp). Grede Foundries, Inc. v. Labor and Industry Review Commission,
2012 WI App 86,
343 Wis. 2d 517,
819 N.W.2d 850,
11-2636.
102.19
102.19
Alien dependents; payments through consular officers. In case a deceased employee, for whose injury or death compensation is payable, leaves surviving alien dependents residing outside of the United States, the duly accredited consular officer of the country of which such dependents are citizens or such officer's designated representative residing within the state shall, except as otherwise determined by the department, be the sole representative of the deceased employee and dependents in all matters pertaining to their claims for compensation. The receipt by such officer or agent of compensation funds and the distribution thereof shall be made only upon order of the department, and payment to such officer or agent pursuant to any such order shall be a full discharge of the benefits or compensation. Such consular officer or such officer's representative shall furnish, if required by the department, a bond to be approved by it, conditioned upon the proper application of all moneys received by such person. Before such bond is discharged, such consular officer or representative shall file with the department a verified account of the items of his or her receipts and disbursements of such compensation. Such consular officer or representative shall make interim reports to the department as it may require.
102.19 History
History: 1977 c. 29.
102.195
102.195
Employees confined in institutions; payment of benefits. In case an employee is adjudged insane or incompetent, or convicted of a felony, and is confined in a public institution and has wholly dependent upon the employee for support a person, whose dependency is determined as if the employee were deceased, compensation payable during the period of the employee's confinement may be paid to the employee and the employee's dependents, in such manner, for such time and in such amount as the department by order provides.
102.195 History
History: 1993 a. 492.
102.20
102.20
Judgment on award. If any party presents a certified copy of the award to the circuit court for any county, the court shall, without notice, render judgment in accordance with the award. A judgment rendered under this section shall have the same effect as though rendered in an action tried and determined by the court, and shall, with like effect, be entered in the judgment and lien docket.
102.20 History
History: 1995 a. 224;
2001 a. 37.
102.20 Annotation
"Award" under this section means an award that has become final under s. 102.18 (3). Warren v. Link Farms, Inc.
123 Wis. 2d 485,
368 N.W.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1985).
102.21
102.21
Payment of awards by municipalities. Whenever an award is made by the department under this chapter or s.
66.191, 1981 stats., against any municipality, the person in whose favor it is made shall file a certified copy thereof with the municipal clerk. Within 20 days thereafter, unless an appeal is taken, such clerk shall draw an order on the municipal treasurer for the payment of the award. If upon appeal such award is affirmed in whole or in part the order for payment shall be drawn within 10 days after a certified copy of such judgment is filed with the proper clerk. If more than one payment is provided for in the award or judgment, orders shall be drawn as the payments become due. No statute relating to the filing of claims against, and the auditing, allowing and payment of claims by municipalities shall apply to the payment of an award or judgment under this section.
102.21 History
History: 1983 a. 191 s.
6.
102.22
102.22
Penalty for delayed payments; interest. 102.22(1)
(1) If the employer or his or her insurer inexcusably delays in making the first payment that is due an injured employee for more than 30 days after the day on which the employee leaves work as a result of an injury and if the amount due is $500 or more, the payments as to which the delay is found shall be increased by 10%. If the employer or his or her insurer inexcusably delays in making the first payment that is due an injured employee for more than 14 days after the day on which the employee leaves work as a result of an injury, the payments as to which the delay is found may be increased by 10%. If the employer or his or her insurer inexcusably delays for any length of time in making any other payment that is due an injured employee, the payments as to which the delay is found may be increased by 10%. Where the delay is chargeable to the employer and not to the insurer
s. 102.62 shall apply and the relative liability of the parties shall be fixed and discharged as therein provided. The department may also order the employer or insurance carrier to reimburse the employee for any finance charges, collection charges or interest which the employee paid as a result of the inexcusable delay by the employer or insurance carrier.
102.22(2)
(2) If the sum ordered by the department to be paid is not paid when due, that sum shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per year. The state is liable for such interest on awards issued against it under this chapter. The department has jurisdiction to issue award for payment of such interest at any time within one year of the date of its order, or upon appeal after final court determination. Such interest becomes due from the date the examiner's order becomes final or from the date of a decision by the labor and industry review commission, whichever is later.
102.22(3)
(3) If upon petition for review the commission affirms an examiner's order, interest at the rate of 7% per year on the amount ordered by the examiner shall be due for the period beginning on the 21st day after the date of the examiner's order and ending on the date paid under the commission's decision. If upon petition for judicial review under
s. 102.23 the court affirms the commission's decision, interest at the rate of 7% per year on the amount ordered by the examiner shall be due up to the date of the commission's decision, and thereafter interest shall be computed under
sub. (2).
102.22 Annotation
The department can assess the penalty for inexcusable delay in making payments prior to the entry of an order. The question of inexcusable delay is one of law and the courts are not bound by the department's finding as to it. Milwaukee County v. DILHR,
48 Wis. 2d 392,
180 N.W.2d 513 (1970).
102.22 Annotation
The penalty under sub. (1) does not bar an action for bad faith for failure to pay a claim. Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co.
86 Wis. 2d 615,
273 N.W.2d 220 (1979).
102.23
102.23
Judicial review. 102.23(1)(a)(a) The findings of fact made by the commission acting within its powers shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive. The order or award granting or denying compensation, either interlocutory or final, whether judgment has been rendered on it or not, is subject to review only as provided in this section and not under
ch. 227 or
s. 801.02. Within 30 days after the date of an order or award made by the commission either originally or after the filing of a petition for review with the department under
s. 102.18 any party aggrieved thereby may by serving a complaint as provided in
par. (b) and filing the summons and complaint with the clerk of the circuit court commence, in circuit court, an action against the commission for the review of the order or award, in which action the adverse party shall also be made a defendant. If the circuit court is satisfied that a party in interest has been prejudiced because of an exceptional delay in the receipt of a copy of any finding or order, it may extend the time in which an action may be commenced by an additional 30 days. The proceedings shall be in the circuit court of the county where the plaintiff resides, except that if the plaintiff is a state agency, the proceedings shall be in the circuit court of the county where the defendant resides. The proceedings may be brought in any circuit court if all parties stipulate and that court agrees.
102.23(1)(b)
(b) In such an action a complaint shall be served with an authenticated copy of the summons. The complaint need not be verified, but shall state the grounds upon which a review is sought. Service upon a commissioner or agent authorized by the commission to accept service constitutes complete service on all parties, but there shall be left with the person so served as many copies of the summons and complaint as there are defendants, and the commission shall mail one copy to each other defendant.
102.23(1)(c)
(c) Except as provided in
par. (cm), the commission shall serve its answer within 20 days after the service of the complaint, and, within the like time, the adverse party may serve an answer to the complaint, which answer may, by way of counterclaim or cross complaint, ask for the review of the order or award referred to in the complaint, with the same effect as if the party had commenced a separate action for the review thereof.
102.23(1)(cm)
(cm) If an adverse party to the proceeding brought under
par. (a) is an insurance company, the insurance company may serve an answer to the complaint within 45 days after the service of the complaint.
102.23(1)(d)
(d) The commission shall make return to the court of all documents and papers on file in the matter, all testimony that has been taken, and the commission's order, findings, and award. Such return of the commission when filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court shall, with the papers specified in
s. 809.15, constitute a judgment roll in the action; and it shall not be necessary to have a transcript approved. The action may thereupon be brought on for hearing before the court upon the record by any party on 10 days' notice to the other; subject, however, to the provisions of law for a change of the place of trial or the calling in of another judge.
102.23(1)(e)
(e) Upon such hearing, the court may confirm or set aside such order or award; and any judgment which may theretofore have been rendered thereon; but the same shall be set aside only upon the following grounds:
102.23(1)(e)1.
1. That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers.
102.23(1)(e)3.
3. That the findings of fact by the commission do not support the order or award.
102.23(2)
(2) Upon the trial of any such action the court shall disregard any irregularity or error of the commission or the department unless it is made to affirmatively appear that the plaintiff was damaged thereby.
102.23(3)
(3) The record in any case shall be transmitted to the department within 5 days after expiration of the time for appeal from the order or judgment of the court, unless appeal shall be taken from such order or judgment.
102.23(4)
(4) Whenever an award is made against the state the attorney general may bring an action for review thereof in the same manner and upon the same grounds as are provided by
sub. (1).
102.23(5)
(5) When an action for review involves only the question of liability as between the employer and one or more insurance companies or as between several insurance companies, a party that has been ordered by the department, the commission, or a court to pay compensation is not relieved from paying compensation as ordered.
102.23(6)
(6) If the commission's order or award depends on any fact found by the commission, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the commission as to the weight or credibility of the evidence on any finding of fact. The court may, however, set aside the commission's order or award and remand the case to the commission if the commission's order or award depends on any material and controverted finding of fact that is not supported by credible and substantial evidence.
102.23 Note
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1976: The procedure for initiating a petition for judicial review under ch. 102 is governed by the provisions of s. 102.23 rather than the provisions for initiating a civil action under s. 801.02. [Re Order effective Jan. 1, 1977]
102.23 Annotation
The fact that a party appealing from a DILHR order as to unemployment compensation labeled his petition "under 227.15" [now 227.52], is immaterial since the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction. An answer by the department that s. 227.15 [now 227.52] gave no jurisdiction amounted to an appearance, and the department could not later claim that the court had no personal jurisdiction because the appellant had not served a summons and complaint. Lees v. DILHR,
49 Wis. 2d 491,
182 N.W.2d 245 (1971).
102.23 Annotation
A finding of fact, whether ultimate or evidentiary, is still in its essential nature a fact, whereas a conclusion of law accepts those facts, and by judicial reasoning results from the application of rules or concepts of law to those facts whether undisputed or not. Kress Packing Co. v. Kottwitz,
61 Wis. 2d 175,
212 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
102.23 Annotation
A challenge to the constitutionality of sub. (1) was not sustained since it is manifest from the statute that the legislature intended to have the department be the real party in interest and not a mere nominal party. Hunter v. DILHR,
64 Wis. 2d 97,
218 N.W.2d 314 (1974).
102.23 Annotation
When the claimant timely appealed an adverse worker's compensation decision in good faith, but erroneously captioned the appeal, the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the action. Cruz v. DILHR,
81 Wis. 2d 442,
260 N.W.2d 692 (1978).
102.23 Annotation
An employer whose unemployment compensation account is not affected by the commission's determination has no standing to seek judicial review. Cornwell Personnel Associates v. DILHR,
92 Wis. 2d 53,
284 N.W.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1979).
