A defendant's request to withdraw from self-representation and proceed with the assistance of counsel rests in the trial court's discretion. A request to reinstate the right to counsel is akin to a request for substitution of counsel. A trial court may err by denying a request to revoke pro se status when the denial is merely to punish the defendant or is based on a rigid insistence on expedition in the face of a justifiable request for delay. A trial court does not erroneously exercise its discretion by preventing a defendant from reasserting the right to counsel merely to hinder the progress of the case against him. State v. Rhodes,
2011 WI App 145,
337 Wis. 2d 594,
807 N.W.2d 1,
10-0435.
The right to select counsel of one's choice has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee. Deprivation of the right is complete when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he or she wants, regardless of the quality of the representation received. To disqualify an attorney as a witness in a case, the state must show that the attorney is a necessary witness. It was an error to disqualify an attorney based solely on the fact that the attorney acted as a translator for his client. State v. Gonzalez-Villarreal,
2012 WI App 110,
344 Wis. 2d 472,
824 N.W.2d 161,
11-1259.
In order to establish a 6th amendment violation on the basis of a conflict of interest, a defendant who did not raise an objection at trial must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his or her counsel had an actual conflict of interest based on the facts of the case. An actual conflict of interest exists when the defendant's attorney was actively representing a conflicting interest so that the attorney's performance was adversely affected. Counsel is considered per se ineffective once an actual conflict of interest adversely affecting counsel's performance has been shown. A defendant need not prove that some kind of specific adverse effect or harm resulted from the conflict. State v. Villarreal,
2013 WI App 33,
346 Wis. 2d 690,
828 N.W.2d 866,
11-0998.
A claim for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel must be filed with the circuit court, either as a s. 974.06 motion or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A defendant arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, conversely, may not seek relief under s. 974.06 and must instead petition the court of appeals for a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Starks,
2013 WI 69,
349 Wis. 2d 274,
833 N.W.2d 146,
10-0425.
A defendant who argues that he or she received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a habeas petition because certain arguments were not raised must show why the claims he or she believes should have been raised on appeal were “clearly stronger" than the claims that were raised. State v. Starks,
2013 WI 69,
349 Wis. 2d 274,
833 N.W.2d 146,
10-0425.
Under
Padilla,
559 U.S. 356, counsel's failure to advise a defendant concerning clear deportation consequences of a plea bargain is prejudicial if the defendant shows that “a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." The defendant is not required to show that “there would be a different outcome" or that he or she had “real and viable challenges to the underlying veracity of the conviction." State v. Mendez,
2014 WI App 57,
354 Wis. 2d 88,
847 N.W.2d 895,
13-1862.
The court where an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel occurred is the proper forum in which to seek relief unless that forum is unable to provide the relief necessary to address the ineffectiveness claim. The remedy for an attorney's failure to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief is an extension of the timeframe to file the notice. Because the circuit court is without authority to extend the deadline to file a notice of intent to pursue post conviction relief, the proper forum lies in the court of appeals. Kyles v. Pollard,
2014 WI 38,
354 Wis. 2d 626,
847 N.W.2d 805,
12-0378.
Failure to call a potential witness may constitute deficient performance. A failure to call a key witness, however, does not always necessarily constitute deficient performance. The failure to call a witness may have been a reasonable trial strategy. State v. Jenkins,
2014 WI 59,
355 Wis. 2d 180,
848 N.W.2d 786,
12-0046.
Montejo, 556 U.S. 778, effectively established that a waiver of
Miranda rights is sufficient to waive the 6th amendment right to counsel and that such a waiver is not presumed invalid merely because the defendant is already represented by counsel. Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin constitution does not provide greater protections than the
6th amendment of the United States Constitution in the context of a waiver of the right to have counsel present during questioning. State v. Delebreau
2015 WI 55,
362 Wis. 2d 542,
864 N.W.2d 852,
13-1108.
Any language in
Mendez, 2014 WI App 57, that suggests that
Padilla,
559 U.S. 356, requires an attorney to advise an alien client that a conviction for a deportable offense will necessarily result in deportation is withdrawn. An attorney is required to “give correct advice" about the possible immigration consequences of a conviction. The attorney in this case satisfied that requirement by correctly advising the client that his guilty plea carried a “strong chance" of deportation. Executive action, including the United States Department of Homeland Security's exercise of prosecutorial discretion, can block the deportation of deportable aliens. State v. Shata,
2015 WI 74,
364 Wis. 2d 63,
868 N.W.2d 93,
13-1437.
Trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to inform the defendant that his no-contest plea to substantial battery was certain to result in his deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States. Because federal immigration law is not “succinct, clear, and explicit" in providing that the defendant's substantial battery constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, the defendant's attorney needed to do no more than advise him that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. State v. Fernando Ortiz-Mondragon,
2015 WI 73,
364 Wis. 2d 1,
866 N.W.2d 717,
13-2435.
The Supreme Court in
Edwards,
554 U.S. 164, declined to adopt a federal constitutional competency standard and specifically recognized an individual trial court's authority to make competency determinations. Nothing in
Edwards establishes severe mental illness as the only circumstance in which a trial judge may deny the right of self-representation. The Wisconsin standards established by
Klessig,
211 Wis. 2d 194, are not contrary to
Edwards. Whether a defendant is competent to proceed pro se is uniquely a question for the trial court to determine. State v. Jackson,
2015 WI App 45,
363 Wis. 2d 484,
867 N.W.2d 814,
13-2859.
Counsel's trial strategy decisions, even those appearing unwise in hindsight, will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel so long as they are reasonably founded on the facts and law under the circumstances existing at the time the decision was made. It was not unreasonable for defendant's counsel to allow an investigator to testify that the victim was telling the truth when counsel's goal was to demonstrate that the investigator's investigation was limited due to the investgator's bias. State v. Smith,
2016 WI App 8,
366 Wis. 2d 613,
874 N.W.2d 610,
14-2653.
Under
Felton,
110 Wis. 2d 485, trial counsel's decisions must be based upon facts and law upon which an ordinarily prudent lawyer would have then relied. This standard implies deliberateness, caution, and circumspection and counsel's decision must evince reasonableness under the circumstances. When counsel articulated no tactical reason implying deliberateness, caution, and circumspection for failing to call a witness and the record was devoid of any factual basis for a strategy that supported that failure, defense counsel's performance was deficient. State v. Honig,
2016 WI App 10,
366 Wis. 2d 681,
874 N.W.2d 589,
14-2968.
The 6th amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not require defense counsel to inform a defendant about the possibility of civil commitment under ch. 980 when the defendant enters a plea to a sexually violent offense. State v. LeMere,
2016 WI 41,
368 Wis. 2d 624,
879 N.W.2d 580,
13-2433.
Failure to raise arguments that require the resolution of unsettled legal questions generally does not render a lawyer's services “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance” sufficient to satisfy the 6th amendment. State v. Lemberger,
2017 WI 39,
374 Wis. 2d 617,
893 N.W.2d 232,
15-1452.
The standard to use in forfeiture of trial counsel cases established under
Cummings,
199 Wis. 2d 721, is upheld. There are two situations when a defendant loses the right to counsel: 1) a defendant may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel; and 2) a defendant may forfeit the right to counsel. The triggering event for forfeiture is when the court becomes convinced that the orderly and efficient progression of the case is being frustrated. State v. Suriano,
2017 WI 42,
374 Wis. 2d 683,
893 N.W.2d 543,
15-0959.
Scenarios triggering forfeiture of the right to trial counsel include: 1) a defendant's manipulative and disruptive behavior; 2) withdrawal of multiple attorneys based on a defendant's consistent refusal to cooperate with any of them and constant complaints about the attorneys' performance; 3) a defendant whose attitude is defiant and whose choices repeatedly result in delay, interfering with the process of justice; and 4) physical or verbal abuse directed at counsel or the court. State v. Suriano,
2017 WI 42,
374 Wis. 2d 683,
893 N.W.2d 543,
15-0959.
The contention that a defendant cannot forfeit the right to counsel unless the defendant's actions were done with an intent or purpose to delay is rejected. Contrary language in
State v. Coleman,
2002 WI App 100, and any other case requiring proof of intentional, purposeful delay is overruled. State v. Suriano,
2017 WI 42,
374 Wis. 2d 683,
893 N.W.2d 543,
15-0959.
Shata, 2015 WI 74, and
Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, stand for the proposition that, where the law is not “succinct, clear, and explicit,” counsel is not deficient by accurately warning a client of the “risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Defendant's counsel had no constitutional duty to give specific, direct advice on how pleading guilty would affect the defendant's possibilities for readmission beyond the accurate, generalized warnings that were given. State v. Villegas,
2018 WI App 9,
380 Wis. 2d 246,
908 N.W.2d 198,
15-2162.
Circuit courts reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel following multiple-count trials may conclude that deficient performance prejudiced only one of the multiple convictions.
Strickland,
466 U.S. 668, clearly contemplates such a result and does not require reversal on all counts when the prejudice proven affected only a single count. State v. Sholar,
2018 WI 53,
381 Wis. 2d 560,
912 N.W.2d 89,
16-0897.
The
Strickland,
466 U.S. 668, prejudice test is distinct from a sufficiency of the evidence test. A defendant need not prove the outcome would more likely than not be different in order to establish prejudice in ineffective assistance cases. The defendant must prove there is a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted him or her absent the error. State v. Sholar,
2018 WI 53,
381 Wis. 2d 560,
912 N.W.2d 89,
16-0897.
Counsel must either reasonably investigate the law and facts or make a reasonable strategic decision that makes any further investigation unnecessary. The court reviews the reasonableness of trial counsel's decisions not with the benefit of hindsight, but in the context of the circumstances as they existed at the time counsel made the decisions. The court must consider the law and the facts as they existed when trial counsel's conduct occurred. State v. Pico,
2018 WI 66,
382 Wis. 2d 273,
914 N.W.2d 95,
15-1799.
A preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for detention pending further proceedings is not a “critical stage" in a prosecution requiring appointed counsel. Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103,
95 S. Ct. 854,
43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975).
When the defendant's right to counsel was violated by a corporeal identification conducted in court without counsel, the prosecution could not introduce identification evidence even though the identification had an independent source. Moore v. Illinois,
434 U.S. 220,
98 S. Ct. 458,
54 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977).
The right to counsel was not violated when a permissible jury instruction, intended for the defendant's benefit, was given over defense counsel's objections. Lakeside v. Oregon,
435 U.S. 333,
98 S. Ct. 1091,
55 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1978).
An indigent defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel when charged with an offense for which imprisonment is authorized but not imposed. Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367,
99 S. Ct. 1158,
59 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979).
In order to demonstrate a violation of the right to counsel, the defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected the counsel's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335,
100 S. Ct. 1708,
64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980).
The government violated the defendant's right to counsel by placing a paid informant in the same cell who deliberately elicited incriminating statements. United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264,
100 S. Ct. 2183,
65 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1980).
Since a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to counsel to pursue a discretionary state appeal, the defendant could not be deprived of effective counsel by counsel's failure to timely file an application for certiorari. Wainwright v. Torna,
455 U.S. 586,
102 S. Ct. 1300,
71 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1982).
Without surrounding circumstances making it unlikely that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel, a claim of ineffective assistance must be supported by demonstrating specific errors made by trial counsel. U.S. v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648,
104 S. Ct. 2039,
80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984).
To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show a probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Indigent inmates held in administrative segregation during the investigation of a prison murder were not entitled to counsel prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against them. U.S. v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 180,
104 S. Ct. 2292,
81 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1984).
An accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of an initial request for counsel. Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. 91,
105 S. Ct. 490,
83 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1984).
The right to assistance of counsel wasn't violated when an attorney refused to cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony at trial. Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U.S. 157 (1986).
Because an individual has no underlying constitutional right to appointed counsel in state collateral postconviction proceedings, the individual may not insist upon implementation of
Anders,
386 U.S. 738, procedures. Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551,
107 S. Ct. 1990,
95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987).
Though the trial court must recognize the presumption that a defendant is entitled to his or her counsel of choice, the presumption is overcome by actual conflict and a serious potential for actual conflict. Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153,
108 S. Ct. 1692,
100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988).
The right to counsel was not violated by the court's instruction to the defendant that he not confer with his attorney during a 15 minute recess between the defendant's direct and cross-examination. Perry v. Leeke,
488 U.S. 272,
109 S. Ct. 594,
102 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1989).
The sixth amendment right to counsel is offense specific. An accused's invocation of this right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under
Miranda arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171,
111 S. Ct. 2204,
115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991).
An uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment upon a subsequent conviction. Nichols v. U.S.,
511 U.S. 738,
114 S. Ct. 1921,
128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994).
To void a conviction due to a 6th amendment violation when a trial court has failed to inquire into a potential conflict of interest that the court knew or should have known of, the defendant must establish that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. Failure of the trial court to inquire into the conflict did not reduce the defendant's burden of proof. Mickens v. Taylor,
535 U.S. 162,
152 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2002).
The 6th amendment right to counsel of choice commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided, to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he or she believes to be best. When that right is violated because the deprivation of counsel is erroneous, no additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation complete, and the violation is not subject to harmless-error analysis. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 U.S. 140,
122 S. Ct. 1237,
165 L. Ed. 2d 409,
126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
The U.S. Constitution does not forbid a state to insist that the defendant proceed to trial with counsel when the state court found the defendant mentally competent to stand trial if represented by counsel but not mentally competent to conduct that trial himself. Indiana v. Edwards,
554 U.S. 164,
128 S. Ct. 2379,
171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008).
The right to counsel applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against him or her and restrictions are imposed on his or her liberty. Attachment of the right does not require that a public prosecutor as distinct from a police officer be aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its conduct. Rothgery v. Gillespie County,
554 U.S. 191,
128 S. Ct. 2578,
171 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2008).
Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, which provided that if police initiate interrogation after the defendant's assertion of the right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid, is overruled. Courts are not required to presume that such a waiver is invalid under those circumstances. Montejo v. Louisiana,
556 U.S. 778,
129 S. Ct. 2079,
173 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2009).
A defendant's incriminating statement to a jailhouse informant, concededly elicited in violation of the 6th amendment right to counsel, was admissible at trial to impeach the defendant's conflicting statement. Kansas v. Ventris
556 U.S. 586,
129 S. Ct. 1841,
172 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2009).
Counsel has an obligation to advise a defendant that a guilty plea will result in the defendant's deportation from this country. Advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the 6th amendment right to counsel. When the deportation consequence is truly clear, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356,
130 S. Ct. 1473,
176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010).
As a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused. When defense counsel allowed an offer to expire without advising the defendant or allowing him to consider it, defense counsel did not render the effective assistance the constitution requires. Missouri v. Frye,
566 U.S. 134,
132 S. Ct. 1399,
182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012).
When ineffective advice led to rejection ofa plea offer and caused the defendant to stand trial, rather than to waive the right to trial, a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court, that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that were imposed. Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156,
132 S. Ct. 1376,
182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012).
When a defendant claims that his or her counsel's deficient performance deprived him or her of a trial by causing him or her to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. The court rejected a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of the right to trial. The decision whether to plead guilty involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea. But for his attorney's incompetence, the defendant would have known that accepting the plea agreement in this case would certainly have led to deportation while going to trial would “
almost certainly” have done so. If deportation were the determinative issue for an individual in plea discussions, and if the consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly harsher than pleading, that “almost” could make all the difference. Jae Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. ___,
137 S. Ct. 1958,
198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017).
A violation of the right to a public trial is a structural error. In the case of a structural error when there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to automatic reversal regardless of the error's actual effect on the outcome. When a defendant raises a public-trial violation via an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim,
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, prejudice is not shown automatically. Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show either a reasonable probability of a different outcome in his or her case or to show that the particular public-trial violation was so serious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. ___,
137 S. Ct. 1899,
198 L. Ed. 2d 42 (2017).
When postconviction counsel failed to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a postconviction motion under s. 974.02, the defendant's opportunity to argue that claim on direct appeal was foreclosed. The appropriate forum for asserting ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel was in a collateral motion under s. 974.06. Page v. Frank,
343 F.3d 901 (2003).
Right to counsel; repayment of cost of court-appointed counsel as a condition of probation. 56 MLR 551.
McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation. 1992 WLR 1643.
How do You Get a Lawyer Around Here? The Ambiguous Invocation of a Defendant's Right to Counsel under Miranda v. Arizona? 79 MLR 1041 (1997).
JURY TRIAL AND JUROR QUALIFICATIONS
NOTE: See also the notes to s. 906.06 for decisions relating to overturning verdicts due to juror misconduct.
Contradictory testimony of different state witnesses does not necessarily cancel the testimony and render it unfit as a basis for a conviction. The determination of credibility and the weight to be accorded the testimony is a jury function, and the jury may accept or reject the inconsistent testimony, even under the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof. Embry v. State,
46 Wis. 2d 151,
174 N.W.2d 521.
A resident of Menominee county may properly be tried by a jury drawn from the Shawano-Menominee district. Article IV, sec. 23, is not violated by using district-based jury lists. Pamanet v. State,
49 Wis. 2d 501,
182 N.W.2d 459.
When 2 alternate jurors in a murder trial made remarks critical of court procedures and the defense attorney, but were removed prior to the time the case was submitted to the jury, a showing of probable prejudice was required for a mistrial to be ordered. Shelton v. State,
50 Wis. 2d 43,
183 N.W.2d 87.
Asking an improper question that is not answered is not grounds for reversal, especially when the trial court instructs the jury to disregard the question and to draw no inferences therefrom. The instruction is presumed to efface any possible prejudice resulting from asking the question. Taylor v. State,
52 Wis. 2d 453,
190 N.W.2d 208.
The trial court did not err in failing to declare a mistrial because of a statement made by the prosecutor in closing argument, challenged as improper because the prosecutor expressed his opinion as to defendant's guilt, where it neither could be said that the statement was based on sources of information outside the record, nor expressed the prosecutor's conviction as to what the evidence established. State v. McGee,
52 Wis. 2d 736,
190 N.W.2d 893.
When the prosecutor stated in opening remarks that the defendant refused to be fingerprinted but failed to introduce testimony to this effect, the error was cured by proper instructions. State v. Tew,
54 Wis. 2d 361,
195 N.W.2d 615.
The exclusion of young persons, students, and teachers from a jury list is discussed. If a challenge establishes discrimination, the jury list is invalid and the defendant need not show prejudice. Brown v. State,
58 Wis. 2d 158,
205 N.W.2d 566.
Rules for proving discrimination in compiling a jury list and the burden of proof are discussed. Wilson v. State,
59 Wis. 2d 269,
208 N.W.2d 134.
Jurors are not necessarily prejudiced by reason of having sat as jurors at the same term on similar cases when the state's witnesses were the same, but it is better not to use the same jurors. State v. Boutch,
60 Wis. 2d 397,
210 N.W.2d 751.
The absence of persons of the defendant's race on the jury panel is not ipso facto evidence of prejudice. Jones v. State,
66 Wis. 2d 105,
223 N.W.2d 889.
A defendant, having been found competent to stand trial, must necessarily have possessed the intellectual capacity to waive the right to a jury trial. Norwood v. State,
74 Wis. 2d 343,
246 N.W.2d 801.
A jury must unanimously find participation in a crime, but the jury need not unanimously agree whether defendant: 1) directly committed crime; 2) aided and abetted its commission; or 3) conspired with another to commit it. Holland v. State,
91 Wis. 2d 134,
280 N.W.2d 288 (1979).
Excusing Native Americans from a jury without individual examination denied the Native American defendant a trial by an impartial jury. State v. Chosa,
108 Wis. 2d 392,
321 N.W.2d 280 (1982).
The verdict was unanimous in a battery case even though the jury was not required to specify whether the battery occurred when the defendant threw an object at the victim or during an ensuing fistfight. State v. Giwosky,
109 Wis. 2d 446,
326 N.W.2d 232 (1982).
The verdict was unanimous in a rape case even though the jury was not required to specify whether the sexual assault was vaginal or oral. State v. Lomagro,
113 Wis. 2d 582,
335 N.W.2d 583 (1983).
When the accused refused to participate in the trial, the court erred by failing to inform the accused of the right to be present at trial, to waive that right, and to reclaim it at any time. State v. Haynes,
118 Wis. 2d 21,
345 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1984).
A waiver of the right to a jury trial is effective if the defendant understands the basic purpose and function of a jury trial. Trial courts are prospectively ordered to advise defendants of the unanimity requirement before accepting a waiver. State v. Resio,
148 Wis. 2d 687,
436 N.W.2d 603 (1989).
A defendant has the right to a jury determination on each element of a charged offense. The right can be waived only by the defendant personally on the record. State v. Villarreal,
153 Wis. 2d 323,
450 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1989).
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges in a purposefully discriminatory manner, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a neutral explanation for challenging the jurors.
Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) is discussed. State v. Walker,
154 Wis. 2d 158,
453 N.W.2d 127 (1990).