973.015(3)
(3) A special disposition under this section is not a basis for a claim under s.
775.05.
973.015 Annotation
An expunged conviction is not admissible to attack a witness's credibility. State v. Anderson,
160 Wis. 2d 435,
466 N.W.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1991).
973.015 Annotation
A reasonable reading of this section is that the legislature included the words “at the time of sentencing" in sub. (1m) (a) 2. to limit the point in time at which the circuit court is to make a decision about expunction, and that the phrase “at the time of sentencing" means at the proceeding at which the circuit court announces the sanction. State v. Matasek,
2014 WI 27,
353 Wis. 2d 601,
846 N.W.2d 811,
12-1582.
973.015 Annotation
The only requirements sub. (2) [now sub. (1m) (b)] places on an individual defendant to successfully complete probation are that: 1) he or she has not been convicted of a subsequent offense; 2) his or her probation has not been revoked; and 3) he or she has satisfied all the conditions of probation. If a probationer satisfies these 3 criteria, he has earned expungement and is automatically entitled to expungement of the underlying charge. State v. Hemp,
2014 WI 129,
359 Wis. 2d 320,
856 N.W.2d 811,
13-1163.
973.015 Annotation
This section places no burden upon a person who successfully completes probation to petition the circuit court within a certain period of time in order to effectuate the expungement. The detaining or probationary authority must forward the certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the individual defendant's successful completion of his or her sentence and at that point the process of expungement is self-executing. State v. Hemp,
2014 WI 129,
359 Wis. 2d 320,
856 N.W.2d 811,
13-1163.
973.015 Annotation
This section does not apply to civil forfeiture violations. The language of sub. (1) (a) [now sub. (1m) (a) 1.] indicates that law violations for which expunction is available relate to laws that include some “period of imprisonment." Thus, where there is no period of imprisonment associated with a law, that law is not one to which this section applies. Kenosha County v. Frett,
2014 WI App 127,
359 Wis. 2d 246,
858 N.W.2d 397,
14-0006.
973.015 Annotation
The sentencing court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered the fact that the defendant had previously successfully completed supervision in a case in which the record of conviction had been expunged.
Leitner allows consideration of all facts underlying an expunged record of conviction, not just the facts underlying the crime itself provided those facts are not obtained from expunged court records. It does not require interrelated facts between the crime underlying a prior expunged record of conviction and the facts underlying a current criminal conviction. Because the references to the defendant's expunged record of conviction in the PSI and at sentencing were obtained from sources other than expunged court records, they were permitted under
Leitner. State v. Allen,
2017 WI 7,
373 Wis. 2d 98,
890 N.W.2d 245,
14-2840.
973.015 Annotation
In assessing whether to grant expungement, the sentencing court should set forth in the record the facts it considered and the rationale underlying its decision for deciding whether to grant or deny expungement. In exercising discretion, the sentencing court must do something more than simply state whether a defendant will benefit from expungement and that society will or will not be harmed. State v. Helmbrecht,
2017 WI App 5,
373 Wis. 2d 203,
891 N.W.2d 412,
15-2300.
973.015 Annotation
“At the time of sentencing" in sub. (1m) (a) 1. means only at the time when sentence is imposed and does not also encompass post-sentencing motions for sentence modification. State v. Arberry,
2018 WI 7,
379 Wis. 2d 254,
905 N.W.2d 832,
16-0866.
973.015 Annotation
The relief of vacating and setting a judgment aside under s. 974.06 (3) (d) is designed to address defects with respect to a conviction or sentence, not to provide a second chance or a fresh start as is intended by this section, the expunction statute. Vacatur invalidates the conviction itself, whereas expunction merely deletes the evidence of the underlying conviction from court records. Expunction does not invalidate a conviction. State v. Braunschweig,
2018 WI 113,
384 Wis. 2d 742,
921 N.W.2d 199,
17-1261.
973.015 Annotation
“Expunge" under this section means to strike or obliterate from the record all references to the defendant's name and identity. 67 Atty. Gen. 301.
973.015 Annotation
Circuit courts do not possess inherent powers to expunge or destroy conviction records. 70 Atty. Gen. 115.
973.017
973.017
Bifurcated sentences; use of guidelines; consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. 973.017(1)(1)
Definition. In this section, “sentencing decision" means a decision as to whether to impose a bifurcated sentence under s.
973.01 or place a person on probation and a decision as to the length of a bifurcated sentence, including the length of each component of the bifurcated sentence, the amount of a fine, and the length of a term of probation.
973.017(2)
(2) General requirement. When a court makes a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a criminal offense committed on or after February 1, 2003, the court shall consider all of the following:
973.017(2)(b)
(b) Any applicable mitigating factors and any applicable aggravating factors, including the aggravating factors specified in subs.
(3) to
(8).
973.017(3)
(3) Aggravating factors; generally. When making a sentencing decision for any crime, the court shall consider all of the following as aggravating factors:
973.017(3)(a)
(a) The fact that the person committed the crime while his or her usual appearance was concealed, disguised, or altered, with the intent to make it less likely that he or she would be identified with the crime.
973.017(3)(b)
(b) The fact that the person committed the crime using information that was disclosed to him or her under s.
301.46.
973.017(3)(c)
(c) The fact that the person committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal gang, as defined in s.
939.22 (9), with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by criminal gang members, as defined in s.
939.22 (9g).
973.017(3)(d)
(d) The fact that the person committed the felony while wearing a vest or other garment designed, redesigned, or adapted to prevent bullets from penetrating the garment.
973.017(3)(e)1.1. Subject to subd.
2., the fact that the person committed the felony with the intent to influence the policy of a governmental unit or to punish a governmental unit for a prior policy decision, if any of the following circumstances also applies to the felony committed by the person:
973.017(3)(e)1.a.
a. The person caused bodily harm, great bodily harm, or death to another.
973.017(3)(e)1.b.
b. The person caused damage to the property of another and the total property damaged is reduced in value by $25,000 or more. For the purposes of this subd.
1. b., property is reduced in value by the amount that it would cost either to repair or to replace it, whichever is less.
973.017(3)(e)1.c.
c. The person used force or violence or the threat of force or violence.
973.017(3)(e)2.a.a. In this subdivision, “
labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
973.017(3)(e)2.b.
b. Subdivision
1. does not apply to conduct arising out of or in connection with a labor dispute.
973.017(4)
(4) Aggravating factors; serious sex crimes committed while infected with certain diseases. 973.017(4)(a)1.
1. “HIV" means any strain of human immunodeficiency virus, which causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
973.017(4)(a)3.
3. “Sexually transmitted disease" means syphilis, gonorrhea, hepatitis B, hepatitis C, or chlamydia.
973.017(4)(a)4.
4. “Significantly exposed" means sustaining a contact that carries a potential for transmission of a sexually transmitted disease or HIV by one or more of the following:
973.017(4)(a)4.a.
a. Transmission, into a body orifice or onto mucous membrane, of blood; semen; vaginal secretions; cerebrospinal, synovial, pleural, peritoneal, pericardial, or amniotic fluid; or other body fluid that is visibly contaminated with blood.
973.017(4)(a)4.b.
b. Exchange, during the accidental or intentional infliction of a penetrating wound, including a needle puncture, of blood; semen; vaginal secretions; cerebrospinal, synovial, pleural, peritoneal, pericardial, or amniotic fluid; or other body fluid that is visibly contaminated with blood.
973.017(4)(a)4.c.
c. Exchange, into an eye, an open wound, an oozing lesion, or other place where a significant breakdown in the epidermal barrier has occurred, of blood; semen; vaginal secretions; cerebrospinal, synovial, pleural, peritoneal, pericardial, or amniotic fluid; or other body fluid that is visibly contaminated with blood.
973.017(4)(b)
(b) When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a serious sex crime, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the serious sex crime was committed under all of the following circumstances:
973.017(4)(b)1.
1. At the time that he or she committed the serious sex crime, the person convicted of committing the serious sex crime had a sexually transmitted disease or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome or had had a positive HIV test.
973.017(4)(b)2.
2. At the time that he or she committed the serious sex crime, the person convicted of committing the serious sex crime knew that he or she had a sexually transmitted disease or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome or that he or she had had a positive HIV test.
973.017(4)(b)3.
3. The victim of the serious sex crime was significantly exposed to HIV or to the sexually transmitted disease, whichever is applicable, by the acts constituting the serious sex crime.
973.017(5)
(5) Aggravating factors; violent felony committed against elder person. 973.017(5)(a)1.
1. “Elder person" means any individual who is 62 years of age or older.
973.017(5)(b)
(b) When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a violent felony, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the victim of the violent felony was an elder person. This paragraph applies even if the person mistakenly believed that the victim had not attained the age of 62 years.
973.017(6)
(6) Aggravating factors; child sexual assault or child abuse by certain persons. 973.017(6)(a)
(a) In this subsection, “person responsible for the welfare of the child" includes the child's parent, stepparent, guardian, or foster parent; an employee of a public or private residential home, institution, or agency; any other person legally responsible for the child's welfare in a residential setting; or a person employed by one who is legally responsible for the child's welfare to exercise temporary control or care for the child.
973.017(6m)
(6m) Aggravating factors; domestic abuse in presence of a child. 973.017(6m)(a)1.
1. “Child" means an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.
973.017(6m)(b)
(b) When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a crime that involves an act of domestic abuse, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the act was committed in a place or a manner in which the act was observable by or audible to a child or was in the presence of a child and the actor knew or had reason to know that the act was observable by or audible to a child or was in the presence of a child.
973.017(7)
(7) Aggravating factors; homicide or injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle. When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a violation of s.
940.09 (1) or
940.25 (1), the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that, at the time of the violation, there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age or an unborn child in the person's motor vehicle.
973.017(8)
(8) Aggravating factors; controlled substances offenses. 973.017(8)(a)1.1. In this paragraph, “precinct" means a place where any activity is conducted by a prison, jail, or house of correction.
973.017(8)(a)2.
2. When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of violating s.
961.41 (1) or
(1m), the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the violation involved delivering, distributing, or possessing with intent to deliver or distribute a controlled substance or controlled substance analog to a prisoner within the precincts of any prison, jail, or house of correction.
973.017(8)(a)3.
3. When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of violating s.
961.65, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the person intended to deliver or distribute methamphetamine or a controlled substance analog of methamphetamine to a prisoner within the precincts of any prison, jail, or house of correction.
973.017(8)(b)
(b)
Distribution or delivery on public transit vehicles. When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of violating s.
961.41 (1) or
(1m), the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the violation involved delivering, distributing, or possessing with intent to deliver or distribute a controlled substance included in schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog of any controlled substance included in schedule I or II and that the person knowingly used a public transit vehicle during the violation.
973.017(8)(c)
(c)
Distribution or delivery of methamphetamine on public transit vehicles. When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of violating s.
961.65, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the person intended to deliver or distribute methamphetamine or a controlled substance analog of methamphetamine and that the person knowingly used a public transit vehicle during the violation.
973.017(9)
(9) Aggravating factors not an element of the crime. The aggravating factors listed in this section are not elements of any crime. A prosecutor is not required to charge any aggravating factor or otherwise allege the existence of an aggravating factor in any pleading for a court to consider the aggravating factor when making a sentencing decision.
973.017(10m)
(10m) Statement of reasons for sentencing decision. 973.017(10m)(a)(a) The court shall state the reasons for its sentencing decision and, except as provided in par.
(b), shall do so in open court and on the record.
973.017(10m)(b)
(b) If the court determines that it is not in the interest of the defendant for it to state the reasons for its sentencing decision in the defendant's presence, the court shall state the reasons for its sentencing decision in writing and include the written statement in the record.
973.017 Annotation
Under sub. (10m), a circuit court must state the reasons for its sentencing decision on the record. Under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard, the circuit court's determination will be upheld on appeal if it is a reasonable conclusion, based upon a consideration of the appropriate law and facts of record. State v. Salas Gayton,
2016 WI 58,
370 Wis. 2d 264,
882 N.W.2d 459,
13-0646.
973.02
973.02
Place of imprisonment when none expressed. Except as provided in s.
973.032, if a statute authorizes imprisonment for its violation but does not prescribe the place of imprisonment, a sentence of less than one year shall be to the county jail, a sentence of more than one year shall be to the Wisconsin state prisons and the minimum under the indeterminate sentence law shall be one year, and a sentence of one year may be to either the Wisconsin state prisons or the county jail. In any proper case, sentence and commitment may be to the department or any house of correction or other institution as provided by law or to detention under s.
973.03 (4).
973.02 Annotation
The legislature is presumed to have been aware of many existing statutes carrying sentences of one year or less with no place of confinement specified when it enacted the predecessor to s. 973.02 as
chapter 154, laws of 1945. State ex rel. McDonald v. Douglas Cty. Cir. Ct.
100 Wis. 2d 569,
302 N.W.2d 462 (1981).
973.02 Annotation
Criminal defendants who receive consecutive sentences that in the aggregate exceed one year, but individually are all less than one year, should be incarcerated in county jails rather than the Wisconsin prison system.
78 Atty. Gen. 44.
973.03(1)(1)
If at the time of passing sentence upon a defendant who is to be imprisoned in a county jail there is no jail in the county suitable for the defendant and no cooperative agreement under s.
302.44, the court may sentence the defendant to any suitable county jail in the state. The expenses of supporting the defendant there shall be borne by the county in which the crime was committed.
973.03(2)
(2) A defendant sentenced to the Wisconsin state prisons and to a county jail or house of correction for separate crimes shall serve all sentences whether concurrent or consecutive in the state prisons.
973.03(3)(a)(a) If a court sentences a defendant to imprisonment in the county jail, the court may provide that the defendant perform community service work under pars.
(b) and
(c). Except as provided in par.
(am), the defendant earns good time at a rate of one day for each 3 days of work performed. A day of work equals 8 hours of work performed. This good time is in addition to good time authorized under s.
302.43.
973.03(3)(am)
(am) If a court provides that a defendant may perform community service work pursuant to par.
(a) and the defendant is sentenced to probation or imprisonment in a Huber facility under s.
303.09, or if a defendant has been ordered to perform community service work under s.
800.09, a county may, with the approval of the chief judge in the county, allow the defendant to perform community service work under pars.
(b) and
(c). The county may determine the rate at which all defendants in the county earn good time, except that a defendant may not earn less than one day of good time for every 3 days of work performed, nor more than one day of good time for each day of work performed. A day of work equals 8 hours of work performed. This good time is in addition to good time authorized under s.
302.43.
973.03(3)(b)
(b) The court may require that the defendant perform community service work for a public agency or a nonprofit charitable organization. The number of hours of work required may not exceed what would be reasonable considering the seriousness of the offense and any other offense which is read into the record at the time of conviction. An order may only apply if agreed to by the defendant and the organization or agency. The court shall ensure that the defendant is provided a written statement of the terms of the community service order and that the community service order is monitored.
973.03(3)(c)
(c) Any organization or agency acting in good faith to which a defendant is assigned pursuant to an order under this subsection has immunity from any civil liability in excess of $25,000 for acts or omissions by or impacting on the defendant.
973.03(3)(d)
(d) This subsection applies to persons who are sentenced to a county jail but are transferred to a Huber facility under s.
303.09, to a county work camp under s.
303.10 or to a tribal jail under s.
302.445.
