Any right to confrontation and cross-examination implicated by the due process clause is relaxed at a suppression hearing. Ultimately, due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. In this case, the arresting officer's death rendered him unavailable to testify at the suppression hearing. However, testimony by a second officer established that the recording from the dashboard camera on the arresting officer's squad car accurately and continuously documented the portions of the stop observed by the second officer and the audio portion of that same recording captured a statement made by the arresting officer to the defendant. The circuit court's reliance on that hearsay statement did not offend the reduced standard for due process of law required at a suppression hearing. State v. Zamzow,
2017 WI 29,
374 Wis. 2d 220,
892 N.W.2d 637,
14-2603.
Denying a defendant the opportunity to present the defendant's case-in-chief in a termination of parental rights proceeding is a structural error, the consequence of which is an automatic new trial. State v. C.L.K.,
2019 WI 14,
385 Wis. 2d 418,
922 N.W.2d 807,
17-1413.
The test for whether this state can, consistent with due process, exercise its police power to regulate an out-of-state entity is whether the out-of-state entity has incidents and requires activities within the state intimately related to local welfare. Payday Loan Resolution, LLC v. DFI,
2019 WI App 28,
388 Wis. 2d 117,
931 N.W.2d 279,
18-0821.
Constitutional due process protections are unavailable to probationary employees. A probationary employee has no more than a unilateral expectation of completing the employee's probation and being hired as a permanent employee. That expectation is insufficient for procedural due process protections to attach. An employee must instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the position to give rise to a property interest warranting protection. State ex rel. Massman v. City of Prescott,
2020 WI App 3,
390 Wis. 2d 378,
938 N.W.2d 602,
18-1621.
The right to an impartial judge is fundamental to our notion of due process. A reviewing court presumes that a judge has acted fairly, impartially, and without bias. To overcome that presumption, the burden is on the party asserting judicial bias to show bias by a preponderance of the evidence. In evaluating whether a party has rebutted the presumption, courts have taken both a subjective and objective approach. A judge must disqualify himself or herself from a case if the judge subjectively determines that the judge is unable to remain impartial. To assess whether the probability of actual bias rises to the level of a due process violation, courts ask whether there is a serious risk of actual bias based on objective and reasonable perceptions. It is the exceptional case with extreme facts that rises to the level of a serious risk of actual bias. Miller v. Carroll,
2020 WI 56,
392 Wis. 2d 49,
944 N.W.2d 542,
17-2132.
The extreme facts of this case, in which a circuit court judge had an undisclosed social media connection with a litigant, rebutted the presumption of judicial impartiality and established a due process violation. Miller v. Carroll,
2020 WI 56,
392 Wis. 2d 49,
944 N.W.2d 542,
17-2132.
To establish specific personal jurisdiction, there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person. In this case, the defendant's sole contact with Wisconsin was its contract with a Wisconsin business. A corporation's contract with an out-of-state party alone is not enough to automatically establish the requisite minimum contacts needed to satisfy the 14th amendment's due process clause. CITGO Petroleum Corp. v. MTI Connect, LLC,
2020 WI App 57,
394 Wis. 2d 126,
949 N.W.2d 577,
18-1555.
The due process requirement of
Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532 (1985), does not require any formal written notice listing all policy violations at issue in a municipality's discipline action against an employee, or that an employee's right to respond to those violations be available during a formal contested hearing before a neutral adjudicator prior to the discipline. In fact,
Loudermill holds to the contrary. Namely, when sufficient post-disciplinary procedures are available, due process is satisfied as long as an employee is provided notice and given some opportunity to respond to the alleged charges against the employee before discipline is imposed. Green Bay Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay,
2021 WI App 73,
399 Wis. 2d 504,
966 N.W.2d 107,
21-0102.
There is no due process right to impartial decision-makers when a legislative body like a village board enacts, repeals, or amends a generally applicable law like a zoning ordinance. When adjudicative acts are involved, procedural due process requires impartial decision-makers. When legislative actions are at issue, however, those affected by legislation are not entitled to any process beyond that provided by the legislative process. Miller v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
2023 WI 46,
407 Wis. 2d 678,
991 N.W.2d 380,
21-1764.
The Wisconsin Medical Examining Board does not deny due process by both investigating and adjudicating a charge of professional misconduct. Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35,
95 S. Ct. 1456,
43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975).
Due process does not disqualify an agency as a decision maker merely because of familiarity with the facts of a case. Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass'n,
426 U.S. 482,
96 S. Ct. 2308,
49 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976).
Utility customers' due process rights were violated when the utility shut off service for nonpayment without advising the customers of available administrative procedures. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1,
98 S. Ct. 1554,
56 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1978).
A father's acquiescence in his daughter's desire to live with her mother in California did not confer jurisdiction over the father in California courts. Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84,
98 S. Ct. 1690,
56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978).
The due process clause was not violated when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitored a conversation with the defendant in violation of IRS rules. United States v. Caceres,
440 U.S. 741,
99 S. Ct. 1465,
59 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1979).
A state may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant having no forum contacts by attacking the contractual obligation of the defendant's insurer licensed in the state. Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320,
100 S. Ct. 571,
62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980).
The termination of appointed assistant public defenders, who were neither policymakers nor confidential employees, solely on grounds of political affiliation was a denial of 1st and 14th amendment rights. Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507,
100 S. Ct. 1287,
63 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1980).
Segregation confinement of a prisoner without prior hearing may violate due process if postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions. Hughes v. Rowe,
449 U.S. 5,
101 S. Ct. 173,
66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980).
When an accident involving only Wisconsin residents occurred in Wisconsin, the fact that the decedent had been employed in Minnesota conferred jurisdiction on Minnesota courts, and Minnesota insurance law was applicable. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302,
101 S. Ct. 633,
66 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981).
A statute that required a putative father in a paternity suit to pay for blood tests denied due process to indigent putative fathers. Little v. Streater,
452 U.S. 1,
101 S. Ct. 2202,
68 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1981).
Due process does not require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18,
101 S. Ct. 2153,
68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981).
Revocation of probation for failure to pay a fine, without a determination that the probationer had not made a bona fide effort to pay or that alternate forms of punishment did not exist, denied due process and equal protection. Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660,
103 S. Ct. 2064,
76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983).
An individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone cannot automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party's home forum for purposes of personal jurisdiction. A contract is ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future consequences which themselves are the real object of the business transaction. It is these factors—prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462,
105 S. Ct. 2174,
85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).
Assuming that a competent person has a constitutional right to refuse treatment, a state may require clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent patient desired withdrawal of treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,
497 U.S. 261,
110 S. Ct. 2841,
111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990).
Substantive due process is not violated by a police officer who causes death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high speed chase aimed at apprehending a suspect. Only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest satisfies the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience necessary for a due process violation. County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833,
118 S. Ct. 1708,
140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998).
In lieu of exclusive reliance on a judge's personal inquiry into the judge's actual bias, or on appellate review of the judge's determination respecting actual bias, the due process clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias. In defining these standards the U.S. Supreme Court has asked whether, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868,
129 S. Ct. 2252,
173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009).
There is a serious risk of actual bias, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on a case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign while the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect the contribution had on the outcome of the election. Whether campaign contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of a judge's victory is not the proper inquiry. Due process requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor's influence on the election under all the circumstances would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead the judge not to hold the balance “nice, clear, and true." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868,
129 S. Ct. 2252,
173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009).
Under the due process clause there was an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant's case. Williams v. Pennsylvania,
579 U.S. 1,
136 S. Ct. 1899,
195 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2016).
The 14th amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Because a state court's assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the state's coercive power, it is subject to review for compatibility with the 14th amendment's due process clause, which limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant. Specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, a defendant's general connections with the forum are not enough. A specific connection between the forum and specific claims at issue is required. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,
582 U.S. 255,
137 S. Ct. 1773,
198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017).
The forum state may exercise specific jurisdiction if the plaintiff's claims arise out of “or relate to" the defendant's contacts with the forum. The “relate to" standard contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. Specific jurisdiction attaches when a company like Ford Motor Company serves a market for a product in a state and that product causes injury in the state to one of its residents, and the state's courts may entertain the resulting suit, even if the particular car involved was not first sold, designed, or manufactured in the forum state. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. ___,
141 S. Ct. 1017,
209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021).
The due process clause of the
14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit a state from requiring an out-of-state corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business there. Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. ___,
143 S. Ct. 2028,
216 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2023).
It is not a violation of the due process clause to tow an illegally parked car without first giving the owner notice and opportunity to be heard regarding the lawfulness of the towing. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee,
672 F.2d 644 (1982).
A village board's denial of an application for a liquor license did not deprive the applicant of either liberty or property. Scott v. Village of Kewaskum,
786 F.2d 338 (1986).
Where an economic regulation is challenged on substantive due process grounds, the rational basis test is applied. To uphold the statute, a court need only find a reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Consumer protection and promoting commerce are both legitimate state interests. On rational-basis review, the state does not need to present actual evidence to support its proffered rationale for the law, which can be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Minerva Dairy, Inc. v. Harsdorf,
905 F.3d 1047 (2018).
Specific personal jurisdiction requires that a defendant's contacts with the forum state show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state or purposefully directed the defendant's activities at the state. This analysis focuses on the defendant's contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there. Deliberate contact with the resident of a state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state itself. Lexington Insurance Co. v. Hotai Insurance Co.,
938 F.3d 874 (2019).
A teacher's alleged de facto tenure is not a protected property interest. Discussing liberty interests. Stevens v. Joint School District No. 1,
429 F. Supp. 477 (1977).
A sheriff violated a tenant's protectible property interest by executing a stale writ of restitution. Wolf-Lillie v. Kenosha County Sheriff,
504 F. Supp. 1 (1979).
One cannot have a constitutionally protected interest solely in a state law procedure; a separate property interest must also be present. Molgaard v. Town of Caledonia,
527 F. Supp. 1073 (1981).
A high school student enjoys no constitutionally protected property interest in participation in interscholastic athletics. Isabella A. v. Arrowhead Union High School District,
323 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (2018).
The Original Understanding of “Property” in the Constitution. Larkin. 100 MLR 1 (2016).
Demon Rum and the Dirty Dance: Reconsidering Government Regulation of Live Sex Entertainment After California v. LaRue. Diel & Salinger. 1975 WLR 161.
Constitutional Law—Schools & School Districts—Reasonable Corporal Punishment by School Official Over Parental Objection is Constitutional. Splain. 1976 WLR 689.
Procedural Due Process in Public Schools: The “Thicket" of Goss v. Lopez. Ransom. 1976 WLR 934.
Constitutional Law—Due Process—Administrative Law—Impartial Decisionmaker—Authority of School Board to Dismiss Striking Teachers. Gallagher. 1977 WLR 521.
Constitutional Law—Due Process—Property Interest—Government Employment—State Law Defines Limitation of Entitlement. Jensen. 1977 WLR 575.
When Roles Collide: Deference, Due Process, and the Judicial Dilemma. Buchmeyer. 2019 WLR 1589.
Conscience Shocking in the Age of Trump. Farnsworth. 2020 WLR 805.
MISCELLANEOUS
An adult bookstore has no right to protect the privacy rights of its customers in a public, commercial establishment. City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha,
170 Wis. 2d 14,
487 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1992).
A narrowly drawn anti-cruising ordinance did not violate the right to assemble or travel. Scheunemann v. City of West Bend,
179 Wis. 2d 469,
507 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1993).
The right to intrastate travel, including the right to move about one's neighborhood in an automobile, is fundamental, but infringements on the right are not subject to strict scrutiny. Cruising ordinances, reasonable in time, place, and manner, do not violate this right. Brandmiller v. Arreola,
199 Wis. 2d 528,
544 N.W.2d 894 (1996),
93-2842.
A father who intentionally refused to pay child support could, as a condition of probation, be required to avoid having another child, unless he showed that he could support that child and his current children. In light of the defendant's ongoing victimization of his children and record manifesting his disregard for the law, this condition was not overly broad and was reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation. State v. Oakley,
2001 WI 103,
245 Wis. 2d 447,
629 N.W.2d 200,
99-3328.
Banishment from a particular place is not a per se violation of the right to travel. There is no exact formula for determining whether a geographic restriction is narrowly tailored. Each case must be analyzed on its own facts, circumstances, and total atmosphere to determine whether the geographic restriction is narrowly drawn. Predick v. O'Connor,
2003 WI App 46,
260 Wis. 2d 323,
660 N.W.2d 1,
02-0503.
In order for a putative biological father to have the necessary foundation for a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his putative paternity, he would have to have taken affirmative steps to assume his parental responsibilities for the child. Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J.,
2004 WI 41,
270 Wis. 2d 384,
677 N.W.2d 630,
02-0469.
Parental status that rises to the level of a constitutionally protected liberty interest does not rest solely on biological factors, but rather, is dependent upon an actual relationship with the child where the parent assumes responsibility for the child's emotional and financial needs. Stuart S. v. Heidi R.,
2015 WI App 19,
360 Wis. 2d 388,
860 N.W.2d 538,
14-1487.
Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment. Samar. 101 MLR 287 (2017).
Domestic Relations—Putative Father's Right to Custody of His Child. 1971 WLR 1262.
I,2
Slavery prohibited.
Section 2
. There shall be neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
I,3
Free speech; libel.
Section 3. Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous be true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.
FREE SPEECH
A city can validly prohibit picketing private homes when the subject of the picketing has no relationship to any activity carried on there. City of Wauwatosa v. King,
49 Wis. 2d 398,
182 N.W.2d 530 (1971).
A journalist has a constitutional right to the privilege not to disclose sources of information received in a confidential relationship, but when such confidence is in conflict with the public's overriding need to know, it must yield to the interest of justice. The state need not affirmatively demonstrate proof of compelling need or lack of an alternative method of obtaining the information sought when the crimes involved and the prevention of repetition of those crimes constitute a compelling need. State v. Knops,
49 Wis. 2d 647,
183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
Only that portion of an obscenity ordinance defining obscenity in
Roth-Memoirs terms is unconstitutional, and the remainder is a viable, effective ordinance when supplemented by the
Chobot,
61 Wis. 2d 354 (1973), obscenity definition as augmented by the “community standards" definition. City of Madison v. Nickel,
66 Wis. 2d 71,
223 N.W.2d 865 (1974).
Prohibiting the solicitation of prostitutes does not violate the right of free speech. Shillcutt v. State,
74 Wis. 2d 642,
247 N.W.2d 694 (1976).
When a radio talk show announcer was fired for allowing talk show guests to slander minorities, the announcer's right of free speech was not infringed. Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith,
75 Wis. 2d 207,
249 N.W.2d 547 (1977).
When the record did not indicate that a tenant union provided inadequate, unethical, or complex legal advice to tenants, the tenant union's information service was protected by free speech guarantees. Hopper v. City of Madison,
79 Wis. 2d 120,
256 N.W.2d 139 (1977).
The public's right to be aware of all facts surrounding an issue does not interfere with the right of a newspaper to reject advertising. Wisconsin Ass'n of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Journal Co.,
92 Wis. 2d 709,
285 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1979).
Setting procedures to determine whether a journalist may properly invoke privilege to prevent disclosure of confidential sources. State ex rel. Green Bay Newspaper Co. v. Circuit Court,
113 Wis. 2d 411,
335 N.W.2d 367 (1983).
News gatherers have no constitutional right of access to disaster scenes beyond that accorded the general public. City of Oak Creek v. King,
148 Wis. 2d 532,
436 N.W.2d 285 (1989).
Commercial speech is protected by the 1st amendment. The government must show that a restriction directly advances a substantial interest for it to be constitutional. City of Milwaukee v. Blondis,
157 Wis. 2d 730,
460 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1990).
A sentence based on an activity protected by the 1st amendment is constitutionally invalid, but when a sufficient link to criminal activity is shown, the activity is no longer protected. State v. J.E.B.,
161 Wis. 2d 655,
469 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1991).
Although music is accorded a presumption of being protected speech, an ordinance prohibiting all unreasonable noise was not an unconstitutionally vague encroachment on free speech. City of Madison v. Baumann,
162 Wis. 2d 660,
470 N.W.2d 296 (1991).
An employee's free speech rights were not violated when the employer's need for confidentiality and discipline clearly outweighed the employee's interest in disclosing confidential information. Barnhill v. Board of Regents,
166 Wis. 2d 395,
479 N.W.2d 917 (1992).
The 1st amendment rights of inmates are subject to limitation and regulation. Interception and withholding of inter-inmate correspondence was reasonable. Yoder v. Palmeri,
177 Wis. 2d 756,
502 N.W.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1993).
