oag1-16,23
¶ 23.
These two sections are followed by more detailed sections describing DNR’s authority over specific programs and areas of regulation. For example, Wis. Stat. § 281.34 (addressed below) provides a detailed explanation of DNR’s authority to approve high capacity wells. Though neither Wis. Stat. § 281.11 nor § 281.12 mention the public trust doctrine, a long line of cases culminating with Lake Beulah has held that those provisions constitute a broad grant of the public trust duties to the DNR from the Legislature. Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 2013 WI 74,
350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800;
Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm’n,
201 Wis. 40, 228 N.W. 144 (1929);
Reuter v. DNR, 43 Wis. 2d 272, 168 N.W.2d 860 (1969); Just v. Marinette Cty., 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Vill. of Menomonee Falls v. DNR, 140 Wis. 2d 579, 412 N.W.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1987).
The public trust doctrine’s foundation is in the Wisconsin
Constitution: “[T]he river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and forever free . . . .” Wis. Const. art. IX, § 1.
oag1-16,24
¶ 24.
Lake Beulah held that the Legislature impliedly delegated to DNR, through Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11.12, public trust authority and duty to impose on high capacity wells any condition DNR deemed necessary to manage the state’s water resources. Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶ 34. The Lake Beulah Court relied on a judicially developed and expanded public trust doctrine to prescribe DNR’s broad authority, giving DNR constitutional control of nearly all water in the state. Id. ¶ 31 (citing Diana Shooting Club. v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 816 (1914); Muench v. PSC, 261 Wis. 492, 499-508, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952); Menzer v. Vill. of Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d 70, 82, 186 N.W.2d 290 (1971)). While you do not inquire about the legality of the public trust doctrine’s vast expansion since ratification of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has only recently sought to limit,[1] the appellate court in Lake Beulah appropriately pointed out that “[t]he public trust doctrine found in our state constitution does not have any self-executing language authorizing the DNR to do anything–the statutes do that.” Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. DNR, 2010 WI App 85, ¶ 30, 327 Wis. 2d 222,
787 N.W.2d 926,
affd in part, revd in part, 2011 WI 54, 335 Wis. 2d 47,
799 N.W.2d 73.
oag1-16,25
¶ 25.
Nonetheless, prior to Rock-Koshkonong, the ever-expanding doctrine resulted in the parallel expansion of DNR’s implied authority to regulate and control all waters in the state. The Lake Beulah Court held that the broad language of Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11.12 impliedly granted equally broad public trust authority to the DNR. 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶ 33 (“the legislature has delegated substantial authority over water management matters to the DNR”) (citation omitted). The Court relied on the absence of statutory language restricting DNR’s broad authority. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. “Finding no language expressly revoking or limiting the DNR’s authority and general duty to protect and manage waters of the state,” the Court concluded that “the DNR retains such authority and general duty to consider whether a proposed high capacity well may impact waters of the state.” Id. ¶ 42. The Court added that the duty was not absolute, but that DNR had a duty to consider harms to the water of the state when the duty was triggered. Id. ¶ 5.
oag1-16,26
¶ 26.
As discussed above, Act 21 explicitly limited agency authority, which would necessarily limit any public trust authority deemed to have been previously granted to DNR in the ‘statement of policy and purpose’ and ‘general departmental powers and duties’ sections of Wis. Stat. ch. 281. In drafting Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), the Legislature specifically chose to use the word “explicitly.” “Explicit” means “[f]ully and clearly expressed; leaving nothing implied.”[2] Thus, permit conditions are lawful only if they are permitted or required in a manner that is fully expressed by statute or rule. An implied grant of authority to impose them is insufficient, under Act 21.
oag1-16,27
¶ 27.
In addition to Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), Act 21 also created Wis. Stat.
§§ 227.11(2)(a)1.
2., which state:
oag1-16,1
1.
A statutory or nonstatutory provision containing a statement or declaration of legislative intent, purpose, findings, or policy does not confer rulemaking authority on the agency or augment the agency’s rulemaking authority beyond the rule-making authority that is explicitly conferred on the agency by the legislature.
oag1-16,2
2.
A statutory provision describing the agency’s general powers or duties does not confer rulemaking authority on the agency or augment the agency’s rulemaking authority beyond the rulemaking authority that is explicitly conferred on the agency by the legislature.
Taken together, these sections represent the Legislature’s unambiguous limitation of agency authority.
oag1-16,28
¶ 28.
Therefore, based on these provisions, Act 21 implied public trust authority or duty for DNR based on the policy and powers sections of Wis. Stat.
§§ 281.11
.12. Wisconsin Stat. §§ 281.11.12 does not provide DNR explicit authority to condition high capacity well permits. At the time of the Lake Beulah decision, explicit authority was not required. The Court could thus rely on implied agency authority, if necessary. Lake Beulah, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶ 23 (citing Brown Cty.,
103 Wis. 2d at 43).
oag1-16,29
¶ 29.
Through the plain language of Act 21, the Legislature sought to regain and maintain control of the breadth of agency authority in two ways. First, an agency must have explicit authority to impose license and permit conditions and second, by requiring explicit authority for rulemaking. Wis. Stat. §§ 227.10(2m), 227.11(2)(a). Act 21 makes clear that permit conditions and rulemaking may no longer be premised on implied agency authority.
oag1-16,30
¶ 30.
Interpreting Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11.12 as explicit authority to impose a specific condition would bypass the strict limitation of agency authority set forth by the Legislature. Wisconsin Stat. § 227.11(2)(a) clearly disallows rulemaking based on broad statements of policy or duty, such as those found in Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11.12. Although Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a) only speaks to rulemaking, it follows that DNR is also prohibited from conditioning a permit based on broad statements of policy or duty. Any other interpretation would allow DNR to bypass the rulemaking process, rendering Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a) meaningless.
oag1-16,31
¶ 31.
For example, DNR could propose a rule explicitly allowing monitoring wells as a condition of high capacity well permits. If that rulemaking failed based on a determination that DNR does not have explicit legislative consent to promulgate such a rule, DNR should not be allowed to impose that same condition in a permit by relying on the broad policy statements in Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11.12.
oag1-16,32
¶ 32.
The same remains true if no rule is proposed. After Act 21, an agency must obtain authorization to impose any specific condition through the rule-making process or through legislation explicitly allowing such a condition. These two avenues for DNR authority are exclusive–there is no other avenue through which DNR
can gain additional authority. Act 21 is clear. In no instance is DNR allowed to

impose conditions or requirements a
bsent explicit authority, in rule or statute.
See Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) (“[n]o agency may implement or enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold, including as a term or condition of any license issued by the agency, unless that standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule that has been promulgated in accordance with this subchapter . . . .”).
oag1-16,33
¶ 33.
Although the Lake Beulah Court found that DNR had broad implied authority to impose permit conditions, 335 Wis. 2d 47, ¶ 3, that holding now directly conflicts with Act 21. I conclude that through Wis. Stat. §§ 227.10(2m), .11(2)(a), the Legislature has limited DNR’s authority to regulate high capacity wells only as explicitly enumerated through statute or rule.[3] DNR cannot premise such authority on broad statements of policy or general duty, such as those found in Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11.12.
oag1-16,34
¶ 34.
Specifically regarding any requirement for cumulative impact analysis, you inquire whether either Wis. Stat. §§ 281.11.12 or the delegated public trust duty require DNR to undertake a cumulative impact analysis for high capacity well applications.
oag1-16,35
¶ 35.
I conclude that DNR’s imposition of cumulative impact analyses for all high capacity wells is precluded by Act 21. I further conclude that Wis. Stat.
§ 281.34(5m) clearly illustrates the Legislature’s intent to cede very limited public trust authority to DNR regarding cumulative impacts of high capacity wells.
oag1-16,36
¶ 36.
The requirement to perform an environmental review, including a cumulative impacts analysis, for all high capacity wells is not explicitly required in any Wisconsin statute. Current DNR practice is to analyze the cumulative impacts of all wells and other sources of water drawdown in the vicinity of, and in combination with, the high capacity well proposed in the permit application. High Capacity Well, http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/wells/highcapacity.html (last revised Feb. 4, 2016). DNR relies on a 2014 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) opinion as authority, and a directive, to undertake this analysis in all high capacity well cases. In re Conditional High Capacity Well Approval for Two Potable Wells to be Located in the Town of Richland, Adams County Issued to Milk Source Holdings, Inc. (Richfield Dairy), Nos. IH-12-03, IH-12-05, DNR-13-021, DNR-13-027 (Wis. Div. Hearings & Appeals Sept. 3, 2014).
oag1-16,37
¶ 37.
The issue in Richfield Dairy was whether DNR, when granting, conditioning, or denying a high capacity well permit, has an obligation to evaluate the cumulative impacts of existing sources of water drawdown in combination with the proposed well. Id. at 2. DNR argued that no such obligation exists, and the agency is only authorized to consider the well(s) for which a permit was being evaluated. Id. at 12. DNR relied on the statutory framework for evaluating high capacity wells, which specifically lists the types of wells for which an environmental review may be undertaken. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4)(5). DNR concluded that language limits its authority to perform an environmental review, including cumulative impact analysis, on high capacity wells based on factors not listed in Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4).
oag1-16,38
¶ 38.
The ALJ, however, relying on Lake Beulah, held that DNR has a broad public trust duty and therefore is obligated to perform an environmental review on all high capacity wells. Richfield Dairy, No. DNR-13-021, at 2. The ALJ in Richfield Dairy further held that the environmental review must include a cumulative impact study. Id. at 11.
oag1-16,39
¶ 39.
After issuance of the order in Richfield Dairy, the Legislature passed Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5m), which states:
No person may challenge an approval, or an application for approval, of a high capacity well based on the lack of consideration of the cumulative environmental impacts of that high capacity well together with existing wells.
oag1-16,40
¶ 40.
For a number of reasons, the DNR may not rely on the Richfield Dairy order as a mandate to review cumulative environmental impacts on all high capacity well applications. First, it directly contradicts Act 21. Second, it renders Wis. Stat.
§ 281.34(4)
(5) meaningless. Third, the Legislature has subsequently clarified DNR’s limited delegation of public trust duty in Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5m).
oag1-16,41
¶ 41.
I will not re-iterate the requirement in Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m) that DNR’s authority be based on explicit language in a rule or statute. As noted, no court order, including an ALJ order, can take the place of an explicit rule or statute in defining agency duties. It is the Legislature, not the judiciary, which is the trustee of navigable waters. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d at 465. Therefore, only the Legislature can delegate such duties. There is no explicit requirement from the Legislature that DNR perform cumulative impact analyses on all proposed high capacity wells. Doing so directly contradicts Act 21 and Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m).
oag1-16,42
¶ 42.
Moreover, a requirement to perform cumulative impact analyses, or undergo any type of environmental review, for all high capacity well permit applications would render Wis. Stat. §§ 281.34(4)(5) meaningless. The Legislature took great care to explain in detail the instances when DNR can perform such an analysis. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4). This includes limiting the types of wells for which this analysis must be performed, as well as explicitly listing the conditions that may be imposed if the DNR determines there is cause for concern. Wis. Stat. §§ 281.34(4)(5). Presumably, the Legislature, as trustee of the waters of the state, carefully considered the instances in which high capacity wells might impact those waters, and gave DNR the explicit tools for managing that impact. A mandate to perform an environmental review, including cumulative impacts, on all high capacity wells would effectively erase the Legislature’s detailed evaluative framework from the statutes.
oag1-16,43
¶ 43.
Finally, after confusion about the apparent ALJ mandate to consider cumulative environmental impacts on all high capacity wells, the Legislature clearly removed the requirement by prohibiting a permit challenge based on absence of a cumulative impact evaluation. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5m). The Legislature could not have been clearer about its intent. If a permit cannot be challenged based on a cumulative impact analysis, it makes little sense that the Legislature would delegate a public trust duty to the DNR that would force them to perform such an analysis.
oag1-16,44
¶ 44.
The Richfield Dairy ALJ relied heavily on Lake Beulah’s rationale which, as explained, is without support after Act 21. The Legislature’s passage of Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5m) made clear that DNR may not rely on the Richfield opinion as a mandate to analyze cumulate impacts.
QUESTION FOUR
oag1-16,45
¶ 45.
Finally, the Assembly asks whether Wisconsin’s high capacity well regulatory structure set forth at Wis. Stat. § 281.34, or in related sections, explicitly require or explicitly permit monitoring wells or cumulative impact analysis as conditions for high capacity well permits.
oag1-16,46
¶ 46.
I conclude that there is no explicit authority in Wis. Stat. § 281.34, or related sections, for DNR to impose these specific conditions on high capacity wells.[4]
oag1-16,47
¶ 47.
Wisconsin Stat. § 281.34 was the result of an effort by the Legislature to create a detailed structure for regulating the impact of high capacity wells
on groundwater. 2003 Wis. Act 310. Wisconsin Stat. § 2
81.34(2), and the related
Wis. Stat. § 281.17, explain in detail the application and approval process for high capacity wells. High capacity wells must be approved by the DNR. Wis. Stat.

§ 281.34(2). The DNR must undertake an environmental review of cert
ain high capacity well applications. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4). In those cases, there are specific conditions that the DNR may place on an approved application. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(5). Those conditions “may include . . . location, depth, pumping capacity, rate of flow, and ultimate use.” Wis. Stat. § 281.23(5)(a)(d).
oag1-16,48
¶ 48.
The DNR has authority, through Wis. Stat. §§ 281.34, .17, to regulate high capacity wells, but that authority is not without limits. As explained in detail above, explicit authority is required for any condition placed on a permit. Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m). Wisconsin Stat. § 281.34 gives DNR authority to impose only the conditions listed: location, depth, pumping capacity, rate of flow, and ultimate use.
In addition, those conditions may only be i
mposed on a certain subset of high capacity wells. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4). Any condition not explicitly identified, or any condition on a well that is not listed in Wis. Stat. § 281.34(4), is prohibited and unlawful, unless and until it is sanctioned by the Legislature either by rule or statute. Wis. Stat.
§ 227.10(2m).
oag1-16,49
¶ 49.
Further, DNR is not required to impose any condition on a high capacity well permit. The use of the word “may” indicates that DNR has discretion to impose the enumerated conditions on the enumerated categories of wells. Wis. Stat.
§ 281.34(5)(a)
(d).
oag1-16,50
¶ 50.
Monitoring is not an explicitly permitted condition. Wis. Stat.
§ 281.34(5)(a)
(d). Nevertheless, it is clear that the issue of monitoring was not lost on the Legislature when it passed Wis. Stat. § 281.34. The Legislature specifically granted DNR the authority to research and monitor interactions of groundwater and surface water, characterization of groundwater resources, and strategies for managing water. Wis. Stat. § 281.34(10). However, the Legislature did not grant DNR authority to impose that monitoring requirement on high capacity well permits. Therefore, a monitoring well condition on a high capacity well permit is prohibited and unenforceable. Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m).
CONCLUSION
oag1-16,51
¶ 51.
The constitution vested in the state a duty to keep navigable waters in trust for the citizens of the state. Nowhere in the constitution is there language delegating that duty to the DNR. Rather, the Legislature maintains the duty of trustee and can choose to delegate that duty in whole or in part to an administrative agency, or to maintain control and carry out the duty itself.
oag1-16,52
¶ 52.
Since the Lake Beulah decision, the Legislature has clearly limited the public trust duty for which DNR is responsible. Act 21 was not intended to remove power from agencies; instead it defines the authority with which they are allowed to act. The Legislature has defined the parameters in which DNR can act to protect the state’s navigable waters, and additionally clarified the ways in which DNR can regulate non-navigable waters, specifically in the context of high capacity wells.
oag1-16,53
¶ 53.
Through these changes to the law, the public trust duty does not cease to exist. Rather, it reverts back to the Legislature, which is responsible for making rules and statutes necessary to protect the waters of the state. The Legislature is free to grant the authority to DNR to impose any conditions the Legislature finds necessary. However, the DNR has only the level of public trust duty assigned to it by the Legislature, and no more.
            Very truly yours,
            BRAD D. SCHIMEL
            Attorney General
BDS:DMB:pss:ts
oag1-16,footnote11
In Rock-Koshkonong Lake District, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the State had no public trust authority to control land or water above the ordinary high water mark.
350 Wis. 2d 45, ¶11.
oag1-16,footnote22
Explicit, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=explicit&submit.y=18 (last visited
Apr. 26, 2016).
oag1-16,footnote33
During the 1985-86 legislative session the Legislature enacted 1985 Wisconsin Act 60, which required the DNR to evaluate the impact of the wells on public rights in navigable waters for wells with a water loss of over two million gallons per day. Wis. Stat. § 281.35. Subsequently, during the 2003-04 legislative session, the Legislature enacted comprehensive legislation (2003 Wisconsin Act 310) that explicitly set forth DNR’s authority when it comes to regulating high capacity wells. Wis. Stat. § 281.34. If the Legislature believes that current law does not provide sufficient groundwater protections, it clearly has the authority to enact more stringent laws. However, as explained in great detail in this opinion, the DNR may not impose conditions unless it has such explicit statutory authority.
oag1-16,footnote44
You specifically inquire about Wis. Stat. § 281.34. This opinion does not address the authority that may or may not be derived from Wis. Stat. § 281.35.
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