973.11(5)(b)
(b) The court may extend the period of supervision for up to 45 days to accommodate a hearing under this subsection.
973.11(5)(c)
(c) Failure of the defendant to appear at a hearing under this subsection tolls the running of the period of supervision.
973.11(5)(d)
(d) If the court finds that the violation occurred, it may impose a sentence, revise the conditions of the order or allow the order to continue.
973.11(6)
(6) Other modifications to order. At any time prior to the expiration of the order the court may shorten the length of the order or modify the conditions of the order. The court shall hold a hearing regarding a determination under this subsection if the defendant or district attorney requests a hearing.
973.11 History
History: 1991 a. 253;
1993 a. 213.
973.12
973.12
Sentence of a repeater or persistent repeater. 973.12(1)(1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a repeater or a persistent repeater under
s. 939.62 if convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. The court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant a reasonable time to investigate possible prior convictions before accepting a plea. If the prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the state, he or she shall be subject to sentence under
s. 939.62 unless he or she establishes that he or she was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any crime necessary to constitute him or her a repeater or a persistent repeater. An official report of the F.B.I. or any other governmental agency of the United States or of this or any other state shall be prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein reported. Any sentence so reported shall be deemed prima facie to have been fully served in actual confinement or to have been served for such period of time as is shown or is consistent with the report. The court shall take judicial notice of the statutes of the United States and foreign states in determining whether the prior conviction was for a felony or a misdemeanor.
973.12(2)
(2) In every case of sentence under
s. 939.62, the sentence shall be imposed for the present conviction, but if the court indicates in passing sentence how much thereof is imposed because the defendant is a repeater, it shall not constitute reversible error, but the combined terms shall be construed as a single sentence for the present conviction.
973.12 History
History: 1993 a. 289.
973.12 Annotation
This section does not authorize 2 sentences for one crime. State v. Upchurch, 101 W (2d) 329, 305 NW (2d) 57 (1981).
973.12 Annotation
See note to 939.62, citing State v. Harris, 119 W (2d) 612, 350 NW (2d) 633 (1984).
973.12 Annotation
Report under (1) must contain critically relevant facts in order to support penalty enhancement. State v. Farr, 119 W (2d) 651, 350 NW (2d) 640 (1984).
973.12 Annotation
No contest plea constitutes admission of all facts alleged in action, including those referring to prior convictions. State v. Rachwal, 159 W (2d) 494, 465 NW (2d) 490 (1991).
973.12 Annotation
See note to 971.09, citing State v. Rachwal, 159 W (2d) 494, 465 NW (2d) 490 (1991).
973.12 Annotation
No amendment to charging document to add repeater allegation may be made after arraignment and acceptance of any plea. State v. Martin, 162 W (2d) 883, 470 NW (2d) 900 (1991).
973.12 Annotation
Post-plea amendment of repeater allegation in charging document which meaningfully changes the basis on which possible punishment can be assessed is barred. State v. Wilks, 165 W (2d) 102, 477 NW (2d) 632 (Ct. App. 1991).
973.12 Annotation
A guilty plea without a specific admission to repeater allegations is not sufficient to establish the facts necessary to impose the repeater penalty enhancer. Sate v. Zimermann, 185 W (2d) 549, 518 NW (2d) 303 (Ct. App. 1994).
973.12 Annotation
When a defendant does not admit to habitual criminality, the state must prove the alleged repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Theriault, 187 W (2d) 125, 522 NW (2d) 254 (Ct. App. 1994).
973.12 Annotation
For a repeater enhancer to apply, the prior conviction must be alleged prior to the entry of a plea, but an error in the information regarding the penalty may be corrected when an amendment will cause no prejudice. State v. Gerard, 189 W (2d) 505, 525 NW (2d) 718 (1995).
973.12 Annotation
Proof of repeater status must be made prior to sentencing. Judicial notice of prior convictions at a postconviction hearing was improper. State v. Koeppen, 195 W (2d) 117, 536 NW (2d) 386 (Ct. App. 1995).
973.12 Annotation
A trial court in exercising sentencing discretion is not prohibited from entertaining general predispositions based on experience, but the judge's predispositions may never be so specific as to ignore the particular circumstances of the individual offender. State v. Ogden, 199 W (2d) 566, 544 NW (2d) 574 (1996).
973.12 Annotation
Gerard is not limited to clerical errors. Where the information correctly alleges a defendant's repeater status, a post-arraignment amendment to the information does not violate this section as long as it does not affect the sufficiency of the notice to the defendant concerning his or her repeater status. State v. Campbell, 201 W (2d) 777, 549 NW (2d) 501 (Ct. App. 1996).
973.13
973.13
Excessive sentence, errors cured. In any case where the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that authorized by law, such excess shall be void and the sentence shall be valid only to the extent of the maximum term authorized by statute and shall stand commuted without further proceedings.
973.13 Annotation
This section caps the length of a sentence reduced thereby, but it does not address other aspects or conditions of sentencing. The sentencing court may resentence the defendant if the new sentence is permitted by the law. State v. Holloway, 202 W (2d) 695, 551 NW (2d) 841 (Ct. App. 1996).
973.135
973.135
Courts to report convictions to the department of education. 973.135(2)
(2) If a court determines that a person convicted of a crime specified in
ch. 948, including a crime specified in
s. 948.015, a felony for which the maximum term of imprisonment is at least 5 years, 4th degree sexual assault under
s. 940.225 (3m) or a crime in which the victim was a child, is employed by an educational agency, the clerk of the court in which such conviction occurred shall promptly forward to the department the record of conviction.
973.135(3)
(3) If a conviction under
sub. (2) is reversed, set aside or vacated, the clerk of the court shall promptly forward to the department a certificate stating that the conviction has been reversed, set aside or vacated.
Effective date note
NOTE: This section is shown as affected eff. 1-1-96 by
1995 Wis. Act 27. The treatment by Act 27 was held unconstitutional and declared void by the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Craney, case no.
95-2168-OA. Prior to Act 27 it read:
Effective date text
973.135 Courts to report convictions to the state superintendent of public instruction. (1) In this section:
Effective date text
(a) "Educational agency" has the meaning given in s. 115.31 (1) (b).
Effective date text
(b) "State superintendent" means the state superintendent of public instruction.
Effective date text
(2) If a court determines that a person convicted of a crime specified in ch. 948, including a crime specified in s. 948.015, a felony for which the maximum term of imprisonment is at least 5 years, 4th degree sexual assault under s. 940.225 (3m) or a crime in which the victim was a child, is employed by an educational agency, the clerk of the court in which such conviction occurred shall promptly forward to the state superintendent the record of conviction.
Effective date text
(3) If a conviction under sub. (2) is reversed, set aside or vacated, the clerk of the court shall promptly forward to the state superintendent a certificate stating that the conviction has been reversed, set aside or vacated.
973.135 History
History: 1991 a. 42;
1995 a. 27.
973.14
973.14
Sentence to house of correction. 973.14(1)
(1) In addition to the authority in
ss. 302.18 and
303.18, prisoners sentenced to a county jail may be transferred by the sheriff to a house of correction without court approval.
973.14(2)
(2) Prisoners confined in the house of correction may be transferred by the superintendent of the house of correction to the county jail without court approval.
973.14(3)
(3) A prisoner sentenced to a county jail or the house of correction being held in a county jail awaiting trial on another charge shall be deemed to be serving the county jail or house of correction sentence and shall be given credit on the sentence as provided in
s. 302.43 or
303.19.
973.14 History
History: 1977 c. 126;
1989 a. 31.
973.15
973.15
Sentence, terms, escapes. 973.15(1)
(1) Except as provided in
s. 973.032, all sentences to the Wisconsin state prisons shall be for one year or more. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all sentences commence at noon on the day of sentence, but time which elapses after sentence while the convicted offender is at large on bail shall not be computed as any part of the term of imprisonment.
973.15(2)(a)(a) Except as provided in
par. (b), the court may impose as many sentences as there are convictions and may provide that any such sentence be concurrent with or consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the same time or previously.
973.15(2)(b)
(b) The court may not impose a sentence to the intensive sanctions program consecutive to any other sentence. The court may not impose a sentence to the intensive sanctions program concurrent with a sentence imposing imprisonment, except that the court may impose a sentence to the program concurrent with an imposed and stayed imprisonment sentence or with a prison sentence for which the offender has been released on parole. The court may impose concurrent intensive sanctions program sentences. The court may impose an intensive sanctions program sentence concurrent to probation. The court may impose any sentence for an escape from a sentence to the intensive sanctions program concurrent with the sentence to the intensive sanctions program.
973.15(3)
(3) Courts may impose sentences to be served in whole or in part concurrently with a sentence being served or to be served in a federal institution or an institution of another state.
973.15(4)
(4) When a court orders a sentence to the Wisconsin state prisons to be served in whole or in part concurrently with a sentence being served or to be served in a federal institution or an institution of another state:
973.15(4)(a)
(a) The court shall order the department to immediately inform the appropriate authorities in the jurisdiction where the prior sentence is to be served that the convicted offender is presently available to commence or resume serving that sentence; and
973.15(4)(b)
(b) The trial and commitment records required under
s. 973.08 shall be delivered immediately to the warden or superintendent of the Wisconsin institution designated as the reception center to receive the convicted offender when he or she becomes available to Wisconsin authorities.
973.15(5)
(5) A convicted offender who is made available to another jurisdiction under
ch. 976 or in any other lawful manner shall be credited with service of his or her Wisconsin sentence or commitment under the terms of
s. 973.155 for the duration of custody in the other jurisdiction.
973.15(6)
(6) Sections 302.11 and
304.06 are applicable to an inmate serving a sentence to the Wisconsin state prisons but confined in a federal institution or an institution in another state.
973.15(7)
(7) If a convicted offender escapes, the time during which he or she is unlawfully at large after escape shall not be computed as service of the sentence.
973.15(8)(a)(a) The sentencing court may stay execution of a sentence of imprisonment or to the intensive sanctions program only:
973.15(8)(b)
(b) If a court sentences a person under
s. 973.03 (5) (b), this subsection applies only to the first period of imprisonment.
973.15 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1981: Sub. (2) has been simplified to allow a court, in imposing a criminal sentence, to order that it be concurrent with or consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the same time or previously. The prior statute, although lengthier and more complicated, failed to achieve its apparent purpose of allowing consecutive sentencing in situations involving probation and parole revocations, escapes, etc. See Drinkwater v. State,
69 Wis. 2d 60 (1975); Guyton v. State,
69 Wis. 2d 663 (1975); Bruneau v. State,
77 Wis. 2d 166 (1977); Smith v. State,
85 Wis. 2d 650 (1978); and Donaldson v. State,
93 Wis. 2d 306 (1980).
973.15 Annotation
This revision allows sentences to be made consecutive to any previously or simultaneously imposed sentence, without regard to whether the offender is "then serving" such sentence, is subject to parole revocation proceedings, or has received a new sentence between the time of an escape and a return to a state facility. The revised statute also governs the sentencing of probationers by virtue of the cross-references in ss. 973.09 (1) (a) and 973.10 (2) (a). [Bill 341-A]
973.15 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1981: Sub. (8) has been added to specify the circumstances under which execution of a sentence of imprisonment may be stayed. Par. (a) references the rule of Reinex v. State, 51 Wis. 152 (1881) and Weston v. State,
28 Wis. 2d 136 (1965), whereby execution can be stayed for "legal cause", such as during the pendency of an appeal. Par. (b) cross-references the probation statute. Par. (c) is new. It allows the court to delay the commencement of a sentence for up to 60 days. The Wisconsin supreme court recently held that courts have no authority to stay execution of a sentence of imprisonment in the absence of such a statutory provision or legal cause. State v. Braun,
100 Wis. 2d 77 (1981). [Bill 736-A]
973.15 Annotation
Under subs. 973.15 (2) and (3), 1979 stats., state court may impose sentence consecutive to out-of-state sentence. State v. Toy, 125 W (2d) 216, 371 NW (2d) 386 (Ct. App. 1985).
973.15 Annotation
Sentencing court has authority to stay sentence and order it be served consecutive to s. 345.47 and 973.07 commitment for failure to pay fine and penalty assessment. State v. Strohbeen, 147 W (2d) 566, 433 NW (2d) 288 (Ct. App. 1988).
973.15 Annotation
Defendant is entitled to credit against sentence for period during which he was denied admission to county jail due to overcrowding, however, defendant is not entitled to credit for time as of date he was to have reported to jail to serve sentence. State v. Riske, 152 W (2d) 260, 448 NW (2d) 260 (Ct. App. 1989).
973.15 Annotation
Primary factors to be considered in exercising discretion in sentencing are gravity of offense, rehabilitative needs of defendant and protection of public. State v. Paske, 163 W (2d) 52, 471 NW (2d) 55 (1991).
973.15 Annotation
An adult sentence cannot run consecutive to a juvenile disposition. State v. Woods, 173 W (2d) 129, 496 NW (2d) 144 (Ct. App. 1992).
973.15 AnnotationOvercrowding doesn't constitute legal cause under (8) (a).
76 Atty. Gen. 165.
973.155(1)(a)(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed. As used in this subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes, without limitation by enumeration, confinement related to an offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, which occurs:
973.155(1)(a)3.
3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after trial.
973.155(1)(b)
(b) The categories in
par. (a) include custody of the convicted offender which is in whole or in part the result of a probation or parole hold under
s. 304.06 (3) or
973.10 (2) placed upon the person for the same course of conduct as that resulting in the new conviction.
973.155(2)
(2) After the imposition of sentence, the court shall make and enter a specific finding of the number of days for which sentence credit is to be granted, which finding shall be included in the judgment of conviction. In the case of revocation of probation or parole, the department, if the hearing is waived, or the division of hearings and appeals in the department of administration, in the case of a hearing, shall make such a finding, which shall be included in the revocation order.
973.155(3)
(3) The credit provided in
sub. (1) shall be computed as if the convicted offender had served such time in the institution to which he or she has been sentenced.
973.155(4)
(4) The credit provided in
sub. (1) shall include earned good time for those inmates subject to
s. 302.43,
303.07 (3) or
303.19 (3) serving sentences of one year or less and confined in a county jail, house of correction or county reforestation camp.
973.155(5)
(5) If this section has not been applied at sentencing to any person who is in custody or to any person who is on probation or parole, the person may petition the department to be given credit under this section. Upon proper verification of the facts alleged in the petition, this section shall be applied retroactively to the person. If the department is unable to determine whether credit should be given, or otherwise refuses to award retroactive credit, the person may petition the sentencing court for relief. This subsection applies to any person, regardless of the date he or she was sentenced.
973.155(6)
(6) A defendant aggrieved by a determination by a court under this section may appeal in accordance with
s. 809.30.
973.155 Annotation
This section grants credit for each day in custody regardless of basis for confinement as long as it is connected to offense for which sentence is imposed. State v. Gilbert, 115 W (2d) 371, 340 NW (2d) 511 (1983).
973.155 Annotation
Where intended sentence was valid, but judge did not follow procedures under this section, appropriate remedy was to modify sentence to conform it to requirements of this section. State v. Walker, 117 W (2d) 579, 345 NW (2d) 413 (1984).
973.155 Annotation
"Custody" must result from occurrence of legal event, process, or authority which occasions, or is related to, confinement on charge for which accused is ultimately sentenced. State v. Demars, 119 W (2d) 19, 349 NW (2d) 708 (Ct. App. 1984).
