940.01 Annotation
State v. Camacho: The Judicial Creation of an Objective Element to Wisconsin's Law of Imperfect Self-defense Homicide. Leiser. 1995 WLR 742.
940.02
940.02
First-degree reckless homicide. 940.02(1)
(1) Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a Class B felony.
940.02(1m)
(1m) Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child under circumstances that show utter disregard for the life of that unborn child, the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class B felony.
940.02(2)
(2) Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class B felony:
940.02(2)(a)
(a) By manufacture, distribution or delivery, in violation of
s. 961.41, of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961, of a controlled substance analog of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961 or of ketamine or flunitrazepam, if another human being uses the controlled substance or controlled substance analog and dies as a result of that use. This paragraph applies:
940.02(2)(a)1.
1. Whether the human being dies as a result of using the controlled substance or controlled substance analog by itself or with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance mixed or combined with the controlled substance or controlled substance analog.
940.02(2)(a)2.
2. Whether or not the controlled substance or controlled substance analog is mixed or combined with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance after the violation of
s. 961.41 occurs.
940.02(2)(a)3.
3. To any distribution or delivery described in this paragraph, regardless of whether the distribution or delivery is made directly to the human being who dies. If possession of the controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961, of the controlled substance analog of the controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961 or of the ketamine or flunitrazepam is transferred more than once prior to the death as described in this paragraph, each person who distributes or delivers the controlled substance or controlled substance analog in violation of
s. 961.41 is guilty under this paragraph.
940.02(2)(b)
(b) By administering or assisting in administering a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961, a controlled substance analog of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II of
ch. 961 or ketamine or flunitrazepam, without lawful authority to do so, to another human being and that human being dies as a result of the use of the substance. This paragraph applies whether the human being dies as a result of using the controlled substance or controlled substance analog by itself or with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance mixed or combined with the controlled substance or controlled substance analog.
940.02 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: [As to sub. (1)] First-degree reckless homicide is analogous to the prior offense of 2nd-degree murder. The concept of "conduct evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life" has been a difficult one for modern juries to comprehend. To avoid the mistaken connotation that a clinical mental disorder is involved, the offense has been recodified as aggravated reckless homicide. The revision clarifies that a subjective mental state, i.e., criminal recklessness, is required for liability. See s. 939.24. The aggravating element, i.e., circumstances which show utter disregard for human life, is intended to codify judicial interpretations of "conduct evincing a depraved mind, regardless of life". State v. Dolan,
44 Wis. 2d 68 (1969); State v. Weso,
60 Wis. 2d 404 (1973).
940.02 Annotation
Under prior law, adequate provocation mitigated 2nd-degree murder to manslaughter. State v. Hoyt,
21 Wis. 2d 284 (1964). Under this revision, the analogs of those crimes, i.e., first-degree reckless and 2nd-degree intentional homicide, carry the same penalty; thus mitigation is impossible. Evidence of provocation will usually be admissible in prosecutions for crimes requiring criminal recklessness, however, as relevant to the reasonableness of the risk (and, in prosecutions under this section, whether the circumstances show utter disregard for human life). Since provocation is integrated into the calculus of recklessness, it is not an affirmative defense thereto and the burdens of production and persuasion stated in s. 940.01 (3) are inapplicable. [Bill 191-S]
940.02 Annotation
Possession of a controlled substance is not a lesser included offense of sub. (2) (a). State v. Clemons,
164 Wis. 2d 506,
476 N.W.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1991).
940.02 Annotation
Generally expert evidence of personality dysfunction is irrelevant to the issue of intent although it might be admissible in very limited circumstances. State v. Morgan,
195 Wis. 2d 388,
536 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.02 Annotation
Utter disregard for human life is an objective standard of what a reasonable person in the defendant's position is presumed to have known and is proved through an examination of the acts that caused death and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct. State v. Edmunds,
229 Wis. 2d 67,
598 N.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1999).
940.02 Annotation
Importance of clarity in law of homicide: The Wisconsin revision. Dickey, Schultz & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323 (1989).
940.03
940.03
Felony murder. Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or attempting to commit a crime specified in
s. 940.225 (1) or
(2) (a),
943.02,
943.10 (2) or
943.32 (2) may be imprisoned for not more than 20 years in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment provided by law for that crime or attempt.
940.03 History
History: 1987 a. 399.
940.03 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: The prior felony murder statute (s. 940.02 (2)) did not allow enhanced punishment for homicides caused in the commission of a Class B felony. State v. Gordon,
111 Wis. 2d 133,
330 N.W. 2d 564 (1983). The revised statute eliminates the "natural and probable consequence" limitation and limits the offense to homicides caused in the commission of or attempt to commit armed robbery, armed burglary, arson, first degree sexual assault or 2nd degree sexual assault by use or threat of force or violence. The revised penalty clause allows imposition of up to 20 years' imprisonment more than that prescribed for the underlying felony. Prosecution and punishment for both offenses remain barred by double jeopardy. State v. Carlson,
5 Wis. 2d 595,
93 N.W. 2d 355 (1958). [Bill 191-S]
940.03 Annotation
To prove that the defendant caused the death, the state need only prove the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor. The phrase "while committing or attempting to commit" encompasses the immediate flight from the felony. A defendant may be convicted if another person, including an intended felony victim, fires the fatal shot. State v. Oimen,
184 Wis. 2d 423,
516 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1994), State v. Rivera,
184 Wis. 2d 485,
516 N.W.2d 391 (1994) and State v. Chambers,
183 Wis. 2d 316,
515 N.W.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1994).
940.03 Annotation
Attempted felony murder does not exist. Attempt requires intent and the crime of felony murder is complete without specific intent. State v. Briggs,
218 Wis. 2d 61,
579 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1998).
940.04(1)(1) Any person, other than the mother, who intentionally destroys the life of an unborn child may be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 3 years or both.
940.04(2)
(2) Any person, other than the mother, who does either of the following may be imprisoned not more than 15 years:
940.04(2)(a)
(a) Intentionally destroys the life of an unborn quick child; or
940.04(2)(b)
(b) Causes the death of the mother by an act done with intent to destroy the life of an unborn child. It is unnecessary to prove that the fetus was alive when the act so causing the mother's death was committed.
940.04(3)
(3) Any pregnant woman who intentionally destroys the life of her unborn child or who consents to such destruction by another may be fined not more than $200 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or both.
940.04(4)
(4) Any pregnant woman who intentionally destroys the life of her unborn quick child or who consents to such destruction by another may be imprisoned not more than 2 years.
940.04(5)
(5) This section does not apply to a therapeutic abortion which:
940.04(5)(b)
(b) Is necessary, or is advised by 2 other physicians as necessary, to save the life of the mother; and
940.04(5)(c)
(c) Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed maternity hospital.
940.04(6)
(6) In this section "unborn child" means a human being from the time of conception until it is born alive.
940.04 Annotation
Aborting a child against a father's wishes does not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. Przybyla v. Przybyla,
87 Wis. 2d 441,
275 N.W.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1978).
940.04 Annotation
Sub. (2) (a) proscribes feticide. It does not apply to consensual abortions. It was not impliedly repealed by the adoption of s. 940.15 in response to
Roe v. Wade. State v. Black,
188 Wis. 2d 639,
526 N.W.2d 132 (1994).
940.04 Annotation
This section is cited as similar to a Texas statute that was held to violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113.
940.04 Annotation
The state may prohibit first trimester abortions by nonphysicians. Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9.
940.04 AnnotationThe viability of an unborn child is discussed. Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
940.04 Annotation
Any law requiring parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion must ensure that the parent does not have absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto power. Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
940.04 Annotation
Poverty is not a constitutionally suspect classification. Encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life. Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
940.04 Annotation
Abortion issues are discussed. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcraft,
462 U.S. 476 (1983); Simopoulas v. Virginia,
462 U.S. 506 (1983).
940.04 Annotation
Wisconsin's abortion statute (940.04, Stats. 1969) is unconstitutional as applied to the abortion of an embryo that has not quickened. Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293.
940.04 Annotation
Where the U.S. supreme court decisions clearly made Wisconsin antiabortion statute unenforceable, the issue in a physician's action for injunctive relief against enforcement became mooted, and it no longer presented a case or controversy over which the court could have jurisdiction. Larkin v. McCann,
368 F. Supp. 1352.
940.04 Annotation
State regulation of abortion. 1970 WLR 933.
940.05
940.05
Second-degree intentional homicide. 940.05(1)(1) Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class B felony if:
940.05(1)(a)
(a) In prosecutions under
s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) did not exist as required by
s. 940.01 (3); or
940.05(1)(b)
(b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.
940.05(2)
(2) In prosecutions under
sub. (1), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another.
940.05(2g)
(2g) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another is guilty of a Class B felony if:
940.05(2g)(a)
(a) In prosecutions under
s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) did not exist as required by
s. 940.01 (3); or
940.05(2g)(b)
(b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.
940.05(2h)
(2h) In prosecutions under
sub. (2g), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another.
940.05(3)
(3) The mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) are not defenses to prosecution for this offense.
940.05 History
History: 1987 a. 399;
1997 a. 295.
940.05 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree intentional homicide is analogous to the prior offense of manslaughter. The penalty is increased and the elements clarified in order to encourage charging under this section in appropriate cases.
940.05 Annotation
Adequate provocation, unnecessary defensive force, prevention of felony, coercion and necessity, which are affirmative defenses to first-degree intentional homicide but not this offense, mitigate that offense to this. When this offense is charged, the state's inability to disprove their existence is conceded. Their existence need not, however, be pleaded or proved by the state in order to sustain a finding of guilty.
940.05 Annotation
When first-degree intentional homicide is charged, this lesser offense must be submitted upon request if the evidence, reasonably viewed, could support the jury's finding that the state has not borne its burden of persuasion under s. 940.01 (3). State v. Felton,
110 Wis. 2d 465, 508 (1983). [Bill 191-S]
940.05 Annotation
The prosecution is required to prove only that the defendant's acts were a substantial factor in the victim's death; not the sole cause. State v. Block,
170 Wis. 2d 676,
489 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1992).
940.05 Annotation
Importance of clarity in law of homicide: The Wisconsin revision. Dickey, Schultz & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323 (1989).
940.06
940.06
Second-degree reckless homicide. 940.06(1)
(1) Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being is guilty of a Class C felony.
940.06(2)
(2) Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a Class C felony.
940.06 History
History: 1987 a. 399;
1997 a. 295.
940.06 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree reckless homicide is analogous to the prior offense of homicide by reckless conduct. The revised statute clearly requires proof of a subjective mental state, i.e., criminal recklessness. See s. 939.24 and the NOTE thereto. [Bill 191-S]
940.06 Annotation
Second degree reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. State v. Lechner,
217 Wis. 2d 392,
576 N.W.2d 912 (1998).
940.06 Annotation
Importance of clarity in law of homicide: The Wisconsin revision. Dickey, Schultz & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323 (1989).
940.07
940.07
Homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious animal. Whoever knowing the vicious propensities of any animal intentionally allows it to go at large or keeps it without ordinary care, if such animal, while so at large or not confined, kills any human being who has taken all the precautions which the circumstances may permit to avoid such animal, is guilty of a Class C felony.
940.07 History
History: 1977 c. 173.
940.08
940.08
Homicide by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire. 940.08(1)
(1) Whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.08(2)
(2) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.08 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: The definition of the offense is broadened to include highly negligent handling of fire, explosives and dangerous weapons in addition to firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow. See s. 939.22 (10). [Bill 191-S]
940.09
940.09
Homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle or firearm. 940.09(1)(1) Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class B felony:
940.09(1)(a)
(a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.09(1)(b)
(b) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in
s. 340.01 (46m).
940.09(1)(bm)
(bm) Causes the death of another by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.1.
940.09(1)(c)
(c) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.09(1)(d)
(d) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in
s. 340.01 (46m).
940.09(1)(e)
(e) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.1.
940.09(1b)
(1b) If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age or an unborn child in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under
sub. (1), any applicable maximum fine or imprisonment specified for the conviction is doubled.
940.09(1d)(a)(a) If a person who committed an offense under
sub. (1) (a),
(b),
(c) or
(d) has one or more prior convictions, suspensions or revocations, counting convictions under this section and
s. 940.09 (1) in the person's lifetime plus other convictions, suspensions or revocations counted under
s. 343.307 (1), the procedure under
s. 343.301 shall be followed if the court orders the the equipping of a motor vehicle owned by the person with an ignition interlock device or the immobilization of the motor vehicle.
940.09(1d)(b)
(b) If the person who committed an offense under
sub. (1) (a),
(b),
(c) or
(d) has 2 or more prior convictions, suspensions or revocations, counting convictions under
sub. (1) and
s. 940.25 in the person's lifetime plus other convictions, suspensions or revocations counted under
s. 343.307 (1), the procedure under
s. 346.65 (6) shall be followed if the court orders the seizure and forfeiture of a motor vehicle owned by the person who committed the offense.
940.09(1g)
(1g) Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class D felony:
