990.001 Annotation
Generally, legislation is presumptively prospective unless statutory language reveals an intent that the statute apply retroactively. Procedural or remedial, rather than substantive, statutes are generally given retroactive effect unless contracts would be impaired or vested rights disturbed. Statutes of limitations are substantive. Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co.
172 Wis. 2d 141,
493 N.W.2d 40 (1992).
990.001 Annotation
Subs. (4) (a) and (d) apply to statutes of limitations; the day upon which a cause of action accrues is not included in computing the period of limitation. Pufahl v. Williams,
179 Wis. 2d 104,
506 N.W.2d 747 (1993).
990.001 Annotation
It is presumed that the legislature knows the case law in existence at the time it changes a statute. When a legislative act has been construed by an appellate court, the legislature is presumed to know that in the absence of the legislature explicitly changing the law, the court's interpretation will remain unchanged. Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee,
225 Wis. 2d 837,
593 N.W.2d 809 (Ct. App.1999),
98-1821.
990.001 Annotation
It is impermissible to apply rules of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent when the legislation is clear on its face. Jones v. State,
226 Wis. 2d 565,
594 N.W.2d 738 (1999),
97-3306.
990.001 Annotation
Procedural statues are to be liberally construed to permit a determination upon the merits of the controversy if possible. DOT v. Peterson,
226 Wis. 2d 623,
594 N.W.2d 765 (1999),
97-2718.
990.001 Annotation
When statutory language is ambiguous, the scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute will be examined to determine the intent of the legislature. State v. Reitter,
227 Wis. 2d 213,
595 N.W.2d 646 (1999),
98-0915.
990.001 Annotation
When an ambiguity exists regarding the specific party to be served, procedural statutes must be construed liberally to achieve a determination of the merits of the controversy, if such construction is possible. McDonough v. DWD,
227 Wis. 2d 271,
595 N.W.2d 686 (1999),
97-3711.
990.001 Annotation
The purpose of legislative interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature, first considering the language of the statute. If the statue clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, the court does not look beyond the statute to find the statute's meaning. In construing a statute, all words and phrases should be construed according to common and approved usage unless a different definition is designated by statute. Resort to a dictionary may be made to ascertain the common and ordinary usage of an undefined term. Resort to a dictionary does not render a term ambiguous. State v. Curiel,
227 Wis. 2d 389,
597 N.W.2d 697 (1999),
97-1337.
990.001 Annotation
If the potential for conflict between 2 statutes exists, they will be read to avoid the conflict if a reasonable construction so permits. Providence Catholic School v. Bristol School District No. 1,
231 Wis. 2d 159,
605 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1999),
98-3390.
990.001 Annotation
The rule of strict construction of penal statutes does not apply unless a statute is ambiguous, and the rule cannot be used to circumvent the purpose of the statute. The rule is not a rule of general or universal application. Sometimes a strict and sometimes a liberal construction is required, even in respect to a penal law because the purpose of all construction is to carry out the legislative purpose. State v. Kittilstad,
231 Wis. 2d 245,
603 N.W.2d 732 (Ct. App. 1999),
98-1456.
990.001 Annotation
If a statute contains a given provision, the omission of that provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant in showing that a different intention existed. Outagamie County v. Town of Greenville, 2000 WI App 65,
233 Wis. 2d 566,
608 N.W.2d 414,
99-1575.
990.001 Annotation
Although courts may not look to legislative history to show that an unambiguous statute is ambiguous, there is no rule that the history cannot be used to reinforce that a statute, plain on its face, is unambiguous. Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76,
236 Wis. 2d 211,
612 N.W.2d 659,
98-1223.
990.001 Annotation
When words are associated, they generally should ordinarily be understood in the same general sense. State ex rel. Speener v. Gudmanson, 2000 WI App 78,
234 Wis. 2d 461,
610 N.W.2d 136,
99-0568.
990.001 Annotation
Although a court will not look beyond a statute's plain meaning, it does consider its parts in relation to the whole statute and related sections. Dubis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 2000 WI App 209,
238 Wis. 2d 608,
618 N.W.2d 266,
99-2638.
990.001 Annotation
Statutes and rules that assist in implementing a chapter's goals must be read in pari materia, which requires a court to read, apply, and construe together statutes relating to the same subject matter. Perra v. Menomonee Mutual Insurance Co. 2000 WI App 215,
239 Wis. 2d 26,
619 N.W.2d 123,
00-0184.
990.001 Annotation
The principal of expressio unius est exclusio alterius provides that the express mention of one matter excludes other similar matters not mentioned. The enumeration of specific alternatives in a statute is evidence of legislative intent that any alternative not enumerated is to be excluded. Perry v. Menomonee Mutual Insurance Co. 2000 WI App 215,
239 Wis. 2d 26,
619 N.W.2d 123,
00-0184.
990.001 Annotation
When related statutes were not created at the same time, the fact that the older statute specifically lists certain powers does not necessarily mean that the legislature intended a broadly worded, later enacted statute to be thus limited. To be limited by the earlier statute, there must be some evidence that the legislature intended its application. Pritchard v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 2001 WI App 62,
242 Wis. 2d 301,
625 N.W.2d 613,
00-0848.
990.001 Annotation
By expressing a time requirement in terms of hours rather than days, the legislature manifests its intent that the clock start running immediately rather than the next day, and the "exclude-the-first-day" rule of sub. (4) (a) and (d) does not apply. Matter of the Mental Commitment of Ryan E. M. 2002 WI App 71,
252 Wis. 2d 490,
642 N.W.2d 592,
01-1175.
990.001 Annotation
Words appearing multiple times in the same statute are given the same meaning unless the context clearly requires a different meaning. Donaldson v. Board of Commissioners of Rock-Koshkonong Lake District, 2003 WI App 26,
260 Wis. 2d 238,
659 N.W.2d 66,
01-3396.
990.001 Annotation
Generally, legislative enactments are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. The purpose of the presumption of constitutionality does not appear to have any relation to whether the statute predates or postdates the constitutional provision. State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112,
264 Wis. 2d 520,
665 N.W.2d 328,
01-0350.
990.001 Annotation
Chapter 35 codifies the rules of publishing and interpreting public documents, including the statutes. Section 35.18 (3) explains how the numbers and sections of statutory provisions are designated. Storm v. Legion Insurance Company, 2003 WI 120,
265 Wis. 2d 169,
665 N.W.2d 353,
01-1139.
990.001 Annotation
Scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative history. Many words have multiple dictionary definitions; the applicable definition depends upon the context in which the word is used. Kalal v. Dane County, 004 WI 58,
271 Wis. 2d 633,
681 N.W.2d 633,
02-2490.
990.001 Annotation
A required tax payment may be made on the next secular day when July 31 is on Saturday and office hours are unofficial. 60 Atty. Gen. 411.
990.001 Annotation
Computing time in tort statutes of limitation. Ghiardi, 64 MLR 575 (1981).
990.001 Annotation
Researching legislative intent in Wisconsin: A suggested procedure. Nispel. WBB April 1983.
990.001 Annotation
Computing Time. Ghiardi. Wis. Law. March 1993.
990.001 Annotation
Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts. Dortzbach. 80 MLR 161 (1997).
990.01
990.01
Construction of laws; words and phrases. In the construction of Wisconsin laws the words and phrases which follow shall be construed as indicated unless such construction would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature:
990.01(1)
(1) General rule. All words and phrases shall be construed according to common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such meaning.
990.01(2)
(2) Acquire. "Acquire," when used in connection with a grant of power to any person, includes the acquisition by purchase, grant, gift or bequest. It includes the power to condemn in the cases specified in
s. 32.02.
990.01(3)
(3) Adult. "Adult" means a person who has attained the age of 18 years, except that for purposes of investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated any state or federal criminal law or any civil law or municipal ordinance, "adult" means a person who has attained the age of 17 years.
990.01(4)
(4) Bequest and bequeath. "Bequest" includes a devise; "bequeath" includes devise.
990.01(5)
(5) Chiropractor. "Chiropractor" means a person holding a license issued by the chiropractic examining board.
990.01(5g)
(5g) Communicable disease. "Communicable disease" means any disease that the department of health and family services determines, by rule, to be communicable in fact.
990.01(5r)
(5r) Controlled access highway. "Controlled access highway" means a highway on which abutting property owners have no right or only a limited right of direct access and on which the type and location of all access connections are determined and controlled by the highway authorities.
990.01(6)
(6) County board. "County board" means the county board of supervisors.
990.01(7a)
(7a) Express highway or expressway. An express highway or expressway is a divided arterial highway for through traffic with "full" or "partial" control of access and generally with grade separations at intersections. "Full" control of access means that the authority to control access is exercised to give preference to through traffic by providing access connections with selected public roads only and by prohibiting crossings at grade or direct private driveway connections. "Partial" control of access means that the authority to control access is exercised to give preference to through traffic to a degree that, in addition to access connections with selected public roads, there may be some crossings at grade and some private driveway connections.
990.01(7g)
(7g) Fire chief. "Fire chief" or "chief of a fire department" includes the chief of a department under
s. 61.66.
990.01(7m)
(7m) Fire department. "Fire department" includes a department under
s. 61.66.
990.01(7r)
(7r) Fire fighter. "Fire fighter" includes a person serving under
s. 61.66.
990.01(8)
(8) Folio. "Folio" means 100 words or figures. Any fraction of a folio shall be paid for as a full folio.
990.01(9)
(9) Following. "Following," when used by way of reference to any statute section, means the section next following that in which the reference is made.
990.01(9a)
(9a) Freeway. "Freeway" means a highway with full control of access and with all crossroads separated in grade from the pavements for through traffic.
990.01(10)
(10) Grantor and grantee. "Grantor" includes every person from or by whom any freehold estate or interest passes in or by any deed; and "grantee" includes every person to whom any such estate or interest passes in like manner.
990.01(11)
(11) Heretofore and hereafter. "Heretofore" means any time previous to the day on which the statute containing it takes effect; "hereafter" means the time after the statute containing such word takes effect.
990.01(12)
(12) Highway. "Highway" includes all public ways and thoroughfares and all bridges upon the same.
990.01(13)(a)(a) The word "homestead" means the dwelling and so much of the land surrounding it as is reasonably necessary for use of the dwelling as a home, but not less than one-fourth acre, if available, and not exceeding 40 acres.
990.01(13)(b)
(b) Any amendment of a homestead statute shall not affect liens of creditors attaching nor rights of devisees or heirs of persons dying prior to the effective date of the amendment.
990.01(14)
(14) Homestead exemption. "Exempt homestead" means the dwelling, including a building, condominium, mobile home, house trailer or cooperative or an unincorporated cooperative association, and so much of the land surrounding it as is reasonably necessary for its use as a home, but not less than 0.25 acre, if available, and not exceeding 40 acres, within the limitation as to value under
s. 815.20, except as to liens attaching or rights of devisees or heirs of persons dying before the effective date of any increase of that limitation as to value.
990.01(15)
(15) Inhabitant. "Inhabitant" means a resident.
990.01(16)
(16) Insane persons. "Insane persons" include every idiot, non compos, lunatic and distracted person.
990.01(17)
(17) Issue. "Issue," as applied to descent of estate, includes all the lawful descendants of the ancestor.
990.01(17m)
(17m) Judge. "Judge" does not include a municipal judge, except as provided in
ch. 755.
990.01(18)
(18) Land. "Land" includes lands, tenements and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein.
990.01(19)
(19) Legacy, legatee. "Legacy" includes a devise; "legatee" includes a devisee.
990.01(19g)
(19g) Licensed practical nurse. "Licensed practical nurse" includes a licensed practical/vocational nurse who is licensed in a party state, as defined in
s. 441.50 (2) (j).
990.01(19j)(a)(a) In this subsection, "breathes" means draws air into and expels it out of the lungs one or more times.
990.01(19j)(b)
(b) "Live birth" means the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother, of a human being, at any stage of development, who, after the expulsion or extraction, breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the umbilical cord has been cut, and regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result of natural or induced labor, a cesarean section, or an abortion, as defined in
s. 253.10 (2) (a).
990.01(19m)
(19m) Marital child. "Marital child" means either of the following:
990.01(19m)(a)
(a) A child who is conceived or born while his or her parents are lawfully intermarried.
990.01(19m)(b)
(b) A nonmarital child who is adopted or whose parents subsequently intermarry under
s. 767.803.
990.01(20)
(20) Minor. "Minor" means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years, except that for purposes of investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a state or federal criminal law or any civil law or municipal ordinance, "minor" does not include a person who has attained the age of 17 years.
990.01(21)
(21) Month. "Month" means a calendar month unless otherwise expressed.
990.01(22)
(22) Municipality. "Municipality" includes cities and villages; it may be construed to include towns.
990.01(23)
(23) Nighttime. "Nighttime," used in any statute, ordinance, indictment or information, means the time between one hour after sunset on one day and one hour before sunrise on the following day; and the time of sunset and sunrise shall be ascertained according to the mean solar time of the ninetieth meridian west from Greenwich, commonly known as central time, as given in any almanac.
990.01(23m)
(23m) Nonmarital child. "Nonmarital child" means a child who is neither conceived nor born while his or her parents are lawfully intermarried, who is not adopted and whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under
s. 767.803.
990.01(23q)
(23q) Nurse. "Nurse", "nurse licensed under
ch. 441" and any reference to an individual who is registered or licensed under
ch. 441 include a registered nurse or licensed practical/vocational nurse who is licensed in a party state, as defined in
s. 441.50 (2) (j).
990.01(24)
(24) Oath. "Oath" includes affirmation in all cases where by law an affirmation may be substituted for an oath. If any oath or affirmation is required to be taken such oath or affirmation shall be taken before and administered by some officer authorized by the laws of this state to administer oaths, at the place where the same is required to be taken or administered, unless otherwise expressly directed, and, when necessary, duly certified by such officer. If an oath is administered it shall end with the words "so help me God". In actions and proceedings in the courts, a person may take an oath or affirmation in communication with the administering officer by telephone or audiovisual means.
990.01(25)
(25) Officers. "Officers" when applied to corporations include directors and trustees.
990.01(25g)
(25g) Optical disk. "Optical disk" means a rotating circular plate on which information or images are placed in storage, and which is recorded and read by laser beams focused on the plate.
990.01(25r)
(25r) Optical imaging. "Optical imaging" means transferring to a format employing an optical disk.
990.01(26)
(26) Person. "Person" includes all partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate.
990.01(27)
(27) Personal property. "Personal property" includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, evidences of debt and energy.
990.01(27m)
(27m) Personal representative. "Personal representative" means a person, however denominated, who is authorized to administer a decedent's estate.
990.01(28)
(28) Physician, surgeon or osteopath. "Physician," "surgeon" or "osteopath" means a person holding a license or certificate of registration from the medical examining board.
990.01(28g)
(28g) Police chief. "Police chief" or "chief of a police department" includes the chief of a department under
s. 61.66.
990.01(28m)
(28m) Police department. "Police department" includes a department under
s. 61.66.
990.01(28r)
(28r) Police officer. "Police officer" includes a person serving under
s. 61.66.
990.01(29)
(29) Population. "Population" means that shown by the most recent regular or special federal census.
990.01(30)
(30) Preceding. "Preceding," when used by way of reference to any statute section, means the section next preceding that in which the reference is made.
990.01(30m)
(30m) Promulgate. "Promulgate", when used in connection with a rule, as defined under
s. 227.01 (13), means to repeal; renumber; consolidate, renumber and amend; renumber and amend; amend; repeal and recreate; or create.
990.01(31)
(31) Property. "Property" includes real and personal property.
990.01(32)
(32) Publication. "Publication" in a newspaper of any notice or other matter indicated to be for a stated number of weeks means one insertion each week, unless specifically stated to be for more than one day in each week.
990.01(33)
(33) Qualified. "Qualified", when applied to any person elected or appointed to office, means that such person has done those things which the person was by law required to do before entering upon the duties of the person's office.
990.01(34)
(34) Railroad corporation. "Railroad corporation" and "railroad company" include any person managing, maintaining, operating or in possession of a railroad, whether as owner, contractor, lessee, mortgagee, trustee, assignee or receiver.
990.01(35)
(35) Real estate or real property. "Real estate" or "real property" includes lands, tenements and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein.
990.01(36)
(36) Recorded. If any instrument is required to be recorded by any officer or in any office it must be recorded in a suitable book kept for that purpose unless otherwise expressly directed.
