939.48 Annotation
Evidence of prior specific instances of violence that were known to the accused may be presented to support a defense of self-defense. The evidence is not limited to the accused's own testimony, but the evidence may not be extended to the point that it is being offered to prove that the victim acted in conformity with his or her violent tendencies. State v. Daniels,
160 Wis. 2d 85,
465 N.W.2d 633 (1991).
939.48 Annotation
Imperfect self-defense contains an initial threshold element requiring a reasonable belief that the defendant was terminating an unlawful interference with his or her person. State v. Camacho,
176 Wis. 2d 860,
501 N.W.2d 380 (1993).
939.48 Annotation
The reasonableness of a person's belief under sub. (1) is judged from the position of a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence in the same situation as the defendant, not a person identical to the defendant placed in the same situation as the defendant. A defendant's psycho-social history showing past violence toward the defendant is generally not relevant to this objective standard, although it may be relevant, as in spousal abuse cases, where the actors are the homicide victim and defendant. State v. Hampton,
207 Wis. 2d 369,
558 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1996).
939.48 Annotation
The right to resist unlawful arrest is not part of the statutory right to self-defense. It is a common law privilege that is abrogated. State v. Hobson,
218 Wis. 2d 350,
577 N.W.2d 825 (1998),
96-0914.
939.48 Annotation
While there is no statutory duty to retreat, whether the opportunity to retreat was available goes to whether the defendant reasonably believed the force used was necessary to prevent an interference with his or her person. A jury instruction to that effect was proper. State v. Wenger,
225 Wis. 2d 495,
593 N.W.2d 467 (Ct. App. 1999),
98-1739.
939.48 Annotation
When a defendant fails to establish a factual basis to raise self-defense, prior specific acts of violence by the victim have no probative value. The presentation of subjective testimony by an accused, going to a belief that taking steps in self-defense was necessary, is not sufficient for the admission of self-defense evidence. State v. Head,
2000 WI App 275,
240 Wis. 2d 162,
622 N.W.2d 9,
99-3071.
939.48 Annotation
Although intentionally pointing a firearm at another constitutes a violation of s. 941.20, under sub. (1) a person is privileged to point a gun at another person in self-defense if the person reasonably believes that the threat of force is necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference. State v. Watkins,
2002 WI 101,
255 Wis. 2d 265,
647 N.W.2d 244,
00-0064.
939.48 Annotation
A defendant asserting perfect self-defense against a charge of 1st-degree murder must meet an objective threshold showing that he or she reasonably believed that he or she was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his or her person and that the force used was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. A defendant asserting the defense of unnecessary defensive force s. 940.01 (2) (b) to a charge of 1st-degree murder is not required to satisfy the objective threshold showing. State v. Head,
2002 WI 99,
255 Wis. 2d 194,
648 N.W.2d 413,
99-3071.
939.48 Annotation
A person may employ deadly force against another, if the person reasonably believes that force is necessary to protect a 3rd-person or one's self from imminent death or great bodily harm, without incurring civil liability for injury to the other. Clark v. Ziedonis,
513 F. 2d 79 (1975).
939.48 Annotation
Self-defense — prior acts of the victim. 1974 WLR 266.
939.48 Annotation
State v. Camacho: The Judicial Creation of an Objective Element to Wisconsin's Law of Imperfect Self-defense Homicide. Leiser. 1995 WLR 742.
939.49
939.49
Defense of property and protection against retail theft. 939.49(1)(1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with the person's property. Only such degree of force or threat thereof may intentionally be used as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. It is not reasonable to intentionally use force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm for the sole purpose of defense of one's property.
939.49(2)
(2) A person is privileged to defend a 3rd person's property from real or apparent unlawful interference by another under the same conditions and by the same means as those under and by which the person is privileged to defend his or her own property from real or apparent unlawful interference, provided that the person reasonably believes that the facts are such as would give the 3rd person the privilege to defend his or her own property, that his or her intervention is necessary for the protection of the 3rd person's property, and that the 3rd person whose property the person is protecting is a member of his or her immediate family or household or a person whose property the person has a legal duty to protect, or is a merchant and the actor is the merchant's employee or agent. An official or adult employee or agent of a library is privileged to defend the property of the library in the manner specified in this subsection.
939.49(3)
(3) In this section "unlawful" means either tortious or expressly prohibited by criminal law or both.
939.49 Annotation
Flight on the part of one suspected of a felony does not, of itself, warrant the use of deadly force by an arresting officer, and it is only in certain aggravated circumstances that a police officer may shoot a fleeing suspect. Clark v. Ziedonis,
368 F. Supp. 544 (1973).
PENALTIES
939.50
939.50
Classification of felonies. 939.50(1)
(1) Felonies in the statutes are classified as follows:
939.50(2)
(2) A felony is a Class A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, or I felony when it is so specified in the statutes.
939.50(3)
(3) Penalties for felonies are as follows:
939.50(3)(b)
(b) For a Class B felony, imprisonment not to exceed 60 years.
939.50(3)(c)
(c) For a Class C felony, a fine not to exceed $100,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 40 years, or both.
939.50(3)(d)
(d) For a Class D felony, a fine not to exceed $100,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 25 years, or both.
939.50(3)(e)
(e) For a Class E felony, a fine not to exceed $50,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 15 years, or both.
939.50(3)(f)
(f) For a Class F felony, a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 12 years and 6 months, or both.
939.50(3)(g)
(g) For a Class G felony, a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.
939.50(3)(h)
(h) For a Class H felony, a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6 years, or both.
939.50(3)(i)
(i) For a Class I felony, a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 3 years and 6 months, or both.
939.51
939.51
Classification of misdemeanors. 939.51(2)
(2) A misdemeanor is a Class A, B or C misdemeanor when it is so specified in
chs. 939 to
951.
939.51(3)
(3) Penalties for misdemeanors are as follows:
939.51(3)(a)
(a) For a Class A misdemeanor, a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 9 months, or both.
939.51(3)(b)
(b) For a Class B misdemeanor, a fine not to exceed $1,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 90 days, or both.
939.51(3)(c)
(c) For a Class C misdemeanor, a fine not to exceed $500 or imprisonment not to exceed 30 days, or both.
939.52
939.52
Classification of forfeitures. 939.52(2)
(2) A forfeiture is a Class A, B, C, D or E forfeiture when it is so specified in
chs. 939 to
951.
939.52(3)
(3) Penalties for forfeitures are as follows:
939.52(3)(a)
(a) For a Class A forfeiture, a forfeiture not to exceed $10,000.
939.52(3)(b)
(b) For a Class B forfeiture, a forfeiture not to exceed $1,000.
939.52(3)(c)
(c) For a Class C forfeiture, a forfeiture not to exceed $500.
939.52(3)(d)
(d) For a Class D forfeiture, a forfeiture not to exceed $200.
939.52(3)(e)
(e) For a Class E forfeiture, a forfeiture not to exceed $25.
939.60
939.60
Felony and misdemeanor defined. A crime punishable by imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons is a felony. Every other crime is a misdemeanor.
939.60 History
History: 1977 c. 418 s.
924 (18) (e).
939.60 Annotation
A statutory offense punishable by imprisonment of one year or less in an unspecified place of confinement may result in confinement in a state prison and, therefore, is a felony, regardless of the classification of the offense at the time of the statute's enactment. State ex rel. McDonald v. Douglas County Circuit Ct.
100 Wis. 2d 569,
302 N.W.2d 462 (1981).
939.61
939.61
Penalty when none expressed. 939.61(1)
(1) If a person is convicted of an act or omission prohibited by statute and for which no penalty is expressed, the person shall be subject to a forfeiture not to exceed $200.
939.61(2)
(2) If a person is convicted of a misdemeanor under state law for which no penalty is expressed, the person may be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than 30 days or both.
939.61(3)
(3) Common law penalties are abolished.
939.61 History
History: 1977 c. 173.
939.615
939.615
Lifetime supervision of serious sex offenders. 939.615(1)(a)
(a) "Department" means the department of corrections.
939.615(1)(b)
(b) "Serious sex offense" means any of the following:
939.615(1)(b)1.
1. A violation, or the solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt to commit a violation, of
s. 940.22 (2),
940.225 (1),
(2), or
(3),
948.02 (1) or
(2),
948.025 (1),
948.05 (1) or
(1m),
948.051,
948.055 (1),
948.06,
948.07,
948.075,
948.08,
948.085,
948.11 (2) (a),
948.12, or
948.13 or of
s. 940.302 (2) if
s. 940.302 (2) (a) 1. b. applies.
939.615(1)(b)2.
2. A violation, or the solicitation, conspiracy or attempt to commit a violation, under
ch. 940,
943,
944 or
948 other than a violation specified in
subd. 1., if the court determines that one of the purposes for the conduct constituting the violation was for the actor's sexual arousal or gratification.
939.615(2)
(2) When lifetime supervision may be ordered. 939.615(2)(a)(a) Except as provided in
par. (b), if a person is convicted of a serious sex offense or found not guilty of a serious sex offense by reason of mental disease or defect, the court may, in addition to sentencing the person, placing the person on probation or, if applicable, committing the person under
s. 971.17, place the person on lifetime supervision by the department if notice concerning lifetime supervision was given to the person under
s. 973.125 and if the court determines that lifetime supervision of the person is necessary to protect the public.
939.615(2)(b)
(b) A court may not place a person on lifetime supervision under this section if the person was previously placed on lifetime supervision under this section for a prior conviction for a serious sex offense or a prior finding of not guilty of a serious sex offense by reason of mental disease or defect and that previous placement on lifetime supervision has not been terminated under
sub. (6).
939.615(2)(c)
(c) If the prosecutor is seeking lifetime supervision for a person who is charged with committing a serious sex offense specified in
sub. (1) (b) 2., the court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as to whether the conduct constituting the offense was for the actor's sexual arousal or gratification.
939.615(3)
(3) When lifetime supervision begins. Subject to
sub. (4), the period of lifetime supervision on which a person is placed under this section shall begin at whichever of the following times is applicable:
939.615(3)(a)
(a) If the person is placed on probation for the serious sex offense, upon his or her discharge from probation.
939.615(3)(b)
(b) If the person is sentenced to prison for the serious sex offense, upon his or her discharge from parole or extended supervision.
