111.322 Annotation
An unlawful practice occurs when an impermissible motivating factor enters into an employment decision, but if the employer can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible factor, the complainant may not be awarded monetary damages or reinstatement. Hoell v. LIRC,
186 Wis. 2d 603,
522 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1994).
111.322 Annotation
The state is prevented from enforcing discrimination laws against religious associations when the employment at issue serves a ministerial or ecclesiastical function. While it must be given considerable weight, a religious association's designation of a position as ministerial or ecclesiastical does not control its status. Jocz v. LIRC,
196 Wis. 2d 273,
538 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1995),
93-3042.
111.322 Annotation
The exclusive remedy provision in s. 102.03 (2) does not bar a complainant whose claim is covered by the workers compensation act from pursuing an employment discrimination claim under the fair employment act, subch. II, of ch. 111. Byers v. LIRC,
208 Wis. 2d 388,
561 N.W.2d 678 (1997),
95-2490.
111.322 Annotation
A
prima facie case of discrimination triggers a burden of production against an employer, but unless the employer remains silent in the face of the
prima facie case, the complainant continues to bear the burden of proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination. Currie v. DILHR,
210 Wis. 2d 380,
565 N.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-1720.
111.322 Annotation
A prima facie case for a violation of this section requires that the complainant: 1) was a member of a protected class; 2) was discharged; 3) was qualified for the position; and 4) was either replaced by someone not in the protected class or that others not in the protected class were treated more favorably. Knight v. LIRC,
220 Wis. 2d 137,
582 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1998),
97-1606.
111.322 Annotation
The free exercise clause of the 1st amendment and the freedom of conscience clauses in Article I, Section 18, of the Wisconsin constitution preclude employment discrimination claims under ss. 111.31 to 111.395 for employees whose positions are important and closely linked to the religious mission of a religious organization. Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC,
2009 WI 88,
320 Wis. 2d 275,
768 N.W.2d 868,
07-0496.
111.322 Annotation
Some “Hardship": Defending a Disability Discrimination Suit Under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. Hansch. 89 MLR 821 (2005).
111.322 Annotation
Discrimination in advertising. Abramson, WBB March, 1985.
111.322 Annotation
Employer Liability for Employment References. Mac Kelly. Wis. Law. May 2008.
111.322 Annotation2009 Wisconsin Act 20: Changes to Wisconsin's Fair Employment Law. Karls-Ruplinger. Wis. Law. Sept. 2009.
111.325
111.325
Unlawful to discriminate. It is unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employee or any applicant for employment or licensing.
111.33
111.33
Age; exceptions and special cases. 111.33(1)
(1) The prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of age applies only to discrimination against an individual who is age 40 or over.
111.33(2)
(2) Notwithstanding
sub. (1) and
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of age to do any of the following:
111.33(2)(a)
(a) To terminate the employment of any employee physically or otherwise unable to perform his or her duties.
111.33(2)(b)
(b) To implement the provisions of any retirement plan or system of any employer if the retirement plan or system is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this subchapter. No plan or system may excuse the failure to hire, or require or permit the involuntary retirement of, any individual under
sub. (1) because of that individual's age.
111.33(2)(d)
(d) To apply varying insurance coverage according to an employee's age.
111.33(2)(e)
(e) To exercise an age distinction with respect to hiring an individual to a position in which the knowledge and experience to be gained is required for future advancement to a managerial or executive position.
111.33(2)(f)
(f) To exercise an age distinction with respect to employment in which the employee is exposed to physical danger or hazard, including, without limitation because of enumeration, certain employment in law enforcement or fire fighting.
111.33 History
History: 1981 c. 334;
1983 a. 391,
538.
111.33 Annotation
Sub. (2) (f) exempts the hiring of fire fighters from being the subject of age discrimination suits. A fire department need not show that it openly and consistently discriminated on the basis of age to be exempt under sub. (2) (f). Johnson v. LIRC,
200 Wis. 2d 715,
547 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1996),
95-2346.
111.33 Annotation
An employee is physically unable to perform a job under sub. (2) if that employee is performing the job with a physical accommodation. Harrison v. LIRC,
211 Wis. 2d 681,
565 N.W.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-1795.
111.33 Annotation
A city charged under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act had the burden of establishing that a mandatory retirement age of 55 for law enforcement personnel was a bona fide occupational qualification. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Janesville,
630 F.2d 1254 (1980).
111.33 Annotation
The federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act preempts sub. (2) (b) to the extent that it applies to employee benefit plans covered by it. Waukesha Engine Division v. DILHR,
619 F. Supp. 1310 (1985).
111.335
111.335
Arrest or conviction record; exceptions and special cases. 111.335(1)(a)(a) Employment discrimination because of arrest record includes, but is not limited to, requesting an applicant, employee, member, licensee or any other individual, on an application form or otherwise, to supply information regarding any arrest record of the individual except a record of a pending charge, except that it is not employment discrimination to request such information when employment depends on the bondability of the individual under a standard fidelity bond or when an equivalent bond is required by state or federal law, administrative regulation or established business practice of the employer and the individual may not be bondable due to an arrest record.
111.335(1)(b)
(b) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of arrest record to refuse to employ or license, or to suspend from employment or licensing, any individual who is subject to a pending criminal charge if the circumstances of the charge substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.
111.335(1)(c)
(c) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any individual who:
111.335(1)(c)1.
1. Has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity; or
111.335(1)(c)2.
2. Is not bondable under a standard fidelity bond or an equivalent bond where such bondability is required by state or federal law, administrative regulation or established business practice of the employer.
111.335(1)(cg)1.1. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to deny or refuse to renew a license or permit under
s. 440.26 to a person who has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cg)2.
2. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to revoke a license or permit under
s. 440.26 (6) (b) if the person holding the license or permit has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cg)3.
3. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ a person in a business licensed under
s. 440.26 or as an employee specified in
s. 440.26 (5) (b) if the person has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cm)
(cm) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ as an installer of burglar alarms a person who has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned.
111.335(1)(cs)
(cs) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to revoke, suspend or refuse to renew a license or permit under
ch. 125 if the person holding or applying for the license or permit has been convicted of one or more of the following:
111.335(1)(cs)1.
1. Manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under
s. 961.41 (1).
111.335(1)(cs)2.
2. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under
s. 961.41 (1m).
111.335(1)(cs)3.
3. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, or manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under a federal law that is substantially similar to
s. 961.41 (1) or
(1m).
111.335(1)(cs)4.
4. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, or manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under the law of another state that is substantially similar to
s. 961.41 (1) or
(1m).
111.335(1)(cs)5.
5. Possessing any of the materials listed in
s. 961.65 with intent to manufacture methamphetamine under that section or under a federal law or a law of another state that is substantially similar to
s. 961.65.
111.335(1)(cv)
(cv) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ in a position in the classified service a person who has been convicted under 50 USC, Appendix, section 462 for refusing to register with the selective service system and who has not been pardoned.
111.335(1)(cx)
(cx) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensure, any individual who has been convicted of any offense under
s. 38.50 (13) (c).
111.335(1)(d)1.1. In this paragraph, “
educational agency" means a school district, a cooperative educational service agency, a county children with disabilities education board, a state prison under
s. 302.01, a juvenile correctional facility, as defined in
s. 938.02 (10p), a secured residential care center for children and youth, as defined in
s. 938.02 (15g), the Wisconsin Center for the Blind and Visually Impaired, the Wisconsin Educational Services Program for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, the Mendota Mental Health Institute, the Winnebago Mental Health Institute, a state center for the developmentally disabled, a private school, a charter school, a private, nonprofit, nonsectarian agency under contract with a school board under
s. 118.153 (3) (c), or a nonsectarian private school or agency under contract with the board of school directors in a 1st class city under
s. 119.235 (1).
111.335(1)(d)2.
2. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record for an educational agency to refuse to employ or to terminate from employment an individual who has been convicted of a felony and who has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335 Annotation
A rule adopted under s. 165.85 properly barred a nonpardoned felon from holding a police job. Law Enforcement Standards Board v. Lyndon Station,
101 Wis. 2d 472,
305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).
111.335 Annotation
A conviction for armed robbery in and of itself constituted circumstances substantially related to a school bus driver's licensure. Gibson v. Transportation Commission,
106 Wis. 2d 22,
315 N.W.2d 346 (1982).
111.335 Annotation
An employer's inquiry is limited to general facts in determining whether the “circumstances of the offense" relate to the job. It is not the details of the criminal activity that are important, but rather the circumstances that foster criminal activity, such as opportunity for criminal behavior, reaction to responsibility, and character traits of the person. County of Milwaukee v. LIRC,
139 Wis. 2d 805,
407 N.W.2d 908 (1987).
111.335 Annotation
There is no requirement that an employer take affirmative steps to accommodate individuals convicted of felonies. Knight v. LIRC,
220 Wis. 2d 137,
582 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1998),
97-1606.
111.335 Annotation
When evaluating an individual for the position of reserve officer, a sheriff's department may consider information in its possession concerning the individual's juvenile record, subject to prohibitions against arrest record and conviction record discrimination contained in the WFEA.
79 Atty. Gen. 89.
111.335 Annotation
Race, Crime, and Getting a Job. Pager. 2005 WLR 617.
111.335 Annotation
Discrimination in employment on the basis of arrest or conviction record. Mukamel. WBB Sept. 1983.
111.337
111.337
Creed; exceptions and special cases. 111.337(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of creed includes, but is not limited to, refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business.
111.337(2)
(2) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of creed:
111.337(2)(a)
(a) For a religious association not organized for private profit or an organization or corporation which is primarily owned or controlled by such a religious association to give preference to an applicant or employee who is a member of the same or a similar religious denomination.
111.337(2)(am)
(am) For a religious association not organized for private profit or an organization or corporation which is primarily owned or controlled by such a religious association to give preference to an applicant or employee who adheres to the religious association's creed, if the job description demonstrates that the position is clearly related to the religious teachings and beliefs of the religious association.
111.337(2)(b)
(b) For a fraternal as defined in
s. 614.01 (1) (a) to give preference to an employee or applicant who is a member or is eligible for membership in the fraternal, with respect to hiring to or promotion to the position of officer, administrator or salesperson.
111.337(3)
(3) No county, city, village or town may adopt any provision concerning employment discrimination because of creed that prohibits activity allowed under this section.
111.337 Annotation
Sub. (2) does not allow religious organizations to engage in prohibited forms of discrimination. Sacred Heart School Board v. LIRC,
157 Wis. 2d 638,
460 N.W.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1990).
111.337 Annotation
A union violated Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act by causing an employer to fire an employee because of the employee's refusal, on religious grounds, to pay union dues. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806,
643 F. 2d 445 (1981).
111.337 Annotation
The supreme court redefines employer's role in religious accommodation. Soeka. WBB July 1987.
111.34
111.34
Disability; exceptions and special cases. 111.34(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of disability includes, but is not limited to:
111.34(1)(a)
(a) Contributing a lesser amount to the fringe benefits, including life or disability insurance coverage, of any employee because of the employee's disability; or
111.34(1)(b)
(b) Refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business.
111.34(2)(a)(a) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of disability to refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar or terminate from employment, membership or licensure any individual, or to discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment if the disability is reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment, membership or licensure.
111.34(2)(b)
(b) In evaluating whether an individual with a disability can adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed activity, the present and future safety of the individual, of the individual's coworkers and, if applicable, of the general public may be considered. However, this evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis and may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure of individuals with disabilities in general or a particular class of individuals with disabilities.
111.34(2)(c)
(c) If the employment, membership or licensure involves a special duty of care for the safety of the general public, including but not limited to employment with a common carrier, this special duty of care may be considered in evaluating whether the employee or applicant can adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed activity. However, this evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis and may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure of individuals with disabilities in general or a particular class of individuals with disabilities.
111.34 History
History: 1981 c. 334;
1997 a. 112.
111.34 Annotation
The utilization of federal regulations as a hiring standard, although not applicable to the employing taxi company, demonstrated a rational relationship to the safety obligations imposed on the employer, and its use was not the result of an arbitrary belief lacking in objective reason or rationale. Boynton Cab Co. v. DILHR,
96 Wis. 2d 396,
291 N.W.2d 850 (1980).
111.34 Annotation
An employee handicapped by alcoholism was properly discharged under s. 111.32 (5) (f), 1973 Stats., (a predecessor to this section) for inability to efficiently perform job duties. Squires v. LIRC,
97 Wis. 2d 648,
294 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1980).
111.34 Annotation
Physical standards for school bus operators established under s. 343.12 (2) (g) are not exempt from the requirements of sub. (2) (b). Bothum v. Department of Transportation,
134 Wis. 2d 378,
396 N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1986).
111.34 Annotation
The duty to reasonably accommodate under sub. (1) (b) is to be broadly interpreted and may involve the transfer of an individual from one job to another. What is reasonable will depend on the facts of the case. McMullen v. LIRC,
148 Wis. 2d 270,
434 N.W.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1986).
111.34 Annotation
To avail itself of the defense under sub. (2) that an ostensibly safety-based employment restriction is job-related, an employer bears the burden of proving to a reasonable probability that the restriction is necessary to prevent harm to the employee or others. Racine Unified School District v. LIRC,
164 Wis. 2d 567,
476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991).
111.34 Annotation
Temporary forbearance of work rules while determining whether an employee's medical problem is treatable may be a reasonable accommodation under sub. (1) (b). The purpose of reasonable accommodation is to enable employees to adequately undertake job-related responsibilities. Target Stores v. LIRC,
217 Wis. 2d 1,
576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998),
97-1253. See also Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. LIRC,
2007 WI 105,
303 Wis. 2d 514,
735 N.W.2d 477,
04-1550.
111.34 Annotation
Whether an employee's mental illness caused him to react angrily and commit the act of insubordination that led to the termination of his employment was sufficiently complex and technical that expert testimony was required. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. LIRC,
2000 WI App 272,
240 Wis. 2d 209,
621 N.W.2d 633,
99-2632.
111.34 Annotation
A complainant must show that he or she is handicapped and that the employer took one of the prohibited actions based on that handicap. The employer then has a burden of proving a defense. Sub. (1) (b) does not require an employer to make a reasonable accommodation if the accommodation will impose a hardship on the employer, but if the employer is not able to demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship there is a violation. Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC,
2003 WI 106,
264 Wis. 2d 200,
664 N.W.2d 651,
02-0815.
111.34 Annotation
A reasonable accommodation is not limited to that which would allow the employee to perform adequately all of his or her job duties. A change in job duties may be a reasonable accommodation in a given circumstance. Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC,
2003 WI 106,
264 Wis. 2d 200,
664 N.W.2d 651,
02-0815.
111.34 Annotation
An interstate commercial driver need not seek a determination of medical qualification from the federal department of transportation (DOT) prior to filing a disability discrimination claim under this chapter. When medical and physical qualifications to be an interstate driver are material to a claim, and a dispute arises concerning those qualifications that cannot be resolved by facial application of DOT regulations, the dispute should be resolved by the DOT under its dispute resolution procedure. The employer must seek a determination of medical and physical qualification from the DOT if the employer intends to offer a defense that the driver was not qualified for medical reasons. Szleszinski v. Labor & Industry Review Commission,
2007 WI 106,
304 Wis. 2d 258,
736 N.W.2d 111,
04-3033.
111.34 Annotation
A person suffering from a contagious disease may be handicapped under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
111.34 Annotation
Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor and Industry Review Commission: A reasonable Turn Under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. Haas. 2004 WLR 1535.
