In an action for foreclosure of real property, the complaint may not name a tenant of residential real property as a defendant unless the tenant has a lien or ownership interest in the real property.
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 619 (1975); 1975 c. 218
; 2009 a. 28
Sub. (8) subjects claims lacking averments of time to motions for a more definite statement and not to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Schweiger v. Loewi & Co., 65 Wis. 2d 56
, 221 N.W.2d 882
The “American rule" of absolute judicial immunity from liability for libel or slander provides that writings made by an attorney of record in a pending lawsuit apply in this state if the statements made are relevant to the matters being considered and are made in a procedural context recognized as affording absolute privilege. Converters Equipment Corp. v. Condes Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 257
, 258 N.W.2d 712
When a libel action is based on conduct rather than words, sub. (6) is not applicable. Starobin v. Northridge Lakes Development Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1
, 287 N.W.2d 747
Sub. (2) does not prevent the trial court from amending the pleadings to conform with the evidence pursuant to s. 802.09 as long as the parties either consent or have the chance to submit additional proof. Meiers v. Wang, 192 Wis. 2d 115
, 531 N.W.2d 54
Sub. (2) requires specification of the time, place, and content of an alleged false representation. Allegations were too general that did not specify the particular individuals who made the representations and did not specify where, when, and to whom the representations were made. Friends of Kenwood v. Green, 2000 WI App 217
, 239 Wis. 2d 78
, 619 N.W.2d 271
The heightened pleading standard set forth by sub. (2) for claims of fraud does not apply to claims made under s. 100.18. Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co., 2020 WI 2
, 389 Wis. 2d 669
, 937 N.W.2d 37
Form of pleadings. 802.04(1)(1)
Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the venue, the title of the action, the file number, and a designation as in s. 802.01 (1)
. If a pleading contains motions, or an answer or reply contains cross claims or counterclaims, the designation in the caption shall state their existence. In the complaint the caption of the action shall include the standardized description of the case classification type and associated code number as approved by the director of state courts, and the title of the action shall include the names and addresses of all the parties, indicating the representative capacity, if any, in which they sue or are sued and, in actions by or against a corporation, the corporate existence and its domestic or foreign status shall be indicated. In pleadings other than the complaint, it is sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties. Every pleading commencing an action under s. 814.61 (1) (a)
or 814.62 (1)
and every complaint filed under s. 814.61 (3)
shall contain in the caption, if the action includes a claim for a money judgment, a statement of whether the amount claimed is greater than the amount under s. 799.01 (1) (d)
(2) Paragraphs; separate statements.
All averments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate claim or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. A counterclaim must be pleaded as such and the answer must demand the judgment to which the defendant supposes to be entitled upon the counterclaim.
(3) Adoption by reference; exhibits.
Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion. A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 621 (1975); 1975 c. 218
; Sup. Ct. Order, 171 Wis. 2d xix (1992); 1995 a. 27
; 2007 a. 97
Limited scope representation permitted — process. 802.045(1)(1)
An attorney's role in an action may be limited to one or more individual proceedings or issues in an action if specifically so stated in a notice of limited appearance filed and served upon the parties prior to or simultaneous with the proceeding. Providing limited scope representation of a person under this section does not constitute a general appearance by the attorney for purposes of s. 801.14
(2) Notice of limited appearance.
The notice of limited appearance shall contain the following information:
The name and the party designation of the client.
The specific proceedings or issues within the scope of the limited representation.
A statement that the attorney will file a notice of termination upon completion of services.
A statement that the attorney providing limited scope representation shall be served with all documents while providing limited scope representation.
Contact information for the client including current address and phone number.
(4) Termination of limited appearance.
At the conclusion of the representation for which a notice of limited appearance has been filed, the attorney's role terminates without further order of the court upon the attorney filing with the court, and serving upon the parties, a notice of the termination of limited appearance. A notice of termination of limited appearance shall contain all of the following information:
A statement that the attorney has completed all services within the scope of the notice of limited appearance.
A statement that the attorney has completed all acts ordered by the court.
A statement that the attorney has served the notice of termination of limited appearance on all parties, including the client.
Contact information for the client including current address and phone number.
The director of state courts shall provide the clerk of circuit court in each county forms for use in filing notices required under this section.
Sup. Ct. Order No. 13-10
, 2014 WI 45, 354 Wis. 2d xliii.
Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to court; sanctions. 802.05(1)(1)
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, electronic mail address, and state bar number, if any. Any attorney or party signing a paper under this section shall designate and provide the court with a primary electronic mail address and shall be responsible for the accuracy of and any necessary changes to the electronic mail address provided to the court. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(2) Representations to court.
By presenting to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, all of the following:
The paper is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions stated in the paper are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.
The allegations and other factual contentions stated in the paper have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
The denials of factual contentions stated in the paper are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(2m) Additional representations to court as to preparation of pleadings or other documents.
An attorney may draft or assist in drafting a pleading, motion, or document filed by an otherwise self-represented person. The attorney is not required to sign the pleading, motion, or document. Any such document must contain a statement immediately adjacent to the person's signature that “This document was prepared with the assistance of a lawyer." The attorney providing such drafting assistance may rely on the otherwise self-represented person's representation of facts, unless the attorney has reason to believe that such representations are false, or materially insufficient, in which instance the attorney shall make an independent reasonable inquiry into the facts.
If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that sub. (2)
has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated sub. (2)
or are responsible for the violation in accordance with the following:
802.05(3)(a)1.1. `By motion.'
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate sub. (2)
. The motion shall be served as provided in s. 801.14
, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion or such other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
2. `On court's initiative.'
On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate sub. (2)
and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated sub. (2)
with the specific conduct described in the court's order.
Nature of sanction; limitations.
A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subds. 1.
, the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation subject to all of the following:
Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of sub. (2) (b)
Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
A court shall review the initial pleading as soon as practicable after the action or special proceeding is filed with the court if the action or special proceeding is commenced by a prisoner, as defined in s. 801.02 (7) (a) 2.
The court may dismiss the action or special proceeding under par. (a)
without requiring the defendant to answer the pleading if the court determines that the action or special proceeding meets any of the following conditions:
The action or proceeding is frivolous, as determined by a violation of sub. (2)
The action or proceeding is used for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.
The action of proceeding seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
The action or proceeding fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
If a court dismisses an action or special proceeding under par. (b)
the court shall notify the department of justice or the attorney representing the political subdivision, as appropriate, of the dismissal by a procedure developed by the director of state courts in cooperation with the department of justice.
The dismissal of an action or special proceeding under par. (b)
does not relieve the prisoner from paying the full filing fee related to that action or special proceeding.
(5) Inapplicability to discovery.
do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to ss. 804.01
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 622 (1975); 1975 c. 218
; 1987 a. 256
; Sup. Ct. Order, 161 Wis. 2d xvii (1991); Sup. Ct. Order, 171 Wis. 2d xix (1992); 1997 a. 133
; Sup. Ct. Order No. 03-06
, 2005 WI 38, 278 Wis. 2d xiii; Sup. Ct. Order No. 03-06A
, 2005 WI 86, 280 Wis. 2d xiii; 2005 a. 253
; Sup. Ct. Order No. 13-10
, 2014 WI 45, 354 Wis. 2d xliii; 2017 a. 317
; 2019 a. 30
; Sup. Ct. Order No. 19-16
, 2020 WI 38, 391 Wis. 2d xiii.
When adopted in 1976, former ss. 802.05 was patterned on the original version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP 11). Subsequently, the legislature adopted in 1978 s. 814.025, entitled costs upon frivolous claims and counterclaims. Circuit courts have used essentially the same guidelines in the determination of frivolousness under both sections. See
Jandrt v. Jerome Foods
, 227 Wis. 2d 531
, 549, 597 N.W.2d 744
(1999). Section 814.025(4), adopted in 1988, provided that “to the extent s. 802.05 is applicable and differs from this section, s. 802.05 applies." Subsection (4) was adopted pursuant to 1987 Act 256
, the same Act that updated section 802.05 to conform with the 1983 amendments to FRCP Rule 11. However, FRCP 11 has since undergone substantial revision, most recently in 1993. The court now adopts the current version of FRCP 11, pursuant its authority under s. 751.12 to regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings. The court's intent is to simplify and harmonize the rules of pleading, practice and procedure, and to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits. In adopting the 1993 amendments to FRCP 11, the court does not intend to deprive a party wronged by frivolous conduct of a right to recovery; rather, the court intends to provide Wisconsin courts with additional tools to deal with frivolous filing of pleadings and other papers. Judges and practitioners will now be able to look to applicable decisions of federal courts since 1993 for guidance in the interpretation and application of the mandates of FRCP 11 in Wisconsin.
802.05 (3) Sanctions. Factors that the court may consider in imposing sanctions include the following: (1) Whether the alleged frivolous conduct was part of a pattern of activity or an isolated event; (2) Whether the conduct infected the entire pleading or was an isolated claim or defense; and (3) Whether the attorney or party has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation. Sanctions authorized under s. 802.05(3) may include an award of actual fees and costs to the party victimized by the frivolous conduct.
802.05 (4) Prisoner litigation
. On April 17, 1998, the legislature amended [former] section 802.05 as part of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. 1997 Act 133
, s. 14
. The legislature added language that requires courts to perform an initial review of pleadings filed by prisoners and permits dismissal if the pleadings are frivolous, used for an improper purpose, seek damages from a defendant who is immune, or fail to state a claim. This language has been retained in s. 802.05, as repealed and recreated by this Sup. Ct. Order.
1993 Federal Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 1993 Federal Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are printed for information purposes and have not been adopted by the court.
Purpose of revision. This revision is intended to remedy problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule. For empirical examination of experience under the 1983 rule, see, e.g., New York State Bar Committee on Federal Courts, Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees (1987); T. Willging, The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process (1989); American Judicature Society, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (S. Burbank ed., 1989); E. Wiggins, T. Willging, and D. Stienstra, Report on Rule 11 (Federal Judicial Center 1991). For book-length analyses of the case law, see G. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse (1989); J. Solovy, The Federal Law of Sanctions (1991); G. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives and Preventive Measures (1991).
The rule retains the principle that attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to the court to refrain from conduct that frustrates the aims of Rule 1. The revision broadens the scope of this obligation, but places greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions presented to the court. New subdivision (d) removes from the ambit of this rule all discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions subject to the provisions of Rule 26 through 37.
Subdivision (a). Retained in this subdivision are the provisions requiring signatures on pleadings, written motions, and other papers. Unsigned papers are to be received by the Clerk, but then are to be stricken if the omission of the signature is not corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or pro se litigant. Correction can be made by signing the paper on file or by submitting a duplicate that contains the signature. A court may require by local rule that papers contain additional identifying information regarding the parties or attorneys, such as telephone numbers to facilitate facsimile transmissions, though, as for omission of a signature, the paper should not be rejected for failure to provide such information.
The sentence in the former rule relating to the effect of answers under oath is no longer needed and has been eliminated. The provision in the former rule that signing a paper constitutes a certificate that it has been read by the signer also has been eliminated as unnecessary. The obligations imposed under subdivision (b) obviously require that a pleading, written motion, or other paper be read before it is filed or submitted to the court.
Subdivisions (b) and (c). These subdivisions restate the provisions requiring attorneys and pro se litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other documents, and prescribing sanctions for violation of these obligations. The revision in part expands the responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule. The rule continues to require litigants to “stop-and-think" before initially making legal or factual contentions. It also, however, emphasizes the duty of candor by subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is no longer tenable and by generally providing protection against sanctions if they withdraw or correct contentions after a potential violation is called to their attention.
The rule applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court. It does not cover matters arising for the first time during oral presentations to the court, when counsel may make statements that would not have been made if there had been more time for study and reflection. However, a litigant's obligations with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit. For example, an attorney who during a pretrial conference insists on a claim or defense should be viewed as “presenting to the court" that contention and would be subject to the obligations of subdivision (b) measured as of that time. Similarly, if after a notice of removal is filed, a party urges in federal court the allegations of a pleading filed in state court (whether as claims, defenses, or in disputes regarding removal or remand), it would be viewed as “presenting" — and hence certifying to the district court under Rule 11 — those allegations.
The certification with respect to allegations and other factual contentions is revised in recognition that sometimes a litigant may have good reason to believe that a fact is true or false but may need discovery, formal or informal, from opposing parties or third persons to gather and confirm the evidentiary basis for the allegation. Tolerance of factual contentions in initial pleadings by plaintiffs or defendants when specifically identified as made on information and belief does not relieve litigants from the obligation to conduct an appropriate investigation into the facts that is reasonable under the circumstances; it is not a license to join parties, make claims, or present defenses without any factual basis or justification. Moreover, if evidentiary support is not obtained after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery, the party has a duty under the rule not to persist with that contention. Subdivision (b) does not require a formal amendment to pleadings for which evidentiary support is not obtained, but rather calls upon a litigant not thereafter to advocate such claims or defenses.
The certification is that there is (or likely will be) “evidentiary support" for the allegation, not that the party will prevail with respect to its contention regarding the fact. That summary judgment is rendered against a party does not necessarily mean, for purposes of this certification, that it had no evidentiary support for its position. On the other hand, if a party has evidence with respect to a contention that would suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment based thereon, it would have sufficient “evidentiary support" for purposes of Rule 11.
Denials of factual contentions involve somewhat different considerations. Often, of course, a denial is premised upon the existence of evidence contradicting the alleged fact. At other times a denial is permissible because, after an appropriate investigation, a party has no information concerning the matter or, indeed, has a reasonable basis for doubting the credibility of the only evidence relevant to the matter. A party should not deny an allegation it knows to be true; but it is not required, simply because it lacks contradictory evidence, to admit an allegation that it believes is not true.
The changes in subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4) will serve to equalize the burden of the rule upon plaintiffs and defendants, who under Rule 8(b) are in effect allowed to deny allegations by stating that from their initial investigation they lack sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation. If, after further investigation or discovery, a denial is no longer warranted, the defendant should not continue to insist on that denial. While sometimes helpful, formal amendment of the pleadings to withdraw an allegation or denial is not required by subdivision (b).
Arguments for extensions, modifications, or reversals of existing law or for creation of new law do not violate subdivision (b)(2) provided they are “nonfrivolous." This establishes an objective standard, intended to eliminate any “empty-head pure-heart" justification for patently frivolous arguments. However, the extent to which a litigant has researched the issues and found some support for its theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or through consultation with other attorneys should certainly be taken into account in determining whether paragraph (2) has been violated. Although arguments for a change of law are not required to be specifically so identified, a contention that is so identified should be viewed with greater tolerance under the rule.
The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head), etc. See Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, s. 42.3. The rule does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should consider in deciding whether to impose a sanction or what sanctions would be appropriate in the circumstances; but, for emphasis, it does specifically note that a sanction may be nonmonetary as well as monetary. Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense; whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; whether the responsible person is trained in the law; what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants: all of these may in a particular case be proper considerations. The court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions should not be more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending person or comparable conduct by similarly situated persons.
Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty. However, under unusual circumstances, particularly for (b)(1) violations, deterrence may be ineffective unless the sanction not only requires the person violating the rule to make a monetary payment, but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to those injured by the violation. Accordingly, the rule authorizes the court, if requested in a motion and if so warranted, to award attorney's fees to another party. Any such award to another party, however, should not exceed the expenses and attorneys' fees for the services directly and unavoidably caused by the violation of the certification requirement. If, for example, a wholly unsupportable count were included in a multi-count complaint or counterclaim for the purpose of needlessly increasing the cost of litigation to an impecunious adversary, any award of expenses should be limited to those directly caused by inclusion of the improper count, and not those resulting from the filing of the complaint or answer itself. The award should not provide compensation for services that could have been avoided by an earlier disclosure of evidence or an earlier challenge to the groundless claims or defenses. Moreover, partial reimbursement of fees may constitute a sufficient deterrent with respect to violations by persons having modest financial resources. In cases brought under statutes providing for fees to be awarded to prevailing parties, the court should not employ cost-shifting under this rule in a manner that would be inconsistent with the standards that govern the statutory award of fees, such as stated in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
The sanction should be imposed on the persons — whether attorneys, law firms, or parties — who have violated the rule or who may be determined to be responsible for the violation. The person signing, filing, submitting, or advocating a document has a nondelegable responsibility to the court, and in most situations is the person to be sanctioned for a violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm is to be held also responsible when, as a result of a motion under subdivision (c)(1)(A), one of its partners, associates, or employees is determined to have violated the rule. Since such a motion may be filed only if the offending paper is not withdrawn or corrected within 21 days after service of the motion, it is appropriate that the law firm ordinarily be viewed as jointly responsible under established principles of agency. This provision is designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule. Cf. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120
(1989) (1983 version of Rule 11 does not permit sanctions against law firm of attorney signing groundless complaint).
The revision permits the court to consider whether other attorneys in the firm, co-counsel, other law firms, or the party itself should be held accountable for their part in causing a violation. When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order to determine whether the sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties either in addition to or, in unusual circumstances, instead of the person actually making the presentation to the court. For example, such an inquiry may be appropriate in cases involving governmental agencies or other institutional parties that frequently impose substantial restrictions on the discretion of individual attorneys employed by it.
Sanctions that involve monetary awards (such as a fine or an award of attorney's fees) may not be imposed on a represented party for causing a violation of subdivision (b)(2), involving frivolous contentions of law. Monetary responsibility for such violations is more properly placed solely on the party's attorneys. With this limitation, the rule should not be subject to attack under the Rules Enabling Act. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131
(1992); Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter. Inc., 498 U.S. 533
(1991). This restriction does not limit the court's power to impose sanctions or remedial orders that may have collateral financial consequences upon a party, such as dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a defense, or preparation of amended pleadings.
Explicit provision is made for litigants to be provided notice of the alleged violation and an opportunity to respond before sanctions are imposed. Whether the matter should be decided solely on the basis of written submissions or should be scheduled for oral argument (or, indeed, for evidentiary presentation) will depend on the circumstances. If the court imposes a sanction, it must, unless waived, indicate its reasons in a written order or on the record; the court should not ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for sanctions. Whether a violation has occurred and what sanctions, if any, to impose for a violation are matters committed to the discretion of the trial court; accordingly, as under current law, the standard for appellate review of these decisions will be for abuse of discretion. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384
(1990) (noting, however, that an abuse would be established if the court based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence).
The revision leaves for resolution on a case-by-case basis, considering the particular circumstances involved, the question as to when a motion for violation of Rule 11 should be served and when, if filed, it should be decided. Ordinarily the motion should be served promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too long, may be viewed as untimely. In other circumstances, it should not be served until the other party has had a reasonable opportunity for discovery. Given the “safe harbor" provisions discussed below, a party cannot delay serving its Rule 11 motion until conclusion of the case (or judicial rejection of the offending contention).
Rule 11 motions should not be made or threatened for minor, inconsequential violations of the standards prescribed by subdivision (b). They should not be employed as a discovery device or to test the legal sufficiency or efficacy of allegations in the pleadings; other motions are available for those purposes. Nor should Rule 11 motions be prepared to emphasize the merits of a party's position, to exact an unjust settlement, to intimidate an adversary into withdrawing contentions that are fairly debatable, to increase the costs of litigation, to create a conflict of interest between attorney and client, or to seek disclosure of matters otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. As under the prior rule, the court may defer its ruling (or its decision as to the identity of the persons to be sanctioned) until final resolution of the case in order to avoid immediate conflicts of interest and to reduce the disruption created if a disclosure of attorney-client communications is needed to determine whether a violation occurred or to identify the person responsible for the violation.
The rule provides that requests for sanctions must be made as a separate motion, i.e., not simply included as an additional prayer for relief contained in another motion. The motion for sanctions is not, however, to be filed until at least 21 days (or such other period as the court may set) after being served. If, during this period, the alleged violation is corrected, as by withdrawing (whether formally or informally) some allegation or contention, the motion should not be filed with the court. These provisions are intended to provide a type of “safe harbor" against motions under Rule 11 in that a party will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's motion unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently have evidence to support a specified allegation. Under the former rule, parties were sometimes reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest that be viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 11; under the revision, the timely withdrawal of a contention will protect a party against a motion for sanctions.
To stress the seriousness of a motion for sanctions and to define precisely the conduct claimed to violate the rule, the revision provides that the “safe harbor" period begins to run only upon service of the motion. In most cases, however, counsel should be expected to give informal notice to the other party, whether in person or by a telephone call or letter, of a potential violation before proceeding to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion.
As under former Rule 11, the filing of a motion for sanctions is itself subject to the requirements of the rule and can lead to sanctions. However, service of a cross motion under Rule 11 should rarely be needed since under the revision the court may award to the person who prevails on a motion under Rule 11 — whether the movant or the target of the motion — reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.
The power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, but with the condition that this be done through a show cause order. This procedure provides the person with notice and an opportunity to respond. The revision provides that a monetary sanction imposed after a court-initiated show cause order be limited to a penalty payable to the court and that it be imposed only if the show cause order is issued before any voluntary dismissal or an agreement of the parties to settle the claims made by or against the litigant. Parties settling a case should not be subsequently faced with an unexpected order from the court leading to monetary sanctions that might have affected their willingness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a case. Since show cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a contempt of court, the rule does not provide a “safe harbor" to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a show cause order has been issued on the court's own initiative. Such corrective action, however, should be taken into account in deciding what — if any — sanction to impose if, after consideration of the litigant's response, the court concludes that a violation has occurred.
Subdivision (d). Rules 26(g) and 37 establish certification standards and sanctions that apply to discovery disclosures, requests, responses, objections, and motions. It is appropriate that Rules 26 through 37, which are specially designed for the discovery process, govern such documents and conduct rather than the more general provisions of Rule 11. Subdivision (d) has been added to accomplish this result.
Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper presentations of claims, defenses, or contentions. It does not supplant statutes permitting awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties or alter the principles governing such awards. It does not inhibit the court in punishing for contempt, in exercising its inherent powers, or in imposing sanctions, awarding expenses, or directing remedial action authorized under other rules or under 28 U.S.C. s. 1927. See Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32
(1991). Chambers cautions, however, against reliance upon inherent powers if appropriate sanctions can be imposed under provisions such as Rule 11, and the procedures specified in Rule 11 — notice, opportunity to respond, and findings — should ordinarily be employed when imposing a sanction under the court's inherent powers. Finally, it should be noted that Rule 11 does not preclude a party from initiating an independent action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.
NOTE: Sup. Ct. Order No. 19-16 states that “the Comment to Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (2m) is not adopted, but will be published and may be consulted for guidance in interpreting and applying the rule."
Comment to s. 802.05 (2m), 2020:
A previous version of s. 802.05(2m) required an attorney to include his or her name and state bar number on documents prepared under s. 802.05(2m). This requirement was removed because of its chilling effect on the effectiveness of limited scope representation. However, attorneys are reminded that, even in the context of limited scope representation, all of the rules of professional conduct for attorneys apply, and limited scope cases should be conducted consistent with the attorney's professional obligations, including SCR 20:1.1 (competence)
and SCR 20:3.1
(meritorious claims and contentions). Lawyers are reminded to be wary that the client is not using the lawyer's limited assistance to assert meritless claims. Providing limited scope representation will not insulate a lawyer from the potential disciplinary consequences of violation of applicable rules. Sua sponte or on motion to the court, a court may order a litigant to disclose the name of the attorney who assisted with preparation of the document, if known, and may direct the attorney to appear before the court to respond to the concerns raised. This comment is intended as a reminder of the existing ethical obligations imposed on all attorneys and an avenue for relief if a court is confronted with meritless filings submitted under this rule.
This section does not allow a “good faith" defense, but imposes an affirmative duty of reasonable inquiry before filing. A party prevailing on appeal in defense of an award under this section is entitled to a further award without showing that the appeal itself is frivolous under s. 809.25 (3). Riley v. Isaacson, 156 Wis. 2d 249
, 456 N.W.2d 619
(Ct. App. 1990).
An unsigned summons served with a signed complaint is a technical defect, which in the absence of prejudice does not deny the trial court personal jurisdiction. This section places a personal obligation on the attorney to assure that there are grounds for the contents of the pleading, which is satisfied by the signing of the complaint. Gaddis v. La Crosse Products, Inc., 198 Wis. 2d 396
, 542 N.W.2d 454