This section does not apply to actions based upon a sale of livestock occurring prior to April 3, 1980, nor to an action by a secured party against its debtor. Section 893.35
applies to any action described in sub. (1m)
if the limitation described in sub. (1m)
is not applicable.
No action may be brought against an engineer or any professional land surveyor, as defined in s. 443.01 (7m)
, to recover damages for negligence, errors, or omission in the making of any survey nor for contribution or indemnity related to such negligence, errors, or omissions more than 6 years after the completion of a survey.
History: 1979 c. 323
; Stats. 1979 s. 893.36; 1979 c. 355
; Stats. 1979 s. 893.37; 2013 a. 358
The discovery rule applies to statutes of limitations that limit the time to sue from the time when the action “accrues," being the time of discovery. The discovery rule does not apply to this section because it is a statute of repose, a statute that specifies the time of accrual (in this statute the time when the injury occurred) and limits the time suit can be brought from that specified date. Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245
, 578 N.W.2d 166
Extension of certain approvals. 893.38(1)(a)
“Challenged permit” means a permit or other approval to which all of the following apply:
The permit or other approval authorizes a construction project.
The application for the permit or other approval includes a description of the construction project.
The permit or other approval was issued by a governmental unit and becomes or remains subject to administrative, judicial, or appellate proceedings, whether or not any proceeding reversed the permit or other approval.
The permit or other approval has or had a finite term or duration, and the term or duration has not expired.
The permit or other approval is the subject of administrative, judicial, or appellate proceedings that may result in the invalidation, reconsideration, or modification of the permit or approval, provided that the proceedings or, if the proceedings are reviewing another decision, the proceedings originating the review proceedings were initiated by a person other than the holder of the permit or approval.
“Challenged plat or survey” means a plat or certified survey map approval that is the subject of administrative, judicial, or appellate proceedings that may result in the invalidation, reconsideration, or modification of the approval, provided that the proceedings, or, if the proceedings are reviewing another decision, the proceedings originating the review proceedings were initiated by a person other than the holder of the approval.
“Construction project” means organized improvements to real property that include the construction or redevelopment of at least one building for occupancy.
“Covered approval” means a challenged permit or challenged plat or survey.
“Governmental unit” means the department of natural resources, the department of transportation, a city, a village, a town, a county, or a special purpose district.
(2) Automatic extension.
A person who has received a covered approval shall obtain an automatic extension of the covered approval by notifying the governmental unit that issued the covered approval of the person's decision to exercise the extension not more than 90 days nor less than 30 days before the expiration of the unextended term or duration of the covered approval. A notification under this subsection shall be in writing and shall specify the covered approval extended. This subsection does not apply to a covered approval for which an automatic extension is not allowed under applicable federal law.
(3) Term of extension.
The term or duration of a covered approval extended under sub. (2)
is an amount of time equal to 36 months plus the duration of the administrative, judicial, or appellate proceedings to which the covered approval is subject. For purposes of calculating the duration of administrative, judicial, or appellate proceedings under this subsection, proceedings begin on the date of the initial filing of the proceedings, or, if the proceedings are reviewing another decision, the proceedings originating the review proceedings and end on the date of the final order disposing of all proceedings.
(4) Effect of orders.
A covered approval extended under sub. (2)
is subject to any order concerning the covered approval that is issued in an administrative, judicial, or appellate proceeding, including a suspension, injunction, restraining order, invalidation, reconsideration, or modification.
(5) Change of law.
Except as provided in s. 66.10015
, the laws, regulations, ordinances, rules, or other properly adopted requirements that were in effect at the time the covered approval was issued shall apply to the construction project, plat, or certified survey map during the period of extension. This subsection does not apply to the extent that a governmental unit demonstrates that the application of this subsection will create an immediate threat to public health or safety.
(6) Regulation of safety and sanitation.
This section does not limit any state or local unit of government from requiring that property be maintained and secured in a safe and sanitary condition in compliance with applicable laws, administrative rules, or ordinances.
This section does not apply to any of the following:
A covered approval under any programmatic, regional, or nationwide general permit issued by the U.S. army corps of engineers.
A covered approval that authorizes a water pollutant discharge under s. 283.31
, or 283.35
or construction or operation of a stationary source under s. 285.60
The holder of a covered approval who is determined by the issuing governmental unit to be in significant noncompliance with the conditions of the covered approval as evidenced by written notice of violation or the initiation of a formal enforcement action.
History: 2021 a. 80
; 2021 a. 240
ACTIONS RELATING TO CONTRACTS
AND COURT JUDGMENTS
Action on judgment or decree; court of record.
Except as provided in ss. 846.04 (2)
, action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record of any state or of the United States shall be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree is entered or be barred.
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section has been created to combine the provisions of repealed ss. 893.16 (1) and 893.18 (1). A substantive change from prior law results as the time period for an action upon a judgment of a court of record sitting without this state is increased from 10 years to 20 years and runs from the time of entry of a judgment. The separate statute of limitations for an action upon a sealed instrument is repealed as unnecessary. [Bill 326-A]
The defendant was prejudiced by an unreasonable 16-year delay in bringing suit; thus laches barred suit even though the applicable limitation period did not. Schafer v. Wegner, 78 Wis. 2d 127
, 254 N.W.2d 193
A request by the state or an offender to correct a clerical error in the sentence portion of a written judgment to reflect accurately an oral pronouncement of sentence is not an “action upon a judgment" under this section. State v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123
, 239 Wis. 2d 244
, 618 N.W.2d 857
This section clearly and unambiguously specifies that the date when a cause of action to collect past-due child support payments begins to run is the date when a judgment ordering payments is entered. State v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50
, 261 Wis. 2d 458
, 661 N.W.2d 832
Under the circumstances present in this case where a statute precluded a provision in a judgment, the statute of repose could not begin to run as to that provision until the legislature changed the law such that the provision could be carried out. Johnson v. Masters, 2013 WI 43
, 347 Wis. 2d 238
, 830 N.W.2d 647
The trial court erred when it held that this section did not apply based on the unique nature of family law judgments and that the court had the equitable authority to carry out those judgments. The statute as written contains only two exceptions; it provides for no other exceptions, for either family law judgments or any other categories of judgments. Schwab v. Schwab, 2020 WI App 40
, 392 Wis. 2d 660
, 946 N.W.2d 241
Breach of contract to marry; action to recover property.
An action to recover property procured by fraud by a party in representing that he or she intended to marry the party providing the property and not breach the contract to marry, to which s. 768.06
applies, shall be commenced within one year after the breach of the contract to marry.
History: 1979 c. 323
; 1981 c. 314
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section has been created to place into ch. 893 the statute of limitations for an action to recover property for an alleged breach of a contract to marry. See also note following s. 768.06. [Bill 326-A]
Action to collect support. 893.415(1)(1)
In this section, “action" means any proceeding brought before a court, whether commenced by a petition, motion, order to show cause, or other pleading.
An action to collect child or family support owed under a judgment or order entered under ch. 767
, or to collect child support owed under a judgment or order entered under s. 48.355 (2) (b) 4.
or (4g) (a)
, 48.357 (5m) (a)
, 48.363 (2)
, 938.183 (4)
, 938.355 (2) (b) 4.
or (4g) (a)
, 938.357 (5m) (a)
, 938.363 (2)
, or 948.22 (7)
, shall be commenced within 20 years after the youngest child for whom the support was ordered under the judgment or order reaches the age of 18 or, if the child is enrolled full-time in high school or its equivalent, reaches the age of 19.
An action under this section is commenced when the petition, motion, order to show cause, or other pleading commencing the action is filed with the court, except that an action under this section is not commenced if proper notice of the action, as required by law or by the court, has not been provided to the respondent in the action within 90 days after the petition, motion, order to show cause, or other pleading is filed.
History: 2003 a. 287
; 2015 a. 373
Action on a judgment of court not of record.
An action upon a judgment of a court not of record shall be commenced within 6 years of entry of judgment or be barred.
History: 1979 c. 323
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.19 (1) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
An action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under ch. 242
shall be barred unless the action is commenced:
Under s. 242.04 (1) (a)
, within 4 years after the transfer is made or the obligation is incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation is or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.
Under s. 242.05 (2)
, within one year after the transfer is made or the obligation is incurred.
History: 1987 a. 192
Sub. (1) sets a one-year statute of limitations from the point at which the claimant discovers or reasonably could have discovered the fraudulent nature of the transfer or obligation. The statute of limitations test is not based on discovery of the transfer; it is based on discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Great Lakes Quick Lube LP v. Theisen, 2018 WI App 70
, 384 Wis. 2d 580
, 920 N.W.2d 356
Action on contract. 893.43(1)(1)
Except as provided in sub. (2)
, an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, including an action to recover fees for professional services, except those mentioned in s. 893.40
, shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred.
An action upon a motor vehicle insurance policy described in s. 632.32 (1)
shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. A cause of action involving underinsured motorist coverage, as defined in s. 632.32 (2) (d)
, or uninsured motorist coverage, as defined in s. 632.32 (2) (f)
, accrues on the date there is final resolution of the underlying cause of action by the injured party against the tortfeasor.
History: 1979 c. 323
; 2015 a. 133
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.19 (3) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
A bonus plan to compensate for increased profits is a contract. Younger v. Rosenow Paper & Supply Co., 51 Wis. 2d 619
, 188 N.W.2d 507
An action to recover benefits under a pension plan is an action to enforce a contract, not an action for wages. Estate of Schroeder v. Gateway Transportation Co., 53 Wis. 2d 59
, 191 N.W.2d 860
An action for personal injuries resulting from medical malpractice, although based on contract, is subject to the three-year limitation for injuries to the person. Estate of Kohls v. Brah, 57 Wis. 2d 141
, 203 N.W.2d 666
An action by an insured against an insurance agent for failing to procure requested coverage is not an action against the insurer on the policy, but is an action resting upon the agent's contract with the insured to procure the insurance coverage agreed upon subject to the statute of limitations for contract. Estate of Ensz v. Brown Insurance Agency, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 193
, 223 N.W.2d 903
A cause of action for contribution is based upon a contract implied by law and must be brought within six years after one joint tortfeasor has paid more than his or her share. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Osborn Plumbing, 66 Wis. 2d 454
, 225 N.W.2d 628
When an employer deducted a “hypothetical tax factor" from salaries of its overseas employees so as to equalize compensation of its employees worldwide, an action to recover amounts so deducted had to be brought within the limitation period on wage claims, and not the period on other contract claims. Sussmann v. Gleisner, 80 Wis. 2d 435
, 259 N.W.2d 114
If the object of a disputed contract is the end product or fruit of human labor rather than the labor per se, s. 893.19 (3) [now this section] applies rather than s. 893.21 (5) [now s. 893.44]. Rupp v. O'Connor, 81 Wis. 2d 436
, 261 N.W.2d 815
Partial payment of an obligation made prior to the running of the statute of limitations tolls the statute and sets it running from the date of payment. St. Mary's Hospital Medical Center v. Tarkenton, 103 Wis. 2d 422
, 309 N.W.2d 14
(Ct. App. 1981).
A breach of a roofing contract occurred when the faulty roof was completed, not when the building was completed. State v. Holland Plastics Co., 111 Wis. 2d 497
, 331 N.W.2d 320
An unjust enrichment claim accrues when a cohabitational relationship terminates. The court does not determine what statute of limitations, if any, applies. Watts (Bischoff) v. Watts, 152 Wis. 2d 370
, 448 N.W.2d 292
(Ct. App. 1989).
A contract cause of action accrues at the time of the breach. The discovery rule is inapplicable. CLL Associates v. Arrowhead Pacific, 174 Wis. 2d 604
, 497 N.W.2d 115
This section applies to actions for the recovery of sales commissions. Erdman v. Jovoco, Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 736
, 512 N.W.2d 487
A party's deficient performance of a contract does not give rise to a tort claim. There must be a duty independent of the contract for a cause of action in tort. Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 724
, 592 N.W.2d 299
(Ct. App. 1999), 98-1806
For actions seeking coverage under an underinsured motorist policy, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of loss, which is the date on which a final resolution is reached in the underlying claim against the tortfeasor, be it through denial of that claim, settlement, judgment, execution of releases, or other form of resolution, whichever is the latest. Yocherer v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2002 WI 41
, 252 Wis. 2d 114
, 643 N.W.2d 457
The label of the documents here—“access easement agreement"—and the fact that each was signed by both parties did not transform the grants of easement into contracts subject to contract law. The plaintiffs alleged that a driveway could not be built on the easements described in the agreements because of a wetland delineation and sought a modification of the easements. This claim for relief was an action to enforce the recorded easements, albeit a modified version, and was therefore governed by s. 893.33 (6), not the contract statute, this section. Mnuk v. Harmony Homes, Inc., 2010 WI App 102
, 329 Wis. 2d 182
, 790 N.W.2d 514
The running of the six-year statute of limitations under this section [now sub. (1)] that applies to enforcement of a note does not prevent timely foreclosure of the mortgage that secures the note. Bank of New York Mellon v. Klomsten, 2018 WI App 25
, 381 Wis. 2d 218
, 911 N.W.2d 364
The statute of limitations for a subrogated claim is the same as the statute of limitations that would apply to the claim if it had not been subrogated. In this case, the plaintiff insurance company was subrogated to the insured's contract claim that the defendant insurance company breached its duty to defend the insured. Because subrogation does not change the identity of the cause of action, the plaintiff's claim was also for breach of contract. Claims for breach of contract have a six-year statute of limitations under sub. (1). Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 2019 WI 6
, 385 Wis. 2d 213
, 922 N.W.2d 71
Rescission is not an “action upon the contract," as that phrase is used in this section. CMFG Life Insurance Co. v. RBS Securities, Inc., 799 F.3d 729
An unconscionability of contract claim is governed by this section. Dairyland Power Coop. v. Amax Inc., 700 F. Supp. 979
Compensation for personal service. 893.44(1)(1)
Any action to recover unpaid salary, wages or other compensation for personal services, except actions to recover fees for professional services and except as provided in sub. (2)
, shall be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred.
An action to recover wages under s. 109.09
shall be commenced within 2 years after the claim is filed with the department of workforce development or be barred.
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.21 (5) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. Actions to collect fees for professional services are brought under s. 893.43. [Bill 326-A]
A stock-purchase plan as a reward for increased profits is not subject to s. 893.21 (5) [now this section]. Younger v. Rosenow Paper & Supply Co., 51 Wis. 2d 619
, 188 N.W.2d 507
Professional services by a physician or attorney, although not customarily performed in the profession, may be classified as professional if requested by reason of the professional's expertise and training, if the professional then utilizes that knowledge and training. If the services are so classified depends upon the facts of the particular employment. Lorenz v. Dreske, 62 Wis. 2d 273
, 214 N.W.2d 753
Section 893.21 (5) [now this section] does not apply unless services are actually rendered. Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 66 Wis. 2d 53
, 224 N.W.2d 389
If the object of a disputed contract is the end product or fruit of human labor rather than the labor per se, s. 893.19 (3) [now s. 893.43] applies rather than s. 893.21 (5) [now this section]. Rupp v. O'Connor, 81 Wis. 2d 436
, 261 N.W.2d 815
An unjust enrichment claim accrues when a cohabitational relationship terminates. The court does not determine which statute of limitations, if any, applies. Watts (Bischoff) v. Watts, 152 Wis. 2d 370
, 448 N.W.2d 292
(Ct. App. 1989).
This section applies only to actions for wages already earned. Lovett v. Mt. Senario College, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 831
, 454 N.W.2d 356
(Ct. App. 1990).