Failure to give the jury an emergency instruction was reversible error, despite the plaintiff's violation of several safety statutes. When an emergency instruction is appropriate is discussed. Westfall v. Kottke, 110 Wis. 2d 86
, 328 N.W.2d 481
"Seat belt negligence" and "passive negligence" are distinguished. Jury instructions regarding seat belts are recommended. A method for apportioning damages in seat belt negligence cases is adopted. Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475
, 335 N.W.2d 824
A bus driver who told an 11-year-old that he could not ride the school bus the next day, but did not inform either the school or the child's parents, was properly found 93% liable for injuries sustained by the boy while riding his bicycle to school the next day. Toeller v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. 115 Wis. 2d 631
, 340 N.W.2d 923
(Ct. App. 1983).
Recovery under s.895.04 (7) is barred by this section if a decedent's negligence was greater than any individual tortfeasor's. Delvaux v. Vanden Langenberg, 130 Wis. 2d 464
, 387 N.W.2d 751
A negligent tortfeasor has the right to indemnity from an intentional joint tortfeasor. A Pierringer
release of the intentional tortfeasor absolved the negligent tortfeasor. Fleming v. Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Co. 131 Wis. 2d 123
, 388 N.W.2d 908
Punitive damages may not be recovered when actual damages are unavailable due to this section. Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis. 2d 425
, 418 N.W.2d 818
This section is inapplicable to the equitable resolution of a subrogation dispute. Ives v. Coopertools, 197 Wis. 2d 938
, 541 N.W.2d 247
(Ct. App. 1995).
Only a tortfeasor found to be 51% or more causally negligent may be jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's total damages. That a plaintiff has no negligence does not alter that rule. Thomas v. Bickler, 2002 WI App 268
, 258 Wis. 2d 304
, 654 N.W.2d 248
When the plaintiff's negligence was greater than any injurer's, neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiff's spouse could recover. Spearing v. National Iron Co. 770 F.2d 87
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits a state from imposing a grossly excessive punishment on a tortfeasor. The degree of reprehensibility of the conduct, the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage award, and the difference between the remedy and other civil penalties imposed in comparable cases are factors to be considered. The most important factor is the degree of reprehensibility. Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI App 194
, 287 Wis. 2d 135
, 704 N.W.2d 309
When a trial court finds that a small claims plaintiff's actual damages exceed the statutory award limit of $5,000, the court should apply any reduction for comparative negligence to the damages found before applying the statutory limit. Bryhan v. Pink, 2006 WI App 110
, 294 Wis. 2d 347
, 718 N.W.2d 112
Sub. (2) is a codification of the common-law rule on concerted-action liability discussed and not a new cause of action. Concerted-action liability attaches when 2 or more persons commit a tortious act in concert. Even if an agreement exists, if that agreement does not directly relate to the tortious conduct that caused the injury, the agreement is insufficient to satisfy the agreement required for concerted action. A plan among 3 people to purchase alcohol for an underage drinker who later caused injury driving while intoxicated did not constitute a concerted action when the common plan to purchase alcohol was not also a common scheme or plan to engage in the act of driving that caused the injury. Richards v. Badger Mutual Insurance, 2006 WI App 255
, 297 Wis. 2d 699
, 727 N.W.2d 69
Sub. (2) applies only after a judge or jury has determined, under applicable substantive law, that more than one tortfeasor is liable in some measure to the plaintiff. Sub. (2) plays no role in determining whether a given defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff. Danks v. Stock Building Supply, Inc. 2007 WI App 8
, 298 Wis. 2d 348
, 727 N.W.2d 846
Sub. (2) is the codification of the common law concerted action theory of liability. There are 3 factual predicates necessary to proving concerted action: 1) there must be an explicit or tacit agreement among the parties to act in accordance with a mutually agreed upon scheme or plan; parallel action, without more, is insufficient to show a common scheme or plan; 2) there must be mutual acts committed in furtherance of that common scheme or plan that are tortious acts; and 3) the tortious acts that are undertaken to accomplish the common scheme or plan must be the acts that result in damages. Richards v. Badger Mutual Insurance, 2008 WI 52
, 309 Wis. 2d 541
, 749 N.W.2d 581
Proportioning comparative negligence — problems of theory and special verdict formulation. Aiken, 53 MLR 293.
From defect to cause to comparative fault — Rethinking some product liability concepts. Twerski, 60 MLR 297.
The problem of the insolvent contributor. Myse, 60 MLR 891.
Punitive damage recovery in products liability cases. Ghiardi and Kircher, 65 MLR 1 (1981).
The concepts of "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" in products liability law. Swartz, 66 MLR 280 (1983).
Seat belt negligence: The ambivalent Wisconsin rules. McChrystal. 68 MLR 539 (1985).
Second collision law — Wisconsin. Ghiardi. 69 MLR 1 (1985).
Comparative Negligence in Wisconsin. Horowitz, WBB Jan. 1981.
Plaintiff's failure to wear a safety belt. Towers, WBB July, 1985.
Strict products liability in Wisconsin. 1977 WLR 227.
Wisconsin's Modified, Modified Comparative Negligence Law. Kircher. Wis. Law. Feb. 1996.
Enforceable Exculpatory Agreements. Pendleton. Wis. Law. Nov. 1997.
Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Statute: Applying It to Products Liability Cases Brought under a Strict Liability Theory. Pless. Wis. Law. Aug. 1998.
Remedies against manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and promoters of products. 895.046(1g)
Legislative findings and intent.
The legislature finds that it is in the public interest to clarify product liability law, generally, and the application of the risk contribution theory of liability first announced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Collins v. Eli Lilly Company
, 116 Wis. 2d 166
(1984), specifically, in order to return tort law to its historical, common law roots. This return both protects the rights of citizens to pursue legitimate and timely claims of injury resulting from defective products, and assures that businesses may conduct activities in this state without fear of being sued for indefinite claims of harm from products which businesses may never have manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted, or which were made and sold decades ago. The legislature finds that the application of risk contribution to former white lead carbonate manufacturers in Thomas v. Mallet
, 285 Wis. 2d 236
(2005), was an improperly expansive application of the risk contribution theory of liability announced in Collins
, and that application raised substantial questions of deprivation of due process, equal protection, and right to jury trial under the federal and Wisconsin constitutions. The legislature finds that this section protects the right to a remedy found in article I, section 9, of the Wisconsin Constitution
, by preserving the narrow and limited application of the risk contribution theory of liability announced in Collins
"Claimant" means a person seeking damages or other relief for injury or harm to a person or property caused by or arising from a product, or a person on whose behalf a claim for such damages or other relief is asserted.
"Relevant production period" means the time period during which the specific product that allegedly caused a claimant's injury or harm was manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted.
This section applies to all actions in law or equity, whenever filed or accrued, in which a claimant alleges that the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product is liable for an injury or harm to a person or property, including actions based on allegations that the design, manufacture, distribution, sale, or promotion of, or instructions or warnings about, a product caused or contributed to a personal injury or harm to a person or property, a private nuisance, or a public nuisance, and to all related or independent claims, including unjust enrichment, restitution, or indemnification.
The U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Gibson v. American Cyanamid Co. et al.
, 760 F. 3d 600
, held that the Wisconsin state constitution's due-process guarantee prohibits retroactive application of this section.
(3) Remedy with specific product identification.
Except as provided in sub. (4)
, the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product may be held liable in an action under sub. (2)
only if the claimant proves, in addition to any other elements required to prove his or her claim, that the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted the specific product alleged to have caused the claimant's injury or harm.
(4) Remedy without specific product identification.
Subject to sub. (5)
, if a claimant cannot meet the burden of proof under sub. (3)
, the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product may be held liable for an action under sub. (2)
only if all of the following apply:
That no other lawful process exists for the claimant to seek any redress from any other person for the injury or harm.
That the claimant has suffered an injury or harm that can be caused only by a manufactured product chemically and physically identical to the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury or harm.
That the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted a complete integrated product, in the form used by the claimant or to which the claimant was exposed, and that meets all of the following criteria:
Is chemically and physically identical to the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury or harm.
Was manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted in the geographic market where the injury or harm is alleged to have occurred during the time period in which the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury or harm was manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted.
Was distributed or sold without labeling or any distinctive characteristic that identified the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter.
The action names, as defendants, those manufacturers of a product who collectively manufactured at least 80 percent of all products sold in this state during the relevant production period by all manufacturers of the product in existence during the relevant production period that are chemically identical to the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury or harm.
(5) Limitation on liability.
No manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product is liable under sub. (4)
if more than 25 years have passed between the date that the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product last manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted the specific product chemically identical to the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury and the date that the claimant's cause of action accrued.
(6) Apportionment of liability.
If more than one manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product is found liable for the claimant's injury or harm under subs. (4)
, the court shall apportion liability among those manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and promoters, but that liability shall be several and not joint.
History: 2011 a. 2
; 2013 a. 20
Wisconsin Is Open for Business or Business Just as Usual? The Practical Effects and Implications of 2011 Wisconsin Act 2
. Irgens. 2012 WLR 1245.
Liability of manufacturer.
In an action for damages caused by a manufactured product based on a claim of strict liability, a manufacturer is liable to a claimant if the claimant establishes all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
That the product is defective because it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product contains a manufacturing defect if the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the manufacture of the product. A product is defective in design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the manufacturer and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe. A product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings only if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the manufacturer and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
That the defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to persons or property.
That the defective condition existed at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer.
That the product reached the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
That the defective condition was a cause of the claimant's damages.
(2) Liability of seller or distributor. 895.047(2)(a)(a)
A seller or distributor of a product is not liable based on a claim of strict liability to a claimant unless the manufacturer would be liable under sub. (1)
and any of the following applies:
The claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the seller or distributor has contractually assumed one of the manufacturer's duties to manufacture, design, or provide warnings or instructions with respect to the product.
The claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that neither the manufacturer nor its insurer is subject to service of process within this state.
A court determines that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer or its insurer.
The court shall dismiss a product seller or distributor as a defendant based on par. (a) 2.
if the manufacturer or its insurer submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit is pending.
If the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the injury the claimant was under the influence of any controlled substance or controlled substance analog to the extent prohibited under s. 346.63 (1) (a)
, or had an alcohol concentration, as defined in s. 340.01 (1v)
, of 0.08 or more, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the claimant's intoxication or drug use was the cause of his or her injury.
Evidence that the product, at the time of sale, complied in material respects with relevant standards, conditions, or specifications adopted or approved by a federal or state law or agency shall create a rebuttable presumption that the product is not defective.
The damages for which a manufacturer, seller, or distributor would otherwise be liable shall be reduced by the percentage of causal responsibility for the claimant's harm attributable to the claimant's misuse, alteration, or modification of the product.
The court shall dismiss the claimant's action under this section if the damage was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product that would be recognized by an ordinary person with ordinary knowledge common to the community that uses or consumes the product.
A seller or distributor of a product is not liable to a claimant for damages if the seller or distributor receives the product in a sealed container and has no reasonable opportunity to test or inspect the product. This paragraph does not apply if the seller or distributor may be liable under sub. (2) (a) 2.
(4) Subsequent remedial measures.
In an action for damages caused by a manufactured product based on a claim of strict liability, evidence of remedial measures taken subsequent to the sale of the product is not admissible for the purpose of showing a manufacturing defect in the product, a defect in the design of the product, or a need for a warning or instruction. This subsection does not prohibit the admission of such evidence to show a reasonable alternative design that existed at the time when the product was sold.
(5) Time limit.
In any action under this section, a defendant is not liable to a claimant for damages if the product alleged to have caused the damage was manufactured 15 years or more before the claim accrues, unless the manufacturer makes a specific representation that the product will last for a period beyond 15 years. This subsection does not apply to an action based on a claim for damages caused by a latent disease.
This section does not apply to actions based on a claim of negligence or breach of warranty.
History: 2011 a. 2
A New Era: Products Liability in Wisconsin. Edwards & Ozlap. Wis. Law. July 2011.
Wisconsin Is Open for Business or Business Just as Usual? The Practical Effects and Implications of 2011 Wisconsin Act 2
. Irgens. 2012 WLR 1245.
Recovery by auto or motorboat owner limited.
The owner of a motor vehicle or motorboat which, while being operated by the spouse or minor child of such owner, is damaged as the result of an accident involving another vehicle or boat, may not recover from the owner or operator of such other vehicle or boat for such damages, if the negligence of such spouse or minor child exceeds that of the operator of such other vehicle or boat. In the event that it is judicially determined that a spouse or minor operator of the motor vehicle or motorboat is found to be guilty of less than 50% of the causal negligence involved in an accident, then in that event the owner of the motor vehicle or motorboat involved shall be entitled to recover in accordance with the contributory negligence principles as laid down in s. 895.045
. For the purposes of recovery of damages by the owner under s. 895.048
, and for this purpose only, the negligence of the spouse or minor operator shall be imputed to the owner.
Recovery by a person who fails to use protective headgear while operating certain motor vehicles.
Notwithstanding s. 895.045
, failure by a person who operates or is a passenger on a utility terrain vehicle, as defined in s. 23.33 (1) (ng)
, a motorcycle, as defined in s. 340.01 (32)
, an all-terrain vehicle, as defined in s. 340.01 (2g)
, or a snowmobile, as defined in s. 340.01 (58a)
, on or off a highway, to use protective headgear shall not reduce recovery for injuries or damages by the person or the person's legal representative in any civil action. This section does not apply to any person required to wear protective headgear under s. 23.33 (3g)
or 347.485 (1)
History: 2003 a. 148
; 2011 a. 208
When this section applies to prohibit a reduction of damages, it necessarily also precludes a person's failure to wear a helmet from being considered a form of negligence. Hardy v. Hoefferle, 2007 WI App 264
, 306 Wis. 2d 513
, 743 N.W.2d 843
Damages in actions for libel. 895.05(1)
The proprietor, publisher, editor, writer or reporter upon any newspaper published in this state shall not be liable in any civil action for libel for the publication in such newspaper of a true and fair report of any judicial, legislative or other public official proceeding authorized by law or of any public statement, speech, argument or debate in the course of such proceeding. This section shall not be construed to exempt any such proprietor, publisher, editor, writer or reporter from liability for any libelous matter contained in any headline or headings to any such report, or to libelous remarks or comments added or interpolated in any such report or made and published concerning the same, which remarks or comments were not uttered by the person libeled or spoken concerning the person libeled in the course of such proceeding by some other person.
Before any civil action shall be commenced on account of any libelous publication in any newspaper, magazine or periodical, the libeled person shall first give those alleged to be responsible or liable for the publication a reasonable opportunity to correct the libelous matter. Such opportunity shall be given by notice in writing specifying the article and the statements therein which are claimed to be false and defamatory and a statement of what are claimed to be the true facts. The notice may also state the sources, if any, from which the true facts may be ascertained with definiteness and certainty. The first issue published after the expiration of one week from the receipt of such notice shall be within a reasonable time for correction. To the extent that the true facts are, with reasonable diligence, ascertainable with definiteness and certainty, only a retraction shall constitute a correction; otherwise the publication of the libeled person's statement of the true facts, or so much thereof as shall not be libelous of another, scurrilous, or otherwise improper for publication, published as the libeled person's statement, shall constitute a correction within the meaning of this section. A correction, timely published, without comment, in a position and type as prominent as the alleged libel, shall constitute a defense against the recovery of any damages except actual damages, as well as being competent and material in mitigation of actual damages to the extent the correction published does so mitigate them.
History: 1993 a. 486
One who contributes a nondefamatory photograph of the plaintiff to a newspaper to accompany a defamatory article is not liable absent knowledge or control of the article. Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc. 81 Wis. 2d 1
, 259 N.W.2d 691
A newscaster did not act with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth by broadcasting that the plaintiff had been charged with a crime when the newscaster was told by a deputy sheriff that charges would be filed. Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130
, 295 N.W.2d 768
(Ct. App. 1980).
A contract printer had no reason to know of libel and was entitled to summary judgment. Maynard v. Port Publications, Inc. 98 Wis. 2d 555
, 297 N.W.2d 500
Sub. (2) applies to non-media defendants, but relates only to libelous publications in print media, not broadcast media. Hucko v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 100 Wis. 2d 372
, 302 N.W.2d 68
(Ct. App. 1981).
The trial court properly dismissed a defamation claim based on a letter by a medical director charging that a foundation conducted a sham nonprofit operation since the director established the defense of truth. Fields Foundation, Ltd. v. Christensen, 103 Wis. 2d 465
, 309 N.W.2d 125
(Ct. App. 1981).
"Public figure" is defined. Constitutional protections of the news media and an individual defamer are discussed. Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636
, 318 N.W.2d 141