Maximum term of extended supervision for attempt to commit classified felony.
The maximum term of extended supervision for an attempt to commit a classified felony is one-half of the maximum term of extended supervision for the completed crime under s. 973.01 (2) (d)
Maximum term of confinement for attempt to commit unclassified felony or misdemeanor.
The court shall determine the maximum term of confinement in prison for an attempt to commit a crime other than a classified felony by applying s. 973.01 (2) (b) 10.
to the maximum term of imprisonment calculated under sub. (1g) (b)
Misdemeanor computer crimes.
Whoever attempts to commit a misdemeanor under s. 943.70
is subject to:
A Class D forfeiture if it is the person's first violation under s. 943.70
A Class C forfeiture if it is the person's 2nd violation under s. 943.70
A Class B forfeiture if it is the person's 3rd violation under s. 943.70
A Class A forfeiture if it is the person's 4th or subsequent violation under s. 943.70
Misdemeanor crimes against financial institution.
Whoever attempts to commit a crime under s. 943.81
, 943.82 (1)
, or 943.84
that is a Class A misdemeanor under s. 943.91 (1)
is subject to the penalty for a Class B misdemeanor.
An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime and that the actor does acts toward the commission of the crime which demonstrate unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that the actor formed that intent and would commit the crime except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor.
There is no crime of “attempted homicide by reckless conduct" since the completed offense does not require intent while any attempt must demonstrate intent. State v. Melvin, 49 Wis. 2d 246
, 181 N.W.2d 490
Attempted first-degree murder was shown when only the fact of the gun misfiring and the action of the intended victim prevented completion of the crime. Austin v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 716
, 190 N.W.2d 887
The victim's kicking of the defendant in the mouth and other resistance was a valid extraneous factor preventing the completion of a crime, an essential requirement for the crime of attempted rape. Adams v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 515
, 204 N.W.2d 657
The screams and struggles of an intended rape victim were an effective intervening extrinsic force not under the defendant's control. Leach v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 199
, 265 N.W.2d 495
The failure to consummate the crime is not an essential element of criminal attempt under sub. (2). Berry v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 316
, 280 N.W.2d 204
The intervention of an extraneous factor is not an essential element of criminal attempt. Hamiel v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 656
, 285 N.W.2d 639
To prove attempt, the state must prove intent to commit a specific crime accompanied by sufficient acts to demonstrate unequivocally that it was improbable that the accused would have desisted of the accused's own free will. State v. Stewart, 143 Wis. 2d 28
, 420 N.W.2d 44
Subs. (1) and (2) enumerate all offenses that may be prosecuted as attempts. State v. Cvorovic, 158 Wis. 2d 630
, 462 N.W.2d 897
(Ct. App. 1990).
The meaning of “have an intent to" in sub. (3) should be defined and interpreted in relation to all criminal statutes. State v. Weeks, 165 Wis. 2d 200
, 477 N.W.2d 642
(Ct. App. 1991).
When a sentence for an attempted crime is subject to repeater enhancement, the maximum penalty for the underlying crime is halved under sub. (1), then the enhancer is added to that penalty. State v. Bush, 185 Wis. 2d 716
, 519 N.W.2d 645
(Ct. App. 1994).
The intervention of an extraneous factor that prevents the commission of a crime is irrelevant to an attempt to commit the crime unless the factor may negate the intent to commit the crime. That a defendant believed he was acquiring stolen property when the property was not actually stolen did not prevent the prosecution of the defendant for attempt to receive stolen property. State v. Kordas, 191 Wis. 2d 124
, 528 N.W.2d 483
(Ct. App. 1995).
Attempted felony murder, s. 940.03, does not exist. Attempt requires intent, and the crime of felony murder is complete without specific intent. State v. Briggs, 218 Wis. 2d 61
, 579 N.W.2d 783
(Ct. App. 1998), 97-1558
The conduct element of sub. (3) is satisfied when the accused engages in conduct that demonstrates that only a circumstance beyond the accused's control could prevent the crime; that it has become too late to repent and withdraw. State v. Henthorn, 218 Wis. 2d 526
, 581 N.W.2d 544
(Ct. App. 1998), 97-2235
Some crimes include attempt and cannot be combined with the general attempt statute. One cannot attempt to attempt to cause. State v. DeRango, 229 Wis. 2d 1
, 599 N.W.2d 27
(Ct. App. 1999), 98-0642
, 49 Wis. 2d 246
(1970), nor Briggs
, 218 Wis. 2d 61
(1998), purport to establish a general rule or address whether possession crimes may be charged as attempted crimes. There is no general rule that a crime may be charged as an attempt only when the crime has intent as an element. Unlike crimes with no state of mind element, the felon in possession of a firearm offense requires proof of knowledge. This makes the offense amenable, even under Briggs
, to be charged as an attempted crime. State v. Henning, 2013 WI App 15
, 346 Wis. 2d 246
, 828 N.W.2d 235
DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
An intoxicated or a drugged condition of the actor is a defense only if such condition is involuntarily produced and does one of the following:
Renders the actor incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in regard to the alleged criminal act at the time the act is committed.
Negatives the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime.
History: 1987 a. 399
; 2013 a. 307
To be relieved from responsibility for criminal acts, it is not enough for a defendant to establish that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages; the defendant must establish that degree of intoxication that means the defendant was utterly incapable of forming the intent requisite to the commission of the crime charged. State v. Guiden, 46 Wis. 2d 328
, 174 N.W.2d 488
This section does not afford a defense when drugs were taken voluntarily and the facts demonstrate that there was an intent to kill and conceal the crime. Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110
, 197 N.W.2d 813
Evidence of addiction was properly excluded as a basis for showing “involuntariness." Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503
, 247 N.W.2d 116
The intoxication instruction did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the accused. State v. Reynosa, 108 Wis. 2d 499
, 322 N.W.2d 504
(Ct. App. 1982).
A correct statement of the law under this section should be conveyed to the jury by instructing it that it must consider the evidence regarding whether the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged offense. State v. Foster, 191 Wis. 2d 14
, 528 N.W.2d 22
(Ct. App. 1995).
It is not a requirement of the defense of involuntary intoxication when intoxication is caused by prescription drugs that the defendant did not know of the drug's intoxicating effect. Intoxication resulting from compliance with a physician's advice will not be deemed voluntary just because the defendant was aware of potential adverse side effects. State v. Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32
, 601 N.W.2d 670
(Ct. App. 1999), 98-2655
To be entitled to an instruction on involuntary intoxication, the defendant must come forward with credible and sufficient evidence of intoxication to the extent that the defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong. State v. Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32
, 601 N.W.2d 670
(Ct. App. 1999), 98-2655
Criminal Law: Alcoholism as a Defense. Herald. 53 MLR 445 (1970).
Due Process and the Voluntary Intoxication Defense. Larson. Wis. Law. Feb. 2019.
An honest error, whether of fact or of law other than criminal law, is a defense if it negatives the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime.
A mistake as to the age of a minor or as to the existence or constitutionality of the section under which the actor is prosecuted or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that section is not a defense.
The prosecution of an individual who relied on a governmental official's statutorily required legal opinion would impose an unconscionable rigidity in the law. State v. Davis, 63 Wis. 2d 75
, 216 N.W.2d 31
Mistake is not a defense to criminal negligence. A defendant's subjective state of mind is not relevant to determining criminal negligence. State v. Lindvig, 205 Wis. 2d 100
, 555 N.W.2d 197
(Ct. App. 1996), 96-0235
Adequate provocation. 939.44(1)(a)
“Adequate" means sufficient to cause complete lack of self-control in an ordinarily constituted person.
“Provocation" means something which the defendant reasonably believes the intended victim has done which causes the defendant to lack self-control completely at the time of causing death.
Adequate provocation is an affirmative defense only to first-degree intentional homicide and mitigates that offense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide.
History: 1987 a. 399
Judicial Council Note, 1988:
Sub. (1) codifies Wisconsin decisions defining “heat of passion" under prior s. 940.05. Ryan v. State, 115 Wis. 488 (1902); Johnson v. State, 129 Wis. 146 (1906); Carlone v. State, 150 Wis. 38 (1912); Zenou v. State, 4 Wis. 2d 655
(1958); State v. Bond, 41 Wis. 2d 219
(1969); State v. Williford, 103 Wis. 2d 98
Traditionally, provocation had 2 essential requirements. State v. Williford, supra., at 113. The first reflected in sub. (1) (b), is subjective. The defendant must have acted in response to provocation. This necessitates an assessment of the particular defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing. The 2nd requirement, reflected in sub. (1) (a), is objective. Only provocation sufficient to cause a reasonable person to lose self-control completely is legally adequate to mitigate the severity of the offense.
Sub. (2) clarifies that adequate provocation is an affirmative defense to first-degree intentional homicide. Although adequate provocation does not negate the intent to kill such that the burden of persuasion rests on the state by constitutional principles (Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
, (1975), Wisconsin has chosen to place the burden of disproving this defensive matter on the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lee, 108 Wis. 2d 1
(1982). Since adequate provocation is not an affirmative defense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide, its effect is to mitigate the severity of an intentional homicide from first to 2nd degree. [Bill 191-S]
Adequate provocation includes both subjective and objective components. As to the subjective component, the defendant must actually believe the provocation occurred, and the lack of self-control must be caused by the provocation. As to the objective component, the provocation must be such that would cause an ordinary, reasonable person to lack self-control completely, and the defendant's belief that the provocative acts occurred must be reasonable. State v. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 113
, 344 Wis. 2d 336
, 824 N.W.2d 839
To place provocation in issue, there need be only “some" evidence supporting the defense. The defendant's proffered evidence of provocation must be examined as a whole to determine whether the “some evidence" threshold is satisfied. It is an all-or-nothing determination as to whether the jury hears any evidence of the affirmative defense. The adequate provocation inquiry is fact-driven. If the victim's prior acts could contribute to a reasonable person's loss of self-control at the time of the crime, the acts are relevant to the objective component of the defense. State v. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 113
, 344 Wis. 2d 336
, 824 N.W.2d 839
The fact that the actor's conduct is privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. The defense of privilege can be claimed under any of the following circumstances:
When the actor's conduct occurs under circumstances of coercion or necessity so as to be privileged under s. 939.46
When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property under any of the circumstances described in s. 939.48
When the actor's conduct is in good faith and is an apparently authorized and reasonable fulfillment of any duties of a public office; or
When the actor's conduct is a reasonable accomplishment of a lawful arrest; or
“Person responsible for the child's welfare" includes the child's parent, stepparent or guardian; an employee of a public or private residential home, institution or agency in which the child resides or is confined or that provides services to the child; or any other person legally responsible for the child's welfare in a residential setting.
When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of a child by a person responsible for the child's welfare. Reasonable discipline may involve only such force as a reasonable person believes is necessary. It is never reasonable discipline to use force which is intended to cause great bodily harm or death or creates an unreasonable risk of great bodily harm or death.
When for any other reason the actor's conduct is privileged by the statutory or common law of this state.
The privilege under sub. (3) for public officials acting with apparent authority did not apply to a volunteer fire fighter driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. State v. Schoenheide, 104 Wis. 2d 114
, 310 N.W.2d 650
(Ct. App. 1981).
A foster parent is a “person legally responsible for the child's welfare" under sub. (5). State v. West, 183 Wis. 2d 46
, 515 N.W.2d 484
(Ct. App. 1994).
A mother's live-in boyfriend did not have parental immunity under sub. (5). The boyfriend did not have legal responsibility for the mother's children, and the term “parent" will not be interpreted to include persons in loco parentis. State v. Dodd, 185 Wis. 2d 560
, 518 N.W.2d 300
(Ct. App. 1994).
A convicted felon's possession of a firearm is privileged under sub. (6) in limited enumerated circumstances. State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199
, 556 N.W.2d 701
There is no statutory or common law privilege for the crime of carrying a concealed weapon under s. 941.23. State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654
, 594 N.W.2d 780
Sub. (6) incorporates excusable homicide by accident or misfortune. Accident is a defense that negatives intent. If a person kills another by accident, the killing could not have been intentional. Accident must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt when a defendant raises it as a defense. When the state proves intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, it necessarily disproves accident. State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101
, 255 Wis. 2d 265
, 647 N.W.2d 244
A defendant may demonstrate that the defendant was acting lawfully, a necessary element of an accident defense, by showing that the defendant was acting in lawful self-defense. Although intentionally pointing a firearm at another constitutes a violation of s. 941.20, under s. 939.48 (1) a person is privileged to point a gun at another person in self-defense if the person reasonably believes that the threat of force is necessary to prevent or terminate what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference. State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101
, 255 Wis. 2d 265
, 647 N.W.2d 244
To overcome the privilege of parental discipline in sub. (5), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that only one of the following is not met: 1) the use of force must be reasonably necessary; 2) the amount and nature of the force used must be reasonable; and 3) the force used must not be known to cause, or create a substantial risk of, great bodily harm or death. Whether a reasonable person would have believed the amount of force used was necessary and not excessive must be determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the time of the defendant's acts. The standard is what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant's position under the circumstances that existed at the time of the alleged offense. State v. Kimberly B., 2005 WI App 115
, 283 Wis. 2d 731
, 699 N.W.2d 641
Testimony supporting the defendant father's assertion that he was beaten with a belt as a child was not relevant to whether the amount of force he used in spanking his daughter was objectively reasonable. A parent may not abuse his or her child and claim that conduct is reasonable based on his or her history of being similarly abused. State v. Williams, 2006 WI App 212
, 296 Wis. 2d 834
, 723 N.W.2d 719
A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide.
It is no defense to a prosecution of a married person that the alleged crime was committed by command of the spouse nor is there any presumption of coercion when a crime is committed by a married person in the presence of the spouse.
A petitioner under s. 813.12
, or an individual whose parent, stepparent, or legal guardian filed a petition under s. 813.122
on behalf of the individual as a child victim, as defined in s. 813.122 (1) (c)
, has an affirmative defense for an offense under s. 175.35 (2e)
that is punishable under s. 175.35 (3) (b) 2.
, or for an offense under s. 941.2905
, if the person prohibited from possessing a firearm was the respondent in the action under s. 813.12
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Sub. (1) is amended by conforming references to the statute titles created by this bill. Since coercion mitigates first-degree intentional homicide to 2nd degree, it is obviously not a defense to prosecution for the latter crime. [Bill 191-S]
The state must disprove an asserted coercion defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Moes v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756
, 284 N.W.2d 66