Loan sharking prohibited. 943.28(1)(1)
For the purposes of this section:
To collect an extension of credit means to induce in any way any person to make repayment thereof.
An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation or property of any person.
An extortionate means is any means which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation or property of any person.
Whoever makes any extortionate extension of credit, or conspires to do so, if one or more of the parties to the conspiracy does an act to effect its object, is guilty of a Class F felony.
Whoever advances money or property, whether as a gift, as a loan, as an investment, pursuant to a partnership or profit-sharing agreement, or otherwise, for the purpose of making extortionate extensions of credit, is guilty of a Class F felony.
Whoever knowingly participates in any way in the use of any extortionate means to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof, is guilty of a Class F felony.
An extortionate extension of credit under sub. (1) (b) is not restricted to the original extension of credit, but includes renewals of loans. State v. Green, 208 Wis. 2d 290
, 560 N.W.2d 295
(Ct. App. 1997), 96-0652
Threats to injure or accuse of crime. 943.30(1)(1)
Whoever, either verbally or by any written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse or accuses another of any crime or offense, or threatens or commits any injury to the person, property, business, profession, calling or trade, or the profits and income of any business, profession, calling or trade of another, with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against the person's will or omit to do any lawful act, is guilty of a Class H felony.
Whoever violates sub. (1)
by obstructing, delaying or affecting commerce or business or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce or business is guilty of a Class H felony.
Whoever violates sub. (1)
by attempting to influence any petit or grand juror, in the performance of his or her functions as such, is guilty of a Class H felony.
Whoever violates sub. (1)
by attempting to influence the official action of any public officer is guilty of a Class H felony.
Whoever, orally or by any written or printed communication, maliciously uses, or threatens to use, the patient health care records of another person, with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against the person's will or omit to do any lawful act, is guilty of a Class H felony.
Commencement of a threat need not occur in Wisconsin to support an extortion charge venued in Wisconsin. State v. Kelly, 148 Wis. 2d 774
, 436 N.W.2d 883
(Ct. App. 1989).
A threat to falsely testify unless paid, in violation of criminal law, is a threat to property within the purview of sub. (1). State v. Manthey, 169 Wis. 2d 673
, 487 N.W.2d 44
(Ct. App. 1992).
Extortion is not a lesser included offense of robbery. Convictions for both is not precluded. State v. Dauer, 174 Wis. 2d 418
, 497 N.W.2d 766
(Ct. App. 1993).
A threat to one's education constitutes a threat to one's profession under sub. (1), and a threat to terminate promised financial support could constitute a threat to property. State v. Kittilstad, 231 Wis. 2d 245
, 603 N.W.2d 732
A claim under this section is governed by the 6-year limitation period under s. 893.93 (1) (a). Elbe v. Wausau Hosp. Center, 606 F. Supp. 1491
Threats to communicate derogatory information.
Whoever maliciously threatens, with intent to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against the person's will, to disseminate or to communicate to anyone information, whether true or false, that would humiliate or injure the reputation of the threatened person or another is guilty of a Class I felony. For the purpose of this section, “information" includes any photograph, exposed film, motion picture, videotape, or data that represents a visual image, a sound recording, or any data that represents or produces an audio signal.
A threat to injure a manager's reputation unless a job is offered violated this section. State v. Gilkes, 118 Wis. 2d 149
, 345 N.W.2d 531
(Ct. App. 1984).
Whoever, with intent to steal, takes property from the person or presence of the owner by either of the following means is guilty of a Class E felony:
By using force against the person of the owner with intent thereby to overcome his or her physical resistance or physical power of resistance to the taking or carrying away of the property; or
By threatening the imminent use of force against the person of the owner or of another who is present with intent thereby to compel the owner to acquiesce in the taking or carrying away of the property.
Whoever violates sub. (1)
by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon, a device or container described under s. 941.26 (4) (a)
or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe that it is a dangerous weapon or such a device or container is guilty of a Class C felony.
In this section “owner" means a person in possession of property whether the person's possession is lawful or unlawful.
While a person who by use of force or a gun seeks to repossess specific property that he or she owns and has a present right of possession to might not have the intention to steal, the taking of money from a debtor by force to pay a debt is robbery unless the accused can trace that ownership to the specific coins and bills in the debtor's possession. Edwards v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 105
, 181 N.W.2d 383
Since attempted robbery requires proof of elements in addition to those required to prove burglary, they are separate and distinct crimes. State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565
, 182 N.W.2d 466
It is error not to instruct on the allegations that the defendant was armed and that he attempted to conceal his identity, but it is harmless error when the facts are uncontroverted. Claybrooks v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 79
, 183 N.W.2d 139
On a charge of armed robbery, the court should instruct as to the definition of a dangerous weapon, but the error is harmless if all the evidence is to the effect that the defendant had a gun. Claybrooks v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 87
, 183 N.W.2d 143
If the evidence is clear that the defendant was armed, the court need not submit a verdict of unarmed robbery. Kimmons v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 266
, 186 N.W.2d 308
An information charging armed robbery is void if it fails to allege the use of or threat of force to overcome the owner's resistance. Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751
, 193 N.W.2d 868
Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. Both require asportation. Moore v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 1
, 197 N.W.2d 820
Taking a pouch from the victim by force and in such a manner as to overcome any physical resistance or power of resistance constituted robbery and not theft under s. 943.20. Walton v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 36
, 218 N.W.2d 309
When a victim testified that the defendant's accomplice held an object to his throat while the defendant took money from his person and the defendant testified that no robbery whatsoever occurred, the jury was presented with no evidence indicating that a robbery absent the threat of force had occurred. It was not error to deny the defendant's request for an instruction on theft from a person. State v. Powers, 66 Wis. 2d 84
, 224 N.W.2d 206
When a defendant lost money to a dice cheat and thereafter recovered a similar amount at gunpoint, the jury could convict despite the defendant's claim that the bills recovered were those lost. Austin v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 213
, 271 N.W.2d 668
Sub. (1) states one offense that may be committed by alternate means. The jury was properly instructed in the disjunctive on the force element. Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413
, 304 N.W.2d 729
Armed robbery can be the natural and probable consequence of robbery. In such case, an aider and abettor need not have had actual knowledge that the principals would be armed. State v. Ivey, 119 Wis. 2d 591
, 350 N.W.2d 622
If the defendant commits a robbery while merely possessing a dangerous weapon, the penalty enhancer under s. 939.63 is applicable. State v. Robinson, 140 Wis. 2d 673
, 412 N.W.2d 535
(Ct. App. 1987).
A defendant's lack of intent to make a victim believe that the defendant is armed is irrelevant in finding a violation of sub. (2); if the victim's belief that the defendant was armed is reasonable, that is enough. State v. Hubanks, 173 Wis. 2d 1
, 496 N.W.2d 96
(Ct. App. 1992).
Extortion is not a lesser included offense of robbery. Convictions for both are not precluded. State v. Dauer, 174 Wis. 2d 418
, 497 N.W.2d 766
(Ct. App. 1993).
This statute does not require a specific intent that property that is demanded actually be transferred. State v. Voss, 205 Wis. 2d 586
, 556 N.W.2d 433
(Ct. App. 1996), 95-1183
Asportation, or carrying away, is an element of robbery. The asportation requirement provides a bright line distinction between attempt and robbery. There is no exception for an automobile that is entered by force, but cannot be moved by the defendant. State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 239
, 558 N.W.2d 375
The key to a conviction under sub. (2) is whether the victim reasonably believed that he or she was threatened with a dangerous weapon even though he or she did not see anything that was perceived as a weapon. In applying reasonable belief to the armed-robbery statute courts must consider the circumstances of the individual case. State v. Rittman, 2010 WI App 41
, 324 Wis. 2d 273
, 781 N.W.2d 545
The state's attempt to retry the defendant for armed robbery, alleging the use of a different weapon after the trial judge concluded that acquittal on a first armed robbery charge resulted from insufficient evidence of the use of a gun, violated double jeopardy protections. It did not necessarily follow that the state was prevented from pursuing a charge of simple robbery however. Losey v. Frank, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1066
Letting Armed Robbery Get Away: An Analysis of Wisconsin's Armed Robbery Statute. Goodstein. 1998 WLR 591.
Receiving stolen property. 943.34(1)(1)
Except as provided under s. 948.62
, whoever knowingly or intentionally receives or conceals stolen property is guilty of:
A Class A misdemeanor, if the value of the property does not exceed $2,500.
A Class I felony, if the value of the property exceeds $2,500 but does not exceed $5,000.
A Class H felony, if the property is a firearm or if the value of the property exceeds $5,000 but does not exceed $10,000.
A Class G felony, if the value of the property exceeds $10,000.
In any action or proceeding for a violation of sub. (1)
, a party may use duly identified and authenticated photographs of property which was the subject of the violation in lieu of producing the property.
The fact that sequentially received stolen property was purchased for a lump sum is an insufficient basis to aggregate the value of the property; the crime of receiving stolen property does not require payment. State v. Spraggin, 71 Wis. 2d 604
, 239 N.W.2d 297
If any element of the crime charged occurred in a given county, then that county can be the place of trial. Because the crime of receiving stolen property requires more than two acts, and one of the acts is that the property must be stolen, venue is properly established in the county where that act occurred. State v. Lippold, 2008 WI App 130
, 313 Wis. 2d 699
, 757 N.W.2d 825
Alteration of property identification marks.
Whoever does any of the following with intent to prevent the identification of the property involved is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor:
Alters or removes any identification mark on any log or other lumber without the consent of the owner; or
Alters or removes any identification mark from any receptacle used by the manufacturer of any beverage; or
Alters or removes any manufacturer's identification number on personal property or possesses any personal property with knowledge that the manufacturer's identification number has been removed or altered. Possession of 2 or more similar items of personal property with the manufacturer's identification number altered or removed is prima facie evidence of knowledge of the alteration or removal and of an intent to prevent identification of the property.
Alters or removes livestock brands, recorded under s. 95.11
, from any animal without the owner's consent, or possesses any livestock with knowledge that the brand has been altered or removed without the owner's knowledge or consent.
History: 1973 c. 239
; 1977 c. 173
“Similar" under sub. (3) means comparable or substantially alike. State v. Hamilton, 146 Wis. 2d 426
, 432 N.W.2d 108
(Ct. App. 1988).
Whoever with intent to defraud falsely makes or alters a writing or object of any of the following kinds so that it purports to have been made by another, or at another time, or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give such authority, is guilty of a Class H felony:
A writing or object whereby legal rights or obligations are created, terminated or transferred, or any writing commonly relied upon in business or commercial transactions as evidence of debt or property rights; or
A public record or a certified or authenticated copy thereof; or
An official authentication or certification of a copy of a public record; or
An official return or certificate entitled to be received as evidence of its contents.
Whoever utters as genuine or possesses with intent to utter as false or as genuine any forged writing or object mentioned in sub. (1)
, knowing it to have been thus falsely made or altered, is guilty of a Class H felony.
Whoever, with intent to defraud, does any of the following is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor:
Falsely makes or alters any object so that it appears to have value because of antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which it does not possess; or possesses any such object knowing it to have been thus falsely made or altered and with intent to transfer it as original and genuine, by sale or for security purposes; or
Falsely makes or alters any writing of a kind commonly relied upon for the purpose of identification or recommendation; or
Without consent, places upon any merchandise an identifying label or stamp which is or purports to be that of another craftsman, tradesman, packer or manufacturer; or
Falsely makes or alters a membership card purporting to be that of a fraternal, business or professional association or of a labor union; or possesses any such card knowing it to have been thus falsely made or altered and with intent to use it or cause or permit its use to deceive another; or
Falsely makes or alters any writing purporting to evidence a right to transportation on any common carrier; or
Falsely makes or alters a certified abstract of title to real estate, a title insurance commitment, a title insurance policy, or any other written evidence regarding the state of title to real estate.
Acceptance of or cashing a forged check is not an element of uttering under sub. (2). Little v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 558
, 271 N.W.2d 105
Fraudulent use of a credit card need not involve forgery. If forgery is involved, the prosecutor has discretion to charge under s. 943.41 or 943.38. Mack v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 287
, 286 N.W.2d 563
Signed receipts for bogus magazine subscriptions constituted forgery even though the defrauded subscriber did not specifically rely on the receipt. State v. Davis, 105 Wis. 2d 690
, 314 N.W.2d 907
(Ct. App. 1981).