Police had no duty to inform suspect during custodial interrogation that lawyer retained by suspect's family was present. State v. Hanson, 136 W (2d) 195, 401 NW (2d) 771 (1987).
Incriminating statement by intoxicated defendant undergoing medical treatment for painful injuries was voluntary since there was no affirmative police misconduct compelling defendant to answer police questioning. State v. Clappes, 136 W (2d) 222, 401 NW (2d) 759 (1987).
"Rescue doctrine" exception to Miranda rule discussed. State v. Kunkel, 137 W (2d) 172, 404 NW (2d) 69 (Ct. App. 1987).
Probationer's answers to probation agent's questions are "compelled" and may not be used for any purpose in criminal trial. State v. Thompson, 142 W (2d) 821, 419 NW (2d) 564 (Ct. App. 1987).
Prosecution may comment on accused's pre-Miranda silence when accused elects to testify on own behalf. State v. Sorenson, 143 W (2d) 226, 421 NW (2d) 77 (1988).
"Functional equivalent" of direct custodial interrogation discussed. State v. Cunningham, 144 W (2d) 272, 423 NW (2d) 862 (1988).
Admission of involuntary or coerced confession is subject to harmless error test. State v. Childs, 146 W (2d) 116, 430 NW (2d) 353 (Ct. App. 1988).
Use of Goodchild testimony to impeach defendant's trial testimony does not violate privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Schultz, 152 W (2d) 408, 448 NW (2d) 424 (1989).
Unconstitutionally obtained confession may be admitted and serve as sole basis for bindover at preliminary examination. State v. Moats, 156 W (2d) 74, 457 W (2d) 299 (1990).
Where psychiatrist did not comply with Miranda, constitution does not require exclusion of results of interview with defendant from competency phase of trial. State v. Lindh, 161 W (2d) 324, 468 NW (2d) 168 (1991).
Miranda does not require warning suspect that he has the right to stop answering questions. State v. Mitchell, 167 W (2d) 672, 482 NW (2d) 364 (1992).
Miranda safeguards are not required where a suspect is simply in custody, but are where the suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. State v. Coulthard, 171 W (2d) 573, 492 NW (2d) 329 (Ct. App. 1992).
A criminal defendant may be compelled to submit a voice sample consisting of specific words for purposes of identification. The words do not require a revelation of the contents of the mind to impart an admission of or evidence of guilt. Comment on a refusal to give a sample does not violate the right against self-incrimination. State v. Hubanks, 173 W (2d) 1, 496 NW (2d) 96 (Ct. App. 1992).
Miranda safeguards are applicable to questions during booking concerning name and residence where the questions relate to an element of the crime. State v. Stevens, 173 W (2d) 290, 496 NW (2d) 201 (Ct. App. 1992).
A waiver of Miranda rights needs to be made knowingly and intelligently as well as voluntarily; knowing and intelligent waiver must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence as determined from an objective assessment of the circumstances. State v. Lee, 175 W (2d) 348, 499 NW (2d) 258 (Ct. App. 1993).
If police do not use coercive tactics, that a defendant is undergoing medical treatment or experiencing pain is not determinative on the issue of voluntariness. State v. Schambow, 176 W (2d) 286, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
When defendant pleads guilty then appeals the denial of a suppression motion under s. 971.31 (10), the harmless error rule may not be applied where a motion to suppress was erroneously denied. State v. Pounds, 176 W (2d) 315, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
Miranda protections come into play when a reasonable person in the defendant's position would consider himself to be in custody. State v. Pounds, 176 W (2d) 315, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
Failure to give Miranda warnings during a telephone conversation initiated to encourage the defendant's surrender following an armed robbery police suspected was committed by the defendant did not require suppression of admissions made to police. State v. Stearns, 178 W (2d) 845, 506 NW (2d) 165 (Ct. App. 1993).
Defendant's intoxication for purposes of motor vehicle statutes did not per se demonstrate an inability to knowingly waive Miranda rights. State v. Beaver, 181 W (2d) 959, 512 NW (2d) 254 (Ct. App. 1994).
Suspect's question to interrogator, ``Do you think I need an attorney?", was an equivocal question insufficient to invoke the right to counsel. Such an equivocal statement requires the police to cease all interrogation except to attempt to clarify the suspect's desire for counsel. State v. Walkowiak, 183 W (2d) 478, 515 NW (2d) 863 (1994). But see the note to Davis v. United States, 129 LEd 2d 362 below. See also State v. Long, 190 W (2d) 387, 526 NW (2d) 826 (Ct. App. 1994).
Coercive police activity is a predicate to establishing involuntariness but does not itself establish involuntariness. Officer dissatisfaction with a defendant's answers and statements by the officer that cooperation would benefit the defendant is not coercion without a promise of leniency. State v. Deets, 187 W (2d) 629, 523 NW (2d) 180 (Ct. App. 1994).
A refusal to perform a field sobriety test is not testimony and not protected by the constitution. Refusal to submit to a field sobriety test was properly admitted as evidence to determine probable cause for arrest for intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle. State v. Babbit, 188 W (2d) 349, 525 NW (2d) 102 (Ct. App. 1994).
Edwards v. Arizona requires interrogation to cease once a suspect requests an attorney. It does not prohibit questions designed to accommodate the request. When in response to being asked his attorney's name a suspect gave a name and then stated that the person was not an attorney, the interrogating officer was not prevented from continuing interrogation. State v. Lagar, 190 W (2d) 423, 526 NW (2d) 836 (Ct. App. 1994).
A forced confession as a condition of probation does not violate the right against self-incrimination; the constitution protects against the use of confessions in subsequent criminal prosecutions but does not protect against the use of such statements in a revocation proceeding. State v. Carrizales, 191 W (2d) 85, 528 NW (2d) 29 (Ct. App. 1995).
A suspect's reference to an attorney who had represented or is presently representing the suspect in another matter is not a request for counsel requiring the cessation of questioning. State v. Jones, 192 W (2d) 78, 532 NW (2d) 79 (1995).
The right to counsel and right to remain silent are the defendant's. An attorney not requested by the defendant could not compel the police to end questioning by stating that no questioning was to take place outside his presence. State v. Jones, 192 W (2d) 78, 532 NW (2d) 79 (1995).
Once given, it is not necessary to repeat the Miranda warnings during an investigation of the same person for the same crime. State v. Jones, 192 W (2d) 78, 532 NW (2d) 79 (1995).
The privilege against self-incrimination extends beyond sentencing as long as a defendant has a real fear of further incrimination, as where an appeal is pending, before an appeal as of right or plea withdrawal has expired, or where the defendant intends or is in the process of moving for sentence modification and shows a reasonable chance of success. State v. Marks, 194 W (2d) 79, 533 NW (2d) 730 (1995).
A defendant may selectively waive Miranda rights. Refusal to answer specific questions does not assert an overall right to to silence, if there is an unequivocal expression of selective invocation. State v. Wright, 196 W (2d) 149, 537 NW (2d) 134 (Ct. App. 1995).
Whether incriminating statements made following an illegal arrest are admissible depends on whether the statements were obtained by means sufficiently attenuated from the illegal act. The factors to be considered are voluntariness, proximity of conduct to the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances and flagrancy of the misconduct. State v. Tobias, 196 W (2d) 537, 538 NW (2d) 843 (Ct. App. 1995).
A trial court must consider a defendant's language in determining if under the totality of the circumstances the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights. State v. Santiago, 198 W (2d) 82, 542 NW (2d) 466 (Ct. App. 1995).
The right to counsel under Miranda must be personally invoked by the suspect. Simply retaining counsel is not an unequivocal statement that the suspect wishes to deal with the police only in the presence of counsel. State v. Coerper, 199 W (2d) 216, 544 NW (2d) 423 (1996).
Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel judicial inquiry into voluntariness is beside the point. Physical evidence derived from statements made in violation of the asserted right must be suppressed. However, evidence admitted in violation of this rule is subject to a harmless error analysis. State v. Harris, 199 W (2d) 227, 544 NW (2d) 545 (1996).
Prosecution comments on a defendant's claimed lack of memory and subsequent silence during a police interview conducted shortly after the incident when the defendant testified at length at trial on the same subject did not violate the right against self-incrimination where the comments were intended to impeach the defendant's testimony and not to ask the jury to infer guilt from the defendant's silence. State v. Wulff, 200 W (2d) 318, 546 NW (2d) 522 (Ct. App. 1996).
A suspect's declaration that he did not wish to speak to a specific police officer is not an invocation of the right to remain silent. Police adoption of "good cop/bad cop" roles did not render an interrogation coercive and its results inadmissible. State v. Owen, 202 W (2d) 621, 551 NW (2d) 50 (Ct. App. 1996).
Statement made after Miranda warnings but before contact with requested counsel is admissible for impeachment. Oregon v. Hass, 420 US 714.
Witness who refuses to testify on self-incrimination grounds after judge grants immunity may summarily be found in criminal contempt. United States v. Wilson, 421 US 309.
Use of defendant's income tax returns to prove gambling charge did not deny self-incrimination protection. Garner v. United States, 424 US 648.
Accused's silence during police interrogation lacked probative value for impeachment of alibi at trial. United States v. Hale, 422 US 171. See: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610.
Voluntary interview at police station was not "custodial interrogation". Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492.
Instruction given to jury over defense objection not to draw adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify did not violate self-incrimination right. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 US 333 (1978).
While statements made by defendant in circumstances violating Miranda protections are admissible for impeachment if their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards, any criminal trial use against defendant of involuntary statements is denial of due process. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385 (1978).
Testimony before grand jury under grant of immunity could not constitutionally be used for impeachment purposes in later criminal trial. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 US 450 (1979).
Explicit statement of waiver is not necessary to support finding that defendant waived Miranda rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US 369 (1979).
Voluntary confession obtained during custodial interrogation following illegal arrest was inadmissible. Dunaway v. New York, 442 US 200 (1979).
Witness compelled by grant of immunity to testify despite claim of self-incrimination privilege was property prosecuted for perjured testimony. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 US 115 (1980).
Officer's comment that child might find loaded gun was not functional equivalent of questioning in violation of Miranda rights. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291 (1980).
Right of self-incrimination was not violated when defendant who testifies in own defense is impeached by use of defendant's prearrest silence. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 US 231 (1980).
Upon defendant's request, judge must instruct jury not to infer guilt from defendant's failure to testify. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 US 288 (1981).
Accused who requests counsel may not be interrogated without counsel unless accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981).
Where for impeachment purposes prosecution cross-examined defendant as to postarrest silence before defendant received Miranda warnings, due process was not violated. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 US 603 (1982).
Where prosecutor improperly commented to jury that defendants did not challenge certain accusations against them, court erred in reversing conviction on appeal without determining whether error was harmless. U.S. v. Hasting, 461 US 499 (1983).
Probationer under obligation to appear before probation officer and answer questions truthfully was not entitled to Miranda warnings; confession was, therefore, admissible. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 US 420 (1984).
Court adopts "inevitable discovery" exception to exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431 (1984).
Court adopts "public safety" exception to Miranda rule. Where accused, known to have had gun, did not have gun at time of arrest in supermarket, officer properly asked where the gun was before giving Miranda warnings. New York v. Quarles, 467 US 649 (1984).
Person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to Miranda warnings regardless of nature or severity of offense. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984).
Suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning may later waive rights and confess after Miranda warnings are given. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298 (1985).
Police's failure to inform defendant that third party had retained counsel didn't invalidate defendant's waiver of Miranda rights. Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986).
Where no evidence is present suggesting that police officers sent suspect's wife in to see him with the hope of obtaining incriminating information, no "interrogation" was undertaken even though detective was present and tape recorded conversation. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 US 520 (1987).
Police may not interrogate suspect held in custody after suspect has previously requested counsel even when interrogation relates to offense different from that for which suspect requested counsel. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 US 675 (1988).
Corporate records custodian may not resist subpoena for records on self-incrimination grounds, regardless of size of corporate entity. Braswell v. United States, 487 US 99 (1988).
Self-incrimination privilege does not support refusal to comply with juvenile court's order to produce child. Baltimore Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 US 474, 107 LEd 2d 992 (1990).
Undercover officer is not required to give Miranda warnings to suspect before surreptitious custodial interrogation. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US 292, 110 LEd 2d 243 (1990).
When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and may not be reinstated without counsel present even though the accused previously did have an opportunity to consult an attorney. Minnich v. Mississippi, 498 US 146, 112 LEd 2d 489 (1990).
Admission of coerced confession may be found to be "harmless error". Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 US 279, 113 LEd 2d 302 (1991).
Sixth amendment right to counsel is offense specific; an accused's invocation of this right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 US 171, 115 LEd 2d 158 (1991).
Police officer's subjective and undisclosed view of whether a person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to determining whether the person is in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings. Stansbury v. California, 511 US ___, 128 LEd 2d 293 (1994).
Officers need not cease questioning a suspect subject to custodial interrogation when the suspect makes an ambiguous reference to an attorney. Although often good practice, it is not necessary that the officer ask clarifying questions. Davis v. United States, 512 US ___, 129 LEd 2d 362 (1994).
Collateral estoppel barred state from introducing evidence of van theft as overt act in conspiracy charge where accuseds had earlier been acquitted in van theft trial. Accused's silence prior to receiving Miranda warnings was properly used to impeach accused; prosecution's reference to post-Miranda silence was harmless error. Feela v. Israel, 727 F (2d) 151 (1984).
Assertion of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in federal civil litigation: Rights and remedies. Daskal, 64 MLR 243 (1980).
Privilege against self-incrimination-truthful statements may be used in a perjury prosecution. 64 MLR 744 (1981).
The privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. 1980 WLR 697.
McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation. 1992 WLR 1643.
I,9 Remedy for wrongs. Section 9. Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
The trial court's holding that plaintiff's claim was barred because the period of limitations ran from the time the last architectural services were performed is not sustained, for to so read the statute, although susceptible of that literal meaning, would reveal a constitutionally impermissible legislative intent to negate a right statutorily recognized in 893.14. Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 W (2d) 1, 213 NW (2d) 741, 216 NW (2d) 252.
The constitutional guaranty, which insures a remedy for injuries to person and property does not, as contended, give plaintiffs a constitutional right to sue the state in tort, because there is no right of a citizen to hold his sovereign substantively liable therefor, and the state, being immune from suit without its consent, may define the conditions under which it will permit actions against itself. Cords v. State, 62 W (2d) 42, 214 NW (2d) 405.
In consonance with the Wisconsin constitutional mandate entitling every person to a remedy in the law for injury or wrong, the supreme court departs herein from the former traditional common-law rule and extends the line of recovery against the seducer to the woman herself, because the seducer's reprehensible and tortious conduct merits his response therefor in damages. Slawek v. Stroh, 62 W (2d) 295, 215 NW (2d) 9.
Sec. 9 does not entitle state litigants to the exact remedy they desire, but merely to their day in court, hence 138.06 (7), providing that retail sellers shall refund excess interest charged before October 9, 1970, upon written individual demand is a certain remedy. Wiener v. J. C. Penney Co. 65 W (2d) 139, 222 NW (2d) 149.
893.155, Stats. (1973) is unconstitutional in denying plaintiffs a remedy for a wrong recognized. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 W (2d) 382, 225 NW (2d) 454.
Illegal aliens have right to sue in Wisconsin for injuries negligently inflicted upon them. Arteaga v. Literski, 83 W (2d) 128, 265 NW (2d) 148 (1978).
No legal rights are conferred by this section. Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp. 95 W (2d) 173, 290 NW (2d) 176 (1980).
Pre-1981 statutory paternity proceedings, which vested exclusive authority in district attorney to commence paternity action, unconstitutionally denied child "day in court". Accordingly, child's action was not barred by any statute of limitations. In re Paternity of R.W.L. 116 W (2d) 150, 341 NW (2d) 682 (1984).
Court fashions remedy for victims of synthetic hormone, DES, which was manufactured in generic form by many drug companies. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. 116 W (2d) 166, 342 NW (2d) 37 (1984).
State is not entitled to protection under this section. State v. Halverson, 130 W (2d) 300, 387 NW (2d) 124 (Ct. App. 1986).
Register in probate's fee based on value of estate does not violate this section. Treiber v. Knoll, 135 W (2d) 58, 398 NW (2d) 756 (1987).
I,9m Victims of crime. Section 9m. [As created April 1993] This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy. This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections as provided by law: timely disposition of the case; the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from the accused throughout the criminal justice process; notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a statement to the court at disposition; restitution; compensation; and information about the outcome of the case and the release of the accused. The legislature shall provide remedies for the violation of this section. Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law. [1993 J.R. 2, vote April 1993]
I,10 Treason. Section 10. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against the same, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
I,11 Searches and seizures. Section 11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
