940.22(4)(b)4.
4. After reporters receive the information under
subd. 2. or
3., they may inform the applicable patients or clients that another report was received regarding the same subject.
940.22(4)(c)
(c) A person to whom a report or record is disclosed under this subsection may not further disclose it, except to the persons and for the purposes specified in this section.
940.22(4)(d)
(d) Whoever intentionally violates this subsection, or permits or encourages the unauthorized dissemination or use of information contained in reports and records made under this section, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
940.22(5)
(5) Immunity from liability. Any person or institution participating in good faith in the making of a report or record under this section is immune from any civil or criminal liability that results by reason of the action. For the purpose of any civil or criminal action or proceeding, any person reporting under this section is presumed to be acting in good faith. The immunity provided under this subsection does not apply to liability resulting from sexual contact by a therapist with a patient or client.
940.22 Annotation
This section applies to persons engaged in a professional therapist-patient relationship. A teacher who conducts informal counseling is not engaged as a professional therapist. State v. Ambrose, 196 W (2d) 768, 540 NW (2d) 208 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.225(1)(1)
First degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class B felony:
940.225(1)(a)
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that person and causes pregnancy or great bodily harm to that person.
940.225(1)(b)
(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that person by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous weapon.
940.225(1)(c)
(c) Is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that person by use or threat of force or violence.
940.225(2)
(2) Second degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class BC felony:
940.225(2)(a)
(a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that person by use or threat of force or violence.
940.225(2)(b)
(b) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without consent of that person and causes injury, illness, disease or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ, or mental anguish requiring psychiatric care for the victim.
940.225(2)(c)
(c) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who suffers from a mental illness or deficiency which renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the person's conduct, and the defendant knows of such condition.
940.225(2)(cm)
(cm) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who is under the influence of an intoxicant to a degree which renders that person incapable of appraising the person's conduct, and the defendant knows of such condition.
940.225(2)(d)
(d) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the defendant knows is unconscious.
940.225(2)(f)
(f) Is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of that person.
940.225(2)(g)
(g) Is an employe of a facility or program under
s. 940.295 (2) (b),
(c),
(h) or
(k) and has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who is a patient or resident of the facility or program.
940.225(3)
(3) Third degree sexual assault. Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person without the consent of that person is guilty of a Class D felony. Whoever has sexual contact in the manner described in
sub. (5) (b) 2. with a person without the consent of that person is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.225(3m)
(3m) Fourth degree sexual assault. Except as provided in
sub. (3), whoever has sexual contact with a person without the consent of that person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
940.225(4)
(4) Consent. "Consent", as used in this section, means words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact. Consent is not an issue in alleged violations of
sub. (2) (c),
(cm),
(d) and
(g). The following persons are presumed incapable of consent but the presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence, subject to the provisions of
s. 972.11 (2):
940.225(4)(b)
(b) A person suffering from a mental illness or defect which impairs capacity to appraise personal conduct.
940.225(4)(c)
(c) A person who is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
940.225(5)(ai)
(ai) "Intoxicant" means any controlled substance, controlled substance analog or other drug, any combination of a controlled substance, controlled substance analog or other drug or any combination of an alcohol beverage and a controlled substance, controlled substance analog or other drug. "Intoxicant" does not include any alcohol beverage.
940.225(5)(am)
(am) "Patient" means any person who does any of the following:
940.225(5)(am)1.
1. Receives care or treatment from a facility or program under
s. 940.295 (2) (b),
(c),
(h) or
(k), from an employe of a facility or program or from a person providing services under contract with a facility or program.
940.225(5)(am)2.
2. Arrives at a facility or program under
s. 940.295 (2) (b),
(c),
(h) or
(k) for the purpose of receiving care or treatment from a facility or program under
s. 940.295 (2) (b),
(c),
(h) or
(k), from an employe of a facility or program under
s. 940.295 (2) (b),
(c),
(h) or
(k), or from a person providing services under contract with a facility or program under
s. 940.295 (2) (b),
(c),
(h) or
(k).
940.225(5)(b)1.
1. Intentional touching by the complainant or defendant, either directly or through clothing by the use of any body part or object, of the complainant's or defendant's intimate parts if that intentional touching is either for the purpose of sexually degrading; or for the purpose of sexually humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant or if the touching contains the elements of actual or attempted battery under
s. 940.19 (1).
940.225(5)(b)2.
2. Intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate or intentional emission of urine or feces by the defendant upon any part of the body clothed or unclothed of the complainant if that ejaculation or emission is either for the purpose of sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.
940.225(5)(c)
(c) "Sexual intercourse" includes the meaning assigned under
s. 939.22 (36) as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal opening either by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction. The emission of semen is not required.
940.225(6)
(6) Marriage not a bar to prosecution. A defendant shall not be presumed to be incapable of violating this section because of marriage to the complainant.
940.225(7)
(7) Death of victim. This section applies whether a victim is dead or alive at the time of the sexual contact or sexual intercourse.
940.225 History
History: 1975 c. 184,
421;
1977 c. 173;
1979 c. 24,
25,
175,
221;
1981 c. 89,
308,
309,
310,
311;
1985 a. 134;
1987 a. 245,
332,
352;
1987 a. 403 ss.
235,
236,
256;
1993 a. 445;
1995 a. 69;
1997 a. 220.
940.225 Annotation
Legislative Council Note, 1981: Presently, [in sub. (5) (a)] the definition of "sexual intercourse" in the sexual assault statute includes any intrusion of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal opening of another person. This proposal clarifies that the intrusion of the body part or object may be caused by the direct act of the offender (defendant) or may occur as a result of an act by the victim which is done in compliance with instructions of the offender (defendant). [Bill 630-S]
940.225 Annotation
Failure to resist is not consent under (4). State v. Clark, 87 W (2d) 804, 275 NW (2d) 715 (1979).
940.225 Annotation
Injury by conduct regardless of life is not a lesser-included crime of first-degree sexual assault. Hagenkord v. State, 94 W (2d) 250, 287 NW (2d) 834 (Ct. App. 1979).
940.225 Annotation
Multiplicitous sexual assault charges discussed. State v. Eisch, 96 W (2d) 25, 291 NW (2d) 800 (1980).
940.225 Annotation
Trial court did not err in denying accused's motions to compel psychiatric examination of victim and to discover victim's past addresses. State v. Lederer, 99 W (2d) 430, 299 NW (2d) 457 (Ct. App. 1980).
940.225 Annotation
See note to Art. I, sec. 5, citing State v. Baldwin, 101 W (2d) 441, 304 NW (2d) 742 (1981).
940.225 Annotation
Age classifications under this section may be open to question. State v. Cuyler, 110 W (2d) 133, 327 NW (2d) 662 (1983).
940.225 Annotation
See note to Art. I, sec. 5, citing State v. Lomagro, 113 W (2d) 582, 335 NW (2d) 583 (1983).
940.225 Annotation
Jury instruction that touching "vaginal area" constituted sexual contact was correct. State v. Morse, 126 W (2d) 1, 374 NW (2d) 388 (Ct. App. 1985).
940.225 Annotation
"Unconscious" as used in (2) (d) is a loss of awareness which may be caused by sleep. State v. Curtis, 144 W (2d) 691, 424 NW (2d) 719 (Ct. App. 1988).
940.225 Annotation
See note to 904.01, citing State v. Hartman, 145 W (2d) 1, 426 NW (2d) 320 (1988).
940.225 Annotation
A defendant's lack of intent to make a victim believe the defendant is armed is irrelevant in finding a violation of sub. (1) (b); if the victim's belief that the defendant was armed is reasonable, that is enough. State v. Hubanks, 173 W (2d) 1, 496 NW (2d) 96 (Ct. App. 1992).
940.225 Annotation
Attempted fourth-degree sexual assault is not offense under Wisconsin law. State v. Cvorovic, 158 W (2d) 630, 462 NW (2d) 897 (Ct. App. 1990).
940.225 Annotation
Discussion of "use or threat of force or violence" under (2) (a). State v. Bonds, 165 W (2d) 27, 477 NW (2d) 265 (1991).
940.225 Annotation
Dog may be dangerous weapon under (1) (b). State v. Sinks, 168 W (2d) 245, 483 NW (2d) 286 (Ct. App. 1992).
940.225 Annotation
Convictions under both (1) (d) and (2) (d) did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Sauceda, 168 W (2d) 486, 485 NW (2d) 1 (1992).
940.225 Annotation
Sub. (2) (d) is not unconstitutionally vague. Expert evidence regarding sleep based solely on a hypothetical situation similar but not identical to the facts of the case was inadmissible. State v. Pittman, 174 W (2d) 255, 496 NW (2d) 74 (1993), 445.
940.225 Annotation
Convictions under both subs. (2) (a) and (2) (e) did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Selmon, 175 W (2d) 155, 877 NW (2d) 498 (Ct. App. 1993).
940.225 Annotation
Discussion of relevant evidence in child sexual assault case. In Interest of Michael R.B. 175 W (2d) 713, 499 NW (2d) 641 (1993).
940.225 Annotation
"Great bodily harm" is a distinct element under sub. (1) (a) and need not be caused by the sexual act. State v. Schambow, 176 W (2d) 286, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
940.225 Annotation
Intent is not an element of sub. (2) (a); lack of intent element does not render this provision constitutionally invalid. State v. Neumann, 179 W (2d) 687, 508 NW (2d) 54 (Ct. App. 1993).
940.225 Annotation
Previous use of force, and victim's resulting fear, was an appropriate basis for finding that a threat of force existed under sub. (2) (a). State v. Speese, 191 W (2d) 205, 528 NW (2d) 63 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.225 Annotation
Violation of any of the provisions of this section does not immunize the defendant from violating the same or another provision in the course of sexual misconduct. Two acts of vaginal intercourse are sufficiently different in fact to justify separate charges under sub. (1) (d). State v. Kruzycki, 192 W (2d) 509, 531 NW (2d) 429 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.225 Annotation
A defendant need not be informed of the potential of a ch. 980 commitment for a guilty plea to a sexual assault charge to be knowingly made as the commitment is a collateral and not direct consequence of the plea. State v. Myers, 199 W (2d) 391, 544 NW (2d) 609 (Ct. App. 1996).
940.225 Annotation
Sub. (2) (c) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Smith, 215 W (2d) 84, 572 NW (2d) 496 (Ct. App. 1997).
940.225 Annotation
Conviction on 2 counts of rape, where offenses occurred 25 minutes apart in same location, did not violate double jeopardy provisions of U.S. Constitution. Harrell v. Israel, 478 F Supp. 752 (1979).
940.225 Annotation
Conviction for attempted first degree sexual assault based on circumstantial evidence did not deny due process. Upshaw v. Powell, 478 F Supp. 1264 (1979).
940.23
940.23
Reckless injury. 940.23(1)(a)(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a Class C felony.
940.23(1)(b)
(b) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to an unborn child under circumstances that show utter disregard for the life of that unborn child, the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class C felony.
940.23(2)(a)(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another human being is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.23(2)(b)
(b) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to an unborn child is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.23 History
History: 1987 a. 399;
1997 a. 295.
940.23 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Sub. (1) is analogous to the prior offense of injury by conduct regardless of life.
940.23 Annotation
Sub. (2) is new. It creates the crime of injury by criminal recklessness. See s. 939.24. [Bill 191-S]
940.23 Annotation
First-degree reckless injury, s. 940.23 (1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery. State v. Eastman, 185 W (2d) 405, 518 NW (2d) 257 (Ct. App. 1994).
940.24
940.24
Injury by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire. 940.24(1)
(1) Whoever causes bodily harm to another by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.24(2)
(2) Whoever causes bodily harm to an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.24 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: The definition of the offense is broadened to include highly negligent handling of fire, explosives and dangerous weapons other than a firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow. See s. 939.22 (10). The culpable mental state is criminal negligence. See s. 939.25 and the NOTE thereto. [Bill 191-S]
940.24 Annotation
Dogs must be intended to be weapons before their handling can result in a violation of this section. Because a dog bites it does not render the dog a dangerous weapon. Despite evidence of positive steps to restrain the dog, where those measures are wholly inadequate criminal negligence may be found. Physical proximity is not necessary for a defendant's activity to constitute handling. State v. Bodoh, 220 W (2d) 102, 582 NW (2d) 440 (Ct. App. 1998).
940.25
940.25
Injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle. 940.25(1)
(1) Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class D felony:
940.25(1)(a)
(a) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.25(1)(b)
(b) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in
s. 340.01 (46m).
940.25(1)(bm)
(bm) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.1.
940.25(1)(c)
(c) Causes great bodily harm to an unborn child by the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
