943.10(2)(c)
(c) While the person is in the burglarized enclosure, he or she opens, or attempts to open, any depository by use of an explosive.
943.10(2)(d)
(d) While the person is in the burglarized enclosure, he or she commits a battery upon a person lawfully therein.
943.10(2)(e)
(e) The burglarized enclosure is a dwelling, boat, or motor home and another person is lawfully present in the dwelling, boat, or motor home at the time of the violation.
943.10(3)
(3) For the purpose of this section, entry into a place during the time when it is open to the general public is with consent.
943.10 Annotation
Stolen items may be introduced in evidence in a burglary prosecution as the items tend to prove that entry was made with intent to steal. Abraham v. State,
47 Wis. 2d 44,
176 N.W.2d 349 (1970).
943.10 Annotation
Since attempted robbery requires proof of elements in addition to those elements required to prove burglary, they are separate and distinct crimes. State v. DiMaggio,
49 Wis. 2d 565,
182 N.W.2d 466 (1971).
943.10 Annotation
The state need not prove that the defendant knew that his or her entry was without consent. Hanson v. State,
52 Wis. 2d 396,
190 N.W.2d 129 (1971).
943.10 Annotation
The unexplained possession of recently stolen goods raises an inference that the possessor is guilty of theft, and also of burglary if the goods were stolen in a burglary, and calls for an explanation of how the possessor obtained the property. Gautreaux v. State,
52 Wis. 2d 489,
190 N.W.2d 542 (1971).
943.10 Annotation
An information is defective if it charges entry into a building with intent to steal or to commit a felony, since these are different offenses. Champlain v. State,
53 Wis. 2d 751,
193 N.W.2d 868 (1972).
943.10 Annotation
While intent to steal will not be inferred from the fact of entry alone, additional circumstances such as time, nature of place entered, method of entry, identity of the accused, conduct at the time of arrest, or interruption, and other circumstances, without proof of actual losses, can be sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant entered with an intent to steal. State v. Barclay,
54 Wis. 2d 651,
196 N.W.2d 745 (1972).
943.10 Annotation
Evidence that the defendant walked around a private dwelling knocking on doors, then broke the glass in one, entered, and when confronted offered no excuse, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for burglary. Raymond v. State,
55 Wis. 2d 482,
198 N.W.2d 351 (1972).
943.10 Annotation
A burglary is completed after a door is pried open and entry made. It was no defense that the defendant had changed his mind and started to leave the scene when arrested. Morones v. State,
61 Wis. 2d 544,
213 N.W.2d 31 (1973).
943.10 Annotation
Hiding in the false ceiling of the men's room, perfected by false pretenses and fraud, rendered an otherwise lawful entrance into a restaurant unlawful. Levesque v. State,
63 Wis. 2d 412,
217 N.W.2d 317 (1974).
943.10 Annotation
Failure to allege lack of consent in an information charging burglary was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. Schleiss v. State,
71 Wis. 2d 733,
239 N.W.2d 68 (1976).
943.10 Annotation
In a burglary prosecution, ordinarily once proof of entry is made, it is the defendant's burden to show consent. When a private residence is broken into at night, little evidence is required to support an inference of intent to steal. LaTender v. State,
77 Wis. 2d 383,
253 N.W.2d 221 (1977).
943.10 Annotation
Entry into a hotel lobby open to the public, with intent to steal, is not burglary. Champlin v. State,
84 Wis. 2d 621,
267 N.W.2d 295 (1978).
943.10 Annotation
Section 939.72 (3) does not bar convictions for possession of burglarious tools and burglary arising out of a single transaction. Dumas v. State,
90 Wis. 2d 518,
280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979).
943.10 Annotation
Intent to steal is capable of being gleaned from the defendant's conduct and the circumstances surrounding it. State v. Bowden,
93 Wis. 2d 574,
288 N.W.2d 139 (1980).
943.10 Annotation
Under the facts of the case, the defendant's employer did not give the defendant consent to enter the employer's premises after hours by providing the defendant with a key to the premises. State v. Schantek,
120 Wis. 2d 79,
353 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1984).
943.10 Annotation
Felonies that form the basis of burglary charges include only offenses against persons and property. State v. O'Neill,
121 Wis. 2d 300,
359 N.W.2d 906 (1984).
943.10 Annotation
To negate the intent to steal through the defense of "self-help" repossession of property stolen from the defendant, the money repossessed must consist of the exact coins and currency owed to him or her. State v. Pettit,
171 Wis. 2d 627,
492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
943.10 Annotation
As used in sub. (2) (d), "battery" applies only to simple battery. Convictions for both intermediate battery under s. 940.19 (3) and burglary/battery under sub. (2) (d) did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Reynolds,
206 Wis. 2d 356,
557 N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1996),
96-0265.
943.10 Annotation
A firearm with a trigger lock is within the applicable definition of a dangerous weapon under s. 939.22 (10). State v. Norris,
214 Wis. 2d 25,
571 N.W.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-2158.
943.10 Annotation
Sub. (1) requires only an intent to commit a felony. There is not a unanimity requirement that the jury agree on the specific felony that was intended. State v. Hammer,
216 Wis. 2d 214,
576 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-3084.
943.10 Annotation
A nexus between the burglary and the weapon is not required for an armed burglary conviction. Being armed is a necessary separate element. That a nexus is not required does not violate due process and fundamental fairness. State v. Gardner,
230 Wis. 2d 32,
601 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1999),
98-2655.
943.10 Annotation
The defendant's violation of the bail jumping statute by making an unauthorized entry into the initial crime victim's premises in violation of the defendant's bond with the purpose of intimidating the victim constituted a felony against persons or property that would support a burglary charge. State v. Semrau, 2000 WI App 54,
233 Wis. 2d 508,
608 N.W.2d 376,
98-3443.
943.10 Annotation
A person commits a burglary by entering premises with the intent of committing a felony against persons or property while on the premises, regardless of whether the person's actions while within the premises constitute a new crime or the continuation of an ongoing offense. Felon in possession of a firearm in violation of s. 941.29 is a crime against persons or property that may be an underlying felony for a burglary charge. State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 34,
241 Wis. 2d 269,
625 N.W.2d 525,
00-0190.
943.10 Annotation
Each paragraph of sub. (2) defines a complete stand-alone crime. Separate convictions under separate paragraphs arising from the same event do not constitute double jeopardy. State v. Beasley, 2004 WI App 42,
271 Wis. 2d 469,
678 N.W.2d 600,
02-2229.
943.11
943.11
Entry into locked vehicle. Whoever intentionally enters the locked and enclosed portion or compartment of the vehicle of another without consent and with intent to steal therefrom is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
943.11 History
History: 1977 c. 173.
943.12
943.12
Possession of burglarious tools. Whoever has in personal possession any device or instrumentality intended, designed or adapted for use in breaking into any depository designed for the safekeeping of any valuables or into any building or room, with intent to use such device or instrumentality to break into a depository, building or room, and to steal therefrom, is guilty of a Class I felony.
943.12 History
History: 1977 c. 173;
2001 a. 109.
943.12 Annotation
A homemade key used to open parking meters is a burglarious tool. Perkins v. State,
61 Wis. 2d 341,
212 N.W.2d 141 (1973).
943.12 Annotation
It was implausible that the defendant was looking for the home of an acquaintance in order to pick up some artwork while carrying a crowbar, a pair of gloves, and a pair of socks. Hansen v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 541,
219 N.W.2d 246 (1974).
943.12 Annotation
Section 939.72 (3) does not bar convictions for possession of burglarious tools and burglary arising out of a single transaction. Dumas v. State,
90 Wis. 2d 518,
280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979).
943.12 Annotation
The defendant's 2 prior convictions for burglary were admissible to prove intent to use gloves, a long pocket knife, a crowbar, and a pillow case as burglarious tools. Vanlue v. State,
96 Wis. 2d 81,
291 N.W.2d 467 (1980).
943.125
943.125
Entry into locked coin box. 943.125(1)
(1) Whoever intentionally enters a locked coin box of another without consent and with intent to steal therefrom is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
943.125(2)
(2) Whoever has in personal possession any device or instrumentality intended, designed or adapted for use in breaking into any coin box, with intent to use the device or instrumentality to break into a coin box and to steal therefrom, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
943.125(3)
(3) In this section, "coin box" means any device or receptacle designed to receive money or any other thing of value. The term includes a depository box, parking meter, vending machine, pay telephone, money changing machine, coin-operated phonograph and amusement machine if they are designed to receive money or other thing of value.
943.125 History
History: 1977 c. 173.
943.13
943.13
Trespass to land. 943.13(1e)(a)
(a) "Dwelling unit" means a structure or that part of a structure which is used or intended to be used as a home, residence or sleeping place by one person or by 2 or more persons maintaining a common household, to the exclusion of all others.
943.13(1e)(az)
(az) "Implied consent" means conduct or words or both that imply that an owner or occupant of land has given consent to another person to enter the land.
943.13(1e)(b)
(b) "Inholding" means a parcel of land that is private property and that is surrounded completely by land owned by the United States, by this state or by a local governmental unit or any combination of the United States, this state and a local governmental unit.
943.13(1e)(c)
(c) "Local governmental unit" means a political subdivision of this state, a special purpose district in this state, an instrumentality or corporation of the political subdivision or special purpose district or a combination or subunit of any of the foregoing.
943.13(1e)(e)
(e) "Private property" means real property that is not owned by the United States, this state or a local governmental unit.
943.13(1e)(f)
(f) "Open land" means land that meets all of the following criteria:
943.13(1e)(f)1.
1. The land is not occupied by a structure or improvement being used or occupied as a dwelling unit.
943.13(1e)(f)2.
2. The land is not part of the curtilage, or is not lying in the immediate vicinity, of a structure or improvement being used or occupied as a dwelling unit.
943.13(1m)
(1m) Whoever does any of the following is subject to a Class B forfeiture:
943.13(1m)(a)
(a) Enters any enclosed, cultivated or undeveloped land of another, other than open land specified in
par. (e) or
(f), without the express or implied consent of the owner or occupant.
943.13(1m)(am)
(am) Enters any land of another that is occupied by a structure used for agricultural purposes without the express or implied consent of the owner or occupant.
943.13(1m)(b)
(b) Enters or remains on any land of another after having been notified by the owner or occupant not to enter or remain on the premises.
943.13(1m)(e)
(e) Enters or remains on open land that is an inholding of another after having been notified by the owner or occupant not to enter or remain on the land.
943.13(1m)(f)
(f) Enters undeveloped private land from an abutting parcel of land that is owned by the United States, this state or a local governmental unit, or remains on such land, after having been notified by the owner or occupant not to enter or remain on the land.
943.13(1s)
(1s) In determining whether a person has implied consent to enter the land of another a trier of fact shall consider all of the circumstances existing at the time the person entered the land, including all of the following:
943.13(1s)(a)
(a) Whether the owner or occupant acquiesced to previous entries by the person or by other persons under similar circumstances.
943.13(1s)(b)
(b) The customary use, if any, of the land by other persons.
943.13(1s)(c)
(c) Whether the owner or occupant represented to the public that the land may be entered for particular purposes.
943.13(1s)(d)
(d) The general arrangement or design of any improvements or structures on the land.
943.13(2)
(2) A person has received notice from the owner or occupant within the meaning of
sub. (1m) (b),
(e) or
(f) if he or she has been notified personally, either orally or in writing, or if the land is posted. Land is considered to be posted under this subsection under either of the following procedures:
943.13(2)(a)
(a) If a sign at least 11 inches square is placed in at least 2 conspicuous places for every 40 acres to be protected. The sign must carry an appropriate notice and the name of the person giving the notice followed by the word "owner" if the person giving the notice is the holder of legal title to the land and by the word "occupant" if the person giving the notice is not the holder of legal title but is a lawful occupant of the land. Proof that appropriate signs as provided in this paragraph were erected or in existence upon the premises to be protected prior to the event complained of shall be prima facie proof that the premises to be protected were posted as provided in this paragraph.
943.13(2)(b)
(b) If markings at least one foot long, including in a contrasting color the phrase "private land" and the name of the owner, are made in at least 2 conspicuous places for every 40 acres to be protected.
943.13(3)
(3) Whoever erects on the land of another signs which are the same as or similar to those described in
sub. (2) without obtaining the express consent of the lawful occupant of or holder of legal title to such land is subject to a Class C forfeiture.
943.13(3m)
(3m) An owner or occupant may give express consent to enter or remain on the land for a specified purpose or subject to specified conditions and it is a violation of
sub. (1m) (a) or
(am) for a person who received that consent to enter or remain on the land for another purpose or contrary to the specified conditions.
943.13(4)
(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a representative of a labor union from conferring with any employee provided such conference is conducted in the living quarters of the employee and with the consent of the employee occupants.
943.13(4m)
(4m) This section does not apply to any of the following:
943.13(4m)(a)
(a) A person entering the land, other than the residence or other buildings or the curtilage of the residence or other buildings, of another for the purpose of removing a wild animal as authorized under
s. 29.885 (2),
(3) or
(4).
943.13(4m)(c)
(c) A person entering or remaining on any exposed shore area of a stream as authorized under
s. 30.134.
943.13(5)
(5) Any authorized occupant of employer-provided housing shall have the right to decide who may enter, confer and visit with the occupant in the housing area the occupant occupies.
943.13 Annotation
The arrest of abortion protesters trespassing at a clinic did not violate their free speech rights. State v. Horn,
139 Wis. 2d 473,
407 N.W.2d 854 (1987).
943.13 Annotation
Administrative code provisions requiring hunters to make reasonable efforts to retrieve game birds killed or injured do not exempt a person from criminal prosecution under sub. (1) (b) for trespassing upon posted lands to retrieve birds shot from outside the posted area. 64 Atty. Gen. 204.
943.14
943.14
Criminal trespass to dwellings. Whoever intentionally enters the dwelling of another without the consent of some person lawfully upon the premises, under circumstances tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
943.14 History
History: 1977 c. 173.
943.14 Annotation
Criminal trespass to a dwelling is not a lesser included offense of burglary. Raymond v. State,
55 Wis. 2d 482,
198 N.W.2d 351 (1972).
943.14 Annotation
Regardless of any ownership rights in the property, if a person enters a dwelling that is another's residence, without consent, this section is violated. State v. Carls,
186 Wis. 2d 533,
516 N.W.2d 533 (Ct. App. 1994).
943.14 Annotation
Entering an outbuilding accessory to a main house may be a violation. 62 Atty. Gen. 16.
943.145
943.145
Criminal trespass to a medical facility. 943.145(1)
(1) In this section, "medical facility" means a hospital under
s. 50.33 (2) or a clinic or office that is used by a physician licensed under
ch. 448 and that is subject to rules promulgated by the medical examining board for the clinic or office that are in effect on November 20, 1985.
943.145(2)
(2) Whoever intentionally enters a medical facility without the consent of some person lawfully upon the premises, under circumstances tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace, is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
943.145(3)
(3) This section does not prohibit any person from participating in lawful conduct in labor disputes under
s. 103.53.
