971.08 Annotation
When discussing a plea recommendation, the state may not give a less than neutral recitation of the agreement's terms. Reference to the plea agreement was not less than neutral when the prosecutor agreed with the presentence report that the defendant needed to be incarcerated, without commenting on the sentence recommendation in the report. State v. Stenseth,
2003 WI App 198,
266 Wis. 2d 959,
669 N.W.2d 776,
02-3330.
971.08 Annotation
The defendant's due process rights were violated when the investigating detective in the case gave a sentencing recommendation to the sentencing court, written on police department letterhead, that undermined the state's plea-bargained recommendation, in effect breaching the plea agreement when the court had also forwarded the letter to the presentence investigation writer to assess and evaluate. State v. Matson,
2003 WI App 253,
268 Wis. 2d 725,
674 N.W.2d 51,
03-0251.
971.08 Annotation
The prosecution may discuss negative facts about the defendant in order to justify a recommended sentence within the parameters of a plea agreement. A defendant is entitled to a neutral recitation of the terms of the plea agreement. The prosecutor may not overtly or covertly convey to the court that a sentence harsher than that recommended is warranted, but the state is not obligated to say something nice or positive about the defendant in order to avoid breaching a plea agreement. State v. Naydihor,
2004 WI 43,
270 Wis. 2d 585,
678 N.W.2d 220,
01-3093.
971.08 Annotation
If the court is aware of a plea agreement, the court must advise the defendant personally that the court is not bound by the terms of that agreement and ascertain that the defendant understands this information. When the defendant shows that the court failed to inform the defendant that it was not bound by the plea agreement, and the defendant alleges that he did not understand that the court was not bound, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw the plea. State v. Hampton,
2004 WI 107,
274 Wis. 2d 379,
683 N.W.2d 14,
01-0509.
971.08 Annotation
The strategic decision by defense counsel to forego an objection to the state's breach of a plea agreement without consulting the defendant was tantamount to entering a renegotiated plea agreement without the defendant's knowledge or consent. On that basis defense counsel's performance was deficient and because counsel's deficient performance involved a breach of a plea agreement, the defendant was automatically prejudiced. State v. Sprang,
2004 WI App 121,
274 Wis. 2d 784,
683 N.W.2d 522,
03-2240.
971.08 Annotation
At sentencing, pertinent factors relating to the defendant's character and behavioral pattern cannot be immunized by a plea agreement between the defendant and the state. A plea agreement that does not allow the sentencing court to be apprised of relevant information is void as against public policy. The fact that the prosecutor's comments were compelling and delivered by strong words does not transform the commentary into a plea bargain violation. State v. Jackson,
2004 WI App 132,
274 Wis. 2d 692,
685 N.W.2d 839,
03-1805.
971.08 Annotation
A prosecutor may not make comments that suggest the prosecutor believes the disposition he or she is recommending pursuant to a plea agreement is insufficient, but may provide relevant negative information including information that has come to light after a plea agreement has been reached. A prosecutor can assert that a recommendation is appropriate and at the same time argue that the circumstances were so severe that the court should impose no less than the recommended sentence. State v. Liukonen,
2004 WI App 157,
276 Wis. 2d 64,
686 N.W.2d 689,
03-1539.
971.08 Annotation
A plea agreement that leads a defendant to believe that a material advantage or right has been preserved when, in fact, it cannot legally be obtained, produces a plea that is as a matter of law neither knowing nor voluntary and the defendant must be allowed to withdraw the plea. Even if the trial court had rejected the illegal provision at sentencing, it would not have cured the error when the defendant was induced to enter the plea by a promise that the state could never keep. State v. Dawson,
2004 WI App 173,
276 Wis. 2d 418,
688 N.W.2d 12,
03-2116.
971.08 Annotation
When a defendant entered a plea believing he would not be subject to the collateral consequences that actually applied and that belief was based on affirmative, incorrect statements on the record by the defendant's counsel and the prosecutor that were not corrected by the court, the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and could be withdrawn. State v. Brown,
2004 WI App 179,
276 Wis. 2d 559,
687 N.W.2d 543,
03-2915.
971.08 Annotation
Williams,
2003 WI App 116, expressly applies only to direct judicial participation in the plea bargaining process itself. A judge's comments on the strength of the state's case and urging a defendant to carefully consider his or her chances of prevailing at trial are many steps removed from the direct judicial participation in plea negotiations that occurred in Williams. State v. Hunter,
2005 WI App 5,
278 Wis. 2d 419,
692 N.W.2d 256,
03-2348.
971.08 Annotation
The state is not required to correct a misstated sentence recommendation forcefully or enthusiastically. It is sufficient to promptly acknowledge the mistake of fact and to rectify the error without impairing the integrity of the sentencing process. State v. Bowers,
2005 WI App 72,
280 Wis. 2d 534,
696 N.W.2d 255,
04-1093.
971.08 Annotation
The state was free to recommend consecutive sentences under a plea agreement that contained no provision regarding whether the sentence for the pled-to charges was to run concurrent or consecutive with the sentence entered in another proceeding. State v. Bowers,
2005 WI App 72,
280 Wis. 2d 534,
696 N.W.2d 255,
04-1093.
971.08 Annotation
Wisconsin eliminated parole and good-time credit when it adopted its "truth-in-sentencing" scheme. The lack of parole eligibility and good-time credit are not direct consequences of a plea that a court must inform a defendant of prior to accepting a plea. State v. Plank,
2005 WI App 109,
282 Wis. 2d 522,
699 N.W.2d 235,
04-2280.
971.08 Annotation
A defendant seeking to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest prior to sentencing must show a fair and just reason for allowing the withdrawal, which is some adequate reason for defendant's change of heart other than the desire to have a trial. A lack of knowledge of sex offender registration or that one is eligible for a ch. 980 commitment are fair and just reasons for withdrawing a guilty plea. Prejudice needed to merit a denial of a plea withdrawal must be significant in order to trump a defendant's fair and just reason. Entitlement to withdraw pleas to some charges does not entitle the defendant to withdraw all guilty pleas. State v. Nelson,
2005 WI App 113,
282 Wis. 2d 502,
701 N.W.2d 32,
04-1954.
971.08 Annotation
The state is free to negotiate away any right it may have to recommend a sentence, but the state does not have a right to make an agreement to stand mute in the face of factual inaccuracies or to withhold relevant factual information from the court. Such an agreement would violate a prosecutor's duty and result in sentences based upon incomplete facts or factual inaccuracies, a notion that is abhorrent to the legal system. State v. Neuaone,
2005 WI App 124,
284 Wis. 2d 473,
700 N.W.2d 298,
04-0196.
971.08 Annotation
A court is not required to conduct an on-the-record colloquy with respect to a defendant's desire to abandon a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Only fundamental constitutional rights warrant this special protection and such a plea falls outside the realm of fundamental rights. State v. Francis,
2005 WI App 161,
285 Wis. 2d 451,
701 N.W.2d 632,
04-1360.
971.08 Annotation
If a defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or she was not informed of the direct consequences of a plea, the burden shifts to the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. The state was required to prove that the defendant knew the correct maximum sentence despite being given erroneous information at every stage of the proceeding. The defendant was not required to show that the misinformation caused the plea. State v. Harden,
2005 WI App 252,
287 Wis. 2d 871,
707 N.W.2d 173,
05-0262.
971.08 Annotation
For purposes of plea withdrawal motions, sentencing, when a deferred prosecution agreement is involved, encompasses the initial disposition of the case after the parties enter the agreement and the agreement is ratified by the trial court and a motion for plea withdrawal after entry of the agreement is subject to the standard for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing. State v. Daley,
2006 WI App 81,
292 Wis. 2d 517,
716 N.W.2d 146,
05-0048.
971.08 Annotation
Although a circuit court must establish that a defendant understands every element of the charges pled to, the court is not expected to explain every element of every charge in every case. Bangert allows a court to tailor a plea colloquy to the individual defendant, but in customizing a plea colloquy a circuit court must do more than merely record the defendant's affirmation of understanding. A statement from defense counsel that he or she has reviewed the elements of the charge, without some summary of the elements or detailed description of the conversation, cannot constitute an affirmative showing that the nature of the crime has been communicated. State v. Brown,
2006 WI 100,
293 Wis. 2d 594,
716 N.W.2d 906,
03-2662.
971.08 Annotation
The circuit court properly advised the defendant of the range of punishments associated with his crimes when it informed him of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed. Nothing in sub. (1) (a) or Bangert requires a sentencing court to make the maximum term of confinement associated with a bifurcated sentence explicit prior to accepting a plea of guilty or no contest. State v. Sutton,
2006 WI App 118,
254 Wis. 2d 330,
718 N.W.2d 146,
05-1693.
971.08 Annotation
Sub. (2) uses the term "likely" and not "shall," meaning the defendant need not prove he definitely will be deported as a result of the case in question. Even though an earlier conviction sparked an investigation and immigration detainer, that an additional sexual assault conviction obviously would be included as part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's information when determining whether to deport him, the defendant had shown his plea in this case offense was likely to result in his deportation requiring that he be permitted to withdraw his plea. State v. Bedolla,
2006 WI App 154,
295 Wis. 2d 410,
720 N.W. 2d 158,
05-2717.
971.08 Annotation
A package plea agreement, which is a plea agreement contingent on two or more codefendants all entering pleas according to the terms of the agreement, is not involuntary if the defendant felt pressure in the sense of a psychological need to try to help his codefendants get the benefit of the package agreement. State v. Goyette,
2006 WI App 178,
296 Wis. 2d 359,
722 N.W. 2d 731,
04-2211.
971.08 Annotation
Compliance with the Bangert requirements does not permit a circuit court to rely on a defendant's plea colloquy responses to deny the defendant an evidentiary hearing on a properly pled postconviction motion that asserts a non-Bangert reason why the plea was not knowing or voluntary. Under Howell, when a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea asserts that the responses given during a plea colloquy were false and the defendant provides non-conclusory information that plausibly explains why the answers were false, the defendant must be given an evidentiary hearing on his or her plea withdrawal motion. State v. Basley,
2006 WI App 253,
298 Wis. 2d 232,
726 N.W.2d 671,
05-2449.
971.08 Annotation
Establishing a sufficient factual basis under sub. (1) (b) requires a showing that the conduct the defendant admits to constitutes the offense charged. The factual basis requirement protects a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his or her conduct does not actually fall within the charge. When the factual basis relied upon by the court in this case in accepting the defendant's guilty plea raised a substantial question as to whether the defendant had committed sexual assault of a child or had herself been the victim of rape, the circuit court was required to make further inquiry to establish a sufficient factual basis to support the plea. State v. Lackershire,
2007 WI 74,
301 Wis. 2d 418,
734 N.W.2d 23,
05-1189.
971.08 Annotation
To ascertain a defendant's understanding of a charge, a circuit court might: 1) summarize the nature of the charge by reading the jury instructions; 2) ask defendant's counsel about his or her explanation to the defendant and ask counsel or the defendant to summarize the explanation; or 3) refer to the record or other evidence of the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge. State v. Howell,
2007 WI 75,
301 Wis. 2d 350,
734 N.W.2d 48,
05-0731.
971.08 Annotation
A defendant's affirmative response that he or she understands the nature of the charge, without establishing his or her knowledge of the nature of the charge, submits more to a perfunctory procedure rather than to the constitutional standard that a plea be affirmatively shown to be voluntarily and intelligently made. A defendant must at some point have expressed his or her knowledge of the nature of the charge to satisfy the requirement of this section. State v. Howell,
2007 WI 75,
301 Wis. 2d 350,
734 N.W.2d 48,
05-0731.
971.08 Annotation
A defendant may invoke both Bangert and Nelson (
54 Wis. 2d 489)/Bentley (
201 Wis. 2d 303) in a single postconviction motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. A defendant invokes Bangert when the plea colloquy is defective; a defendant invokes Nelson/Bentley when the defendant alleges that some factor extrinsic to the plea colloquy, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion, renders a plea infirm. State v. Howell,
2007 WI 75,
301 Wis. 2d 350,
734 N.W.2d 48,
05-0731.
971.08 Annotation
Upon a motion to withdraw a plea before sentencing, the defendant faces 3 obstacles: 1) the defendant must proffer a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea; 2) the circuit court must find the reason credible; and 3) the defendant must rebut evidence of substantial prejudice to the state. If the defendant does not overcome these obstacles in the view of the circuit court, and is not permitted to withdraw the plea, the defendant's burden to reverse the circuit court on appeal becomes relatively high. State v. Jenkins,
2007 WI 96,
303 Wis. 2d 157,
736 N.W.2d 24,
05-0302.
971.08 Annotation
Misinformation as to one charge did not render all the defendants' pleas under a plea agreement unknowing, involuntary, and not intelligently entered. A return of the parties to pre-plea positions is not the mandated remedy when convictions are based on a negotiated plea agreement and an error later surfaces as to one count. The appropriate remedy depends upon the totality of the circumstances and a consideration of the parties' interests, a matter committed to the sentencing court's discretion. State v. Roou,
2007 WI App 193,
305 Wis. 2d 164,
738 N.W.2d 173,
06-1574.
971.08 Annotation
Circuit courts may not sua sponte vacate fully and fairly entered and accepted pleas. When the state never asked the circuit court to sua sponte vacate a guilty plea, but merely acquiesced in that decision until it filed its motion for reconsideration, the state was not judicially estopped from seeking to have the circuit court comply with the law. State v. Rushing,
2007 WI App 227,
305 Wis. 2d 739,
740 N.W.2d 894,
06-3152.
971.08 Annotation
Wisconsin's read-in procedure does not require a defendant to admit guilt of a read-in charge for purposes of sentencing and does not require a circuit court to deem the defendant to admit to the read-in crime for purposes of sentencing. The terms "admit" or "deemed admitted" should be avoided in referring to a defendant's agreement to read in a dismissed charge. A court should advise a defendant that it may consider read-in charges when imposing sentence but that the maximum penalty of the charged offense will not be increased; that a circuit court may require a defendant to pay restitution on any read-in charges; and that the state is prohibited from future prosecution of the read-in charge. A court is not barred from accepting a defendant's admission of guilt of a read-in charge. State v. Straszkowski,
2008 WI 65,
310 Wis. 2d 259,
750 N.W.2d 835,
06-0064.
971.08 Annotation
Williams does not prohibit a trial judge from informing a defendant that the judge intends to exceed the sentencing recommendation and allowing the defendant to withdraw a plea. State v. Marinez,
2008 WI App 105,
313 Wis. 2d 490,
756 N.W.2d 570,
07-0964.
971.08 Annotation
A circuit court may not rely entirely on the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form as a substitute for a substantive in-court plea colloquy. The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form provides a defendant and counsel the opportunity to review together a written statement of the information a defendant should know before entering a guilty plea. A completed Form can be a very useful instrument to help ensure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. The plea colloquy cannot, however, be reduced to determining whether the defendant has read and filled out the Form. State v. Christopher S. Hoppe,
2009 WI 41,
317 Wis. 2d 161,
765 N.W.2d 794,
07-0905.
971.08 Annotation
Courts do not construe plea bargains against the drafter. When language is equally capable of two constructions, the construction that would safeguard the public interests, substantially, must be given preference over that construction that secures only insufficient or unsubstantial advantages to the public. State v. Wesley,
2009 WI App 118,
321 Wis. 2d 151,
772 N.W.2d 232,
08-1338.
971.08 Annotation
When a plea agreement merely prohibited the state from recommending a particular length of sentence, the plea agreement did not curtail the state's ability to advocate its position that the defendant receive prison time. The state's recitation of the pre-sentence investigation report's recommendation for a specific sentence was simply that, a recitation, and the state's discussion of the particulars of the crime did not amount to an endorsement of the report's recommendation. State v. Duckett,
2010 WI App 44,
324 Wis. 2d 244,
781 N.W.2d 522,
09-0958.
971.08 Annotation
Deciding whether to reject a plea agreement is squarely within the court's authority; to hold otherwise would permit encroachment by the executive branch into the realm that has historically been that of the judicial branch. Consideration of the views of the prosecutor as well as the defense attorney enter into that determination. Authority vests in the circuit court to determine what pleas are in the public interest without permitting the court to intrude on the authority of the prosecutor to decide what charges to file or whether to file charges in the first instance. Factors to be considered by the court are discussed. State v. Conger,
2010 WI 56,
325 Wis. 2d 664,
797 N.W.2d 341,
08-0755.
971.08 Annotation
Matson did not stand for the proposition that law enforcement views can never be properly considered by a court. Considering law enforcement representatives' views as a factor in determining whether to reject the proposed plea agreement is quite a different matter from allowing law enforcement to slip a harsher sentencing recommendation to a court while the prosecutor uses a lesser sentencing recommendation to procure a plea from the defendant. Here, the consideration of law enforcement's views was only one factor, of several noted in the record, in the circuit court's decision, and it was not obtained after the prosecution had secured the defendant's plea. State v. Conger,
2010 WI 56,
325 Wis. 2d 664,
797 N.W.2d 341,
08-0755.
971.08 Annotation
When a defendant is told that he or she faces a maximum possible sentence that is higher, but not substantially higher, than that authorized by law, the circuit court has not violated the plea colloquy requirements outlined in this section and the Bangert line of cases and the circuit court has still fulfilled its duty to inform the defendant of the range of punishments. However, when the difference is significant, or when the defendant is told the sentence is lower than the amount allowed by law, a defendant's due process rights are at greater risk and a Bangert violation may be established. State v. Cross,
2010 WI 70,
326 Wis. 2d 492;
786 N.W.2d 64,
09-0003.
971.08 Annotation
Given the provision's placement within the statute, the context requires circuit courts to give the sub. (1) (c) deportation advisement at the plea hearing. The duty set forth in sub. (1) (c) is imposed solely on the circuit court. A defendant's action or inaction cannot alter that duty. A defendant may neither waive nor forfeit the right to plea withdrawal under sub. (2), which provides a specific remedy when a defendant later shows that the plea is likely to result in the defendant's deportation. State v. Vang,
2010 WI App 118,
328 Wis. 2d 251;
789 N.W.2d 115,
09-2162.
971.08 Annotation
When the circuit court did not inform the defendant that it was not bound by the plea agreement, the circuit court erred; however, given that the circuit court accepted the plea agreement, the defendant did not demonstrate that withdrawal of his plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. The defendant was not affected by the defect in his plea colloquy; in fact, he received the benefit of the plea agreement when the court accepted the plea, dropping one of 2 charges. State v. Johnson,
2012 WI App 21,
339 Wis. 2d 421,
811 N.W.2d 441,
11-0348.
971.08 Annotation
When the accused rejected a plea bargain on a misdemeanor charge and instead requested a jury trial, the prosecutor did not act vindictively in raising the charge to a felony. United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368 (1982).
971.08 Annotation
The defendant's acceptance of the prosecutor's proposed plea bargain did not bar the prosecutor from withdrawing the offer. Mabry v. Johnson,
467 U.S. 504 (1984).
971.08 Annotation
When a defendant knowingly entered a guilty plea and the state's evidence supported a conviction, the conviction was valid even though the defendant gave testimony inconsistent with the plea. Hansen v. Mathews,
424 F.2d 1205 (1970).
971.08 Annotation
Following a guilty plea, the defendant could not raise a speedy trial issue. United States v. Gaertner,
583 F.2d 308 (1978).
971.08 Annotation
Guilty pleas in Wisconsin. Bishop, 58 MLR 631.
971.08 Annotation
Pleas of guilty; plea bargaining. 1971 WLR 583.
971.09
971.09
Plea of guilty to offenses committed in several counties. 971.09(1)(1) Any person who admits that he or she has committed crimes in the county in which he or she is in custody and also in another county in this state may apply to the district attorney of the county in which he or she is in custody to be charged with those crimes so that the person may plead guilty and be sentenced for them in the county of custody. The application shall contain a description of all admitted crimes and the name of the county in which each was committed.
971.09(2)
(2) Upon receipt of the application the district attorney shall prepare an information charging all the admitted crimes and naming in each count the county where each was committed. The district attorney shall send a copy of the information to the district attorney of each other county in which the defendant admits he or she committed crimes, together with a statement that the defendant has applied to plead guilty in the county of custody. Upon receipt of the information and statement, the district attorney of the other county may execute a consent in writing allowing the defendant to enter a plea of guilty in the county of custody, to the crime charged in the information and committed in the other county, and send it to the district attorney who prepared the information.
971.09(3)
(3) The district attorney shall file the information in any court of the district attorney's county having jurisdiction to try or accept a plea of guilty to the most serious crime alleged therein as to which, if alleged to have been committed in another county, the district attorney of that county has executed a consent as provided in
sub. (2). The defendant then may enter a plea of guilty to all offenses alleged to have been committed in the county where the court is located and to all offenses alleged to have been committed in other counties as to which the district attorney has executed a consent under
sub. (2). Before entering a plea of guilty, the defendant shall waive in writing any right to be tried in the county where the crime was committed. The district attorney of the county where the crime was committed need not be present when the plea is made but the district attorney's written consent shall be filed with the court.
971.09(4)
(4) Thereupon the court shall enter such judgment, the same as though all the crimes charged were alleged to have been committed in the county where the court is located, whether or not the court has jurisdiction to try all those crimes to which the defendant has pleaded guilty under this section.
971.09(5)
(5) The county where the plea is made shall pay the costs of prosecution if the defendant does not pay them, and is entitled to retain fees for receiving and paying to the state any fine which may be paid by the defendant. The clerk where the plea is made shall file a copy of the judgment of conviction with the clerk in each county where a crime covered by the plea was committed. The district attorney shall then move to dismiss any charges covered by the plea of guilty, which are pending against the defendant in the district attorney's county, and the same shall thereupon be dismissed.
971.09 History
History: 1979 c. 31;
1993 a. 486.
971.09 Annotation
It was not error for the court to accept a plea before an amended complaint was filed when the defendant waived the late filing and was not prejudiced thereby. Failure to prepare an amended information prior to obtaining consents by the district attorneys involved did not invalidate the conviction when the consents were actually obtained and the defendant waived the defect. Failure to dismiss the charges in one of the counties did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Failure of a district attorney to specifically consent to one offense did not invalidate the procedure when the error was clerical. Peterson v. State,
54 Wis. 2d 370,
195 N.W.2d 837 (1972).
971.09 Annotation
Although the statute requires a plea of guilty to both the primary case and the case being consolidated, it is a logical extension to allow the defendant to ask for the consolidation of a case from another county to which a guilty plea has been entered with a case in which guilt was found by the court. State v. Rachwal,
159 Wis. 2d 494,
465 N.W.2d 490 (1991).
971.09 Annotation
In a consolidated case, amendment of the charges from another county is not permissible. When amendment of those charges occurs after consolidation, the original trial court retains jurisdiction. If the original charge does not have the identical elements of the amended charge, double jeopardy does not prevent prosecution of the original charge in the original county although a guilty plea was entered to the amended charge in the other court. State v. Dillon,
187 Wis. 2d 39,
522 N.W.2d 530 (Ct. App. 1994).
971.095
971.095
Consultation with and notices to victim. 971.095(2)
(2) In any case in which a defendant has been charged with a crime, the district attorney shall, as soon as practicable, offer all of the victims in the case who have requested the opportunity an opportunity to confer with the district attorney concerning the prosecution of the case and the possible outcomes of the prosecution, including potential plea agreements and sentencing recommendations. The duty to confer under this subsection does not limit the obligation of the district attorney to exercise his or her discretion concerning the handling of any criminal charge against the defendant.
971.095(3)
(3) At the request of a victim, a district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to provide the victim with notice of the date, time and place of scheduled court proceedings in a case involving the prosecution of a crime of which he or she is a victim and any changes in the date, time or place of a scheduled court proceeding for which the victim has received notice. This subsection does not apply to a proceeding held before the initial appearance to set conditions of release under
ch. 969.
971.095(4)
(4) If a person is arrested for a crime but the district attorney decides not to charge the person with a crime, the district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to inform all of the victims of the act for which the person was arrested that the person will not be charged with a crime at that time.
971.095(5)
(5) If a person is charged with committing a crime and the charge against the person is subsequently dismissed, the district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to inform all of the victims of the crime with which the person was charged that the charge has been dismissed.
971.095(6)
(6) A district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to provide information concerning the disposition of a case involving a crime to any victim of the crime who requests the information.
971.095 History
History: 1997 a. 181.
971.10(1)(1) In misdemeanor actions trial shall commence within 60 days from the date of the defendant's initial appearance in court.
971.10(2)(a)(a) The trial of a defendant charged with a felony shall commence within 90 days from the date trial is demanded by any party in writing or on the record. If the demand is made in writing, a copy shall be served upon the opposing party. The demand may not be made until after the filing of the information or indictment.
971.10(2)(b)
(b) If the court is unable to schedule a trial pursuant to
par. (a), the court shall request assignment of another judge pursuant to
s. 751.03.
971.10(3)(a)(a) A court may grant a continuance in a case, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, if the ends of justice served by taking action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. A continuance shall not be granted under this paragraph unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
971.10(3)(b)
(b) The factors, among others, which the court shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under
par. (a) are:
971.10(3)(b)1.
1. Whether the failure to grant the continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice.
971.10(3)(b)2.
2. Whether the case taken as a whole is so unusual and so complex, due to the number of defendants or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this section.
971.10(3)(c)
(c) No continuance under
par. (a) may be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar or the lack of diligent preparation or the failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the state.
971.10(4)
(4) Every defendant not tried in accordance with this section shall be discharged from custody but the obligations of the bond or other conditions of release of a defendant shall continue until modified or until the bond is released or the conditions removed.
971.10 Annotation
A federal court applied balancing test is applicable to review the exercise of a trial court's discretion on a request for the substitution of trial counsel, with the associated request for a continuance. Phifer v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 24,
218 N.W.2d 354.
971.10 Annotation
A party requesting a continuance on grounds of surprise must show: 1) actual surprise from an unforeseeable development; 2) when surprise is caused by unexpected testimony, the probability of producing contradictory or impeaching evidence; and 3) resulting prejudice if the request is denied. Angus v. State,
76 Wis. 2d 191,
251 N.W.2d 28 (1977).
971.10 Annotation
A delay of 84 days between a defendant's first court appearance and trial on misdemeanor traffic charges was not so inordinate as to raise a presumption of prejudice. State v. Mullis,
81 Wis. 2d 454,
260 N.W.2d 696 (1978).
971.10 Annotation
A stay of proceedings caused by the state's interlocutory appeal stopped the running of the time period under sub. (2). State ex rel. Rabe v. Ferris,
97 Wis. 2d 63,
293 N.W.2d 151 (1980).
971.10 Annotation
Following a guilty plea, the defendant could not raise a speedy trial issue. United States v. Gaertner,
583 F.2d 308 (1978).
971.105
971.105
Child victims and witnesses; duty to expedite proceedings. In all criminal and delinquency cases, juvenile fact-finding hearings under
s. 48.31 and juvenile dispositional hearings involving a child victim or witness, as defined in
s. 950.02, the court and the district attorney shall take appropriate action to ensure a speedy trial in order to minimize the length of time the child must endure the stress of the child's involvement in the proceeding. In ruling on any motion or other request for a delay or continuance of proceedings, the court shall consider and give weight to any adverse impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of a child victim or witness.
