102.03 Annotation
An attack that occurs during employment arising from a personal relationship outside the employment arises out of the employment if employment conditions contribute to the attack. Emotional injury from harassing phone calls by an ex-spouse to the employee at her place of work, after her employer unwittingly gave out her phone number, was an injury in the course of employment. Weiss v. City of Milwaukee,
208 Wis. 2d 95,
559 N.W.2d 558 (1997),
94-0171.
102.03 Annotation
The elements of proof placed on a claimant alleging physical injury as a result of emotional stress in the workplace requires that work activity precipitate, aggravate, or accelerate beyond normal progression a progressively deteriorating or degenerative condition. Unlike emotional injury from stress, showing "unusual stress" is not required. UPS v. Lust,
208 Wis. 2d 306,
560 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-0137.
102.03 Annotation
The exclusive remedy provision in s. 102.03 (2) does not bar a complainant whose claim is covered by worker's compensation from pursuing an employment discrimination claim under the Fair Employment Act, subch. II of ch. 111. Byers v. LIRC,
208 Wis. 2d 388,
561 N.W.2d 678 (1997),
95-2490.
102.03 Annotation
An employee terminated for misrepresenting his or her medical condition while receiving disability benefits for a concededly work-related injury continues to be entitled to benefits. Brakebush Brothers, Inc. v. LIRC,
210 Wis. 2d 623,
563 N.W.2d 512 (1997),
95-2586.
102.03 Annotation
A work-related injury that plays any role in a second injury is properly considered a substantial factor in the reinjury. To find a work-related injury not a factor in a second injury, it must be found that the claimant would have suffered the same injury, to the same extent, despite the first injury. New symptoms alone do not suggest an unrelated second injury. Lange v. LIRC,
215 Wis. 2d 561,
573 N.W.2d 856 (Ct. App. 1997),
97-0865.
102.03 Annotation
The
Seaman loaned employee test is a 3-element test that is often miscast because the
Seaman court indicated that there are 4 "vital questions" that must be answered. The 3 elements are: 1) consent by the employee; 2) entry by the employee upon work for the special employer; and 3) power of the special employer to control details of the work. The distinction between employee consent to perform certain acts and consent to enter into a new employment relationship is important. Borneman v. Corwyn Transport, Ltd.
219 Wis. 2d 346,
580 N.W.2d 253 (1998),
96-2511.
102.03 Annotation
Under sub. (1) (f), there is a presumption that a travelling employee performs services incidental to employment at all times on a trip. The burden of proving a personal deviation on the trip is on the party asserting the deviation. Recreational activities may be considered a usual and proper part of the trip but do not always fit the presumption. CBS, Inc. v. LIRC,
219 Wis. 2d 564,
579 N.W.2d 668 (1998),
96-3707.
102.03 Annotation
LIRC's determination of "scope of employment" is given great weight deference. Whether any agency's determination is given great weight depends on whether it has experience in interpreting a particular statutory scheme and not on whether it has ruled on the specific facts. Town of Russell Volunteer Fire Department v. LIRC,
223 Wis. 2d 723,
589 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1998),
98-0734.
102.03 Annotation
A compensable injury must arise out of employment, which refers to the causal origin of the injury, and occur while the employee performs a service growing out of and incidental to employment, which refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Ide v. LIRC,
224 Wis. 2d 159,
589 N.W.2d 363 (1999),
97-1649.
102.03 Annotation
Intentional harm to an employee is an "accident " subject to this chapter if caused by acts of a coemployee, but not if caused by acts of an employer. Intentionally self-inflicted injury is not subject to this chapter, but death by suicide is not necessarily "intentionally self-inflicted" and is subject to this chapter if the suicide results from a work-related injury without an independent intervening cause. Cohn v. Apogee, Inc.
225 Wis. 2d 815,
593 N.W.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1999),
97-3817.
102.03 Annotation
Sub. (1) (f) does not establish a bright line rule that if a travelling employee stays over past the conclusion of a business part of a trip, there is a personal deviation. An employee is not required to seek immediate seclusion in a hotel and to remain away from human beings at the risk of being charged with deviating from employment. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. LIRC,
226 Wis. 2d 778,
595 N.W.2d 23 (1999),
97-2747.
102.03 Annotation
It was reasonable for LIRC to hold that an employee had temporarily abandoned his job and was not performing services incidental to employment under sub. (1) (c) 1. when he left the workplace to seek medical attention for an immediate need that was not related to his employment, even though intending to return. Fry v. LIRC,
2000 WI App 239,
239 Wis. 2d 574,
620 N.W.2d 449,
00-0523.
102.03 Annotation
Whether a traveling employee's multiple drinks at a tavern was a deviation was irrelevant when the employee was injured while engaged in a later act reasonably necessary to living. Under s. 102.58, intoxication does not defeat a worker's compensation claim but only decreases the benefits. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co. v. Larsen,
2001 WI 30,
242 Wis. 2d 47,
624 N.W.2d 129,
98-3577.
102.03 Annotation
Under the private errand doctrine, if a person in authority over the employee asks the employee to perform a service for the personal benefit of the employer or the employee's superior and the employee is injured while performing the task, the injury grew out of and was incidental to employment unless the request is clearly unauthorized. Begel v. LIRC,
2001 WI App 134,
246 Wis. 2d 345,
631 N.W.2d 220,
00-1875.
102.03 Annotation
Under the "dual persona" doctrine, the employer's second role must be so unrelated to its role as an employer that it constitutes a separate legal person. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Keltgen,
2003 WI App 53,
260 Wis. 2d 523,
659 N.W.2d 906,
02-1249.
102.03 Annotation
When one company was the injured employee's employer on the date of the injury, but another company contracted to become the employer retroactive to a date prior to the injury, the former and its insurer were the responsible for providing benefits under ch. 102. Epic Staff Management, Inc. v. LIRC,
2003 WI App 143,
266 Wis. 2d 369,
667 N.W.2d 765,
02-2310.
102.03 Annotation
Under the last exception in sub. (2), an employee who receives worker's compensation benefits may also file suit against a coemployee when a governmental unit is obligated to pay judgments against that employee pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or a local ordinance. Keller v. Kraft,
2003 WI App 212,
267 Wis. 2d 444,
671 N.W.2d 361,
02-3377.
102.03 Annotation
A claim of negligent hiring, training, and supervision against an employer for injuries caused by a sexual assault committed by a coemployee is precluded by the exclusivity provision in sub. (2). This chapter's purpose, history, and application demonstrate that the court is not a proper authority to create a public policy exception to the exclusivity provision. Peterson v. Arlington Hospitality Staffing, Inc.
2004 WI App 199,
276 Wis. 2d 746,
689 N.W.2d 61,
03-2811.
102.03 Annotation
A Labor and Industry Review Commission's (LIRC) determination that an employee who sustained a knee injury while playing softball during a paid break period deserved worker's compensation benefits was reasonable. LIRC reasonably relied upon a treatise that holds that recreational activities are within the course of employment when they have gone on long enough to become an incident of employment. E. C. Styberg Engineering v. LIRC,
2005 WI App 20,
278 Wis. 2d 540,
692 N.W.2d 322,
04-1039.
102.03 Annotation
A state session law that was never adopted by the common council or any other local legislative body as an ordinance, but was numbered and reprinted in the Milwaukee City Charter because it was not a local ordinance under sub. (2). Keller v. Kraft,
2005 WI App 102,
381 Wis. 2d 784,
698 N.W.2d 843,
04-1315.
102.03 Annotation
When two employees, who each work for separate temporary help agencies are both placed with the same client of the temporary help agencies, sub. (2) does not prevent the employee who is injured by the conduct of the other employee from suing the latter's temporary help agency under a theory of
respondeat superior. Warr v. QPS Companies,
2007 WI App 14,
298 Wis. 2d 440,
728 N.W.2d 39,
06-0208.
102.03 Annotation
The exception to coemployee immunity due to negligent operation of a vehicle in sub. (2) must be narrowly construed. The distinction between operation and maintenance or repairs should apply in the context of the exception. When the action under consideration is undertaken to service or repair a vehicle, and the condition of the vehicle is such that it could not then be driven on a public roadway, the action does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle. McNeil v. Hansen,
2007 WI 56,
300 Wis. 2d 358,
731 N.W.2d 273,
05-0423.
102.03 Annotation
An injured employee was entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) benefits after being terminated for violating plant safety rules while assigned to light duty work while within his healing period and without having regained the use of a hand. The employee suffered a wage loss while his injury limited his ability to work, meeting the statutory criteria for TTD. This chapter contains no exception to liability for an injured employee who is subsequently terminated, even for good cause. Emmpak Foods, Inc. v. LIRC,
2007 WI App 164,
303 Wis. 2d 771,
737 N.W.2d 60,
06-0729.
102.03 Annotation
Wisconsin's worker's compensation jurisprudence clearly recognizes that an in-state injury in the course of employment will give rise to coverage under the act. When an out-of-state employer sends an out-of-state employee to Wisconsin and the employee is injured or killed in Wisconsin in the course of employment, Wisconsin's act is applicable. Therefore, a coemployee has no liability for the employee's death and the coemployee's insurers were properly dismissed from the case. Estate of Torres v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company,
2008 WI App 113,
313 Wis. 2d 371,
756 N.W.2d 662,
07-1519.
102.03 Annotation
The negligent operation of a motor vehicle exception to the exclusive remedy provision in sub. (2) did not apply to the incorrect placement of a vehicle on a hoist for repairs. The alleged negligence here was the way the vehicle was positioned on the hoist, which is independent of how the vehicle was operated. Under any definition of operation, the defendant's manipulation of or control over the vehicle, its movement, or its instruments was not negligent in and of itself. Kuehl v. Sentry Select Insurance Company,
2009 WI App 38,
316 Wis. 2d 506,
765 N.W.2d 860,
08-1681.
102.03 Annotation
When an employee was required to report to a job site not owned or controlled by the employer to render services to a customer and the making of the journey was not part of the service for which the employee was paid, there was nothing to distinguish the employee's regular commute to work from that of any employees who leave their home to travel to their place of employment where the workday begins. The employee was not a traveling employee under sub. (1) (f). The travel contemplated by sub. (1) (f) must be something more and something different than a daily commute to or from work at an established job site. McRae v. Porta Painting, Inc.
2009 WI App 89,
320 Wis. 2d 178,
769 N.W.2d 74,
08-1946.
102.03 Annotation
Under
Jenson, the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Worker's Compensation Act. The
Jenson court did not make or discuss the distinction between acts that occurred during employment and after termination. Farady-Sultze v. Aurora Medical Center of Oshkosh, Inc.
2010 WI App 99,
327 Wis. 2d 110,
787 N.W.2d 433,
09-2429.
102.03 Annotation
Sub. (1) (d) exists to prevent fraud in the system, i.e., a deliberately inflicted injury for the purpose of recovering worker's compensation benefits. It did not apply when the claimant suffered injuries while performing cake decorating when the claimant was asked to do so by her superiors, despite the fact that the employer was aware of medical restrictions prohibiting that activity. Pick 'n Save Roundy's v. LIRC,
2010 WI App 130,
329 Wis. 2d 674,
791 N.W.2d 216,
09-2594.
102.03 Annotation
The key to the application of the "well-being activity" exclusion under sub. (1) (c) 3. is whether the employee was being compensated for engaging in his or her employer's business at the time of the injury. If the employer was compensating the employee when the injury occurred, it is the employer's acknowledgement that the employee was engaged in the employer's business and the exception does not apply. City of Kenosha v. LIRC,
2011 WI App 51,
332 Wis. 2d 448,
797 N.W.2d 885,
10-0883.
102.03 Annotation
Because an injured employee entered into a compromise agreement with his employer, the exclusive remedy provision under sub. (2) precludes the injured employee from bringing a subsequent negligence action against a fellow employee for the injuries that were the subject of the worker's compensation claim. Martine v. Williams,
2011 WI App 68,
333 Wis. 2d 203,
799 N.W.2d 449,
10-1426.
102.03 Annotation
The logical corollary to sub. (1) (c) 3. is that an employee is performing services growing out of and incidental to employment if the employee's injury occurs while participating in a well-being program, event, or activity that is not voluntary or for which the employee is receiving compensation. An employee who was performing push-ups at his residence in preparation for a mandatory fitness test, for which extra pay could be awarded for excellence and discipline imposed for failure, was reasonably found to be acting in the course of his employment and entitled to benefits. City of Appleton Police Department v. Labor and Industry Review Commission,
2012 WI App 50,
340 Wis. 2d 720,
813 N.W.2d 237,
11-2008.
102.03 Annotation
While s. 895.46 (1) (a) requires governments to pay judgments taken against their officers and employees for liability incurred though the performance of their official duties, the statute is not encompassed within the language of sub. (2). The coemployee exception of sub. (2) specifically eliminated a local government unit's obligation to pay judgments under s. 895.46. Flores v. Goeman,
2013 WI App 110,
350 Wis. 2d 454,
839 N.W.2d 409,
12-2272.
102.03 Annotation
The exclusive remedy provision does not bar a ship owner from asserting a right to indemnification against the employer of the injured worker even though he has been paid compensation. Bagrowski v. American Export Isbrantsen Lines, Inc.
440 F.2d 502 (1971).
102.03 Annotation
Emotional distress injury due to sexual harassment was exclusively compensable under this section. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., Div. Dart Industries,
789 F.2d 540 (1986).
102.03 Annotation
When 2 employees left their place of employment to fight each other, neither was acting within the scope of employment. There was no cause of action against the employer under ch. 102 or tort or agency law. Johnson v. Hondo, Inc.
125 F.3d 408 (1997).
102.03 Annotation
Sexual harassment was an accident under sub. (1) (e) and subject to the exclusivity provision of sub. (2).
Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d 457, is distinguished. Hibben v. Nardone,
137 F.3d 480 (1998).
102.03 Annotation
A 3rd-party was required to pay 95% of the damages even though only 25% negligent because an employer was shielded by sub. (2). Schuldies v. Service Machine Co.
448 F. Supp. 1196 (1978).
102.03 Annotation
The plaintiff was a special employee of a 3rd-party defendant and a 3rd-party action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of this section. Simmons v. Atlas Vac Mach. Co.
493 F. Supp. 1082 (1980).
102.03 Annotation
Although the employer of an injured employee was found to be at fault, a manufacturer who was also found to be at fault was not entitled to contribution from the employer. Ladwig v. Ermanco, Inc.
504 F. Supp. 1229 (1981).
102.03 Annotation
Unauthorized sexual touching did not constitute an assault intended to cause bodily harm under sub. (2). Hrabak v. Marquip, Inc.
798 F. Supp. 550 (1992).
102.03 Annotation
The exclusivity provision of the worker's compensation act does not bar a claim for invasion of privacy under s. 895.50. Marino v. Arandell Corp.
1 F. Supp. 2d 947 (1998).
102.03 Annotation
Worker's Compensation Act No Longer Protects Against Employment Discrimination Claims. Skinner. Wis. Law. March 1998.
102.04
102.04
Definition of employer. 102.04(1)
(1) The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this chapter, within the meaning of
s. 102.03:
102.04(1)(a)
(a) The state, each county, city, town, village, school district, sewer district, drainage district, long-term care district and other public or quasi-public corporations therein.
102.04(1)(b)1.1. Every person who usually employs 3 or more employees for services performed in this state, whether in one or more trades, businesses, professions, or occupations, and whether in one or more locations.
102.04(1)(b)2.
2. Every person who usually employs less than 3 employees, provided the person has paid wages of $500 or more in any calendar quarter for services performed in this state. Such employer shall become subject on the 10th day of the month next succeeding such quarter.
102.04(1)(b)3.
3. This paragraph shall not apply to farmers or farm labor.
102.04(1)(c)
(c) Every person engaged in farming who on any 20 consecutive or nonconsecutive days during a calendar year employs 6 or more employees, whether in one or more locations. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to such employer 10 days after the twentieth such day.
102.04(1)(e)
(e) Every person to whom
pars. (a) to
(d) are not applicable, who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, and who, at or prior to the time of the injury to the employee for which compensation may be claimed, shall, as provided in
s. 102.05, have elected to become subject to the provisions of this chapter, and who shall not, prior to such accident, have effected a withdrawal of such election.
102.04(2)
(2) Except with respect to a partner or member electing under
s. 102.075, members of partnerships or limited liability companies shall not be counted as employees. Except as provided in
s. 102.07 (5) (a), a person under contract of hire for the performance of any service for any employer subject to this section is not the employer of any other person with respect to that service, and that other person shall, with respect to that service, be an employee only of the employer for whom the service is being performed.
102.04(2m)
(2m) A temporary help agency is the employer of an employee whom the temporary help agency has placed with or leased to another employer that compensates the temporary help agency for the employee's services. A temporary help agency is liable under
s. 102.03 for all compensation and other payments payable under this chapter to or with respect to that employee, including any payments required under
s. 102.16 (3),
102.18 (1) (b) or
(bp),
102.22 (1),
102.35 (3),
102.57, or
102.60. Except as permitted under
s. 102.29, a temporary help agency may not seek or receive reimbursement from another employer for any payments made as a result of that liability.
102.04(3)
(3) As used in this chapter "farming" means the operation of farm premises owned or rented by the operator. "Farm premises" means areas used for operations herein set forth, but does not include other areas, greenhouses or other similar structures unless used principally for the production of food and farm plants. "Farmer" means any person engaged in farming as defined. Operation of farm premises shall be deemed to be the planting and cultivating of the soil thereof; the raising and harvesting of agricultural, horticultural or arboricultural crops thereon; the raising, breeding, tending, training and management of livestock, bees, poultry, fur-bearing animals, wildlife or aquatic life, or their products, thereon; the processing, drying, packing, packaging, freezing, grading, storing, delivering to storage, to market or to a carrier for transportation to market, distributing directly to consumers or marketing any of the above-named commodities, substantially all of which have been planted or produced thereon; the clearing of such premises and the salvaging of timber and management and use of wood lots thereon, but not including logging, lumbering or wood cutting operations unless conducted as an accessory to other farming operations; the managing, conserving, improving and maintaining of such premises or the tools, equipment and improvements thereon and the exchange of labor, services or the exchange of use of equipment with other farmers in pursuing such activities. The operation for not to exceed 30 days during any calendar year, by any person deriving the person's principal income from farming, of farm machinery in performing farming services for other farmers for a consideration other than exchange of labor shall be deemed farming. Operation of such premises shall be deemed to include also any other activities commonly considered to be farming whether conducted on or off such premises by the farm operator.
102.04 Annotation
When an employee simultaneously performs service for 2 employers under their joint control and the service for each is the same or closely related, both employers are liable for worker's compensation. Insurance Co. of North America v. DILHR
45 Wis. 2d 361,
173 N.W.2d 192 (1970).
102.04 Annotation
Wisconsin's worker's compensation jurisprudence clearly recognizes that an in-state injury in the course of employment will give rise to coverage under the act. When an out-of-state employer sends an out-of-state employee to Wisconsin and the employee is injured or killed in Wisconsin in the course of employment, Wisconsin's act is applicable. Therefore, a coemployee has no liability for the employee's death and the coemployee's insurers were properly dismissed from the case. Estate of Torres v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company,
2008 WI App 113,
313 Wis. 2d 371,
756 N.W.2d 662,
07-1519.
102.04 Annotation
The county was found to be the employer, for worker's compensation purposes, of a care giver for a service recipient under the long-term support community options waiver program under s. 46.27 (11). County of Barron v. Labor and Industry Review Commission,
2010 WI App 149,
330 Wis. 2d 203,
792 N.W.2d 584,
09-1845.
102.05
102.05
Election by employer, withdrawal. 102.05(1)
(1) An employer who has had no employee at any time within a continuous period of 2 years shall be deemed to have effected withdrawal, which shall be effective on the last day of such period. An employer who has not usually employed 3 employees and who has not paid wages of at least $500 for employment in this state in every calendar quarter in a calendar year may file a withdrawal notice with the department, which withdrawal shall take effect 30 days after the date of such filing or at such later date as is specified in the notice. If an employer who is subject to this chapter only because the employer elected to become subject to this chapter under
sub. (2) cancels or terminates his or her contract for the insurance of compensation under this chapter, that employer is deemed to have effected withdrawal, which shall be effective on the day after the contract is canceled or terminated.
102.05(2)
(2) Any employer who shall enter into a contract for the insurance of compensation, or against liability therefor, shall be deemed thereby to have elected to accept the provisions of this chapter, and such election shall include farm laborers, domestic servants and employees not in the course of a trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer if such intent is shown by the terms of the policy. Such election shall remain in force until withdrawn in the manner provided in
sub. (1).
102.05(3)
(3) Any person engaged in farming who has become subject to this chapter may withdraw by filing with the department a notice of withdrawal, if the person has not employed 6 or more employees as defined by
s. 102.07 (5) on 20 or more days during the current or previous calendar year. Such withdrawal shall be effective 30 days after the date of receipt by the department, or at such later date as is specified in the notice. Such person may again become subject to this chapter as provided by
s. 102.04 (1) (c) and
(e).
102.05 History
History: 1983 a. 98 s.
31;
1993 a. 81,
492;
1999 a. 14.
102.05 Annotation
An injured worker who never had individuals in his service as employees and did not otherwise fulfill the statutory definition of an employer was not an employer, because he had parachuted a worker's compensation policy. Lloyd Frank Logging v. Healy,
2007 WI App 249,
306 Wis. 2d 385,
742 N.W.2d 337,
07-0692.
102.06
102.06
Joint liability of employer and contractor. An employer shall be liable for compensation to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor under the employer who is not subject to this chapter, or who has not complied with the conditions of
s. 102.28 (2) in any case where such employer would have been liable for compensation if such employee had been working directly for the employer, including also work in the erection, alteration, repair or demolition of improvements or of fixtures upon premises of such employer which are used or to be used in the operations of such employer. The contractor or subcontractor, if subject to this chapter, shall also be liable for such compensation, but the employee shall not recover compensation for the same injury from more than one party. The employer who becomes liable for and pays such compensation may recover the same from such contractor, subcontractor or other employer for whom the employee was working at the time of the injury if such contractor, subcontractor or other employer was an employer as defined in
s. 102.04. This section does not apply to injuries occurring on or after the first day of the first July beginning after the day that the secretary files the certificate under
s. 102.80 (3) (a), except that if the secretary files the certificate under
s. 102.80 (3) (ag) this section does apply to claims for compensation filed on or after the date specified in that certificate.
102.06 Annotation
A "contractor under the employer" is one who regularly furnishes to a principal employer materials or services that are integrally related to the finished product or service provided by that principal employer. Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. DILHR,
72 Wis. 2d 26,
240 N.W.2d 422 (1976).
102.06 Annotation
A franchisee was a "contractor under" a franchisor within the meaning of this section. Maryland Casualty Co. v. DILHR,
77 Wis. 2d 472,
253 N.W.2d 228 (1977).
102.06 Annotation
Liability of principal employer for injuries to employees of his contractors or subcontractors. 1977 WLR 185.
102.07
102.07
Employee defined. "Employee" as used in this chapter means:
102.07(1)(a)(a) Every person, including all officials, in the service of the state, or of any municipality therein whether elected or under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, and whether a resident or employed or injured within or without the state. The state and any municipality may require a bond from a contractor to protect the state or municipality against compensation to employees of such contractor or employees of a subcontractor under the contractor. This paragraph does not apply beginning on the first day of the first July beginning after the day that the secretary files the certificate under
s. 102.80 (3) (a), except that if the secretary files the certificate under
s. 102.80 (3) (ag) this paragraph does apply to claims for compensation filed on or after the date specified in that certificate.
102.07(1)(b)
(b) Every person, including all officials, in the service of the state, or of any municipality therein whether elected or under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, and whether a resident or employed or injured within or without the state. This paragraph first applies on the first day of the first July beginning after the day that the secretary files the certificate under
s. 102.80 (3) (a), except that if the secretary files the certificate under
s. 102.80 (3) (ag) this paragraph does apply to claims for compensation filed on or after the date specified in that certificate.
102.07(2)
(2) Any peace officer shall be considered an employee while engaged in the enforcement of peace or in the pursuit and capture of those charged with crime.
102.07(3)
(3) Nothing herein contained shall prevent municipalities from paying teachers, police officers, fire fighters and other employees full salaries during disability, nor interfere with any pension funds, nor prevent payment to teachers, police officers or fire fighters therefrom.
102.07(4)(a)(a) Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, all helpers and assistants of employees, whether paid by the employer or employee, if employed with the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer, including minors, who shall have the same power of contracting as adult employees, but not including the following:
102.07(4)(a)2.
2. Any person whose employment is not in the course of a trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer, unless as to any of said classes, the employer has elected to include them.
102.07(4)(b)
(b) Par.
(a) 2. shall not operate to exclude an employee whose employment is in the course of any trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer, however casual, unusual, desultory or isolated the employer's trade, business, profession or occupation may be.
102.07(4m)
(4m) For the purpose of determining the number of employees to be counted under
s. 102.04 (1) (b), but for no other purpose, a member of a religious sect is not considered to be an employee if the conditions specified in
s. 102.28 (3) (b) have been satisfied with respect to that member.
102.07(5)
(5) For the purpose of determining the number of employees to be counted under
s. 102.04 (1) (c), but for no other purpose, the following definitions shall apply:
102.07(5)(a)
(a) Farmers or their employees working on an exchange basis shall not be deemed employees of a farmer to whom their labor is furnished in exchange.
102.07(5)(b)
(b) The parents, spouse, child, brother, sister, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law of a farmer shall not be deemed the farmer's employees.
