48.415(10)
(10) Prior involuntary termination of parental rights to another child. Prior involuntary termination of parental rights to another child, which shall be established by proving all of the following:
48.415(10)(a)
(a) That the child who is the subject of the petition has been adjudged to be in need of protection or services under s.
48.13 (2),
(3) or
(10); or that the child who is the subject of the petition was born after the filing of a petition under this subsection whose subject is a sibling of the child.
48.415(10)(b)
(b) That, within 3 years prior to the date the court adjudged the child to be in need of protection or services as specified in par.
(a) or, in the case of a child born after the filing of a petition as specified in par.
(a), within 3 years prior to the date of birth of the child, a court has ordered the termination of parental rights with respect to another child of the person whose parental rights are sought to be terminated on one or more of the grounds specified in this section.
48.415 History
History: 1979 c. 330;
1983 a. 189 s.
329 (5);
1983 a. 326;
1983 a. 447 ss.
8,
67;
1983 a. 488,
538;
1987 a. 355,
383;
1989 a. 86;
1993 a. 235,
395;
1995 a. 77,
108,
225,
275;
1997 a. 35,
80,
237,
292,
294;
1999 a. 9,
32;
2001 a. 2,
109;
2005 a. 277,
293;
2007 a. 45,
116;
2009 a. 94;
2011 a. 257 s.
56;
2011 a. 271;
2015 a. 366;
2017 a. 128,
256.
48.415 Annotation
A termination order was not supported by sufficient findings when the findings merely repeated statutory language and made no determination of the best interests of the child. Termination of Parental Rights to T. R. M.
100 Wis. 2d 681,
303 N.W.2d 581 (1981).
48.415 Annotation
A parent has constitutionally protected rights to the care, custody, and management of a child. In Interest of J. L. W.
102 Wis. 2d 118,
306 N.W.2d 46 (1981).
48.415 Annotation
The dismissal of termination proceedings on grounds of abandonment because only 2 of 6 dispositional orders contained statutory warnings was inappropriate. The warning is only required in one order. In Interest of K.K.
162 Wis. 2d 431,
469 N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1991).
48.415 Annotation
The abandonment period under sub. (1) (a) 3. need not immediately precede filing of the petition. If abandonment is found, termination is still discretionary. In Interest of T.P.S.
168 Wis. 2d 259,
483 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1992).
48.415 Annotation
While the CHIPS judge must notify the parents of possible termination grounds in the written dispositional order and repeat that information orally to any parent present in court, proof that the oral notice was given is not required in later termination proceedings under sub. (2) (a). In Interest of D.P.
170 Wis. 2d 313,
488 N.W.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1992).
48.415 Annotation
A developmentally disabled father's allegation that the county, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, did not take into account his disability in attempting to provide court ordered services was not a basis to attack a termination proceeding. The ADA did not place an added burden on the county to meet the requirements of sub. (2) (b) [now sub. (2) (a) 2.]. In Interest of Torrence P.
187 Wis. 2d 10,
522 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994).
48.415 Annotation
A child “left with" another person under sub. (1) (a) 3. may have been actively placed with the other person by the parent or allowed to live with the other person with the parent's knowledge. Interest of Christopher D.
191 Wis. 2d 681,
530 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995).
48.415 Annotation
“Disassociated" under sub. (1) (c) is not unconstitutionally vague. Disassociation means more than “failure to visit or communicate" under sub. (1) (a). Interest of Christopher D.
191 Wis. 2d 681,
530 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995).
48.415 Annotation
The respondent in a TPR case has the right to meaningfully participate; whether physical presence is required must be determined on a case by case basis. Telephone participation may be adequate. Interest of Christopher D.
191 Wis. 2d 681,
530 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995).
48.415 Annotation
A showing of abandonment under sub. (1) (a) 3. creates a rebuttable presumption that imposes on the parent the burden of disproving abandonment under sub. (1) (c) by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent has not disassociated himself or herself from the child. Odd S.-G v. Carolyn S.-G,
194 Wis. 2d 366,
533 N.W.2d 794 (1995).
48.415 Annotation
Termination under sub. (8), due to a murder occurring prior to the adoption of sub. (8), did not violate the prohibition against
ex post facto laws and did not violate due process, equal protection, or double jeopardy protections. Winnebago County DSS v. Darrell A.
194 Wis. 2d 628,
534 N.W.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1995).
48.415 Annotation
It was a denial of due process to terminate parental rights on grounds substantially different from those that the parent was warned of under s. 48.356. State v. Patricia A.P.
195 Wis. 2d 855,
537 N.W.2d 47 (Ct. App. 1995),
95-1164.
48.415 Annotation
Sub. (5) does not require an assessment of present and future behavior. The statute refers to past behavior that was a threat to the child's welfare. Jerry M. v. Dennis L. M.
198 Wis. 2d 10,
542 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1995),
95-0075.
48.415 Annotation
For all terminations under sub. (5), there must be a showing that the parent has exhibited a pattern of abusive behavior and a showing under par. (a) or (b). A “conviction" under par. (a) is a conviction after the appeal as of right has been exhausted. Monroe County v. Jennifer V.
200 Wis. 2d 678,
548 N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996),
95-3062.
48.415 Annotation
Sub. (7) is a constitutional part of a statutory scheme that is narrowly tailored to meet the state's compelling interests. State v. Allen M.
214 Wis. 2d 302,
571 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1997),
97-0852.
48.415 Annotation
Venue becomes an issue only in the event that it is contested. The county where a child “resides" is the county of domicile. The county where a child “is present" is the county where the child is present at the time a petition is filed. State v. Corey J. G.
215 Wis. 2d 395,
572 N.W.2d 845 (1998),
96-3148.
48.415 Annotation
When a parent is prohibited from visitation, communication by phone and letter is not prohibited, and sub. (1) (b) does not apply. Periods in which there has been no contact whatsoever will be counted under sub. (1) (a) 2. and 3. Carla B. v. Timothy N.
228 Wis. 2d 695,
598 N.W.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1999),
99-0853.
48.415 Annotation
The rules of civil procedure apply to termination of parental rights proceedings. Directed verdicts are permissible. Door County DHFS v. Scott S.
230 Wis. 2d 460,
602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999),
99-0719.
48.415 Annotation
A guardian ad litem's comments regarding the best interests of the child were not improper. Only when the jury is instructed that it should consider the best interests of the child is there reversible error. Door County DHFS v. Scott S.
230 Wis. 2d 460,
602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999),
99-0719.
48.415 Annotation
Prior to determining that grounds existed to terminate parental rights, the circuit court had the duty at the fact-finding hearing to find by clear and convincing evidence that all of the elements of s. 48.415 (1) (a) 3. had been satisfied. By entering a default judgment against the mother on the issue of abandonment without first taking evidence, the circuit court did not make the finding. The error was subject to a harmless error analysis. Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S.
2001 WI 110,
246 Wis. 2d 1,
629 N.W.2d 768,
00-1739.
48.415 Annotation
In a case under sub. (4), a parent's right to meaningfully participate in the termination proceeding includes the right to present evidence at the fact-finding hearing regarding efforts to meet the conditions for reestablishing visitation. It was error to restrict evidence to whether an order denying visitation had remained in effect for a year. State v. Frederick H.
2001 WI App 141,
246 Wis. 2d 215,
630 N.W.2d 734,
00-3035.
48.415 Annotation
Events occurring prior to a CHIPS dispositional order are frequently relevant at a termination proceeding. A history of parental conduct may be relevant to predicting a parent's chances of complying with conditions in the future, despite failing to do so to date. La Crosse County Department of Human Services v. Tara P.
2002 WI App 84,
252 Wis. 2d 179,
643 N.W.2d 194,
01-3034.
48.415 Annotation
In determining whether “there is a substantial likelihood" that a parent will not meet conditions for the return of his or her children, a parent's relevant character traits and patterns of behavior and the likelihood that any problematic traits or propensities have been or can be modified in order to assure the safety of the children must be considered. La Crosse County Department of Human Services v. Tara P.
2002 WI App 84,
252 Wis. 2d 179,
643 N.W.2d 194,
01-3034.
48.415 Annotation
A mother's criminal offenses and sentences were relevant to whether she had failed to establish a substantial parental relationship with her children under sub. (6). State v. Quinsanna D.
2002 WI App 318,
259 Wis. 2d 429,
655 N.W.2d 752,
02-1919.
48.415 Annotation
Partial summary judgment may be granted in the unfitness phase of a termination case if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding the asserted grounds for unfitness, and, taking into consideration the heightened burden of proof specified in s. 48.31 (1) and required by due process, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steven V. v. Kelley H.
2004 WI 47,
271 Wis. 2d 1,
678 N.W.2d 831,
02-2860.
48.415 Annotation
As applied in this case the incestuous parenthood ground under sub. (7) is not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state interest underlying the statute. It is fundamentally unfair to terminate parental rights based solely on a parent's status as a victim of incest. Monroe County DHS v. Kelli B.
2004 WI 48,
271 Wis. 2d 51,
678 N.W.2d 856,
03-0060.
48.415 Annotation
Jennifer V.'s holding is limited to appeals based on guilt or innocence. When a parent's pending appeal does not raise issues of guilt or innocence, “final judgment of conviction" in sub. (9m) means the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court, either after a verdict of guilty by the jury, a finding of guilty by the court when a jury is waived, or a plea of guilty or no contest. Reynaldo F. v. Christal M.
2004 WI App 106,
272 Wis. 2d 816,
684 N.W.2d 138,
03-2687.
48.415 Annotation
A parent's prior convictions are not so prejudicial as to outweigh their probative value when the information would lead the jury to an understanding of why children are removed from the parent's home. Reynaldo F. v. Christal M.
2004 WI App 106,
272 Wis. 2d 707,
684 N.W.2d 138,
03-2687.
48.415 Annotation
Sub. (4) does not violate substantive due process by not requiring any evidence of parental unfitness. There are required steps that must be taken before reaching the application of sub. (4) in a TPR case and those steps form the foundation for the ultimate finding. At each of these steps, findings must be made that reflect on the parent's fitness. Dane County Department of Human Services v. P. P.
2005 WI 32,
279 Wis. 2d 169,
694 N.W.2d 344,
03-2440.
48.415 Annotation
The biological father of a nonmarital child satisfies the definition of parent in s. 48.02 (13), as he is a biological parent notwithstanding that he has not officially been adjudicated as the child's biological father, and may have his parental rights terminated based on periods of abandonment that occurred prior to his official adjudication as the child's biological father. State v. James P.
2005 WI 80,
281 Wis. 2d 685,
698 N.W.2d 95,
04-0723.
48.415 Annotation
The notice requirement provision of sub. (4) (a) are a part of the clause pertaining to juvenile court orders, and are inapplicable to the clause pertaining to family court orders. The fact that s. 767.24 (4) (d) [now s. 767.41 (4) (d)] requires a family court to provide the applicable notice does not establish that provision of the notice is an element of proof under sub. (4). Kimberly S. S. v. Sebastian X. L.
2005 WI App 83,
281 Wis. 2d 261,
697 N.W.2d 476,
04-3220.
48.415 Annotation
When a parent is incarcerated and the only ground for parental termination is that the child continues to be in need of protection or services solely because of the parent's incarceration, sub. (2) requires that the court-ordered conditions of return are tailored to the particular needs of the parent and child. A parent's incarceration is not a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights. Other factors must be considered, such as the parent's relationship with the child both prior to and while the parent is incarcerated, the nature of the crime committed, the length and type of sentence imposed, the parent's level of cooperation with the responsible agency and the department of corrections, and the best interests of the child. Kenosha County Department of Human Services v. Jodie W.
2006 WI 93,
293 Wis. 2d 530,
716 N.W.2d 845,
05-0002.
48.415 Annotation
Sub. (10) (b) requires that within the 3 years prior a court has terminated the parent's rights to another child in an involuntary termination proceeding, but does not require proof of which of the available 12 grounds set out in this section was the basis for the involuntary termination. Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Nicole W.
2007 WI 30,
299 Wis. 2d 637,
728 N.W.2d 652,
05-2656.
48.415 Annotation
In determining whether a party seeking termination of parental rights has proven by clear and convincing evidence that a biological father has failed to assume parental responsibility under sub. (6), a circuit court must consider the biological father's efforts undertaken after he discovers that he is the father but before the circuit court adjudicates the grounds of the termination proceeding. State v. Bobby G.
2007 WI 77,
301 Wis. 2d 531,
734 N.W.2d 81,
06-0066.
48.415 Annotation
The 3-month abandonment ground under sub. (1) (a) 2. is effectively an exception to the more general requirement of 6 months of abandonment under sub. (1) (a) 3. The 3-month provision is a special scenario justifying a shorter abandonment period. When there is an active CHIPS order, it is a given that the child has been facing some kind of peril, and a shorter abandonment period is therefore appropriate and in the child's best interests. When a CHIPS order has been terminated or allowed to lapse, it is reasonable to assume that the parental situation has changed and the reason for the shorter abandonment period is no longer present. Heather B. v. Jennifer B.
2011 WI App 26,
331 Wis. 2d 666,
794 N.W.2d 800,
10-2528.
48.415 Annotation
Sub. (1) (a) 2. requires that the 3-month abandonment period fall within the duration of a CHIPS-based placement of the child outside the parent's home. Heather B. v. Jennifer B.
2011 WI App 26,
331 Wis. 2d 666,
794 N.W.2d 800,
10-2528.
48.415 Annotation
Under sub. (6) (a), a fact-finder must look to the totality-of-the-circumstances to determine if a parent has assumed parental responsibility. The phrase “have not had," does not direct the fact-finder to consider only a limited time period. Rather, the statute gives latitude to the fact-finder to consider the entirety of the child's life and determine if the parent's actions have been sufficient to find that he or she has assumed parental responsibility. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, a fact-finder may consider whether, during the time the parent was caring for his or her child, the parent exposed the child to a hazardous living environment. Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T.
2011 WI 30,
333 Wis. 2d 273,
797 N.W.2d 854,
09-2973.
48.415 Annotation
Even though there is no restraint of the petitioner's liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may be used in the court of appeals to seek relief from a termination of parental rights (TPR) when appellate counsel fails to appeal before the deadline. Under s. 809.82 (2) (b), the time for filing an appeal of a TPR may not be enlarged when the petition is filed by someone other than a representative of the public. If the court is not able to recognize the petitioner's right to raise ineffectiveness of counsel, the petitioner will never have an appeal through no fault of his or her own. Amy W. v. David G.,
2013 WI App 83,
348 Wis. 2d 593,
834 N.W.2d 432,
13-0731.
48.415 Annotation
Subsection (2) (a) 1. makes the written notice in s. 48.356 (2), the CHIPS statute, an element to prove in a TPR case grounded in continuing CHIPS. The plain language of sub. (2) (a) 1. provides that the statutory notice requirements are satisfied when at least one of the CHIPS orders contains the written notice required under s. 48.356 (2). Sub. (2) (a) does not require that notice be given in every CHIPS order, and it does not require that notice be in the
last CHIPS order. St. Croix County Department of Health and Human Services v. Michael D.
2016 WI 35,
368 Wis. 2d 170,
880 N.W.2d 107,
14-2431.
48.415 Annotation
The agency does not need to wait 6 months after the last out-of-home placement order is issued before filing a TPR petition under sub. (2) (a). Subsection (2) (a) 3. does not require that the 6-month period must be after the last CHIPS dispositional order or extension; rather, the 6-month period is a cumulative total period under the CHIPS orders. St. Croix County Department of Health and Human Services v. Michael D.
2016 WI 35,
368 Wis. 2d 170,
880 N.W.2d 107,
14-2431.
48.415 Annotation
Process is constitutionally due a natural parent at a state-initiated parental rights termination proceeding. A 3-factor test is discussed. Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
48.415 Annotation
Adoption and termination proceedings in Wisconsin: Straining the wisdom of Solomon. Hayes and Morse, 66 MLR 439 (1983).
48.417
48.417
Petition for termination of parental rights; when required. 48.417(1)(1)
Filing or joining in petition; when required. Subject to sub.
(2), an agency or the district attorney, corporation counsel or other appropriate official designated under s.
48.09 shall file a petition under s.
48.42 (1) to terminate the parental rights of a parent or the parents of a child, or, if a petition under s.
48.42 (1) to terminate those parental rights has already been filed, the agency, district attorney, corporation counsel or other appropriate official shall join in the petition, if any of the following circumstances apply:
48.417(1)(a)
(a) The child has been placed outside of his or her home, as described in s.
48.365 (1) or
938.365 (1), in a foster home, group home, nonsecured residential care center for children and youth, or shelter care facility for 15 of the most recent 22 months, not including any period during which the child was a runaway from the out-of-home placement or was residing in a trial reunification home. If the circumstances specified in this paragraph apply, the petition shall be filed or joined in by the last day of the 15th month, as described in this paragraph, for which the child was placed outside of his or her home.
48.417(1)(b)
(b) A court of competent jurisdiction has found under s.
48.13 (2) or under a law of any other state or a federal law that is comparable to s.
48.13 (2) that the child was abandoned when he or she was under one year of age or has found that the parent abandoned the child when the child was under one year of age in violation of s.
948.20 or in violation of the law of any other state or federal law, if that violation would be a violation of s.
948.20 if committed in this state. If the circumstances specified in this paragraph apply, the petition shall be filed or joined in within 60 days after the date on which the court of competent jurisdiction found that the child was abandoned as described in this paragraph.
48.417(1)(c)
(c) A court of competent jurisdiction has found that the parent has committed, has aided or abetted the commission of, or has solicited, conspired, or attempted to commit, a violation of s.
940.01,
940.02,
940.03, or
940.05 or a violation of the law of any other state or federal law, if that violation would be a violation of s.
940.01,
940.02,
940.03, or
940.05 if committed in this state, and that the victim of that violation is a child of the parent. If the circumstances specified in this paragraph apply, the petition shall be filed or joined in within 60 days after the date on which the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter determines, based on a finding that a circumstance specified in this paragraph applies, that reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his or her home are not required.
48.417(1)(d)
(d) A court of competent jurisdiction has found that the parent has committed a violation of s.
940.19 (3), 1999 stats., a violation of s.
940.19 (2),
(4), or
(5),
940.225 (1) or
(2),
948.02 (1) or
(2),
948.025,
948.03 (2) (a),
(3) (a), or
(5) (a) 1.,
2., or
3.,
948.051, or
948.085, a violation of s.
940.302 (2) if s.
940.302 (2) (a) 1. b. applies, or a violation of the law of any other state or federal law, if that violation would be a violation listed under this paragraph if committed in this state, and that the violation resulted in great bodily harm, as defined in s.
939.22 (14), or in substantial bodily harm, as defined in s.
939.22 (38), to the child or another child of the parent. If the circumstances specified in this paragraph apply, the petition shall be filed or joined in within 60 days after the date on which the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this chapter determines, based on a finding that a circumstance specified in this paragraph applies, that reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his or her home are not required.
48.417(2)
(2) Filing or joining in petition; when not required. Notwithstanding that any of the circumstances specified in sub.
(1) (a),
(b),
(c) or
(d) may apply, an agency or the district attorney, corporation counsel or other appropriate official designated under s.
48.09 need not file a petition under s.
48.42 (1) to terminate the parental rights of a parent or the parents of a child, or, if a petition under s.
48.42 (1) to terminate those parental rights has already been filed, the agency, district attorney, corporation counsel or other appropriate official need not join in the petition, if any of the following circumstances apply:
48.417(2)(a)
(a) The child is being cared for by a fit and willing relative of the child.
48.417(2)(b)
(b) The child's permanency plan indicates and provides documentation that termination of parental rights to the child is not in the best interests of the child.
48.417(2)(c)
(c) The agency primarily responsible for providing services to the family under a court order, if required under s.
48.355 (2) (b) 6. to make reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his or her home, has not provided to the family of the child, consistent with the time period in the child's permanency plan, the services necessary for the safe return of the child to his or her home.
48.417(2)(cm)
(cm) In the case of an Indian child, the agency primarily responsible for providing services to the Indian child and the family under a court order, if required under s.
48.355 (2) (b) 6v. to make active efforts under s.
48.028 (4) (d) 2. to prevent the breakup of the Indian child's family, has not provided to the Indian child's family, consistent with the child's permanency plan, the services necessary to prevent the breakup of the Indian child's family.
48.417(2)(d)
(d) Grounds for an involuntary termination of parental rights under s.
48.415 do not exist.
48.417(3)
(3) Concurrent adoption efforts required. If a petition is filed or joined in as required under sub.
(1), the agency primarily responsible for providing services to the child under a court order shall, during the pendency of the proceeding on the petition, work with the agency identified in the report under s.
48.425 (1) (f) that would be responsible for accomplishing the adoption of the child in processing and approving a qualified family for the adoption of the child.
48.417(4)
(4) Notice to department. If a petition is filed or joined in as required under sub.
(1), the person who filed or joined in the petition shall notify the department of that filing or joinder.
48.42(1)(1)
Petition. A proceeding for the termination of parental rights shall be initiated by petition which may be filed by the child's parent, an agency or a person authorized to file a petition under s.
48.25 or
48.835. The petition shall be entitled “In the interest of .......... (child's name), a person under the age of 18" and shall set forth with specificity:
48.42(1)(a)
(a) The name, birth date or anticipated birth date, and address of the child and whether the child has been adopted.
48.42(1)(b)
(b) The names and addresses of the child's parent or parents, guardian and legal custodian.
48.42(1)(c)1.
1. A statement that consent will be given to termination of parental rights as provided in s.
48.41.
48.42(1)(c)2.
2. A statement of the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights under s.
48.415 and a statement of the facts and circumstances which the petitioner alleges establish these grounds.
48.42(1)(d)
(d) A statement of whether the child may be subject to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act,
25 USC 1901 to
1963, and, if the child may be subject to that act, the names of the child's Indian custodian, if any, and tribe, if known.
48.42(1)(e)
(e) If the petition is seeking the involuntary termination of parental rights to an Indian child, reliable and credible information showing that continued custody of the Indian child by the Indian child's parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the Indian child under s.
48.028 (4) (e) 1. and reliable and credible information showing that active efforts under s.
48.028 (4) (e) 2. have been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian child's family and that those efforts have proved unsuccessful.
48.42(1g)(a)
(a) Except as provided in par.
(c), if the petition is filed by a person or agency other than the district attorney, corporation counsel, or other appropriate official under s.
48.09; if the petition seeks to terminate the parental rights of a person who may be the father of a nonmarital child who is under one year of age at the time the petition is filed, who is not adopted or whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s.
767.803, and whose paternity has not been established; and if the mother of the child has voluntarily consented to or seeks to voluntarily consent to the termination of her parental rights to the child, the petitioner may file with the petition an affidavit signed by the mother that includes all of the following:
48.42(1g)(a)1.
1. A statement that the mother has voluntarily consented to or seeks to voluntarily consent to the termination of her parental rights to the child.
48.42(1g)(a)2.
2. A statement acknowledging that the mother has been asked to identify the father of the child.
48.42(1g)(a)3.
3. A statement that the mother knows and is identifying the father or that she does not know the identity of the father.
48.42(1g)(a)4.
4. A statement identifying any man who has lived in a familial relationship with the child and who may be the father of the child.
48.42(1g)(a)5.
5. If the mother states that she knows and is identifying the father under subd.
3. or
4., the father's name, age, and last-known mailing address, and the last-known mailing address of the father's employer.
48.42(1g)(a)6.
6. If the mother states that she does not know the identity of the father, an explanation of why she is unable to identify him and a physical description of the father.
48.42(1g)(a)7.
7. A statement that the mother has been informed and understands that if she misidentifies the father, she is permanently barred from attacking the termination of the father's or her parental rights on the basis that the father was not correctly identified.
48.42(1g)(a)8.
8. A statement that the mother understands that she may be prosecuted under s.
946.32 (2) for false swearing if she makes a false statement that she does not believe is true in the affidavit under this paragraph.
48.42(1g)(a)9.
9. A statement that the mother has reviewed and understands the affidavit, the name of the person who explained the affidavit and the consequences of signing the affidavit to her, and a statement that the mother is signing the affidavit voluntarily.
48.42(1g)(b)
(b) The petitioner shall notify any man identified in the affidavit under par.
(a) as an alleged father of his right to file a declaration of paternal interest under s.
48.025 before the birth of the child, within 14 days after the birth of the child, or within 21 days after the date on which the notice is mailed, whichever is later; of the birth date or anticipated birth date of the child; and of the consequences of filing or not filing a declaration of paternal interest. The petitioner shall include with the notice a copy of the form required to file a declaration of paternal interest under s.
48.025. The notice shall be sent by certified mail to the last-known address of the alleged father.
48.42(1g)(c)
(c) If an affidavit under par.
(a) is not filed with the petition, notice shall be given to an alleged father under sub.
(2).
48.42(1m)(a)
(a) If the petition filed under sub.
(1) includes a statement of the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights under sub.
(1) (c) 2., the petitioner may, at the time the petition under sub.
(1) is filed, also petition the court for a temporary order and an injunction prohibiting the person whose parental rights are sought to be terminated from visiting or contacting the child who is the subject of the petition under sub.
(1). Any petition under this paragraph shall allege facts sufficient to show that prohibiting visitation or contact would be in the best interests of the child.
48.42(1m)(b)
(b) Subject to par.
(e), the court may issue the temporary order ex parte or may refuse to issue the temporary order and hold a hearing on whether to issue an injunction. The temporary order is in effect until a hearing is held on the issuance of an injunction. The court shall hold a hearing on the issuance of an injunction on or before the date of the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights under s.
48.422 (1).
48.42(1m)(c)
(c) Notwithstanding any other order under s.
48.355 (3), the court, subject to par.
(e), may grant an injunction prohibiting the respondent from visiting or contacting the child if the court determines that the prohibition would be in the best interests of the child. An injunction under this subsection is effective according to its terms but may not remain in effect beyond the date the court dismisses the petition for termination of parental rights under s.
48.427 (2) or issues an order terminating parental rights under s.
48.427 (3).
