940.09 Annotation
See note to art. I, sec. 11, citing State v. Jenkins, 80 W (2d) 426, 259 NW (2d) 109.
940.09 Annotation
See note to art. I, sec. 11, citing State v. Bentley, 92 W (2d) 860, 286 NW (2d) 153 (Ct. App. 1979).
940.09 Annotation
See note to art. I, sec. 8, citing State v. Rabe, 96 W (2d) 48, 291 NW (2d) 809 (1980).
940.09 Annotation
Because driving while intoxicated is inherently dangerous, state need not prove causal connection between driver's intoxication and victim's death. Sub. (2) does not violate right against self-incrimination. State v. Caibaiosai, 122 W (2d) 587, 363 NW (2d) 574 (1985).
940.09 Annotation
Where state impounded vehicle but released it to scrap dealer before defendant's expert could examine it, charge was properly dismissed for destruction of exculpatory evidence. State v. Hahn, 132 W (2d) 351, 392 NW (2d) 464 (Ct. App. 1986).
940.09 Annotation
A vehicle under this section is defined in s. 939.44 (2) and includes a tractor. State v. Sohn, 193 W (2d) 346, 535 NW (2d) 1 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.09 Annotation
Sub. (2) does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. State v. Lohmeier, 196 W (2d) 432, 538 NW (2d) 821 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.09 Annotation
This statute doesn't violate due process. Caibaiosai v. Barrington, 643 F Supp. 1007 (W. D. Wis. 1986).
940.09 Annotation
Homicide By Intoxicated Use Statute. Sines. Wis. Law. April, 1995.
940.10
940.10
Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle. Whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.10 History
History: 1987 a. 399.
940.10 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988 Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle is analogous to prior s. 940.08. The mental element is criminal negligence as defined in s. 939.25. [Bill 191-S]
940.10 Annotation
Motorist was properly convicted under this section for running red light at 50 m.p.h., even though speed limit was 55 m.p.h. State v. Cooper, 117 W (2d) 30, 344 NW (2d) 194 (Ct. App. 1983).
940.10 Annotation
The definition of criminal negligence as applied to homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Barman, 183 W (2d) 180, 515 NW (2d) 493 (Ct. App. 1994).
940.10 Annotation
A corporation may be subject to criminal liability under this section. State v. Knutson, Inc. 196 W (2d) 86, 537 NW (2d) 420 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.11
940.11
Mutilating or hiding a corpse. 940.11(1)
(1) Whoever mutilates, disfigures or dismembers a corpse, with intent to conceal a crime or avoid apprehension, prosecution or conviction for a crime, is guilty of a Class C felony.
940.11(2)
(2) Whoever hides or buries a corpse, with intent to conceal a crime or avoid apprehension, prosecution or conviction for a crime, is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.11(3)
(3) A person may not be subject to prosecution under both this section and
s. 946.47 for his or her acts regarding the same corpse.
940.11 History
History: 1991 a. 205.
940.12
940.12
Assisting suicide. Whoever with intent that another take his or her own life assists such person to commit suicide is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.12 History
History: 1977 c. 173.
940.13
940.13
Abortion exception. No fine or imprisonment may be imposed or enforced against and no prosecution may be brought against a woman who obtains an abortion or otherwise violates any provision of any abortion statute with respect to her unborn child or fetus, and
s. 939.05,
939.30 or
939.31 does not apply to a woman who obtains an abortion or otherwise violates any provision of any abortion statute with respect to her unborn child or fetus.
940.13 History
History: 1985 a. 56.
940.15(1)(1) In this section, "viability" means that stage of fetal development when, in the medical judgment of the attending physician based on the particular facts of the case before him or her, there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without artificial support.
940.15(2)
(2) Whoever intentionally performs an abortion after the fetus or unborn child reaches viability, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician, is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.15(3)
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician.
940.15(4)
(4) Any abortion performed under
sub. (3) after viability of the fetus or unborn child, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician, shall be performed in a hospital on an inpatient basis.
940.15(5)
(5) Whoever intentionally performs an abortion and who is not a physician is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.15(6)
(6) Any physician who intentionally performs an abortion under
sub. (3) shall use that method of abortion which, of those he or she knows to be available, is in his or her medical judgment most likely to preserve the life and health of the fetus or unborn child. Nothing in this subsection requires a physician performing an abortion to employ a method of abortion which, in his or her medical judgment based on the particular facts of the case before him or her, would increase the risk to the woman. Any physician violating this subsection is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.15(7)
(7) Subsections (2) to
(6) and
s. 939.05,
939.30 or
939.31 do not apply to a woman who obtains an abortion that is in violation of this section or otherwise violates this section with respect to her unborn child or fetus.
940.15 History
History: 1985 a. 56.
BODILY SECURITY.
940.19
940.19
Battery; substantial battery; aggravated battery. 940.19(1)(1) Whoever causes bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of the person so harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
940.19(2)
(2) Whoever causes substantial bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.19(3)
(3) Whoever causes substantial bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause substantial bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.19(4)
(4) Whoever causes great bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.19(5)
(5) Whoever causes great bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause either substantial bodily harm or great bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class C felony.
940.19(6)
(6) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to another by conduct that creates a substantial risk of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class D felony. A rebuttable presumption of conduct creating a substantial risk of great bodily harm arises:
940.19(6)(a)
(a) If the person harmed is 62 years of age or older; or
940.19(6)(b)
(b) If the person harmed has a physical disability, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury or disease, that is discernible by an ordinary person viewing the physically disabled person, or that is actually known by the actor.
940.19 Annotation
Under "elements only" test, offenses under subsections that require proof of nonconsent are not lesser included offenses of offenses under subsections where proof of nonconsent is not required. State v. Richards, 123 W (2d) 1, 365 NW (2d) 7 (1985).
940.19 Annotation
"Physical disability" under (former) sub. (3) (now sub. (6)) discussed. State v. Crowley, 143 W (2d) 324, 422 NW (2d) 847 (1988).
940.19 Annotation
First-degree reckless injury, s. 940.23 (1), is not a lesser included offense of aggravated battery. State v. Eastman, 185 W (2d) 405, 518 NW (2d) 257 (Ct. App. 1994).
940.20
940.20
Battery: special circumstances. 940.20(1)
(1)
Battery by prisoners. Any prisoner confined to a state prison or other state, county or municipal detention facility who intentionally causes bodily harm to an officer, employe, visitor or another inmate of such prison or institution, without his or her consent, is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.20(1m)
(1m) Battery by persons subject to certain injunctions. 940.20(1m)(a)(a) Any person who is subject to an injunction under
s. 813.12 or a tribal injunction filed under [
s. 813.12 (9) (a)] and who intentionally causes bodily harm to the petitioner who sought the injunction by an act done without the consent of the petitioner is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.20 Note
NOTE: The bracketed cross-reference does not exist.
1995 Wis. Act 343 created this provision without taking into account the repeal and recreation of s. 813.12 (9) by
1995 Wis. Act 306.
940.20(1m)(b)
(b) Any person who is subject to an injunction under
s. 813.125 and who intentionally causes bodily harm to the petitioner who sought the injunction by an act done without the consent of the petitioner is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.20(2)
(2) Battery to law enforcement officers and fire fighters. Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a law enforcement officer or fire fighter, as those terms are defined in
s. 102.475 (8) (b) and
(c), acting in an official capacity and the person knows or has reason to know that the victim is a law enforcement officer or fire fighter, by an act done without the consent of the person so injured, is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.20(2m)
(2m) Battery to probation and parole agents and aftercare agents. 940.20(2m)(a)1.
1. "Aftercare agent" means any person authorized by the department of corrections to exercise control over a juvenile on aftercare.
940.20(2m)(a)2.
2. "Probation and parole agent" means any person authorized by the department of corrections to exercise control over a probationer or parolee.
940.20(2m)(b)
(b) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a probation and parole agent or an aftercare agent, acting in an official capacity and the person knows or has reason to know that the victim is a probation and parole agent or an aftercare agent, by an act done without the consent of the person so injured, is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.20(3)
(3) Battery to witnesses and jurors. Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a person who he or she knows or has reason to know is or was a witness as defined in
s. 940.41 (3) or a grand or petit juror, and by reason of the person having attended or testified as a witness or by reason of any verdict or indictment assented to by the person, without the consent of the person injured, is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.20(4)
(4) Battery to public officers. Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a public officer in order to influence the action of such officer or as a result of any action taken within an official capacity, without the consent of the person injured, is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.20(5)
(5) Battery to technical college district or school district officers and employes. 940.20(5)(a)2.
2. "Technical college district" means a district established under
ch. 38.
940.20(5)(b)
(b) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a technical college district or school district officer or employe acting in that capacity, and the person knows or has reason to know that the victim is a technical college district or school district officer or employe, without the consent of the person so injured, is guilty of a Class E felony.
940.20(6)
(6) Battery to public transit vehicle operator, driver or passenger. 940.20(6)(a)(a) In this subsection, "public transit vehicle" means any vehicle used for providing transportation service to the general public.
940.20(6)(b)
(b) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to another under any of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class E felony:
940.20(6)(b)1.
1. The harm occurs while the victim is an operator, a driver or a passenger of, in or on a public transit vehicle.
940.20(6)(b)2.
2. The harm occurs after the offender forces or directs the victim to leave a public transit vehicle.
940.20(6)(b)3.
3. The harm occurs as the offender prevents, or attempts to prevent, the victim from gaining lawful access to a public transit vehicle.
940.20(7)(a)1g.
1g. "Emergency department" means a room or area in a hospital, as defined in
s. 50.33 (2), that is primarily used to provide emergency care, diagnosis or radiological treatment.
940.20(7)(a)2.
2. "Emergency department worker" means any of the following:
940.20(7)(a)2.a.
a. An employe of a hospital who works in an emergency department.
940.20(7)(a)2.b.
b. A health care provider, whether or not employed by a hospital, who works in an emergency department.
940.20(7)(a)3.
3. "Health care provider" means any person who is licensed, registered, permitted or certified by the department of health and family services or the department of regulation and licensing to provide health care services in this state.
940.20(7)(b)
(b) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to an emergency department worker, an emergency medical technician, a first responder or an ambulance driver who is acting in an official capacity and who the person knows or has reason to know is an emergency department worker, an emergency medical technician, a first responder or an ambulance driver, by an act done without the consent of the person so injured, is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.20 Annotation
Resisting or obstructing an officer (946.41) is not a lesser-included crime of battery to a peace officer. State v. Zdiarstek, 53 W (2d) 776, 193 NW (2d) 833.
940.20 Annotation
Battery to prospective witness is prohibited by s. 940.206, 1975 stats. [now s. 940.20 (3)]. McLeod v. State, 85 W (2d) 787, 271 NW (2d) 157 (Ct. App. 1978).
