346.60 346.60 Penalty for violating sections 346.57 to 346.595.
346.60(1)(1) Except as provided in sub. (5), any person violating s. 346.59 may be required to forfeit not less than $20 nor more than $40 for the first offense and not less than $50 nor more than $100 for the 2nd or subsequent conviction within a year.
346.60(2) (2)
346.60(2)(a)(a) Except as provided in sub. (3m) or (5), any person violating s. 346.57 (4) (d) to (g) or (h) or (5) or 346.58 may be required to forfeit not less than $30 nor more than $300.
346.60(2)(b) (b) Except as provided in sub. (3m) or (5), any person violating s. 346.57 (4) (gm) may be required to forfeit not less than $50 nor more than $300.
346.60(3) (3) Except as provided in sub. (3m) or (5), any person violating s. 346.57 (2), (3) or (4) (a) to (c) may be required to forfeit not less than $40 nor more than $300 for the first offense and may be required to forfeit not less than $80 nor more than $600 for the 2nd or subsequent conviction within a year.
346.60(3m) (3m)
346.60(3m)(a)(a) If an operator of a vehicle violates s. 346.57 (2), (3), (4) (d) to (h) or (5) where persons engaged in work in a highway maintenance or construction area or in a utility work area are at risk from traffic, any applicable minimum and maximum forfeiture specified in sub. (2) or (3) for the violation shall be doubled.
346.60(3m)(b) (b) If an operator of a vehicle violates s. 346.57 (2) to (5) when children are present in a zone designated by "school" warning signs as provided in s. 118.08 (1), any applicable minimum and maximum forfeiture specified in sub. (2) or (3) for the violation shall be doubled.
346.60(4) (4) Any person violating s. 346.595 may be required to forfeit not less than $30 nor more than $300.
346.60(5) (5)
346.60(5)(a)(a) Any operator of a bicycle who violates s. 346.57 may be required to forfeit not more than $20.
346.60(5)(b) (b) Any operator of a bicycle who violates s. 346.59 may be required to forfeit not more than $10.
346.60 Annotation Sub. (4) is not unconstitutionally irrational. State v. King, 187 W (2d) 547, 523 NW (2d) 159 (Ct. App. 1994).
RECKLESS AND DRUNKEN DRIVING
346.61 346.61 Applicability of sections relating to reckless and drunken driving. In addition to being applicable upon highways, ss. 346.62 to 346.64 are applicable upon all premises held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles, all premises provided by employers to employes for the use of their motor vehicles and all premises provided to tenants of rental housing in buildings of 4 or more units for the use of their motor vehicles, whether such premises are publicly or privately owned and whether or not a fee is charged for the use thereof. Sections 346.62 to 346.64 do not apply to private parking areas at farms or single-family residences.
346.61 History History: 1995 a. 127.
346.61 Annotation Privately owned parking lot was not included under this section. City of Kenosha v. Phillips, 142 W (2d) 549, 419 NW (2d) 236 (1988).
346.61 Annotation A parking lot for patrons of a business is held out for the use of the public under this section. City of LaCrosse v. Richling, 178 W (2d) 856, 505 NW (2d) 448 (Ct. App. 1993).
346.62 346.62 Reckless driving.
346.62(1)(1) In this section:
346.62(1)(a) (a) "Bodily harm" has the meaning designated in s. 939.22 (4).
346.62(1)(b) (b) "Great bodily harm" has the meaning designated in s. 939.22 (14).
346.62(1)(c) (c) "Negligent" has the meaning designated in s. 939.25 (2).
346.62(1)(d) (d) "Vehicle" has the meaning designated in s. 939.22 (44), except that for purposes of sub. (2m) "vehicle" has the meaning given in s. 340.01 (74).
346.62(2) (2) No person may endanger the safety of any person or property by the negligent operation of a vehicle.
346.62(2m) (2m) No person may recklessly endanger the safety of any person by driving a vehicle on or across a railroad crossing in violation of s. 346.44 (1) or through, around or under any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad crossing in violation of s. 346.44 (2).
346.62(3) (3) No person may cause bodily harm to another by the negligent operation of a vehicle.
346.62(4) (4) No person may cause great bodily harm to another by the negligent operation of a vehicle.
346.62 History History: 1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 135.
346.62 Note Judicial Council Note, 1988: The revisions contained in subs. (2) and (3) are intended as editorial, not substantive, as is the substitution of a cross-reference to s. 939.25 (2) for the prior definition of a high degree of negligence. New sub. (4) carries forward the crime created by 1985 Wisconsin Act 293. [Bill 191-S]
346.62 Annotation The fact that defendant was an experienced stock car driver is not a defense to a charge of reckless driving. State v. Passarelli, 55 W (2d) 78, 197 NW (2d) 740.
346.62 Annotation Sub. (4) is not unconstitutionally irrational. State v. King, 187 W (2d) 547, 523 NW (2d) 159 (Ct. App. 1994).
346.63 346.63 Operating under influence of intoxicant or other drug.
346.63(1)(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while:
346.63(1)(a) (a) Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or any combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance and a controlled substance analog, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or
346.63(1)(b) (b) The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration.
346.63(1)(c) (c) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of par. (a) or (b) or both for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating both pars. (a) and (b), the offenses shall be joined. If the person is found guilty of both pars. (a) and (b) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under ss. 343.30 (1q) and 343.305. Paragraphs (a) and (b) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require.
346.63(2) (2)
346.63(2)(a)(a) It is unlawful for any person to cause injury to another person by the operation of a vehicle while:
346.63(2)(a)1. 1. Under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or any combination of an intoxicant, a controlled substance and a controlled substance analog, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; or
346.63(2)(a)2. 2. The person has a prohibited alcohol concentration.
346.63(2)(a)3. 3. A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of subd. 1. or 2. or both for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating both subds. 1. and 2. in the complaint, the crimes shall be joined under s. 971.12. If the person is found guilty of both subds. 1. and 2. for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under ss. 343.30 (1q) and 343.305. Subdivisions 1. and 2. each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require.
346.63(2)(b) (b) In an action under this subsection, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury would have occurred even if he or she had been exercising due care and he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or a combination thereof, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving or did not have a prohibited alcohol concentration described under par. (a) 2.
346.63(2m) (2m) If a person has not attained the legal drinking age, as defined in s. 125.02 (8m), the person may not drive or operate a motor vehicle while he or she has an alcohol concentration of more than 0.0 but not more than 0.1. One penalty for violation of this subsection is suspension of a person's operating privilege under s. 343.30 (1p). The person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10 at any time. If a person arrested for a violation of this subsection refuses to take a test under s. 343.305, the refusal is a separate violation and the person is subject to revocation of the person's operating privilege under s. 343.305 (10) (em).
346.63(3) (3) In this section:
346.63(3)(a) (a) "Drive" means the exercise of physical control over the speed and direction of a motor vehicle while it is in motion.
346.63(3)(b) (b) "Operate" means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.
346.63(4) (4) If a person is convicted under sub. (1) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, or sub. (2), the court shall proceed under s. 343.30 (1q).
346.63(5) (5)
346.63(5)(a)(a) No person may drive or operate a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.1.
346.63(5)(b) (b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based on a violation of par. (a) or sub. (1) (a) or both for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating both par. (a) and sub. (1) (a), the offenses shall be joined. Paragraph (a) and sub. (1) (a) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require. If the person is found guilty of violating both par. (a) and sub. (1) (a) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions. Each conviction shall be reported to the department and counted separately for purposes of suspension or revocation of the operator's license and disqualification.
346.63(6) (6)
346.63(6)(a)(a) No person may cause injury to another person by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.1.
346.63(6)(b) (b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based upon a violation of par. (a) or sub. (2) (a) 1. or both for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating both par. (a) and sub. (2) (a) 1. in the complaint, the crimes shall be joined under s. 971.12. If the person is found guilty of violating both par. (a) and sub. (2) (a) 1. for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions. Paragraph (a) and sub. (2) (a) 1. each require proof of a fact for conviction which the other does not require.
346.63(6)(c) (c) Under par. (a), the person charged has a defense if it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury would have occurred even if he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or a combination thereof, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving or did not have an alcohol concentration described under par. (a).
346.63(7) (7)
346.63(7)(a)(a) No person may drive or operate or be on duty time with respect to a commercial motor vehicle under any of the following circumstances:
346.63(7)(a)1. 1. While having an alcohol concentration above 0.0.
346.63(7)(a)2. 2. Within 4 hours of having consumed or having been under the influence of an intoxicating beverage, regardless of its alcohol content.
346.63(7)(a)3. 3. While possessing an intoxicating beverage, regardless of its alcohol content. This subdivision does not apply to possession of an intoxicating beverage if the beverage is unopened and is manifested and transported as part of a shipment.
346.63(7)(b) (b) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon complaints based on a violation of this subsection and sub. (1) (a) or (b) or both, or sub. (1) (a) or (5) (a), or both, for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence. If the person is charged with violating this subsection and sub. (1) or (5), the proceedings shall be joined. If the person is found guilty of violating both this subsection and sub. (1) or (5) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions. This subsection and subs. (1) and (5) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require. Each conviction shall be reported to the department and counted separately for purposes of suspension or revocation of the operator's license and disqualification.
346.63 Note NOTE: For legislative intent see chapter 20, laws of 1981, section 2051 (13).
346.63 Annotation It is no defense that defendant is an alcoholic. State v. Koller, 60 W (2d) 755.
346.63 Annotation Evidence that defendant, found asleep in parked car at 12:53 a.m., had driven to the parking place 14 minutes earlier, was sufficient to support conviction for operating a car while intoxicated "at or about 12:53 a.m." Monroe County v. Kruse, 76 W (2d) 126, 250 NW (2d) 375.
346.63 Annotation Intent to drive or move motor vehicle is not required to find accused guilty of operating vehicle while under influence of intoxicant. Milwaukee County v. Proegler, 95 W (2d) 614, 291 NW (2d) 608 (Ct. App. 1980).
346.63 Annotation Section 346.63 (4), 1979 stats., does not prevent state from introducing corroborating evidence. State v. Burkman, 96 W (2d) 630, 292 NW (2d) 641 (1980).
346.63 Annotation First violation of ss. 346.63 (1), 1979 stats., is not a criminal offense. State v. Schulz, 100 W (2d) 329, 302 NW (2d) 59 (Ct. App. 1981).
346.63 Annotation Court properly instructed jury that it could infer from a breathalyzer reading of .13% that defendant was intoxicated. Alcohol absorption rate discussed. State v. Vick, 104 W (2d) 678, 312 NW (2d) 489 (1981).
346.63 Annotation Previous conviction for drunk driving is penalty enhancer, not element of crime. State v. McAllister, 107 W (2d) 532, 319 NW (2d) 865 (1982).
346.63 Annotation See note to Art. I, sec. 8, citing State v. Haefer, 110 W (2d) 381, 328 NW (2d) 894 (Ct. App. 1982).
346.63 Annotation Sub. (1) (b) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Muehlenberg, 118 W (2d) 502, 347 NW (2d) 914 (Ct. App. 1984).
346.63 Annotation See note to 904.03, citing State v. Hinz, 121 W (2d) 282, 360 NW (2d) 56 (Ct. App. 1984).
346.63 Annotation See note to 939.22, citing State v. Waalen, 130 W (2d) 18, 386 NW (2d) 47 (1986).
346.63 Annotation Sub. (1) (b) establishes per se rule that it is violation to operate motor vehicle with specified breath alcohol content, regardless of individual's "partition ratio"; provision is constitutional. State v. McManus, 152 W (2d) 113, 447 NW (2d) 654 (1989).
346.63 Annotation First offender OMVWI prosecution is civil, and jeopardy does not attach to prevent subsequent criminal prosecution. State v. Lawton, 167 W (2d) 461, 482 NW (2d) 142 (Ct. App. 1992).
346.63 Annotation Because there is no privilege under 904.05 (4) (f) for chemical tests for intoxication, results of test taken for diagnostic purposes are admissible in OMVWI trial without patient approval. City of Muskego v. Godec, 167 W (2d) 536, 482 NW (2d) 79 (1992).
346.63 Annotation See note to Art. I, sec. 11 citing State v. Krause, 168 W (2d) 578, 484 NW (2d) 347 (Ct. App. 1992).
346.63 Annotation Dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw when made at an officer's direction following an arrest for OWI. State v. Bohling, 173 W (2d) 529, 494 NW (2d) 399 (1993).
346.63 Annotation Where municipal court found defendant guilty of OWI and dismissed a blood alcohol count charge without finding guilt, the defendant's appeal of the OWI conviction under s. 800.14 (1) did not give the circuit court jurisdiction to here the BAC charge absent an appeal of the dismissal. Town of Menasha v. Bastian, 178 W (2d) 191, 503 NW (2d) 382 (Ct. App. 1993).
346.63 Annotation Two or more prior convictions are an element of sub. (1) (b), and evidence must be presented to prove the same regardless of the potential prejudice arising from evidence of prior convictions. State v. Ludeking, 195 W (2d) 132, 536 NW (2d) 392 (Ct. App. 1995).
346.63 Annotation Failure to timely notify a person of the right to an alternative blood alcohol test does not affect the presumption of the validity of a properly given blood test and is not grounds for suppressing the test results. County of Dane v. Granum, 203 W (2d) 252, 551 NW (2d) 859 (Ct. App. 1996).
346.63 Annotation A request to perform field sobriety tests does not convert an otherwise lawful investigatory stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. County of Dane v. Campshure, 204 W (2d) 27, 552 NW (2d) 876 (Ct. App. 1996)
346.63 Annotation Immobility of a vehicle does not preclude a finding that the vehicle was being operated. Movement is not necessary for operation. State v. Modory, 204 W (2d) 538, 555 NW (2d) 399 (Ct. App. 1996).
346.63 Annotation Criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content subsequent to administrative suspension of a driver's operating privileges does not constitute multiple punishment and therefore does not constitute double jeopardy. State v. McMaster, 206 W (2d) 30, 556 NW (2d) 673 (1996).
346.63 Annotation Evidence of a refusal which follows an inadequate warning under s. 343.305 (4) violates due process, but admission is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Schirmang, 210 W (2d) 325, 565 NW (2d) 225 (Ct. App. 1997).
346.63 Annotation A defendant's refusal to submit to a field sobriety test is not protected by the right against self-incrimination and is admissible as evidence. State v. Mallick, 210 W (2d) 428, 565 NW (2d) 245 (Ct. App. 1997).
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This is an archival version of the Wis. Stats. database for 1997. See Are the Statutes on this Website Official?