943.245(1)
(1) In this section, "pecuniary loss" means:
943.245(1)(a)
(a) All special damages, but not general damages, including, without limitation because of enumeration, the money equivalent of loss resulting from property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise harmed and out-of-pocket losses, such as medical expenses; and
943.245(1)(b)
(b) Reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the victim resulting from the filing of charges or cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the offense under
s. 943.24.
943.245(1m)
(1m) Any person who incurs pecuniary loss, including any holder in due course of a check or order, may bring a civil action against any adult or emancipated minor who:
943.245(1m)(b)
(b) Knew, should have known or recklessly disregarded the fact that the check or order was drawn on an account that did not exist, was drawn on an account with insufficient funds or was otherwise worthless.
943.245(2)
(2) If the person who incurs the loss prevails, the judgment in the action shall grant monetary relief for all of the following:
943.245(2)(a)
(a) The face value of whatever checks or orders were involved.
943.245(2)(c)2.
2. No additional proof is required for an award of exemplary damages under this paragraph.
943.245(2)(d)
(d) Notwithstanding the limitations of
s. 799.25 or
814.04, all actual costs of the action, including reasonable attorney fees.
943.245(3)
(3) Notwithstanding
sub. (2) (c) and
(d), the total amount awarded for exemplary damages and reasonable attorney fees may not exceed $500.
943.245(3m)
(3m) Any recovery under this section shall be reduced by the amount recovered as restitution for the same act under
ss. 800.093 and
973.20.
943.245(4)
(4) At least 20 days prior to commencing an action, as specified in
s. 801.02, under this section, the plaintiff shall notify the defendant, by mail, of his or her intent to bring the action. Notice of nonpayment or dishonor shall be sent by the payee or holder of the check or order to the drawer by regular mail supported by an affidavit of service of mailing or by a certificate of mailing obtained from the U.S. post office from which the mailing was made. The plaintiff shall mail the notice to the defendant's last-known address or to the address provided on the check or order. If the defendant pays the check or order prior to the commencement of the action, he or she is not liable under this section.
943.245(5)
(5) The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred under
s. 943.24 or that he or she incurred a pecuniary loss as a result of the circumstances described in
sub. (6). A conviction under
s. 943.24 is not a condition precedent to bringing an action, obtaining a judgment or collecting that judgment under this section.
943.245(6)(a)(a) In this subsection, "past consideration" does not include work performed, for which a person is entitled to a payroll check.
943.245(6)(b)
(b) Whoever issues any check or other order for the payment of money given for a past consideration which, at the time of issuance, the person intends shall not be paid is liable under this section.
943.245(7)
(7) A person is not criminally liable under
s. 943.30 for any civil action brought in good faith under this section.
943.245(8)
(8) Nothing in this section precludes a plaintiff from bringing the action under
ch. 799 if the amount claimed is within the jurisdictional limits of
s. 799.01 (1) (d).
943.25
943.25
Transfer of encumbered property. 943.25(1)
(1) Whoever, with intent to defraud, conveys real property which he or she knows is encumbered, without informing the grantee of the existence of the encumbrance is guilty of a Class E felony.
943.25(2)
(2) Whoever, with intent to defraud, does any of the following is guilty of a Class E felony:
943.25(2)(a)
(a) Conceals, removes or transfers any personal property in which he or she knows another has a security interest; or
943.25(2)(b)
(b) In violation of the security agreement, fails or refuses to pay over to the secured party the proceeds from the sale of property subject to a security interest.
943.25(3)
(3) It is prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud within the meaning of
sub. (2) (a) if a person, with knowledge that the security interest exists, removes or sells the property without either the consent of the secured party or authorization by the security agreement and fails within 72 hours after service of written demand for the return of the property either to return it or, in the event that return is not possible, to make full disclosure to the secured party of all the information the person has concerning its disposition, location and possession.
943.25(4)
(4) In this section "security interest" means an interest in property which secures payment or other performance of an obligation; "security agreement" means the agreement creating the security interest; "secured party" means the person designated in the security agreement as the person in whose favor there is a security interest or, in the case of an assignment of which the debtor has been notified, the assignee.
943.25(5)
(5) In prosecutions for violation of
sub. (2) arising out of transfers of livestock subject to a security agreement in violation of the terms of the security agreement, evidence that the debtor who transferred the livestock signed or endorsed any writing arising from the transaction, including a check or draft, which states that the transfer of the livestock is permitted by the secured party establishes a rebuttable presumption of intent to defraud.
943.25 Annotation
It is not necessary that a security interest be perfected by filing to support a conviction under this section. State v. Tew, 54 W (2d) 361, 195 NW (2d) 615.
943.25 Annotation
"Removal" under (2) (a) refers to a permanent change in situs, not necessarily across state lines. Statute does not require a showing of diligence by secured party in seeking secured property. Jameson v. State, 74 W (2d) 176, 246 NW (2d) 501.
943.25 Annotation
Sub. (1) is not unconstitutionally vague. Liens were effective as encumbrances on date work was performed or materials supplied. State v. Lunz, 86 W (2d) 695, 273 NW (2d) 767 (1979).
943.26
943.26
Removing or damaging encumbered real property. 943.26(1)(1) Any mortgagor of real property or vendee under a land contract who, without the consent of the mortgagee or vendor, intentionally removes or damages the real property so as to substantially impair the mortgagee's or vendor's security is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
943.26(2)
(2) If the security is impaired by more than $1,000, the mortgagor or vendee is guilty of a Class E felony.
943.26 History
History: 1977 c. 173.
943.27
943.27
Possession of records of certain usurious loans. Any person who knowingly possesses any writing representing or constituting a record of a charge of, contract for, receipt of or demand for a rate of interest or consideration exceeding $20 upon $100 for one year computed upon the declining principal balance of the loan, use or forbearance of money, goods or things in action or upon the loan, use or sale of credit is, if the rate is prohibited by a law other than this section, guilty of a Class E felony.
943.27 History
History: 1977 c. 173;
1979 c. 168.
943.28
943.28
Loan sharking prohibited. 943.28(1)
(1) For the purposes of this section:
943.28(1)(a)
(a) To collect an extension of credit means to induce in any way any person to make repayment thereof.
943.28(1)(b)
(b) An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation or property of any person.
943.28(1)(c)
(c) An extortionate means is any means which involves the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation or property of any person.
943.28(2)
(2) Whoever makes any extortionate extension of credit, or conspires to do so, if one or more of the parties to the conspiracy does an act to effect its object, is guilty of a Class C felony.
943.28(3)
(3) Whoever advances money or property, whether as a gift, as a loan, as an investment, pursuant to a partnership or profit-sharing agreement, or otherwise, for the purpose of making extortionate extensions of credit, is guilty of a Class C felony.
943.28(4)
(4) Whoever knowingly participates in any way in the use of any extortionate means to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit, or to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof, is guilty of a Class C felony.
943.28 History
History: 1977 c. 173;
1995 a. 225.
943.28 Annotation
An extortionate extension of credit under sub. (1) (b) is not restricted to the original extension of credit, but includes renewals of loans. State v. Green, 208 W (2d) 290, 560 NW (2d) 295 (Ct. App. 1997).
943.30
943.30
Threats to injure or accuse of crime. 943.30(1)
(1) Whoever, either verbally or by any written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse or accuses another of any crime or offense, or threatens or commits any injury to the person, property, business, profession, calling or trade, or the profits and income of any business, profession, calling or trade of another, with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against the person's will or omit to do any lawful act, is guilty of a Class D felony.
943.30(2)
(2) Whoever violates
sub. (1) by obstructing, delaying or affecting commerce or business or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce or business is guilty of a Class D felony.
943.30(3)
(3) Whoever violates
sub. (1) by attempting to influence any petit or grand juror, in the performance of his or her functions as such, is guilty of a Class D felony.
943.30(4)
(4) Whoever violates
sub. (1) by attempting to influence the official action of any public officer is guilty of a Class D felony.
943.30(5)(b)
(b) Whoever, orally or by any written or printed communication, maliciously uses, or threatens to use, the patient health care records of another person, with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against the person's will or omit to do any lawful act, is guilty of a Class D felony.
943.30 Annotation
Commencement of threat need not occur in Wisconsin to support extortion charge venued in Wisconsin county. State v. Kelly, 148 W (2d) 774, 436 NW (2d) 883 (Ct. App. 1989).
943.30 Annotation
Threat to falsely testify unless paid, in violation of criminal law, is threat to property within purview of sub. (1). State v. Manthey, 169 W (2d) 673, 487 NW (2d) 44 (Ct. App. 1992).
943.30 Annotation
Extortion is not a lesser included offense of robbery. Convictions for both is not precluded. State v. Dauer, 174 W (2d) 418, 497 NW (2d) 766 (Ct. App. 1993).
943.30 Annotation
Claim under this section is governed by six year limitation period under 893.93 (1) (a). Elbe v. Wausau Hosp. Center, 606 F Supp. 1491 (1985).
943.31
943.31
Threats to communicate derogatory information. Whoever threatens to communicate to anyone information, whether true or false, which would injure the reputation of the threatened person or another unless the threatened person transfers property to a person known not to be entitled to it is guilty of a Class E felony.
943.31 History
History: 1977 c. 173.
943.31 Annotation
Threat to injure manager's reputation unless job is offered violated this section. State v. Gilkes, 118 W (2d) 149, 345 NW (2d) 531 (Ct. App. 1984).
943.32(1)(1) Whoever, with intent to steal, takes property from the person or presence of the owner by either of the following means is guilty of a Class C felony:
943.32(1)(a)
(a) By using force against the person of the owner with intent thereby to overcome his or her physical resistance or physical power of resistance to the taking or carrying away of the property; or
943.32(1)(b)
(b) By threatening the imminent use of force against the person of the owner or of another who is present with intent thereby to compel the owner to acquiesce in the taking or carrying away of the property.
943.32(2)
(2) Whoever violates
sub. (1) by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon, a device or container described under
s. 941.26 (4) (a) or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe that it is a dangerous weapon or such a device or container is guilty of a Class B felony.
943.32(3)
(3) In this section "owner" means a person in possession of property whether the person's possession is lawful or unlawful.
943.32 Annotation
While a person who seeks to repossess himself of specific property which he owns, and to which he has the present right of possession, and the means he uses involves a gun or force, might not have the intention to steal, the taking of money from a debtor by force to pay a debt is robbery unless the accused can trace his ownership to specific coins and bills in the possession of the debtor. Edwards v. State, 49 W (2d) 105, 181 NW (2d) 383.
943.32 Annotation
See note to 943.10, citing State v. DiMaggio, 49 W (2d) 565, 182 NW (2d) 466.
943.32 Annotation
It is error not to instruct on the allegations that the defendant was armed and that he attempted to conceal his identity, but this is harmless error where the facts are uncontroverted. Claybrooks v. State, 50 W (2d) 79, 183 NW (2d) 139.
943.32 Annotation
On a charge of armed robbery the court should instruct as to the definition of a dangerous weapon, but the error is harmless where all the evidence is to the effect that the defendant had a gun. Claybrooks v. State, 50 W (2d) 87, 183 NW (2d) 143.
943.32 Annotation
Where the evidence is clear that the defendant was armed, the court need not submit a verdict which would allow the jury to find him guilty of unarmed robbery. Kimmons v. State, 51 W (2d) 266, 186 NW (2d) 308.
943.32 Annotation
An information charging armed robbery is void if it fails to allege the use or threat of force to overcome the owner's resistance. Champlain v. State, 53 W (2d) 751, 193 NW (2d) 868.
943.32 Annotation
Theft is a lesser included offense of the crime of robbery. Both require asportation. Moore v. State, 55 W (2d) 1, 197 NW (2d) 820.
943.32 Annotation
It is undisputed that the pouch was taken from her by force and in such a manner as to overcome any physical resistance or power of resistance by the victim. These facts do not constitute a theft under 943.20. Walton v. State, 64 W (2d) 36, 218 NW (2d) 309.
943.32 Annotation
Where the victim testified that defendant's accomplice held an object to his throat while defendant took money from his person and where the defendant testified that no robbery whatsoever occurred, the jury was presented with no evidence indicating that a robbery absent the threat of force had occurred, and there was no error in denial of defendant's request for an instruction on theft from a person. State v. Powers, 66 W (2d) 84, 224 NW (2d) 206.
943.32 Annotation
Where defendant lost money to dice cheat and soon after recovered similar amount at gunpoint, jury could convict despite defendant's claim that bills recovered were those lost. Austin v. State, 86 W (2d) 213, 271 NW (2d) 668 (1978).
943.32 Annotation
Sub. (1) states one offense which may be committed by alternate means. Jury was properly instructed in the disjunctive on the force element. Manson v. State, 101 W (2d) 413, 304 NW (2d) 729 (1981).
943.32 Annotation
See note to 939.05, citing State v. Ivey, 119 W (2d) 591, 350 NW (2d) 622 (1984).
943.32 Annotation
Where robbery is committed while merely possessing dangerous weapon, penalty enhancer under 939.63 can be applied. State v. Robinson, 140 W (2d) 673, 412 NW (2d) 535 (Ct. App. 1987).
943.32 Annotation
A defendant's lack of intent to make a victim believe the defendant is armed is irrelevant in finding a violation of sub. (2); if the victim's belief that the defendant was armed is reasonable, that is enough. State v. Hubanks, 173 W (2d) 1, 496 NW (2d) 96 (Ct. App. 1992).
943.32 Annotation
Extortion is not a lesser included offense of robbery. Convictions for both is not precluded. State v. Dauer, 174 W (2d) 418, 497 NW (2d) 766 (Ct. App. 1993).
