111.321 Annotation
It was reasonable for LIRC to interpret the prohibition against marital status discrimination as protecting the status of being married in general rather than the status of being married to a particular person. Bammert v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 28,
232 Wis. 2d 365,
606 N.W.2d 620.
111.321 Annotation
The department of workforce development has statutory authority to receive and investigate a firefighter's employment discrimination claim that is tied directly to the charges sustained and disciplinary sanctions imposed by a police and fire commission under s. 62.13 (5), to which claim preclusion is no bar. City of Madison v. DWD, 2002 WI App 199,
257 Wis. 2d 348,
651 N.W.2d 292.
111.321 Annotation
The police and fire commission has exclusive statutory authority under s. 62.13 (5) to review disciplinary actions against firefighters. Any claim that a disciplinary termination is discriminatory under ch.111 must be raised before the PFC. DWD may not take jurisdiction over a ch. 111 complaint arising out of a decision of a PFC to terminate a firefighter. City of Madison v. DWD, 2003 WI 76,
262 Wis. 2d 652,
664 N.W.2d 584,
01-1910.
111.321 Annotation
Licensing boards do not have authority to enact general regulations that would allow them to suspend, deny, or revoke the license of a person who has a communicable disease. Licensing boards do have authority on a case-by-case basis to suspend, deny, or revoke the license of a person who poses a direct threat to the health and safety of other persons or who is unable to perform duties of the licensed activity.
77 Atty. Gen. 223.
111.321 Annotation
A person suffering from a contagious disease may be handicapped under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
111.321 Annotation
The Wisdom of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act's Ban of Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Conviction Records. Hruz. 85 MLR 779 (2002).
111.321 Annotation
Expanding Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act: Jim Walter Color Separations v. Labor & Industry Review Commission. Edgar. 2000 WLR 885.
111.322
111.322
Discriminatory actions prohibited. Subject to
ss. 111.33 to
111.36, it is an act of employment discrimination to do any of the following:
111.322(1)
(1) To refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar or terminate from employment or labor organization membership any individual, or to discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or labor organization membership because of any basis enumerated in
s. 111.321.
111.322(2)
(2) To print or circulate or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, advertisement or publication, or to use any form of application for employment or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which implies or expresses any limitation, specification or discrimination with respect to an individual or any intent to make such limitation, specification or discrimination because of any basis enumerated in
s. 111.321.
111.322(2m)
(2m) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of any of the following:
111.322(2m)(a)
(a) The individual files a complaint or attempts to enforce any right under
s. 103.02,
103.10,
103.13,
103.28,
103.32,
103.455,
103.50,
104.12,
109.03,
109.07,
109.075 or
146.997 or
ss. 101.58 to
101.599 or
103.64 to
103.82.
111.322(2m)(b)
(b) The individual testifies or assists in any action or proceeding held under or to enforce any right under
s. 103.02,
103.10,
103.13,
103.28,
103.32,
103.455,
103.50,
104.12,
109.03,
109.07,
109.075 or
146.997 or
ss. 101.58 to
101.599 or
103.64 to
103.82.
111.322(2m)(d)
(d) The individual's employer believes that the individual engaged or may engage in any activity described in
pars. (a) to
(c).
111.322(3)
(3) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual because he or she has opposed any discriminatory practice under this subchapter or because he or she has made a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this subchapter.
111.322 Annotation
Actions under subs. (1) and (2) do not involve wholly different elements of proof. Sub. (1) involves actual discrimination; the violation of sub. (2) is not in adopting a discriminatory policy, but rather the publication of it. The remaining elements are the same for both subsections. Sub. (2) is not limited to advertising for employees, it also applies to the printing of policies that affect existing employees. Racine Unified School District v. LIRC,
164 Wis. 2d 567,
476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991).
111.322 Annotation
An unlawful practice occurs when an impermissible motivating factor enters into an employment decision, but if the employer can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible factor, the complainant may not be awarded monetary damages or reinstatement. Hoell v. LIRC,
186 Wis. 2d 603,
522 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1994).
111.322 Annotation
The state is prevented from enforcing discrimination laws against religious associations when the employment at issue serves a ministerial or ecclesiastical function. While it must be given considerable weight, a religious association's designation of a position as ministerial or ecclesiastical does not control its status. Jocz v. LIRC,
196 Wis. 2d 273,
538 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1995),
93-3042.
111.322 Annotation
The exclusive remedy provision in s. 102.03 (2) does not bar a complainant whose claim is covered by the workers compensation act from pursuing an employment discrimination claim under the fair employment act, subch. II, of ch. 111. Byers v. LIRC,
208 Wis. 2d 388,
561 N.W.2d 678 (1997).
111.322 Annotation
A prima facie case of discrimination triggers a burden of production against an employer, but unless the employer remains silent in the face of the
prima facie case, the complainant continues to bear the burden of proof on the ultimate issue of discrimination. Currie v. DILHR,
210 Wis. 2d 381,
565 N.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1997).
111.322 Annotation
A prima facie case for a violation of this section requires that the complainant: 1) was a member of a protected class; 2) was discharged; 3) was qualified for the position; and 4) was either replaced by someone not in the protected class or that others not in the protected class were treated more favorably. Knight v. LIRC,
220 Wis. 2d 137,
582 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1998).
111.322 Annotation
Discrimination in advertising. Abramson, WBB March, 1985.
111.325
111.325
Unlawful to discriminate. It is unlawful for any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to discriminate against any employee or any applicant for employment or licensing.
111.33
111.33
Age; exceptions and special cases. 111.33(1)
(1) The prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of age applies only to discrimination against an individual who is age 40 or over.
111.33(2)
(2) Notwithstanding
sub. (1) and
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of age to do any of the following:
111.33(2)(a)
(a) To terminate the employment of any employee physically or otherwise unable to perform his or her duties.
111.33(2)(b)
(b) To implement the provisions of any retirement plan or system of any employer if the retirement plan or system is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this subchapter. No plan or system may excuse the failure to hire, or require or permit the involuntary retirement of, any individual under
sub. (1) because of that individual's age.
111.33(2)(d)
(d) To apply varying insurance coverage according to an employee's age.
111.33(2)(e)
(e) To exercise an age distinction with respect to hiring an individual to a position in which the knowledge and experience to be gained is required for future advancement to a managerial or executive position.
111.33(2)(f)
(f) To exercise an age distinction with respect to employment in which the employee is exposed to physical danger or hazard, including, without limitation because of enumeration, certain employment in law enforcement or fire fighting.
111.33 History
History: 1981 c. 334;
1983 a. 391,
538.
111.33 Annotation
Sub. (2) (f) exempts the hiring of fire fighters from being the subject of age discrimination suits. A fire department need not show that it openly and consistently discriminated on the basis of age to be exempt under sub. (2) (f). Johnson v. LIRC,
200 Wis. 2d 715,
547 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1996),
95-2346.
111.33 Annotation
An employee is physically unable to perform a job under sub. (2) if that employee is performing the job with a physical accommodation. Harrison v. LIRC,
211 Wis. 2d 680,
565 N.W.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1997).
111.33 Annotation
A city charged under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act had the burden of establishing that a mandatory retirement age of 55 for law enforcement personnel was a bona fide occupational qualification. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Janesville,
630 F.2d 1254 (1980).
111.33 Annotation
The federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act preempts sub. (2) (b) to the extent that it applies to employee benefit plans covered by it. Waukesha Engine Division v. DILHR,
619 F. Supp. 1310 (1985).
111.335
111.335
Arrest or conviction record; exceptions and special cases. 111.335(1)(a)(a) Employment discrimination because of arrest record includes, but is not limited to, requesting an applicant, employee, member, licensee or any other individual, on an application form or otherwise, to supply information regarding any arrest record of the individual except a record of a pending charge, except that it is not employment discrimination to request such information when employment depends on the bondability of the individual under a standard fidelity bond or when an equivalent bond is required by state or federal law, administrative regulation or established business practice of the employer and the individual may not be bondable due to an arrest record.
111.335(1)(b)
(b) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of arrest record to refuse to employ or license, or to suspend from employment or licensing, any individual who is subject to a pending criminal charge if the circumstances of the charge substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.
111.335(1)(c)
(c) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ or license, or to bar or terminate from employment or licensing, any individual who:
111.335(1)(c)1.
1. Has been convicted of any felony, misdemeanor or other offense the circumstances of which substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity; or
111.335(1)(c)2.
2. Is not bondable under a standard fidelity bond or an equivalent bond where such bondability is required by state or federal law, administrative regulation or established business practice of the employer.
111.335(1)(cg)1.1. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to deny or refuse to renew a license or permit under
s. 440.26 to a person who has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cg)2.
2. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to revoke a license or permit under
s. 440.26 (6) (b) if the person holding the license or permit has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cg)3.
3. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ a person in a business licensed under
s. 440.26 or as an employee specified in
s. 440.26 (5) (b) if the person has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cm)
(cm) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ as an installer of burglar alarms a person who has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned.
111.335(1)(cs)
(cs) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to revoke, suspend or refuse to renew a license or permit under
ch. 125 if the person holding or applying for the license or permit has been convicted of one or more of the following:
111.335(1)(cs)1.
1. Manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under
s. 961.41 (1).
111.335(1)(cs)2.
2. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under
s. 961.41 (1m).
111.335(1)(cs)3.
3. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, or manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under a federal law that is substantially similar to
s. 961.41 (1) or
(1m).
111.335(1)(cs)4.
4. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, or manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under the law of another state that is substantially similar to
s. 961.41 (1) or
(1m).
111.335(1)(cv)
(cv) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ in a position in the classified service or in a position described in
s. 230.08 (2) (k) a person who has been convicted under 50 USC, Appendix, section 462 for refusing to register with the selective service system and who has not been pardoned.
111.335 Annotation
A rule adopted under s. 165.85 properly barred a nonpardoned felon from holding a police job. Law Enforcement Standards Board v. Lyndon Station,
101 Wis. 2d 472,
305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).
111.335 Annotation
A conviction for armed robbery in and of itself constituted circumstances substantially related to a school bus driver's licensure. Gibson v. Transportation Commission,
106 Wis. 2d 22,
315 N.W.2d 346 (1982).
111.335 Annotation
An employer's inquiry is limited to general facts in determining whether the "circumstances of the offense" relate to the job. It is not the details of the criminal activity that are important, but rather the circumstances that foster criminal activity, such as opportunity for criminal behavior, reaction to responsibility, and character traits of the person. County of Milwaukee v. LIRC,
139 Wis. 2d 805,
407 N.W.2d 908 (1987).
111.335 Annotation
There is no requirement that an that an employer take affirmative steps to accommodate individuals convicted of felonies. Knight v. LIRC,
220 Wis. 2d 137,
582 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1998).
111.335 Annotation
When evaluating an individual for the position of reserve officer, a sheriff's department may consider information in its possession concerning the individual's juvenile record, subject to prohibitions against arrest record and conviction record discrimination contained in the WFEA.
79 Atty. Gen. 89.
111.335 Annotation
Discrimination in employment on the basis of arrest or conviction record. Mukamel. WBB Sept. 1983.
111.337
111.337
Creed; exceptions and special cases. 111.337(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of creed includes, but is not limited to, refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business.
111.337(2)
(2) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of creed:
111.337(2)(a)
(a) For a religious association not organized for private profit or an organization or corporation which is primarily owned or controlled by such a religious association to give preference to an applicant or employee who is a member of the same or a similar religious denomination.
111.337(2)(am)
(am) For a religious association not organized for private profit or an organization or corporation which is primarily owned or controlled by such a religious association to give preference to an applicant or employee who adheres to the religious association's creed, if the job description demonstrates that the position is clearly related to the religious teachings and beliefs of the religious association.
111.337(2)(b)
(b) For a fraternal as defined in
s. 614.01 (1) (a) to give preference to an employee or applicant who is a member or is eligible for membership in the fraternal, with respect to hiring to or promotion to the position of officer, administrator or salesperson.
111.337(3)
(3) No county, city, village or town may adopt any provision concerning employment discrimination because of creed that prohibits activity allowed under this section.
111.337 Annotation
Sub. (2) does not allow religious organizations to engage in prohibited forms of discrimination. Sacred Heart School Board v. LIRC,
157 Wis. 2d 638,
460 N.W.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1990).
111.337 Annotation
A union violated Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act by causing an employer to fire an employee because of the employee's refusal, on religious grounds, to pay union dues. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806,
643 F. 2d 445 (1981).
111.337 Annotation
The supreme court redefines employer's role in religious accommodation. Soeka. WBB July 1987.
111.34
111.34
Disability; exceptions and special cases. 111.34(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of disability includes, but is not limited to:
111.34(1)(a)
(a) Contributing a lesser amount to the fringe benefits, including life or disability insurance coverage, of any employee because of the employee's disability; or
111.34(1)(b)
(b) Refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business.
111.34(2)(a)(a) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of disability to refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar or terminate from employment, membership or licensure any individual, or to discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment if the disability is reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment, membership or licensure.
111.34(2)(b)
(b) In evaluating whether an individual with a disability can adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed activity, the present and future safety of the individual, of the individual's coworkers and, if applicable, of the general public may be considered. However, this evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis and may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure of individuals with disabilities in general or a particular class of individuals with disabilities.
111.34(2)(c)
(c) If the employment, membership or licensure involves a special duty of care for the safety of the general public, including but not limited to employment with a common carrier, this special duty of care may be considered in evaluating whether the employee or applicant can adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed activity. However, this evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis and may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure of individuals with disabilities in general or a particular class of individuals with disabilities.
111.34 History
History: 1981 c. 334;
1997 a. 112.
111.34 Annotation
The utilization of federal regulations as a hiring standard, although not applicable to the employing taxi company, demonstrated a rational relationship to the safety obligations imposed on the employer, and its use was not the result of an arbitrary belief lacking in objective reason or rationale. Boynton Cab Co. v. DILHR,
96 Wis. 2d 396,
291 N.W.2d 850 (1980).
111.34 Annotation
An employee handicapped by alcoholism was properly discharged under s. 111.32 (5) (f), 1973 Stats., (a predecessor to this section) for inability to efficiently perform job duties. Squires v. LIRC,
97 Wis. 2d 648,
294 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1980).
111.34 Annotation
Physical standards for school bus operators established under s. 343.12 (2) (g) are not exempt from the requirements of sub. (2) (b). Bothum v. Department of Transportation,
134 Wis. 2d 378,
396 N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1986).
111.34 Annotation
The duty to reasonably accommodate under sub. (1) (b) is to be broadly interpreted and may involve the transfer of an individual from one job to another. What is reasonable will depend on the facts of the case. McMullen v. LIRC,
148 Wis. 2d 270,
434 N.W.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1986).
