111.335(1)(cg)1.1. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to deny or refuse to renew a license or permit under
s. 440.26 to a person who has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cg)2.
2. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to revoke a license or permit under
s. 440.26 (6) (b) if the person holding the license or permit has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cg)3.
3. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ a person in a business licensed under
s. 440.26 or as an employee specified in
s. 440.26 (5) (b) if the person has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned for that felony.
111.335(1)(cm)
(cm) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ as an installer of burglar alarms a person who has been convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned.
111.335(1)(cs)
(cs) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to revoke, suspend or refuse to renew a license or permit under
ch. 125 if the person holding or applying for the license or permit has been convicted of one or more of the following:
111.335(1)(cs)1.
1. Manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under
s. 961.41 (1).
111.335(1)(cs)2.
2. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under
s. 961.41 (1m).
111.335(1)(cs)3.
3. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, or manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under a federal law that is substantially similar to
s. 961.41 (1) or
(1m).
111.335(1)(cs)4.
4. Possessing, with intent to manufacture, distribute or deliver, or manufacturing, distributing or delivering a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under the law of another state that is substantially similar to
s. 961.41 (1) or
(1m).
111.335(1)(cv)
(cv) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of conviction record to refuse to employ in a position in the classified service or in a position described in
s. 230.08 (2) (k) a person who has been convicted under 50 USC, Appendix, section 462 for refusing to register with the selective service system and who has not been pardoned.
111.335 Annotation
A rule adopted under s. 165.85 properly barred a nonpardoned felon from holding a police job. Law Enforcement Standards Board v. Lyndon Station,
101 Wis. 2d 472,
305 N.W.2d 89 (1981).
111.335 Annotation
A conviction for armed robbery in and of itself constituted circumstances substantially related to a school bus driver's licensure. Gibson v. Transportation Commission,
106 Wis. 2d 22,
315 N.W.2d 346 (1982).
111.335 Annotation
An employer's inquiry is limited to general facts in determining whether the "circumstances of the offense" relate to the job. It is not the details of the criminal activity that are important, but rather the circumstances that foster criminal activity, such as opportunity for criminal behavior, reaction to responsibility, and character traits of the person. County of Milwaukee v. LIRC,
139 Wis. 2d 805,
407 N.W.2d 908 (1987).
111.335 Annotation
There is no requirement that an that an employer take affirmative steps to accommodate individuals convicted of felonies. Knight v. LIRC,
220 Wis. 2d 137,
582 N.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1998).
111.335 Annotation
When evaluating an individual for the position of reserve officer, a sheriff's department may consider information in its possession concerning the individual's juvenile record, subject to prohibitions against arrest record and conviction record discrimination contained in the WFEA.
79 Atty. Gen. 89.
111.335 Annotation
Discrimination in employment on the basis of arrest or conviction record. Mukamel. WBB Sept. 1983.
111.337
111.337
Creed; exceptions and special cases. 111.337(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of creed includes, but is not limited to, refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business.
111.337(2)
(2) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of creed:
111.337(2)(a)
(a) For a religious association not organized for private profit or an organization or corporation which is primarily owned or controlled by such a religious association to give preference to an applicant or employee who is a member of the same or a similar religious denomination.
111.337(2)(am)
(am) For a religious association not organized for private profit or an organization or corporation which is primarily owned or controlled by such a religious association to give preference to an applicant or employee who adheres to the religious association's creed, if the job description demonstrates that the position is clearly related to the religious teachings and beliefs of the religious association.
111.337(2)(b)
(b) For a fraternal as defined in
s. 614.01 (1) (a) to give preference to an employee or applicant who is a member or is eligible for membership in the fraternal, with respect to hiring to or promotion to the position of officer, administrator or salesperson.
111.337(3)
(3) No county, city, village or town may adopt any provision concerning employment discrimination because of creed that prohibits activity allowed under this section.
111.337 Annotation
Sub. (2) does not allow religious organizations to engage in prohibited forms of discrimination. Sacred Heart School Board v. LIRC,
157 Wis. 2d 638,
460 N.W.2d 430 (Ct. App. 1990).
111.337 Annotation
A union violated Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act by causing an employer to fire an employee because of the employee's refusal, on religious grounds, to pay union dues. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806,
643 F. 2d 445 (1981).
111.337 Annotation
The supreme court redefines employer's role in religious accommodation. Soeka. WBB July 1987.
111.34
111.34
Disability; exceptions and special cases. 111.34(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of disability includes, but is not limited to:
111.34(1)(a)
(a) Contributing a lesser amount to the fringe benefits, including life or disability insurance coverage, of any employee because of the employee's disability; or
111.34(1)(b)
(b) Refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business.
111.34(2)(a)(a) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of disability to refuse to hire, employ, admit or license any individual, to bar or terminate from employment, membership or licensure any individual, or to discriminate against any individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment if the disability is reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment, membership or licensure.
111.34(2)(b)
(b) In evaluating whether an individual with a disability can adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed activity, the present and future safety of the individual, of the individual's coworkers and, if applicable, of the general public may be considered. However, this evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis and may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure of individuals with disabilities in general or a particular class of individuals with disabilities.
111.34(2)(c)
(c) If the employment, membership or licensure involves a special duty of care for the safety of the general public, including but not limited to employment with a common carrier, this special duty of care may be considered in evaluating whether the employee or applicant can adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of a particular job, membership or licensed activity. However, this evaluation shall be made on an individual case-by-case basis and may not be made by a general rule which prohibits the employment or licensure of individuals with disabilities in general or a particular class of individuals with disabilities.
111.34 History
History: 1981 c. 334;
1997 a. 112.
111.34 Annotation
The utilization of federal regulations as a hiring standard, although not applicable to the employing taxi company, demonstrated a rational relationship to the safety obligations imposed on the employer, and its use was not the result of an arbitrary belief lacking in objective reason or rationale. Boynton Cab Co. v. DILHR,
96 Wis. 2d 396,
291 N.W.2d 850 (1980).
111.34 Annotation
An employee handicapped by alcoholism was properly discharged under s. 111.32 (5) (f), 1973 Stats., (a predecessor to this section) for inability to efficiently perform job duties. Squires v. LIRC,
97 Wis. 2d 648,
294 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1980).
111.34 Annotation
Physical standards for school bus operators established under s. 343.12 (2) (g) are not exempt from the requirements of sub. (2) (b). Bothum v. Department of Transportation,
134 Wis. 2d 378,
396 N.W.2d 785 (Ct. App. 1986).
111.34 Annotation
The duty to reasonably accommodate under sub. (1) (b) is to be broadly interpreted and may involve the transfer of an individual from one job to another. What is reasonable will depend on the facts of the case. McMullen v. LIRC,
148 Wis. 2d 270,
434 N.W.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1986).
111.34 Annotation
To avail itself of the defense under sub. (2) that an ostensibly safety-based employment restriction is job-related, an employer bears the burden of proving to a reasonable probability that the restriction is necessary to prevent harm to the employee or others. Racine Unified School District v. LIRC,
164 Wis. 2d 567,
476 N.W.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1991).
111.34 Annotation
Temporary forbearance of work rules while determining whether an employee's medical problem is treatable may be a reasonable accommodation under sub. (1) (b). The purpose of reasonable accommodation is to enable employees to adequately undertake job-related responsibilities. Target Stores v. LIRC,
217 Wis. 2d 1,
576 N.W.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1998).
111.34 Annotation
Whether an employee's mental illness caused him to react angrily and commit the act of insubordination that led to the termination of his employment was sufficiently complex and technical that expert testimony was required. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 272,
240 Wis. 2d 209,
621 N.W.2d 633.
111.34 Annotation
A complainant must show that he or she is handicapped and that the employer took one of the prohibited actions based on that handicap. The employer then has a burden of proving a defense. Sub. (1) (b) does not require an employer to make a reasonable accommodation if the accommodation will impose a hardship on the employer, but if the employer is not able to demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship there is a violation. Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106,
264 Wis. 2d 200,
664 N.W.2d 651,
02-0815.
111.34 Annotation
A reasonable accommodation is not limited to that which would allow the employee to perform adequately all of his or her job duties. A change in job duties may be a reasonable accommodation in a given circumstance. Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106,
264 Wis. 2d 200,
664 N.W.2d 651,
02-0815.
111.34 Annotation
A person suffering from a contagious disease may be handicapped under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273 (1987).
111.34 Annotation
Hidden handicaps: Protection of alcoholics, drug addicts, and the mentally ill against employment discrimination under the rehabilitation act of 1973 and the Wisconsin fair employment act. 1983 WLR 725.
111.345
111.345
Marital status; exceptions and special cases. Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of marital status to prohibit an individual from directly supervising or being directly supervised by his or her spouse.
111.345 History
History: 1981 c. 334.
111.345 Annotation
A work rule intended to limit extramarital affairs among coemployees was not discrimination because of marital status. Federated Rural Electric Insurance v. Kessler,
131 Wis. 2d 189,
388 N.W.2d 553 (1986).
111.35
111.35
Use or nonuse of lawful products; exceptions and special cases. 111.35(1)(a)(a) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of use of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours for a nonprofit corporation that, as one of its primary purposes or objectives, discourages the general public from using a lawful product to refuse to hire or employ an individual, to suspend or terminate the employment of an individual, or to discriminate against an individual in promotion, in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because that individual uses off the employer's premises during nonworking hours a lawful product that the nonprofit corporation discourages the general public from using.
111.35(1)(b)
(b) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of nonuse of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours for a nonprofit corporation that, as one of its primary purposes or objectives, encourages the general public to use a lawful product to refuse to hire or employ an individual, to suspend or terminate the employment of an individual, or to discriminate against an individual in promotion, in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because that individual does not use off the employer's premises during nonworking hours a lawful product that the nonprofit corporation encourages the general public to use.
111.35(2)
(2) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of use or nonuse of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person to refuse to hire, employ, admit, or license an individual, to bar, suspend or terminate an individual from employment, membership or licensure, or to discriminate against an individual in promotion, in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or labor organization membership if the individual's use or nonuse of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours does any of the following:
111.35(2)(a)
(a) Impairs the individual's ability to undertake adequately the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment, membership or licensure.
111.35(2)(b)
(b) Creates a conflict of interest, or the appearance of a conflict of interest, with the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment, membership or licensure.
111.35(2)(c)
(c) Conflicts with a bona fide occupational qualification that is reasonably related to the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment, membership or licensure.
111.35(2)(e)
(e) Conflicts with any federal or state statute, rule or regulation.
111.35(3)(a)(a) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of use of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person to offer a policy or plan of life, health or disability insurance coverage under which the type of coverage or the price of coverage for an individual who uses a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours differs from the type of coverage or the price of coverage provided for an individual who does not use that lawful product, if all of the following conditions apply:
111.35(3)(a)1.
1. The difference between the premium rates charged to an individual who uses that lawful product and the premium rates charged to an individual who does not use that lawful product reflects the cost of providing the coverage to the individual who uses that lawful product.
111.35(3)(a)2.
2. The employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person that offers the coverage provides each individual who is charged a different premium rate based on that individual's use of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours with a written statement specifying the premium rate differential used by the insurance carrier.
111.35(3)(b)
(b) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of nonuse of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person to offer a policy or plan of life, health or disability insurance coverage under which the type of coverage or the price of coverage for an individual who does not use a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours differs from the type of coverage or the price of coverage provided for an individual who uses that lawful product, if all of the following conditions apply:
111.35(3)(b)1.
1. The difference between the premium rates charged to an individual who does not use that lawful product and the premium rates charged to an individual who uses that lawful product reflects the cost of providing the coverage to the individual who does not use that lawful product.
111.35(3)(b)2.
2. The employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person that offers the coverage provides each individual who is charged a different premium rate based on that individual's nonuse of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours with a written statement specifying the premium rate differential used by the insurance carrier.
111.35(4)
(4) Notwithstanding
s. 111.322, it is not employment discrimination because of use of a lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours to refuse to employ an applicant if the applicant's use of a lawful product consists of smoking tobacco and the employment is as a fire fighter covered under
s. 891.45 or
891.455.
111.36
111.36
Sex, sexual orientation; exceptions and special cases. 111.36(1)(1) Employment discrimination because of sex includes, but is not limited to, any of the following actions by any employer, labor organization, employment agency, licensing agency or other person:
111.36(1)(a)
(a) Discriminating against any individual in promotion, compensation paid for equal or substantially similar work, or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment or licensing on the basis of sex where sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification.
111.36(1)(b)
(b) Engaging in sexual harassment; or implicitly or explicitly making or permitting acquiescence in or submission to sexual harassment a term or condition of employment; or making or permitting acquiescence in, submission to or rejection of sexual harassment the basis or any part of the basis for any employment decision affecting an employee, other than an employment decision that is disciplinary action against an employee for engaging in sexual harassment in violation of this paragraph; or permitting sexual harassment to have the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an employee's work performance or of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Under this paragraph, substantial interference with an employee's work performance or creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment is established when the conduct is such that a reasonable person under the same circumstances as the employee would consider the conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere substantially with the person's work performance or to create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
111.36(1)(br)
(br) Engaging in harassment that consists of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct directed at another individual because of that individual's gender, other than the conduct described in
par. (b), and that has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment or has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with that individual's work performance. Under this paragraph, substantial interference with an employee's work performance or creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment is established when the conduct is such that a reasonable person under the same circumstances as the employee would consider the conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere substantially with the person's work performance or to create an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.
111.36(1)(c)
(c) Discriminating against any woman on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, maternity leave or related medical conditions by engaging in any of the actions prohibited under
s. 111.322, including, but not limited to, actions concerning fringe benefit programs covering illnesses and disability.
111.36(1)(d)1.1. For any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or employment agency or other person to refuse to hire, employ, admit or license, or to bar or terminate from employment, membership or licensure any individual, or to discriminate against an individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's sexual orientation; or
111.36(1)(d)2.
2. For any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or employment agency or other person to discharge or otherwise discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any discriminatory practices under this paragraph or because he or she has made a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this paragraph.
111.36(2)
(2) For the purposes of this subchapter, sex is a bona fide occupational qualification if all of the members of one sex are physically incapable of performing the essential duties required by a job, or if the essence of the employer's business operation would be undermined if employees were not hired exclusively from one sex.
111.36(3)
(3) For purposes of sexual harassment claims under
sub. (1) (b), an employer, labor organization, employment agency or licensing agency is presumed liable for an act of sexual harassment by that employer, labor organization, employment agency or licensing agency or by any of its employees or members, if the act occurs while the complaining employee is at his or her place of employment or is performing duties relating to his or her employment, if the complaining employee informs the employer, labor organization, employment agency or licensing agency of the act, and if the employer, labor organization, employment agency or licensing agency fails to take appropriate action within a reasonable time.
111.36 Annotation
Federal law may be looked to in interpreting sub. (1) (b) and (br). Under federal law "hostile environment" sexual harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Kanneneberg v. LIRC,
213 Wis. 2d 373,
571 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1997).
111.36 Annotation
Emotional distress injury due to on-the-job sexual harassment was exclusively compensable under s.102.03. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., Division of Dart Industries, Inc.
789 F. 2d 540 (1986).
111.36 Annotation
Sexual harassment. Gibson, WBB March, 1981.
111.37
111.37
Use of honesty testing devices in employment situations.
