940.04 Annotation
Sub. (2) (a) proscribes feticide. It does not apply to consensual abortions. It was not impliedly repealed by the adoption of s. 940.15 in response to
Roe,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). State v. Black,
188 Wis. 2d 639,
526 N.W.2d 132 (1994).
940.04 Annotation
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte,
2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.04 Annotation
This section is cited as similar to a Texas statute that was held to violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113,
93 S. Ct. 705,
35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973).
940.04 Annotation
Poverty is not a constitutionally suspect classification. Encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life. Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297,
100 S. Ct. 2671,
65 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980).
940.04 Annotation
Discussing abortion issues. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416,
103 S. Ct. 2481,
76 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476,
103 S. Ct. 2517,
76 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1983); Simopoulas v. Virginia,
462 U.S. 506,
103 S. Ct. 2532,
76 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1983).
940.04 Annotation
Wisconsin's abortion statute, former s. 940.04, 1969 stats., is unconstitutional as applied to the abortion of an embryo that has not quickened. Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (1970).
940.04 Annotation
When U.S. Supreme Court decisions clearly made Wisconsin's antiabortion statute unenforceable, the issue in a physician's action for injunctive relief against enforcement became mooted, and it no longer presented a case or controversy over which the court could have jurisdiction. Larkin v. McCann,
368 F. Supp. 1352 (1974).
940.05
940.05
Second-degree intentional homicide. 940.05(1)(1)
Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class B felony if:
940.05(1)(a)
(a) In prosecutions under s.
940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s.
940.01 (2) did not exist as required by s.
940.01 (3); or
940.05(1)(b)
(b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s.
940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.
940.05(2)
(2) In prosecutions under sub.
(1), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another.
940.05(2g)
(2g) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another is guilty of a Class B felony if:
940.05(2g)(a)
(a) In prosecutions under s.
940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s.
940.01 (2) did not exist as required by s.
940.01 (3); or
940.05(2g)(b)
(b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s.
940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.
940.05(2h)
(2h) In prosecutions under sub.
(2g), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another.
940.05(3)
(3) The mitigating circumstances specified in s.
940.01 (2) are not defenses to prosecution for this offense.
940.05 History
History: 1987 a. 399;
1997 a. 295.
940.05 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree intentional homicide is analogous to the prior offense of manslaughter. The penalty is increased and the elements clarified in order to encourage charging under this section in appropriate cases.
940.05 Note
Adequate provocation, unnecessary defensive force, prevention of felony, coercion and necessity, which are affirmative defenses to first-degree intentional homicide but not this offense, mitigate that offense to this. When this offense is charged, the state's inability to disprove their existence is conceded. Their existence need not, however, be pleaded or proved by the state in order to sustain a finding of guilty.
940.05 Note
When first-degree intentional homicide is charged, this lesser offense must be submitted upon request if the evidence, reasonably viewed, could support the jury's finding that the state has not borne its burden of persuasion under s. 940.01 (3). State v. Felton,
110 Wis. 2d 465, 508 (1983). [Bill 191-S]
940.05 Annotation
The prosecution is required to prove only that the defendant's acts were a substantial factor in the victim's death; not the sole cause. State v. Block,
170 Wis. 2d 676,
489 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1992).
940.05 Annotation
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte,
2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.05 Annotation
The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision. Dickey, Schultz, & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323.
940.06
940.06
Second-degree reckless homicide. 940.06(1)(1)
Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.06(2)
(2) Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a Class D felony.
940.06 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree reckless homicide is analogous to the prior offense of homicide by reckless conduct. The revised statute clearly requires proof of a subjective mental state, i.e., criminal recklessness. See s. 939.24 and the NOTE thereto. [Bill 191-S]
940.06 Annotation
Second-degree reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. State v. Lechner,
217 Wis. 2d 392,
576 N.W.2d 912 (1998),
96-2830.
940.06 Annotation
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte,
2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.06 Annotation
The second-degree reckless homicide statute requires both the creation of an objectively unreasonable and substantial risk of human death or great bodily harm and the actor's subjective awareness of that risk. The circuit court's refusal to instruct the jury about the effect of the parents' sincere belief in prayer treatment for their child on the subjective awareness element of second-degree reckless homicide did not undermine the parents' ability to defend themselves. The second-degree reckless homicide statute does not require that the actor be subjectively aware that the actor's conduct is a cause of the death of the actor's child. The statute and the jury instructions require only that the actor be subjectively aware that the actor's conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. State v. Neumann,
2013 WI 58,
348 Wis. 2d 455,
832 N.W.2d 560,
11-1044.
940.06 Annotation
The only difference between first-degree and second-degree reckless homicide is that “utter disregard for human life" is a required element for first-degree, but not second-degree, reckless homicide. In this case, there was evidence that the defendant acted in fear for his own life, not necessarily with utter disregard for the victim's life. Based on that evidence, the circuit court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree reckless homicide as well as first-degree reckless homicide. State v. Johnson,
2021 WI 61,
397 Wis. 2d 633,
961 N.W.2d 18,
18-2318.
940.06 Annotation
The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision. Dickey, Schultz, & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323.
940.07
940.07
Homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious animal. Whoever knowing the vicious propensities of any animal intentionally allows it to go at large or keeps it without ordinary care, if such animal, while so at large or not confined, kills any human being who has taken all the precautions which the circumstances may permit to avoid such animal, is guilty of a Class G felony.
940.07 History
History: 1977 c. 173;
2001 a. 109.
940.07 Annotation
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte,
2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.08
940.08
Homicide by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire. 940.08(1)(1)
Except as provided in sub.
(3), whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony.
940.08(2)
(2) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony.
940.08(3)
(3) Subsection
(1) does not apply to a health care provider acting within the scope of his or her practice or employment.
940.08 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: The definition of the offense is broadened to include highly negligent handling of fire, explosives and dangerous weapons in addition to firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow. See s. 939.22 (10). [Bill 191-S]
940.08 Annotation
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte,
2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.08 Annotation
In order to establish that the defendant was guilty of the crime of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon under sub. (1), the state had to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant operated or handled a dangerous weapon; 2) the defendant operated or handled a dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence; and 3) the defendant's operation or handling of a dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence caused the death of another human being. State v. Langlois,
2018 WI 73,
382 Wis. 2d 414,
913 N.W.2d 812,
16-1409.
940.09
940.09
Homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle or firearm. 940.09(1)(1)
Any person who does any of the following may be penalized as provided in sub.
(1c):
940.09(1)(a)
(a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.09(1)(am)
(am) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
940.09(1)(b)
(b) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in s.
340.01 (46m).
940.09(1)(bm)
(bm) Causes the death of another by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.
940.09(1)(c)
(c) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.09(1)(cm)
(cm) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
940.09(1)(d)
(d) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in s.
340.01 (46m).
940.09(1)(e)
(e) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.
940.09(1c)(a)(a) Except as provided in par.
(b), a person who violates sub.
(1) is guilty of a Class D felony. Upon conviction, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s.
973.01 and the term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence shall be at least 5 years except that a court may impose a term of confinement that is less than 5 years if the court finds a compelling reason and places its reason on the record.
940.09(1c)(b)
(b) A person who violates sub.
(1) is guilty of a Class C felony if the person has one or more prior convictions, suspensions, or revocations, as counted under s.
343.307 (2). Upon conviction, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s.
973.01 and the term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence shall be at least 5 years except that a court may impose a term of confinement that is less than 5 years if the court finds a compelling reason and places its reason on the record.
940.09(1d)
(1d) A person who violates sub.
(1) is subject to the requirements and procedures for installation of an ignition interlock device under s.
343.301.
940.09(1g)
(1g) Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class D felony:
940.09(1g)(a)
(a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.09(1g)(am)
(am) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
940.09(1g)(b)
(b) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.
940.09(1g)(c)
(c) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while under the influence of an intoxicant.
940.09(1g)(cm)
(cm) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
940.09(1g)(d)
(d) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.
940.09(1m)(a)(a) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon an information based upon a violation of any combination of sub.
(1) (a),
(am), or
(b); any combination of sub.
(1) (a),
(am), or
(bm); any combination of sub.
(1) (c),
(cm), or
(d); any combination of sub.
(1) (c),
(cm), or
(e); any combination of sub.
(1g) (a),
(am), or
(b); or any combination of sub.
(1g) (c),
(cm), or
(d) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence.
940.09(1m)(b)
(b) If a person is charged in an information with any of the combinations of crimes referred to in par.
(a), the crimes shall be joined under s.
971.12. If the person is found guilty of more than one of the crimes so charged for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under s.
23.33 (13) (b) 2. and
3., under s.
23.335 (23) (c) 2. and
3., under s.
30.80 (6) (a) 2. and
3., under s.
343.307 (1) or under s.
350.11 (3) (a) 2. and
3. Subsection
(1) (a),
(am),
(b),
(bm),
(c),
(cm),
(d), and
(e) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require, and sub.
(1g) (a),
(am),
(b),
(c),
(cm), and
(d) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require.
940.09(2)(a)(a) In any action under this section, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the death would have occurred even if he or she had been exercising due care and he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, did not have a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood, or did not have an alcohol concentration described under sub.
(1) (b),
(bm),
(d) or
(e) or
(1g) (b) or
(d).
940.09(2)(b)
(b) In any action under sub.
(1) (am) or
(cm) or
(1g) (am) or
(cm) that is based on the defendant allegedly having a detectable amount of methamphetamine or gamma-hydroxybutyric acid or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one of its metabolic precursors or gamma-hydroxybutyric acid or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol.
940.09 History
History: 1977 c. 173;
1981 c. 20,
184,
314,
391;
1983 a. 459;
1985 a. 331;
1987 a. 399;
1989 a. 105,
275,
359;
1991 a. 32,
277;
1993 a. 317;
1995 a. 425,
436;
1997 a. 237,
295,
338;
1999 a. 32,
109;
2001 a. 16,
109;
2003 a. 30,
97;
2009 a. 100;
2015 a. 170;
2015 a. 197 s.
51;
2019 a. 31.
940.09 Annotation
Probable cause for arrest on a charge of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle justified taking a blood sample without a search warrant or arrest. State v. Bentley,
92 Wis. 2d 860,
286 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1979).
940.09 Annotation
Each death caused by an intoxicated operator's negligence is chargeable as a separate offense. State v. Rabe,
96 Wis. 2d 48,
291 N.W.2d 809 (1980).
940.09 Annotation
Because driving while intoxicated is inherently dangerous, the state need not prove a causal connection between the driver's intoxication and the victim's death. Sub. (2) does not violate the right against self-incrimination. State v. Caibaiosai,
122 Wis. 2d 587,
363 N.W.2d 574 (1985). See also State v. Fonte,
2005 WI 77,
281 Wis. 2d 654,
698 N.W.2d 594,
03-2097.
940.09 Annotation
The definition of vehicle in s. 939.22 (44) applies to this section and includes a tractor. State v. Sohn,
193 Wis. 2d 346,
535 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1995).
940.09 Annotation
The defense under sub. (2) does not require an intervening cause; a victim's conduct can be the basis of the defense. The s. 939.14 rule that contributory negligence is not a defense to a crime does not prevent considering the victim's negligence in relation to causation. State v. Lohmeier,
205 Wis. 2d 183,
556 N.W.2d 90 (1996),
94-2187.
940.09 Annotation
Second-degree reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. State v. Lechner,
217 Wis. 2d 392,
576 N.W.2d 912 (1998),
96-2830.
940.09 Annotation
The common law “year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is prospectively abrogated. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.09 Annotation
Defendant's conviction under sub. (1) (c) for causing the death of an unborn child was not unconstitutional. The court rejected the assertion that s. 939.75 (2) (b) 3. denies equal protection of the law because a pregnant woman can perform acts that cause the death of her unborn child without criminal liability while others are not similarly exempt for acts causing the death of the same unborn child. Because neither the defendant in this case nor anyone else is similarly situated to a pregnant woman who engages in conduct that causes the death of or harm to the unborn child within the pregnant woman, there is no equal protection violation. State v. Benson,
2012 WI App 101,
344 Wis. 2d 126,
822 N.W.2d 484,
11-1399.
940.09 Annotation
When a blood test reveals the presence of a restricted controlled substance, homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle is a type of strict liability offense; the state only need prove that the restricted controlled substance was present and the defendant caused the death of another by using a motor vehicle. Though generally structured as a strict liability offense, sub. (2) (a) provides a defense for when there is an intervening cause between the intoxicated operation of the automobile and the death of an individual. A seizure can, as a general matter, be a defense to the charge. State v. Raczka,
2018 WI App 3,
379 Wis. 2d 720,
906 N.W.2d 722,
16-1057.
940.09 Annotation
In this case, the defendant had a history of seizures and failed to take his seizure medication as prescribed. If failing to take the medication was negligent and this negligence caused the seizure and the crash, then the statute offers no defense. However, whether the defendant's failure to take his medication was a failure to exercise due care is a question of fact; it cannot be presumed as a matter of law. State v. Raczka,
2018 WI App 3,
379 Wis. 2d 720,
906 N.W.2d 722,
16-1057.
