Chapter 70

70.11(34)(a)4. 4. Is used for civic, governmental, cultural or educational purposes.

70.11(34)(a)5. 5. Is subject to an easement, covenant or similar restriction running with the land that is held by or approved by the state historical society or by an entity approved by the state historical society, that protects the historic features of the property and that will remain effective for at least 20 years after January 1, 1989.

70.11(35) (35) Cultural and architectural landmarks. Property described in s. 234.935 (1), 1997 stats.

70.11(36) (36) Professional sports and entertainment home stadiums.

70.11(36)(a) (a) Property consisting of or contained in a sports and entertainment home stadium, except a football stadium as defined in s. 229.821 (6); including but not limited to parking lots, garages, restaurants, parks, concession facilities, entertainment facilities, transportation facilities, and other functionally related or auxiliary facilities and structures; including those facilities and structures while they are being built; constructed by, leased to or primarily used by a professional athletic team that is a member of a league that includes teams that have home stadiums in other states, and the land on which that stadium and those structures and facilities are located. Leasing or subleasing the property; regardless of the lessee, the sublessee and the use of the leasehold income; does not render the property taxable.

70.11(36)(b) (b) Property consisting of or contained in a football stadium, as defined in s. 229.821 (6), and related facilities and structures, including those facilities and structures while they are being built or constructed, primarily used by a professional football team described in s. 229.823, and the land, including parking lots, on which that stadium and those facilities and structures are located. Related facilities and structures are limited to improvements that share common structural supports with the stadium or are physically attached to the stadium. Using the property for garages, restaurants, parks, concession facilities, entertainment facilities, transportation facilities, or other functionally related or auxiliary facilities does not render the property taxable. Leasing or subleasing the property; regardless of the lessee, the sublessee and the use of the leasehold income; does not render the property taxable.

70.11(37) (37) Local exposition district. The property of a local exposition district under subch. II of ch. 229, including sports and entertainment arena facilities, as defined in s. 229.41 (11g), except that any portion of the sports and entertainment arena facilities, excluding the outdoor plaza area, that is used, leased, or subleased for use as a restaurant or for any use licensed under ch. 125, and is regularly open to the general public at times when the sports and entertainment arena, as defined in s. 229.41 (11e), is not being used for events that involve the arena floor and seating bowl, is not exempt under this subsection.

70.11(38) (38) University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority. Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 70.11 (intro.) that relate to leased property, all property owned by the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority and all property leased to the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority that is owned by the state, provided that use of the property is primarily related to the purposes of the authority.

70.11(38m) (38m) Wisconsin Aerospace Authority. Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 70.11 (intro.) that relate to leased property or that impose other limitations, all property owned or leased by the Wisconsin Aerospace Authority, provided that use of the property is primarily related to the purposes of the authority.

70.11(38r) (38r) Economic Development Corporation. All property owned by the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation, provided that use of the property is primarily related to the purposes of the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation.

70.11(39) (39) Computers. Mainframe computers, minicomputers, personal computers, networked personal computers, servers, terminals, monitors, disk drives, electronic peripheral equipment, tape drives, printers, basic operational programs, systems software, and prewritten software. The exemption under this subsection does not apply to custom software, fax machines, copiers, equipment with embedded computerized components or telephone systems, including equipment that is used to provide telecommunications services, as defined in s. 76.80 (3). For the purposes of s. 79.095, the exemption under this subsection does not apply to property that is otherwise exempt under this chapter.

70.11(39m) (39m) Cash registers and fax machines. Cash registers and fax machines, excluding fax machines that are also copiers.

70.11(40) (40) Local cultural arts district. Property of a local cultural arts district under subch. V of ch. 229, except any of the following:

70.11(40)(a) (a) Property that is not a part of the physical structure of a cultural arts facility, as defined under s. 229.841 (5), if that property is used for a retail business or a restaurant, unless the retail business or restaurant is operated by the local cultural arts district or by a corporation, organization or association described in section 501 (c) 3 of the Internal Revenue Code that is exempt from taxation under section 501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.

70.11(40)(b) (b) A parking lot or parking structure that is not used to support the operation of a cultural arts facility, as defined under s. 229.841 (5).

70.11(41) (41) Fox River Navigational System Authority. All property owned by the Fox River Navigational System Authority, provided that use of the property is primarily related to the purposes of the authority.

70.11(43) (43) Art and arts education centers. All of the property owned or leased by a corporation, organization, or association that is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, if the property satisfies the following conditions:

70.11(43)(a) (a) It is used for the purposes for which the exemption under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code is granted to the corporation, organization, or association that owns or leases the property.

70.11(43)(b) (b) It includes one or more buildings that are owned or leased by the corporation, organization, or association and that are located within, or are surrounded by, a municipal park.

70.11(43)(c) (c) It includes one or more theaters for the performing arts that are operated by the corporation, organization, or association and the seating capacity of the theater or theaters is not less than 600 persons.

70.11(43)(d) (d) It includes facilities that are used for arts education.

70.11(44) (44) National Ice Training Center. Beginning with the first assessment year in which the property would not otherwise be exempt from taxation under sub. (1), property owned by a nonprofit corporation that operates a National Ice Training Center on land purchased from the state, if the property is located or primarily used at the center. Property that is exempt under this subsection includes property leased to a nonprofit entity, regardless of the use of the leasehold income, and up to 6,000 square feet of property leased to a for-profit entity, regardless of the use of the leasehold income.

70.11(45) (45) Nonprofit community theater. All property owned or leased by a corporation, organization, or association that is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, if the property satisfies the following conditions:

70.11(45)(a) (a) It is used for the purposes for which the exemption under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code is granted to the corporation, organization, or association that owns or leases the property.

70.11(45)(b) (b) It is located on land that the property owner owned prior to March 25, 2010, or on land donated by a local business owner or by a municipality.

70.11(45)(c) (c) It is located on land that is within 20 miles of the Mississippi River.

70.11(45)(d) (d) It is located on a parcel of land that is at least one-fourth of an acre, but no larger than 2 acres.

70.11(45)(e) (e) It includes one or more theaters for the performing arts that are operated by the corporation, organization, or association and the seating capacity of the theater or theaters is not less than 450 persons.

70.11(45)(f) (f) It includes facilities that are used for arts education.

70.11(45m) (45m) Snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, and utility terrain vehicle clubs. Trail groomers owned by a snowmobile club, an all-terrain vehicle club, a utility terrain vehicle club, or an off-highway motorcycle club that is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) (3), (4), or (7) of the Internal Revenue Code.

70.11(46) (46) Nonprofit youth baseball associations. Land not exceeding 6 acres, the buildings on that land, and personal property, if the land is owned or leased by, and the buildings and personal property are owned by, a nonprofit youth baseball association and used exclusively for the purposes of the association. Leasing all or a portion of the property does not render the property taxable if all of the leasehold income is used for maintaining the leased property.

70.11(47) (47) Cranberry research and educational station. All property owned or leased by the Wisconsin Cranberry Research and Education Foundation that is located in Jackson County and consists of at least 130.5 acres of land.

70.11 History History: 1971 c. 152, 154, 312; 1973 c. 90; 1973 c. 333 s. 201m; 1973 c. 335 s. 13; 1975 c. 39; 1975 c. 94 s. 91 (10); 1975 c. 199; 1977 c. 29 ss. 745m, 1646 (3), 1647 (5), (7); 1977 c. 83 s. 26; 1977 c. 273, 282, 391, 418, 447; 1979 c. 34 s. 2102 (39) (g); 1979 c. 221, 225; 1979 c. 310 s. 12; 1981 c. 20; 1983 a. 27 ss. 1177, 1178, 1179f; 1983 a. 189 s. 329 (16); 1983 a. 201, 327; 1985 a. 26, 29, 316, 332; 1987 a. 10, 27, 395, 399; 1987 a. 403 s. 256; 1989 a. 25, 31, 307; 1991 a. 37, 39, 269; 1993 a. 263, 307, 399, 490; 1995 a. 27 ss. 3344 to 3348m, 9126 (19); 1995 a. 201, 227, 247, 366; 1997 a. 27, 35, 134, 147, 164, 184, 237; 1999 a. 9, 32, 63, 65; 1999 a. 150 ss. 624, 672; 1999 a. 167, 185; 2001 a. 16, 38, 59, 103; 2003 a. 195, 291; 2005 a. 4, 22, 70, 74, 335; 2007 a. 19; 2007 a. 20 ss. 1932 to 1934f, 9121 (6) (a); 2009 a. 28, 152, 155; 2011 a. 7, 10, 32, 208; 2011 a. 260 s. 80; 2013 a. 20, 380; 2015 a. 60, 170; 2017 a. 59, 222; 2019 a. 9, 172; 2021 a. 1, 58, 151, 239; 2023 a. 12, 19.

70.11 Cross-reference Cross-reference: For other exemptions from property taxation, see s. 1.04, U.S. sites; s. 70.112, specially taxed property; s. 70.42, coal docks; s. 70.421, petroleum; s. 76.23, utilities.

70.11 Annotation A building used as a residence by various missionaries for rest and recreation falls within the housing exemption under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)]. Evangelical Alliance Mission v. Village of Williams Bay, 54 Wis. 2d 187, 194 N.W.2d 646 (1972).

70.11 Annotation Voting machines leased by a city with an option to purchase are city property and exempt. City of Milwaukee v. Shoup Voting Machine Corp., 54 Wis. 2d 549, 196 N.W.2d 694 (1972).

70.11 Annotation An educational institution under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)] must be substantially and primarily devoted to educational purposes, the determination of which requires a careful analysis of the property’s use. National Foundation of Health, Welfare & Pension Plans, Inc. v. City of Brookfield, 65 Wis. 2d 263, 222 N.W.2d 608 (1974).

70.11 Annotation “Owned” under sub. (2) cannot be equated with paper title only. When a corporate lessee was the beneficial and true owner of improvements made to a structure, the lessee was the owner for personal property assessment purposes. State ex rel. Mitchell Aero, Inc. v. Board of Review, 74 Wis. 2d 268, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976).

70.11 Annotation “Used exclusively” under sub. (4m) means to physically employ the tangible characteristics of the property. Although medical equipment was leased commercially, it was “used exclusively” for hospital purposes and was exempt. First National Leasing Corp. v. City of Madison, 81 Wis. 2d 205, 260 N.W.2d 251 (1977).

70.11 Annotation Religious persons whose housing is exempt under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)] include only those who have official leadership roles in the activities of the congregation. Midtown Church of Christ, Inc. v. City of Racine, 83 Wis. 2d 72, 264 N.W.2d 281 (1978).

70.11 Annotation Discussing indicia of true and beneficial ownership of leased property under sub. (1). Gebhardt v. City of West Allis, 89 Wis. 2d 103, 278 N.W.2d 465 (1979).

70.11 Annotation The residence of a hospital chaplain was exempt under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)] as housing for a pastor and under sub. (4m) because it was reasonably necessary for the hospital to have a priest located near the hospital to serve the spiritual needs of its patients and staff. Sisters of St. Mary v. City of Madison, 89 Wis. 2d 372, 278 N.W.2d 814 (1979).

70.11 Annotation To qualify as an educational association under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)], an organization must be devoted to “traditional” educational activities, which must include traditional charitable objectives and which must benefit the public directly and lessen the burden of government in some way. International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, Inc. v. City of Brookfield, 95 Wis. 2d 444, 290 N.W.2d 720 (Ct. App. 1980).

70.11 Annotation A “function or use” test, rather than a “physical appearance” test, was applied to determine whether building-like structures were eligible for the machinery and equipment exemption under sub. (27). Ladish Malting Co. v. DOR, 98 Wis. 2d 496, 297 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1980).

70.11 Annotation An organization that practices racial discrimination may not be granted preferential tax treatment. State ex rel. Palleon v. Musolf, 117 Wis. 2d 469, 345 N.W.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1984).

70.11 Annotation Affirmed. 120 Wis. 2d 545, 356 N.W.2d 487 (1984).

70.11 Annotation Under an “integrated plant test” for classifying property directly used in manufacturing, graving docks were exempt under sub. (27). The exemption was not destroyed by incidental use of the dock for a nonexempt purpose. Manitowoc Co. v. City of Sturgeon Bay, 122 Wis. 2d 406, 362 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1984).

70.11 Annotation Sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)] is constitutional. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. City of Prairie du Chien, 125 Wis. 2d 541, 373 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1985).

70.11 Annotation Property leased by an institution for the care of dependent children was not exempt under sub. (19). Chileda Institute, Inc. v. City of La Crosse, 125 Wis. 2d 554, 373 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1985).

70.11 Annotation A day care center devoted primarily to educational purposes was exempt under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)]. Janesville Community Day Care Center, Inc. v. Spoden, 126 Wis. 2d 231, 376 N.W.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1985).

70.11 Annotation Property exempted under sub. (21) (a) need not have a “primary purpose” of eliminating pollution. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Town of Bradley, 132 Wis. 2d 310, 392 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1986).

70.11 Annotation The burden of proving exempt status is on the taxpayer. Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992).

70.11 Annotation Non-adjoining property may constitute “grounds” of a college or university under sub. (3) (a). Trustees of Indiana University v. Town of Rhine, 170 Wis. 2d 293, 488 N.W.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1992).

70.11 Annotation A benevolent association under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)] is not required to provide free services or to be affordable by all in the community and may pay its officers reasonable compensation for their services. Friendship Village of Greater Milwaukee, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 181 Wis. 2d 207, 511 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1993).

70.11 Annotation A lease provision between a county-lessor and a lessee that the lessee was responsible for taxes was not determinative of the taxability of buildings constructed on the leased premises. The county, as beneficial owner of the property, was exempt from taxation. City of Franklin v. Crystal Ridge, Inc., 180 Wis. 2d 561, 509 N.W.2d 730 (1994).

70.11 Annotation The legislature may not delegate the power to grant tax exemptions to a county board. University of Wisconsin La Crosse Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Washington, 182 Wis. 2d 490, 513 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1994).

70.11 Annotation Discussing the determination of “land necessary for location and convenience of buildings” under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)]. Friendship Village of Greater Milwaukee, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 787, 535 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1995).

70.11 Annotation A youth soccer association failed to establish that it was substantially and primarily devoted to educational purposes. Although its program had educational elements, it was not entitled to tax exempt status under sub. (4) as an educational association. Kickers of Wisconsin, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 675, 541 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1995).

70.11 Annotation No notice of claim under s. 893.80 is ever required on a claim arising from a county board determination under sub. (20) (d). Little Sissabagama Lake Shore Owners Ass’n v. Town of Edgewater, 208 Wis. 2d 259, 559 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1800.

70.11 Annotation Whether a clinic building is a “doctor’s office” under is sub. (4m) is not dependent on whether or not it is operated as part of a for profit practice owned by physicians or as a nonprofit corporation. A clinic operated by a nonprofit corporation that contains offices for doctors, provides outpatient care only, and is open for regular business hours is a “doctor’s office.” St. Clare Hospital of Monroe, Wisconsin, Inc. v. City of Monroe, 209 Wis. 2d 364, 563 N.W.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-0732.

70.11 Annotation The exemption under sub. (13m) will not be applied to reduce the value of a remaining taxable property not a part of the exempt archeological site. Wrase v. City of Neenah, 220 Wis. 2d 166, 582 N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3457.

70.11 Annotation The exclusivity requirement under sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)] does not prohibit occasional commercial use. The question is how consequential the use is compared to the total use of the property. The party seeking the exemption must present more than “recollections” and “observations” of use. Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999), 96-2489.

70.11 Annotation The sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)] exemption of up to ten acres of land is tied to and follows from the exemption of buildings. It does not allow for the exemption of buildings necessary for the use of the land. Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999), 96-2489.

70.11 Annotation Section 70.11 (intro.), and not s. 70.1105, applies if an exempt organization leases part of its property to a for-profit entity. Section 70.1105 applies when the exempt organization engages in for-profit activities. However, the methodology for determining exemptions under each is the same. Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999), 96-2489.

70.11 Annotation Revisions to sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)] and sub. (4m) by 1995 Wis. Act 27 were constitutional. Group Health Cooperative of Eau Claire v. DOR, 229 Wis. 2d 846, 601 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1264.

70.11 Annotation Property that on the assessment date was wholly vacant and unoccupied, and on which no construction had commenced, was not being readied for a benevolent use and was properly determined as not being used exclusively for benevolent purposes under sub. (4). Group Health Cooperative of Eau Claire v. DOR, 229 Wis. 2d 846, 601 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1264.

70.11 Annotation In applying the exempt lessee condition in the section introduction, a housing authority that subsidized low-income tenants’ rent payments to a benevolent organization property owner cannot be found to be the tenant, which as a governmental entity would be entitled to property tax exemption. Under the established legal definition of lessee, the lessees are the low-income individuals to whom the benevolent organization rents. Columbus Park Housing Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633, 02-0699.

70.11 Annotation The standard under Sisters of Saint Mary, 89 Wis. 2d 372 (1979), that properties that are “reasonably necessary” to the operation of an exempt use are also exempt is restricted to hospitals subject to sub. (4m). University of Wisconsin Medical Foundation, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2003 WI App 204, 267 Wis. 2d 504, 671 N.W.2d 292, 02-1473.

70.11 Annotation Benevolent ownership of property is not enough to satisfy sub. (4) [now sub. (4) (a)]; benevolent use is also required. A property owner must detail its use of the property so that tax assessors know what type of activities, if any, are occurring on the property. Unsupported opinion testimony and generalized assertions about the purportedly benevolent use will not suffice. University of Wisconsin Medical Foundation, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2003 WI App 204, 267 Wis. 2d 504, 671 N.W.2d 292, 02-1473.

70.11 Annotation All provision of medical care is not “benevolent” merely because it makes the recipients better members of society by improving their physical and mental condition. A benevolent foundation that charged market rates for medical services, advertised extensively to promote them, and typically forbore collecting for its services only when accounts were deemed uncollectible was not engaged in a benevolent use of its clinic properties. University of Wisconsin Medical Foundation, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2003 WI App 204, 267 Wis. 2d 504, 671 N.W.2d 292, 02-1473.

70.11 Annotation For a claim under sub. (25) to survive summary judgment, the property owner must establish in the summary judgment record that there is, at a minimum, a factual dispute that the main purpose to which the properties were primarily devoted was one or more of medical research, physician education, or care for destitute individuals. University of Wisconsin Medical Foundation, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2003 WI App 204, 267 Wis. 2d 504, 671 N.W.2d 292, 02-1473.

70.11 Annotation “Commercial purposes” as used in sub. (4m) are those through which profits are made. Even if a property is reasonably necessary to the primary and secondary purposes of a hospital, a strict but reasonable construction of sub. (4m) indicates that property fails to qualify for the exemption if it nevertheless is used for a commercial purpose. FH Healthcare Development, Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa, 2004 WI App 182, 276 Wis. 2d 243, 687 N.W.2d 532, 03-2999.

70.11 Annotation A hospital seeking tax-exempt status for property under sub. (4m) (a) has the burden of showing a benefit to the functioning of the hospital, but no burden of showing that the benefit is not otherwise available. Assuming, without deciding, that partial exemptions are allowed, the portion of a hospital’s child care center attributable to use by hospital employees is tax exempt. Whether the portion attributable to children whose parents are not hospital employees is exempt depends on whether the children’s parents are reasonably necessary to the efficient functioning of the hospital as an organization. Saint Joseph’s Hospital of Marshfield, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 2004 WI App 187, 276 Wis. 2d 574, 688 N.W.2d 658, 03-1006.

70.11 Annotation The portion of sub. (12) (a) exempting from taxation property owned by Young Men’s Christian Associations is constitutional. Lake Country Racquet & Athletic Club, Inc. v. Morgan, 2006 WI App 25, 289 Wis. 2d 498, 710 N.W.2d 701, 04-3061.

70.11 Annotation Retaining legal title to land does not guarantee that a municipality will remain the owner of property for tax exemption purposes. Taxation or exemption depends not upon legal title but on the status of the owner of the beneficial interest in the property. “Owned” in sub. (2) means beneficial ownership, not mere technical title. Milwaukee Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa, 2007 WI 101, 304 Wis. 2d 53, 735 N.W.2d 156, 05-1160.

70.11 Annotation The Tax Appeals Commission (TAC) reasonably relied on nontechnical dictionary definitions of the computer-related terms in sub. (39). TAC aptly noted that the terms at issue were “within the common lexicon, familiar to most people” and that the statute had a “more colloquial than technical tone.” Based on these observations, TAC reasonably concluded that the computer terms at issue were not technical, and reasonably applied the general rule of construing the language in accord with its common and approved usage. Xerox Corp. v. DOR, 2009 WI App 113, 321 Wis. 2d 181, 772 N.W.2d 677, 07-2884.

70.11 Annotation The Tax Appeals Commission’s conclusion that, to be exempt under sub. (39), a device must be an exempt item under sub. (39) and not merely contain an exempt item was reasonable. Xerox Corp. v. DOR, 2009 WI App 113, 321 Wis. 2d 181, 772 N.W.2d 677, 07-2884.

70.11 Annotation An exemption under sub. (4) depends on: 1) whether the residence is owned and used exclusively by the church; and 2) whether it is housing for any of four listed categories of persons, namely, pastors, ordained assistants, members of religious orders and communities, or ordained teachers. The exemption applies to a limited group who are members of a religious group and integral to the functioning of the church. It is not enough under sub. (4) or Midtown Church of Christ, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 72 (1978), that a custodian’s employment serves the church or is integral to the functioning of the church. The person must serve a religious leadership purpose. Wauwatosa Avenue United Methodist Church v. City of Wauwatosa, 2009 WI App 171, 321 Wis. 2d 796, 776 N.W.2d 280, 09-0202.

70.11 Annotation In applying the sub. (4m) (a) exemption for nonprofit hospitals, when an off-site facility is engaged in the primary purpose of a parent hospital the court examines only whether the off-site facility is “used exclusively for the purposes of” that hospital. When the circuit court determined that an outpatient clinic effectively served as a department of the larger parent hospital, the outpatient clinic was used exclusively for the purposes of a hospital and therefore qualified for the exemption under sub. (4m) (a). Covenant Healthcare System, Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa, 2011 WI 80, 336 Wis. 2d 522, 800 N.W.2d 906, 09-1469.

70.11 Annotation The determination of whether property is used as a “doctor’s office” under sub. (4m) (a) ultimately turns on the facts of each case. Factors to be considered are discussed. That a clinic does not provide inpatient services, and that most patients are seen by physicians at the clinic by appointment during regular business hours is not determinative of a “doctor’s office.” Covenant Healthcare System, Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa, 2011 WI 80, 336 Wis. 2d 522, 800 N.W.2d 906, 09-1469.

70.11 Annotation In the context of not-for-profit entities, the definition of “commercial purposes” in sub. (4m) (a) is not limited to those purposes that generate profits. The more appropriate definition of commercial for the purposes of the not-for-profit hospital exemption is having profit as the primary aim. Not-for-profit entities may operate in such a fashion that generates revenues in excess of expenses. Covenant Healthcare System, Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa, 2011 WI 80, 336 Wis. 2d 522, 800 N.W.2d 906, 09-1469.

70.11 Annotation Under the sub. (4m) (a) exemption of hospital property from taxation if “no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any shareholder, member, director or officer,” the term “member” does not include not-for-profit entities. Covenant Healthcare System, Inc. v. City of Wauwatosa, 2011 WI 80, 336 Wis. 2d 522, 800 N.W.2d 906, 09-1469.

70.11 Annotation A nonprofit entity that is “operated as a facility that is licensed, certified, or registered under ch. 50” is eligible for the exemption under sub. (4) (a), whether or not the facility is benevolent. The word “benevolent,” found within the clause “including benevolent nursing homes,” clearly modifies “nursing homes”; it does not modify “facility.” Beaver Dam Community Hospitals, Inc. v. City of Beaver Dam, 2012 WI App 102, 344 Wis. 2d 278, 822 N.W.2d 491, 11-1479.

70.11 Annotation The purpose, and not the name it is given, determines whether a government charge constitutes a tax. The primary purpose of a tax is to obtain revenue for the government, while the primary purpose of a fee is to cover the expense of providing a service or of regulation and supervision of certain activities. The test is whether the primary purpose of the charge is to cover the expense of providing services, supervision, or regulation. Here, the town demonstrated that the primary purpose of a charge was to cover the expense of providing the service of fire protection to the properties within its geographic boundaries, and, therefore, the charge was a fee rather than a tax and assessable against county property. Town of Hoard v. Clark County, 2015 WI App 100, 366 Wis. 2d 239, 873 N.W.2d 241, 15-0678.

70.11 Annotation Tax exemption statutes are strictly construed against granting an exemption. The burden is on the party seeking the exemption to prove its entitlement, and any ambiguity is resolved in favor of taxation. Although the court applies a strict construction, that does not mean that the court need apply the narrowest possible construction or an unreasonable construction. The court, therefore, applies a “strict but reasonable” interpretation to a tax exemption statute. Southwest Airlines Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384, 19-0818.

70.11 Annotation The property tax exemption for pollution control facilities provided in sub. (21) (a) [now sub. (21) (am)] applies to pollution control facilities incorporated into new plants to be constructed, in addition to those installed to abate or eliminate existing pollution sources. 60 Atty. Gen. 154.

70.11 Annotation Preferential tax treatment may not be given to any organization that discriminates on the basis of race. Pitts v. DOR, 333 F. Supp. 662 (1971).

70.11 Annotation Constitutional Law: Tax Exemption and Religious Freedom. Howard. 54 MLR 385 (1971).

70.11 Annotation What Is Benevolence? Clarifying Wisconsin’s Real Property Tax Exemption for Benevolent Organizations and the Argument for the “Retirement” of the Exemption for High-End Senior-Housing Complexes. Jaynes. 2006 WLR 1433.