346.65(6)(em) (em) If there is a perfected security interest in the motor vehicle, the law enforcement officer shall transfer the motor vehicle to the lienholder having the primary perfected security interest for sale following the procedure under s. 342.40 (3) (c). The lienholder shall distribute the proceeds of the sale in the following order:

346.65(6)(f) (f) If a motor vehicle forfeited and sold under this subsection is owned in part by a person other than the person who committed the violation or refusal under par. (a), any moneys remaining from the sale, after making any payment to the lienholders under par. (em) and as provided in par. (e) 1. to 4., shall be paid to that person to the extent of the person's interest in the motor vehicle.

346.65(6)(g) (g) Any balance remaining from the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicle after the distribution under par. (f) shall be deposited in the school fund.

346.65(6)(h) (h) After a determination is made that a motor vehicle seized is not subject to forfeiture, the agency having custody of the motor vehicle shall take reasonable steps to notify the owner or other person in charge of the motor vehicle of the location of the motor vehicle and of his or her right to take possession of the motor vehicle.

346.65(6)(k) (k) Except as provided in par. (km), no person may transfer ownership of any motor vehicle that is subject to immobilization or seizure or to equipping with an ignition interlock device under this subsection or make application for a new certificate of title under s. 342.18 for the motor vehicle unless the court determines that the transfer is in good faith and not for the purpose of or with the effect of defeating the purposes of this subsection. The department may cancel a title or refuse to issue a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner to any person who violates this paragraph.

Effective date text (k) Except as provided in par. (km), no person may transfer ownership of any motor vehicle that is subject to seizure under this subsection or make application for a new certificate of title under s. 342.18 for the motor vehicle unless the court determines that the transfer is in good faith and not for the purpose of or with the effect of defeating the purposes of this subsection. The department may cancel a title or refuse to issue a new certificate of title in the name of the transferee as owner to any person who violates this paragraph.

346.65(6)(km) (km) If a person purchases a motor vehicle in good faith and without knowledge that the motor vehicle was subject to immobilization or seizure or to equipping with an ignition interlock device under this subsection and the department has no valid reason for not issuing a certificate of title other than the prohibition under par. (k), the department shall issue a new certificate of title in the name of the person requesting the new certificate of title if at the time of the purchase of the motor vehicle the certificate of title did not contain the notation stamped on the certificate of title by the clerk of circuit court under par. (a) 2m. and if the person submits the affidavit required under s. 342.12 (4) (c) 1. c.

346.65(6)(m) (m) The court may order a vehicle to be immobilized under this subsection for not more than the period that the person's operating privilege is revoked under s. 343.30 or 343.31. The court may order a vehicle to be equipped with an ignition interlock device under this subsection for not more than 2 years more than the period that the person's operating privilege is revoked under s. 343.30 or 343.31. If the court orders any motor vehicle immobilized or equipped with an ignition interlock device under this subsection, the owner shall be liable for the reasonable costs of the immobilization or the equipping of the ignition interlock device. If a motor vehicle that is immobilized is subject to a security agreement, the court shall release the motor vehicle to the secured party upon the filing of an affidavit by the secured party that the security agreement is in default and upon payment of the accrued cost of immobilizing the motor vehicle.

346.65 Annotation Penalty provisions of sub. (2) are mandatory and apply to subsequent violations committed prior to a conviction for the 1st offense. State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981).

346.65 Annotation When the accused was represented by counsel in proceedings leading to the 2nd conviction, but not the first, there was no violation of the right to counsel precluding incarceration for the 2nd conviction since the first offense was a civil forfeiture case. State v. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d 31, 318 N.W.2d 364 (1982).

346.65 Annotation The state has exclusive jurisdiction over 2nd offense for drunk driving. It is criminal and may not be prosecuted as an ordinance violation. County of Walworth v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982).

346.65 Annotation Probation with a condition of 30-days' confinement in the county jail is inadequate to meet mandatory the imprisonment requirement of sub. (2) (c). State v. Meddaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 204, 435 N.W.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1988).

346.65 Annotation A judgment entered in municipal court against a defendant for what is actually a second or subsequent offense is void. The state may proceed against the defendant criminally regardless of whether the judgment in municipal court is vacated. City of Kenosha v. Jensen, 184 Wis. 2d 91, 516 N.W.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1994).

346.65 Annotation The general requirements for establishing prior criminal offenses in s. 973.12 are not applicable to the penalty enhancement provisions for drunk driving offenses under sub. (2). There is no presumption of innocence accruing to the defendant as to prior convictions, but the accused must have an opportunity to challenge the existence of the prior offense. State v. Wideman, 206 Wis. 2d 90, 556 N.W.2d 737 (1996).

346.65 Annotation Sub. (2) is primarily a penalty enhancement statute. When a prior conviction is determined to be constitutionally defective, that conviction cannot be relied on for either charging or sentencing a present offense. State v. Foust, 214 Wis. 2d 567, 570 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1997).

346.65 Annotation Seizure and forfeiture under sub. (6) of a vehicle used in the commission of the crime is an in rem civil forfeiture to which the constitution's double jeopardy clause is inapplicable. State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 577 N.W.2d 601 (1998).

346.65 Annotation The requirement under sub. (6) (k) that a court find a transfer to have been in good faith does not apply to security interests, but the creation of a security interest in a vehicle must be done in good faith in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code. State v. Frankwick, 229 Wis. 2d 406, 599 N.W.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1999).

346.65 Annotation When a person is charged under s. 346.63 (1) with a 2nd offense, the charge may not be reduced to a first offense and the court may not sentence under s. 346.65 (2) (a) 1. The department must treat this as a 2nd offense for purposes of revocation. 69 Atty. Gen. 47.