“State," when applied to states of the United States, includes the District of Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the several territories organized by Congress.
“Sworn" includes “affirmed" in all cases where by law an affirmation may be substituted for an oath.
“Town" may be construed to include cities, villages, wards or districts.
(43) Town board.
“Town board" means the town board of supervisors.
Effective date note
Sub. (43m) is renumbered to sub. (21m) and amended eff. 5-1-20 by 2019 Wis. Act 50
Effective date note
Sub. (43r) is repealed eff. 5-1-20 by 2019 Wis. Act 50
(44) United States.
“United States" includes the District of Columbia, the states, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the territories organized by congress.
“Village" means incorporated village.
“Week" means 7 consecutive days.
“Will" includes codicils as well as wills.
(48) Written or in writing.
“Written" or “in writing" includes any representation of words, letters, symbols or figures. This subsection does not affect any law relating to signatures.
“Year" means a calendar year, unless otherwise expressed; “year" alone means “year of our Lord".
History: 1971 c. 164
; 1971 c. 213
; Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 784; 1977 c. 305
; 1979 c. 169
; 1981 c. 291
; 1983 a. 447
; 1985 a. 65
; Sup. Ct. Order, 141 Wis. 2d xiii (1987); 1987 a. 399
; 1989 a. 56
; 1991 a. 39
; 1993 a. 486
; 1995 a. 27
, 9126 (19)
; 1995 a. 77
; 1997 a. 252
; 1999 a. 22
; 2001 a. 102
; 2003 a. 110
; 2005 a. 441
; 2005 a. 443
; 2007 a. 11
; 2007 a. 20
s. 9121 (6) (a)
; 2011 a. 32
; 2015 a. 196
; 2017 a. 59
; 2019 a. 50
Sub. (38) did not prevent the delegation of authority to sign an annexation petition on the behalf of a property owner. Town of Medary v. City of La Crosse, 88 Wis. 2d 101
, 277 N.W.2d 310
(Ct. App. 1979).
A city is a municipal corporation. Under sub. (26), “person" includes all partnerships, associations and bodies politic and corporate. The general term “corporation" presumptively should be read to include more specific types of corporations. Benson v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 65
, 376 Wis. 2d 35
, 897 N.W.2d 16
Chapter 90's plain language, when read in light of sub. (42), unambiguously authorizes a city to administer the enforcement procedures of ch. 90. White v. City of Watertown, 2019 WI 9
, 385 Wis. 2d 320
, 922 N.W.2d 61
Oaths, affirmations, notaries public, and jurats are discussed. 60 Atty. Gen. 429.
Construing statutes of 1898. 990.02(1)(1)
All references to chapters or sections in the statutes of 1898 are to the chapters and sections of those statutes.
If the provisions of different chapters of the statutes of 1898 conflict with or contravene each other the provisions of each chapter shall prevail as to all matters and questions growing out of the subject matter of such chapter.
If conflicting provisions are found in different sections of the same chapter of the statutes of 1898 the provisions of the section which is last in numerical order shall prevail unless such construction is inconsistent with the meaning of such chapter.
History: 1979 c. 89
Effect of repeals. 990.03(1)(1)
No law repealed by a subsequent act of the legislature is revived or affected by the repeal of such repealing act.
The repeal of a curative or validating law does not impair or affect any cure or validation previously effected thereby.
No section, subsection or paragraph of Wisconsin Statutes is repealed or affected by the repeal of any session law from which it was in whole or in part derived.
The repeal, express or implied, of any law already repealed, expressly or by implication, does not constitute or supply a declaration or implication that such law was in force or was valid for any purpose at any time subsequent to such prior repeal.
Actions pending not defeated by repeal of statute.
The repeal of a statute hereafter shall not remit, defeat or impair any civil or criminal liability for offenses committed, penalties or forfeitures incurred or rights of action accrued under such statute before the repeal thereof, whether or not in course of prosecution or action at the time of such repeal; but all such offenses, penalties, forfeitures and rights of action created by or founded on such statute, liability wherefore shall have been incurred before the time of such repeal thereof, shall be preserved and remain in force notwithstanding such repeal, unless specially and expressly remitted, abrogated or done away with by the repealing statute. And criminal prosecutions and actions at law or in equity founded upon such repealed statute, whether instituted before or after the repeal thereof, shall not be defeated or impaired by such repeal but shall, notwithstanding such repeal, proceed to judgment in the same manner and to the like purpose and effect as if the repealed statute continued in full force to the time of final judgment thereon, unless the offenses, penalties, forfeitures or rights of action on which such prosecutions or actions shall be founded shall be specially and expressly remitted, abrogated or done away with by such repealing statute.
This section also applies to statutes that are amended after the commission of an alleged criminal act although before trial. Truesdale v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 481
, 210 N.W.2d 726
Absent legislative intent to the contrary, repeal of a statute governing appeals of tax assessments did not affect a taxpayer whose right to appeal under the statute accrued prior to its repeal. Jackson County Iron Co. v. Musolf, 134 Wis. 2d 95
, 396 N.W.2d 323
This section provides that although the state need not have commenced a prosecution at the time of the repeal, it is necessary that by the time of the repeal, the offender has committed the offense and thereby become subject to the penalty for the offense. A defendant has not committed an offense unless all the elements of that crime have been met. Thus, he or she incurs no penalties until that time. State v. Thums, 2006 WI App 173
, 295 Wis. 2d 664
, 721 N.W.2d 729
Citing Waddell v. Mama
t, 271 Wis. 176, 181, (1955), the court held that this section applies to a fully accrued right, not to a merely inchoate right that could ripen into a right preserved by the statute only upon the happening of a further event. Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Company, Inc. 2006 WI App 219
, 296 Wis. 2d 666
, 724 N.W. 2d 259
A law is retroactive if it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. A statute does not operate retroactively simply because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment or upsets expectations based on prior law. The mere expectation of a future benefit or contingent interest does not create a vested right. In this case, because the appellant did not have a vested right to the interest rate that applied in s. 807.01 (4) before that statute was amended, this section was not implicated. Lands' End, Inc. v. City of Dodgeville, 2016 WI 64
, 370 Wis. 2d 500
, 881 N.W.2d 702
Repeal or change of law limiting time for bringing actions.
In any case when a limitation or period of time prescribed in any act which shall be repealed for the acquiring of any right, or barring of any remedy, or for any other purpose shall have begun to run before such repeal and the repealing act shall provide any limitation or period of time for such purpose, such latter limitation or period shall apply only to such rights or remedies as shall accrue subsequently to the time when the repealing act shall take effect, and the act repealed shall be held to continue in force and be operative to determine all such limitations and periods of time which shall have previously begun to run unless such repealing act shall otherwise expressly provide.
Generally, legislation is presumptively prospective unless statutory language reveals an intent that the statute apply retroactively. Procedural or remedial, rather than substantive, statutes are generally given retroactive effect unless contracts would be impaired or vested rights disturbed. Statutes of limitations are substantive. Betthauser v. Medical Protective Co. 172 Wis. 2d 141
, 493 N.W.2d 40
When a statute of limitations is replaced or amended, a cause of action that has accrued prior to the effective date of the new statute or amendment is governed by the prior statute, unless the legislature specifies otherwise. A cause of action that has not accrued prior to the effective date of the new statute or amendment is governed by the new language, unless otherwise specified. State v. Hamilton, 2002 WI App 89
, 253 Wis. 2d 805
, 644 N.W.2d 243
“Repeal" in this section includes “amendment." Poquette v. Community State Bank, 631 F. Supp. 1480
The Wisconsin statutes as prepared under s. 35.18
shall be prima facie evidence in all courts and proceedings as provided by s. 889.01
; but they shall not preclude reference to, nor control, in case of any discrepancy, any original act of the legislature; and the certified volumes of the Laws of Wisconsin provided for by s. 35.15
shall also and in the same degree be prima facie evidence in all courts and proceedings.
History: 1981 c. 372
; Stats. 1981 s. 990.08; 1983 a. 192
; Stats. 1983 s. 990.07; 1991 a. 39
Citation of supreme court rules.
When a supreme court rule is cited within the statutes, the reference shall be to the SCR number, such as “words and phrases specified in SCR 99.02
History: 1983 a. 192