971.23 Annotation
A witness's probationary status was relevant and should have been disclosed by the prosecution under sub. (7). That the defendant disclosed to the jury that the witness had been convicted of a crime did not obviate the requirement that the status be disclosed. A witness's probationary status is relevant because it and the fear of possible revocation are pertinent to the material issue of whether the witness has ulterior motives to shape his or her testimony. State v. White, 2004 WI App 78,
271 Wis. 2d 742,
680 N.W.2d 362,
03-1132.
971.23 Annotation
Due process does not require the disclosure of material exculpatory impeachment information before a defendant enters into a plea bargain. However, a defendant making a statutory discovery demand may be entitled to material exculpatory impeachment evidence before entering into a plea bargain if the plea bargain is entered into within the time frame when the prosecutor would have been statutorily required to disclose the information. A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea on nonconstitutional grounds after demonstrating that withdrawal is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice. State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64,
272 Wis. 2d 80,
680 N.W.2d 737,
02-2433.
971.23 Annotation
Sub. (7m) (a) does not prevent the prosecution, whose evidence was excluded for violation of this section, from moving for dismissal without prejudice and refiling he charges and introducing the same evidence in a subsequent proceeding if there was no violation of this section in the subsequent proceeding. State v. Miller, 2004 WI App 117,
274 Wis. 2d 471,
683 N.W.2d 485,
03-1747.
971.23 Annotation
Of necessity, the defense of alibi involves presence of the defendant at a place other than the scene of the crime, at the time the crime was committed. Since an alibi derives its potency as a defense from the fact that it involves the physical impossibility of the accused's guilt, a purported alibi that leaves it possible for the accused to be the guilty person is no alibi at all. In this case, testimony did not constitute an alibi because it placed the defendant in the same hallway as the crime scene and did not indicate that it was physically impossible for the defendant to have committed the offense, but placed her in the immediate vicinity of the crime. Therefore, notice of an alibi witness under sub. (8) was not required. State v. Harp, 2005 WI App 250,
288 Wis. 2d 441,
707 N.W.2d 304,
04-3240.
971.23 Annotation
The state unconstitutionally excluded the defendant's alibi testimony for failure to comply with this section, but the error was harmless. Alicea v. Gagnon,
675 F.2d 913 (1982).
971.23 Annotation
Comparison of federal discovery and the ABA standards with the Wisconsin statute. 1971 WLR 614.
971.26
971.26
Formal defects. No indictment, information, complaint or warrant shall be invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matters of form which do not prejudice the defendant.
971.26 Annotation
The fact that the information alleged the wrong date for the offense was not prejudicial when the complaint stated the correct date and there was no evidence that the defendant was misled. A charge of the violation of s. "946.42 (2) (a) (c)" was a technical defect of language when both paragraphs applied. Burkhalter v. State,
52 Wis. 2d 413,
190 N.W.2d 502 (1971).
971.26 Annotation
The failure to cite in the information and certificate of conviction the correct statutory subsections violated was immaterial when defendant the could not show that he was misled. Craig v. State,
55 Wis. 2d 489,
198 N.W.2d 609 (1972).
971.26 Annotation
A lack of prejudice to the defendant, notwithstanding technical defects in the information, was made patent by defense counsel's concession that his client knew precisely what crime he was charged with having committed, and the absence in the record of any such claim asserted during the case, which was vigorously tried. Clark v. State,
62 Wis. 2d 194,
214 N.W.2d 450 (1974).
971.26 Annotation
Failure to allege lack of consent was not a fatal jurisdictional defect of an information charging burglary. Schleiss v. State,
71 Wis. 2d 733,
239 N.W.2d 68 (1976).
971.26 Annotation
No statute authorizes a clerk of court's office to correct a clerical error in the sentence portion of a judgment of conviction. The circuit court, and not the clerk's office, must determine the merits of a request for a change in the sentence portion of a written judgment because of an alleged clerical error. State v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123,
239 Wis. 2d 244,
618 N.W.2d 857,
98-2263.
971.27
971.27
Lost information, complaint or indictment. In the case of the loss or destruction of an information or complaint, the district attorney may file a copy, and the prosecution shall proceed without delay from that cause. In the case of the loss or destruction of an indictment, an information may be filed.
971.28
971.28
Pleading judgment. In pleading a judgment or other determination of or proceeding before any court or officer, it shall be sufficient to state that the judgment or determination was duly rendered or made or the proceeding duly had.
971.29
971.29
Amending the charge. 971.29(1)
(1) A complaint or information may be amended at any time prior to arraignment without leave of the court.
971.29(2)
(2) At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the complaint, indictment or information to conform to the proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the defendant. After verdict the pleading shall be deemed amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the trial.
971.29(3)
(3) Upon allowing an amendment to the complaint or indictment or information, the court may direct other amendments thereby rendered necessary and may proceed with or postpone the trial.
971.29 Annotation
When there is evidence that a jury could believe proved guilt, the trial court cannot sua sponte set aside the verdict, amend the information, and find defendant guilty on a lesser charge. State v. Helnik,
47 Wis. 2d 720,
177 N.W.2d 881 (1970).
971.29 Annotation
A variance was not material when the court amended the charge against the defendant to charge a lesser included crime. Moore v. State,
55 Wis. 2d 1,
197 N.W.2d 820 (1972).
971.29 Annotation
Sub. (2), in regard to amendments after verdict, applies only to technical variances in the complaint, not material to the merits of the action. It may not be used to substitute a new charge. State v. Duda,
60 Wis. 2d 431,
210 N.W.2d 763 (1973).
971.29 Annotation
The refusal of a proposed amendment of an information has no effect on the original information. An amendment to charge a violation of a substantive section as well as a separate penalty section is not prejudicial to a defendant. Wagner v. State,
60 Wis. 2d 722,
211 N.W.2d 449 (1973).
971.29 Annotation
Sub. (1) does not prohibit amendment of the information with leave of the court after arraignment, but before trial, provided that the defendant's rights are not prejudiced. Whitaker v. State,
83 Wis. 2d 368,
265 N.W.2d 575 (1978).
971.29 Annotation
Notice of the nature and cause of the accusations is a key factor in determining whether an amendment at trial has prejudiced a defendant. The inquiry is whether the new charge is so related to the transaction and facts adduced at the preliminary hearing that a defendant cannot be surprised by the new charge since the preparation for the new charge would be no different than the preparation for the old charge. State v. Neudorff,
170 Wis. 2d 608,
489 N.W.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1992).
971.29 Annotation
Failure of the state to obtain court permission to file a post-arraignment amended information did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Webster,
196 Wis. 2d 308,
538 N.W.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1995),
93-3217.
971.29 Annotation
The trial court cannot after trial amend a charge of sexual intercourse with a child to one of contributing to the delinquency of a minor since the offenses require proof of different facts and the defendant is entitled to notice of the charge against him. LaFond v. Quatsoe,
325 F. Supp. 1010 (1971).
971.30(1)(1) ``Motion" means an application for an order.
971.30(2)
(2) Unless otherwise provided or ordered by the court, all motions shall meet the following criteria:
971.30(2)(b)
(b) Contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the venue, the title of the action, the file number, a denomination of the party seeking the order or relief and a brief description of the type of order or relief sought.
971.30(2)(c)
(c) State with particularity the grounds for the motion and the order or relief sought.
971.30 History
History: Sup. Ct. Order, 171 Wis. 2d xix (1992).
971.31
971.31
Motions before trial. 971.31(1)
(1) Any motion which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be made before trial.
971.31(2)
(2) Except as provided in
sub. (5), defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the proceedings, insufficiency of the complaint, information or indictment, invalidity in whole or in part of the statute on which the prosecution is founded, or the use of illegal means to secure evidence shall be raised before trial by motion or be deemed waived. The court may, however, entertain such motion at the trial, in which case the defendant waives any jeopardy that may have attached. The motion to suppress evidence shall be so entertained with waiver of jeopardy when it appears that the defendant is surprised by the state's possession of such evidence.
971.31(3)
(3) The admissibility of any statement of the defendant shall be determined at the trial by the court in an evidentiary hearing out of the presence of the jury, unless the defendant, by motion, challenges the admissibility of such statement before trial.
971.31(4)
(4) Except as provided in
sub. (3), a motion shall be determined before trial of the general issue unless the court orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial. All issues of fact arising out of such motion shall be tried by the court without a jury.
971.31(5)(a)(a) Motions before trial shall be served and filed within 10 days after the initial appearance of the defendant in a misdemeanor action or 10 days after arraignment in a felony action unless the court otherwise permits.
971.31(5)(b)
(b) In felony actions, motions to suppress evidence or motions under
s. 971.23 or objections to the admissibility of statements of a defendant shall not be made at a preliminary examination and not until an information has been filed.
971.31(5)(c)
(c) In felony actions, objections based on the insufficiency of the complaint shall be made prior to the preliminary examination or waiver thereof or be deemed waived.
971.31(6)
(6) If the court grants a motion to dismiss based upon a defect in the indictment, information or complaint, or in the institution of the proceedings, it may order that the defendant be held in custody or that the defendant's bail be continued for not more than 72 hours pending issuance of a new summons or warrant or the filing of a new indictment, information or complaint.
971.31(7)
(7) If the motion to dismiss is based upon a misnomer, the court shall forthwith amend the indictment, information or complaint in that respect, and require the defendant to plead thereto.
971.31(8)
(8) No complaint, indictment, information, process, return or other proceeding shall be dismissed or reversed for any error or mistake where the case and the identity of the defendant may be readily understood by the court; and the court may order an amendment curing such defects.
971.31(9)
(9) A motion required to be served on a defendant may be served upon the defendant's attorney of record.
971.31(10)
(10) An order denying a motion to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the admissibility of a statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon appeal from a judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment was entered upon a plea of guilty.
971.31(11)
(11) In actions under
s. 940.225,
948.02,
948.025,
948.085, or
948.095, evidence which is admissible under
s. 972.11 (2) must be determined by the court upon pretrial motion to be material to a fact at issue in the case and of sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflammatory and prejudicial nature before it may be introduced at trial.
971.31(12)
(12) In actions under
s. 940.22, the court may determine the admissibility of evidence under
s. 972.11 only upon a pretrial motion.
971.31(13)(a)(a) A juvenile over whom the court has jurisdiction under
s. 938.183 (1) (b) or
(c) on a misdemeanor action may make a motion before trial to transfer jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under
chs. 48 and
938.The motion may allege that the juvenile did not commit the violation under the circumstances described in
s. 938.183 (1) (b) or
(c), whichever is applicable, or that transfer of jurisdiction would be appropriate because of all of the following:
971.31(13)(a)1.
1. If convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice system.
971.31(13)(a)2.
2. Transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under
chs. 48 and
938 would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense.
971.31(13)(a)3.
3. Retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other juveniles from committing the violation of which the juvenile is accused under the circumstances specified in
s. 938.183 (1) (b) or
(c), whichever is applicable.
971.31(13)(b)
(b) The court shall retain jurisdiction unless the juvenile proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she did not commit the violation under the circumstances described in
s. 938.183 (1) (b) or
(c), whichever is applicable, or that transfer would be appropriate because all of the factors specified in
par. (a) 1.,
2. and
3. are met.
971.31 Annotation
When defense counsel refused, for strategic reasons, to pursue a motion made pro se by the defendant before trial to suppress evidence of identification at a lineup, there was a waiver of the motion. State v. McDonald,
50 Wis. 2d 534,
184 N.W.2d 886 (1971).
971.31 Annotation
A claim of illegal arrest for lack of probable cause must be raised by motion before trial. Lampkins v. State,
51 Wis. 2d 564,
187 N.W.2d 164 (1971).
971.31 Annotation
A defendant is not required to make a motion to withdraw his plea to preserve his right to a review of an alleged error of refusal to suppress evidence. State v. Meier,
60 Wis. 2d 452,
210 N.W.2d 685 (1971).
971.31 Annotation
A motion to suppress statements on the ground that they were products of an allegedly improper arrest was timely, notwithstanding failure to assert that challenge prior to arraignment, since it was made after the information was filed and prior to trial. Rinehart v. State,
63 Wis. 2d 760,
218 N.W.2d 323 (1974).
971.31 Annotation
A request for a Goodchild hearing after direct testimony is concluded is not timely under sub. (2). Coleman v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 124,
218 N.W.2d 744 (1974).
971.31 Annotation
The rule in sub. (2) does not apply to confessions, because sub. (2) is qualified by subs. (3) and (4). Upchurch v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 553,
219 N.W.2d 363 (1974).
971.31 Annotation
A challenge to the search of one's person cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Madison v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 564,
219 N.W.2d 259 (1974).
971.31 Annotation
A defendant's right to testify at a Goodchild hearing may be curtailed only for the most compelling reasons. Franklin v. State,
74 Wis. 2d 717,
247 N.W.2d 721 (1976).
971.31 Annotation
When the state used a traffic citation to initiate legal proceedings and subsequently decided to prosecute the action as a crime, the trial court erred in not giving the defendant 10 days from the date of the amended charge to object to the sufficiency of the complaint. State v. Mudgett,
99 Wis. 2d 525,
299 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1980).
971.31 Annotation
Sub. (6) authorizes the court to hold a defendant in custody or on bail for 72 hours pending new proceedings. State ex rel. Brockway v. Milwaukee Cty. Cir. Ct.
105 Wis. 2d 341,
313 N.W.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1981).
971.31 Annotation
Factors that a court should consider when a defendant requests to be tried after a codefendant in order to secure the testimony of the codefendant are: 1) the likelihood that the codefendant will testify; 2) the likelihood that the testimony will be significant and beneficial to the defendant; 3) whether the defendant diligently attempted to secure the evidence in time for trial; 4) the length of delay requested; and 5) the burden on the trial court and prosecution. State v. Anastas,
107 Wis. 2d 270,
320 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1982).
971.31 Annotation
By pleading guilty, the defendant waived the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence. State v. Nelson,
108 Wis. 2d 698,
324 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1982).
971.31 Annotation
A finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect is a judgment of conviction under s. 972.13 (1) and thus s. 971.31 (10) is applicable. State v. Smith,
113 Wis. 2d 497,
335 N.W.2d 376 (1983).
971.31 Annotation
To admit evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault under sub. (11) and s. 972.11 (2) (b) 3., the court must be able to conclude from an offer of proof that a reasonable person could infer that the complainant made a prior untruthful allegation. "Allegation" is not restricted to allegations reported to the police. State v. DeSantis,
155 Wis. 2d 774,
456 N.W.2d 600 (1990).
971.31 Annotation
Sub. (10) is inapplicable when the statement sought to be suppressed has no possible relevance to the charge to which the defendant pled guilty. State v. Pozo,
198 Wis. 2d 706,
544 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1995).
971.31 Annotation
A Miranda-Goodchild hearing to determine voluntariness of confessions is an evidentiary hearing for the parties. It is not a soliloquy for the court. The court must not permit itself to become a witness or an advocate for one party. A defendant does not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing when the role of the prosecutor is played by the judge and the prosecutor is reduced to a bystander. State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66,
262 Wis. 2d 457,
663 N.W.2d 798,
02-0153.
971.31 Annotation
The press and public have no constitutional right to attend a pretrial suppression hearing when the defendant demands closed hearing to avoid prejudicial publicity. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979).
971.315
971.315
Inquiry upon dismissal. Before a court dismisses a criminal charge against a person, the court shall inquire of the district attorney whether he or she has complied with
s. 971.095 (2).
971.315 History
History: 1997 a. 181.
971.32
971.32
Ownership, how alleged. In an indictment, information or complaint for a crime committed in relation to property, it shall be sufficient to state the name of any one of several co-owners, or of any officer or manager of any corporation, limited liability company or association owning the same.
971.32 History
History: 1993 a. 112,
491.
971.33
971.33
Possession of property, what sufficient. In the prosecution of a crime committed upon or in relation to or in any way affecting real property or any crime committed by stealing, damaging or fraudulently receiving or concealing personal property, it is sufficient if it is proved that at the time the crime was committed either the actual or constructive possession or the general or special property in any part of such property was in the person alleged to be the owner thereof.
971.34
971.34
Intent to defraud. Where the intent to defraud is necessary to constitute the crime it is sufficient to allege the intent generally; and on the trial it shall be sufficient if there appears to be an intent to defraud the United States or any state or any person.
971.36
971.36
Theft; pleading and evidence; subsequent prosecutions. 971.36(1)(1) In any criminal pleading for theft, it is sufficient to charge that the defendant did steal the property (describing it) of the owner (naming the owner) of the value of (stating the value in money).
971.36(2)
(2) Any criminal pleading for theft may contain a count for receiving the same property and the jury may find all or any of the persons charged guilty of either of the crimes.
971.36(3)
(3) In any case of theft involving more than one theft, all thefts may be prosecuted as a single crime if:
971.36(3)(a)
(a) The property belonged to the same owner and the thefts were committed pursuant to a single intent and design or in execution of a single deceptive scheme;
971.36(3)(b)
(b) The property belonged to the same owner and was stolen by a person in possession of it; or
971.36(3)(c)
(c) The property belonged to more than one owner and was stolen from the same place pursuant to a single intent and design.
