Wisconsin Constitution

In considering whether an individual's expectation of privacy was legitimate or justifiable, the following may be relevant: 1) whether the accused had a property interest in the premises; 2) whether the accused was lawfully on the premises; 3) whether the accused had complete dominion and control and the right to exclude others; 4) whether the accused took precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy; 5) whether the property was put to some private use; and 6) whether the claim of privacy was consistent with historical notions of privacy. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 05-1516.

Whether an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal property found inside a vehicle that he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in is not governed by a bright-line rule. Principles pertinent to whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy are that: 1) personal property found in vehicles is treated differently than personal property found in dwellings, there being a lesser expectation of privacy in vehicles; 2) neither ownership nor possession of an item alone establishes a reasonable expectation of privacy; 3) an individual's expectation of privacy in the space, rather than concepts of property law, is critical. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 05-1516.

When the defendant was only suspected of driving a vehicle with a suspended registration for an emissions violation and failing to signal for a turn, violations in no way linked to criminal activity or weapons possession, and when the only purported basis for a protective search was a single, partially obscured movement of the defendant in his vehicle that the officers observed from their squad car, the behavior observed by the officers was not sufficient to justify a protective search of Johnson's person and his car. State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182, 05-0573.

Weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of a vehicle. The reasonableness of a stop must be determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances. State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, 05-2778.

A private party's discovery, and subsequent disclosure to law enforcement, of contraband is not prohibited by the 4th amendment when there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in dealings with the private party. One does not generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy when delivering property to a private shipping company, particularly when the shipping company posts a sign reserving its right to inspect parcels left with it for shipping. State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, 303 Wis. 2d 438, 736 N.W.2d 189, 06-1271.

An employee of a private company is not acting on behalf of the government and is free to disclose a package and material to law enforcement. Law enforcement, without a warrant, can properly replicate the search the employee has already conducted. By otherwise replicating the private-party search, police did not exceed the scope of the private search by conducting a field test for drugs. State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, 303 Wis. 2d 438, 736 N.W.2d 189, 06-1271.

The emergency doctrine permits officers investigating a kidnapping case to conduct a warrantless search if the officers possess an objectively reasonable belief that the particular search will result in finding the victim or evidence leading to the victim's location. Police need not delay rescue where they reasonably believe that a kidnap victim is being held and a search of the premises will lead to the victim or to information about the victim's whereabouts; time is of the essence. State v. Larsen, 2007 WI App 147, 302 Wis. 2d 718, 736 N.W.2d 211, 06-1396.

One common factor in some cases in which courts have concluded that the officers did not have a justifiable basis for conducting a protective sweep has been that the protective search takes place after the traffic investigation has been completed. A protective sweep was justified when there were specific facts that demonstrated that the officers' primary concern was indeed weapons and safety and the protective search was the first thing the officers did, and was not an afterthought. State v. Alexander, 2008 WI App 9, 307 Wis. 2d 323, 744 N.W.2d 909, 07-0403.

The fact that an officer told the defendant that she was under arrest did not necessarily establish an arrest when immediately after making that statement the officer told the defendant that she would be issued a citation and then would be free to go. Although the statements are contradictory, the assurance that the defendant would be issued a citation and released would lead a reasonable person to believe he or she was not in custody. Under those circumstances a search of the defendant was not incident to a lawful arrest and, as such, unlawful. State v. Marten-Hoye, 2008 WI App 19, 307 Wis. 2d 671, 746 N.W.2d 498, 06-1104.

The potential availability of an innocent explanation does not prohibit an investigative stop. If any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of innocent inferences that could be drawn, officers have the right to temporarily detain an individual for the purpose of inquiry. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, 312 Wis. 2d 174, 751 N.W.2d 877, 07-1578.

Although Terry provides only for an officer to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons that might be used to assault the officer, under the circumstances of this case, the search was properly broadened to encompass the opening of the defendant's purse, which was essentially an extension of her person where the purse was accessible by her. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, 312 Wis. 2d 174, 751 N.W.2d 877, 07-1578.

Because of the limited intrusion resulting from a dog sniff for narcotics and the personal interests that Art. I, s. 11 were meant to protect, a dog sniff around the outside perimeter of a vehicle located in a public place is not a search under the Wisconsin Constitution. The 78 seconds during which the dog sniff occurred was not an unreasonable incremental intrusion upon the defendant's liberty. State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748, 06-0974.

The "search incident to arrest" exception to the 4th amendment warrant requirement holds that a lawful arrest creates a situation justifying a contemporaneous, warrantless search of the arrestee's person and the area within his or her immediate control. It is reasonable to search an area near the arrestee, but not an area so broad as to be unrelated to the protective purposes of the search. Although a bedroom might be considered within the defendant's immediate presence or control the search of a bedroom was not a search incident to arrest after the defendant had been removed from the home as the defendant could not have gained possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 N.W.2d 713, 06-2060.

Reasonable suspicion was not obviated by the fact that 15 minutes passed between the time of a stop and a protective search when the defendant was kept under continuous surveillance. The passage of time can be a factor in the totality of circumstances, but it is not likely to be a determinative factor in establishing or eliminating reasonable suspicion for a frisk. State v. Sumner, 2008 WI 94, 312 Wis. 2d 292, 752 N.W.2d 783, 06-0102.

The standing of a guest to challenge a search is measured by the guest's relationship to the property and the host. When a person claims guest status, the analysis examines the evidence in light of: 1) whether the guest's use of the premises was for a purely commercial purpose; 2) the duration of the guest's stay; and 3) the nature of the guest's relationship to the host. The defendant did not have standing when there was little evidence of the duration or closeness of the defendant's friendship with the property owner, the defendant did not have a long-term relationship to the place and not an overnight guest, and at the time of the search, used it largely for a commercial purpose. State v. Fox, 2008 WI App 136, 314 Wis. 2d 84, 758 N.W.2d 790, 07-0685.

The defendant did not have standing to assert a 4th amendment violation based on an officer unlocking the door of the public restroom the defendant occupied. The defendant's expectation of privacy was not reasonable when, while his initial use of the restroom was for its intended purpose, he continued to have the private use of the locked restroom for at least 25 minutes without responding to knocking and while dozing off. State v. Neitzel, 2008 WI App 143, 314 Wis. 2d 209, 758 N.W.2d 159, 07-2346.

An entry into a home was illegal when police, after seizing contraband from the defendant and seeing others on cell phones, acted on a hunch that someone would destroy evidence at the defendant's residence and entered the residence without a warrant upon the silence of the defendant's elderly mother and made a protective sweep without seizing any contraband. However, the illegality was attenuated by knowledge that contraband was seized after two hours had passed from the entry, no search for contraband took place during the entry, and the eventual search of the residence was pursuant to a valid search warrant. State v. Rogers, 2008 WI App 176, 315 Wis. 2d 60, 762 N.W.2d 795, 07-1850.

Government involvement in a search is not measured by the primary occupation of the actor, but by the capacity in which the actor acts at the time in question. An off-duty officer acting in a private capacity in making a search does not implicate the 4th amendment. When an officer opened mail that contained evidence of criminal activity that was incorrectly addressed to a person other than herself at her home address, her action was that of a private citizen. State v. Cole, 2008 WI App 178, 315 Wis. 2d 75, 762 N.W.2d 711, 07-2472. See also State v. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, 320 Wis. 2d 209, 769 N.W.2d 110, 08-0786.

Based on the reasoning in Pallone and under the facts of this case, the police could search the personal belongings of a passenger that were found outside a motor vehicle incident to the arrest of the driver. State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, 315 Wis. 2d 5, 758 N.W.2d 775, 06-1744.

A security guard's seizure, detention, and search of the defendant was not a government action that permitted the invocation of the exclusionary rule, because unless state action is involved, a defendant detained by another citizen has no right to suppress the fruits of the citizen's search. Although a citizen may detain another citizen for a misdemeanor committed in the citizen's presence and amounting to a breach of the peace, the court left for another day whether a citizen is privileged to detain another whom he or she sees breaching the peace by doing something that is not a crime, but an offense subject to a forfeiture. State v. Butler, 2009 WI App 52, 317 Wis. 2d 515, 768 N.W.2d 46, 08-1178.

During a traffic stop, a police officer may make inquiries to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions concerning weapons or other dangerous articles. The response that a person provides to an officer's inquiry, including the absence of or refusal to provide a response, may provide information that is relevant to whether a protective search is reasonable, and is therefore a factor to be considered alongside other factors that together comprise the totality of the circumstances. In this case, failure to provide an explanation effectively transformed what the defendant maintains was an innocent movement into a specific, articulable fact supporting a reasonable suspicion that the defendant posed a threat to the officers' safety. State v. Bridges, 2009 WI App 66, 319 Wis. 2d 217, 767 N.W.2d 593, 08-1207.

When officers found themselves in the middle of an unstable situation — having to decide whether to stand guard over the open door to an apartment potentially occupied by armed individuals prepared to attack them while they took the time necessary to obtain a warrant, or instead to retreat and risk the destruction of evidence, along with a continuing risk of attack — the circumstances posed the sort of special risks that required the officers to act immediately and to forego obtaining a warrant and constituted exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry. State v. Lee, 2009 WI App 96, 320 Wis. 2d 536, 771 N.W.2d 373, 07-2976.

Unlike in Johnson, 2007 WI 32, where the defendant's head and shoulder movement did not give reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of the person and car, here, the defendant after being stopped in his vehicle made 3 to 5 furtive-type movements that the trial court found were attempts to hide something. While the number of acts by itself may not be determinative of a reasonable basis, the persistence in the gesture is a specific, articulable measure of a strong intent to hide something from the police officer who made the stop. Further, when the defendant said the object seemingly being hidden was candy, it was reasonable to doubt the truthfulness of that response and it created another articulable suspicion to support the inference that the defendant was trying to hide a gun. State v. Bailey, 2009 WI App 140, 321 Wis. 2d 350, 773 N.W.2d 488, 08-3153.

The defendant, not the police, created the exigency in this case that resulted in a warrantless search when, after seeing the police outside his residence, the defendant retreated into the residence and shut the door after the police ordered him to stop. Those actions created the exigency of the risk that evidence would be destroyed. It was not necessary to delve into the appropriateness of the officers' determination after a controlled drug buy to conduct a "knock and talk" contact with the defendant or whether a knock and talk creates an exigency because in this case, a knock and talk was never actually accomplished. State v. Phillips, 2009 WI App 179, 322 Wis. 2d 576, 778 N.W.2d 157, 09-0249.

In a community caretaker context, when under the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for the community caretaker function is shown, that determination is not negated by the officer's subjective law enforcement concerns. An officer may have law enforcement concerns even when the officer has an objectively reasonable basis for performing a community caretaker function. State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598, 07-1834.

Even if no probable cause exists, a police officer may conduct a traffic stop when, under the totality of the circumstances, he or she has grounds to reasonably suspect that a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed. The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion of the stop. The crucial question is whether the facts would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of his or her training and experience, to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime. While any one fact, standing alone, might well be insufficient for reasonable suspicion, as facts accumulate, reasonable inferences about the cumulative effect can be drawn. State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569, 08-0446.

An officer's demand that a suspect drop an object that the officer believes could be a weapon can be likened to a frisk or pat-down. The approach in Wisconsin for determining whether a pat-down is valid has been one of reasonableness. State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 07-1378.

Law enforcement agents are justified in seizing and continuing to hold a container if: 1) there is probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime; and 2) if exigencies of the circumstances demand it. Analogizing a cell phone containing pictures to a container was appropriate. An officer who legally viewed an image of the defendant with marijuana in plain view on an open cell phone and who testified that he knew, based on his training and experience, that drug traffickers frequently personalize their cell phones with images of themselves with items acquired through drug activity, had probable cause to believe that the phone contained evidence of illegal drug activity. State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 07-1378.

When an officer had probable cause to seize a cell phone that he reasonably believed was a tool used in drug trafficking, exigent circumstances permitted the officer to answer an incoming call. The test for whether exigent circumstances are present focuses on whether the officer reasonably believes that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatens the destruction of evidence. The fleeting nature of a phone call is apparent; if it is not picked up, the opportunity to gather evidence is likely to be lost, as there is no guarantee or likelihood that the caller would leave a voice mail or otherwise preserve the evidence. State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 07-1378.

Under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect. At the same time, in a collective knowledge situation, if a defendant moves to suppress, the prosecutor must prove the collective knowledge that supports the stop. Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer. Such testimony provides no basis for the court to assess the validity of the police suspicion. The testimony contains no specific, articulable facts to which the court can apply the reasonable suspicion standard. State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5, 323 Wis. 2d 226, 779 N.W.2d 1, 08-1514.

When a temporary detention is justified, the court will still examine the circumstances of the detention to determine whether the investigative means used in a continued seizure are the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion and whether it lasted no longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. It was an unreasonable seizure when a suspect was handcuffed based on the bare fact that the officer knew the suspect was suspected in a prior shooting when no specific, articulable facts were presented to support that position under the collective knowledge doctrine. State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5, 323 Wis. 2d 226, 779 N.W.2d 1, 08-1514.

Although a person sharing a hotel room was found to have apparent authority over the room authorizing her to consent to a search of the room, she did not have actual or apparent authority over the inside of the safe when the safe was locked, she could not open the safe, and she did not even know it was in the room. Even if the scope of her consent to search the room included the safe, the search of the safe was unreasonable if she had no authority to grant that consent. State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5, 323 Wis. 2d 226, 779 N.W.2d 1, 08-1514.

In a search incident to an arrest, an officer may only search that area within the "immediate control" of the arrestee. In a no-arrest case, the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists since the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle when the interrogation is completed. Because the defendant was not under arrest, the officers had an immediate safety interest in verifying that that the defendant did not have a gun or other weapon under his immediate control. Therefore, the search of the defendant's vehicle console was not prohibited. State v. Williams, 2010 WI App 39, 323 Wis. 2d 460, 781 N.W.2d 495, 09-0501.

Soldal, 506 U.S. 56, recognized that there could be a seizure of property in violation of the 4th amendment even though the seizure was not preceded or accompanied by a search. Soldal also specifically recognized that a valid consent permits a lawful 4th amendment seizure. Here computers owned by one tenant were legally seized when another tenant, who had permission to use those computers, specifically gave the detective the right to "conduct a complete search of [m]y premises, and all property found therein, located at" the apartment and to take the computers away for further analysis. State v. Ramage, 2010 WI App 77, 325 Wis. 2d 483, 784 N.W.2d 746, 09-0784.

The test for exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless seizure is an objective one: whether a police officer under the circumstances known to the officer at the time reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life or risk destruction of evidence or greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape. An arrest was lawful when the urgency reasonably perceived by the officers was compelling and the danger they reasonably perceived for themselves and others if they did not move quickly was substantial. State v. Ayala, 2011 WI App 6, 331 Wis. 2d 171, 793 N.W.2d 511, 09-2690.

An officer's exercise of the bona fide community caretaker function must be reasonable as determined by the court by balancing the public interest or need that is furthered by the officers' conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion on the citizen's constitutional interest. The stronger the public need and the more minimal the intrusion upon an individual's liberty, the more likely the police conduct will be held to be reasonable. Four factors are considered: 1) the extent of the public's interest; 2) the attendant circumstances surrounding the search; 3) whether the search or seizure took place in an automobile; and 4) the alternatives that were available to the action taken. State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 17, 331 Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505, 10-0895.

The holding of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle is adopted as the proper interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97, 07-1894.

Federal case law does not limit an officer's community caretaker functions to incidents involving automobiles, but instead counsels a cautious approach when the exception is invoked to justify law enforcement intrusion into a home. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, 08-1204.

In light of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, the broad rule adopted in Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, is no longer good law. Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. State v. Bauer, 2010 WI App 93, 327 Wis. 2d 765, 787 N.W.2d 412, 09-1367.

Police cannot conduct warrantless searches pursuant to a probation apprehension request. Warrantless searches conducted by police, as opposed to probation agents, are prohibited. State v. Bauer, 2010 WI App 93, 327 Wis. 2d 765, 787 N.W.2d 412, 09-1367.

A "knock and talk" interview at a private residence that has lost its consensual nature and has effectively become an in-home seizure or constructive entry may trigger 4th amendment scrutiny. When the situation is such that a person would not wish to leave his or her location, such as his or her home, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. City of Sheboygan v. Cesar, 2010 WI App 170, 330 Wis. 2d 760, 796 N.W.2d 429, 09-3049.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the trooper's observation of the defendant's furtive movements and visible nervousness, a record of arrests for violent crimes, and a drug delivery arrest that had occurred nearby a short time before the stop constituted specific and articulable facts that, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, created reasonable suspicion and justified a protective search for the officer's safety. State v. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, 334 Wis. 2d 379, 799 N.W.2d 775, 09-2934.

As a general matter, it is unacceptable for a member of the public to enter a home's attached garage uninvited regardless of whether an overhead or entry door is open. Thus, generally, an attached garage will never be impliedly open to public, i.e., police entry. There may be an exception to that general rule if, in a given circumstance, it reasonably appears that entry into the attached garage is the least intrusive means of attempting contact with persons inside the home. State v. Davis, 2011 WI App 74, 333 Wis. 2d 490, 798 N.W.2d 902, 10-2191.

Randolph held that in co-habitation cases, if both parties are present, a search is unlawful when one consents but the other expressly refuses to consent. Randolph did not apply when one co-habitant consented and the other did not object. State v. Pirtle, 2011 WI App 89, 334 Wis. 2d 211, 799 N.W.2d 492, 10-1363.

Under circumstances where: 1) a man in a high-crime area; 2) late at night; 3) wearing a ski mask that covered his face below his eyes; 4) wearing a hoodie; 5) had an ambiguous but "unusual"-appearing encounter with a woman walking by herself, the police reasonably and based on their experience could objectively see that further investigation was warranted to ensure that criminal activity was not afoot. State v. Matthews, 2011 WI App 92, 334 Wis. 2d 455, 799 N.W.2d 911, 10-1712.

It was reasonable for the officers to conclude that the leaseholder of a property had the authority to consent to them proceeding up the property's stairs to look for another tenant who was not present to either consent or refuse consent when: 1) a third non-leaseholder tenant refused to consent; 2) the officers were aware that the tenant granting consent was the leaseholder of the property; and 3) the person refusing consent had not previously lived there and had left the room to wake up the subject of the police inquiry after the officers arrived. State v. Lathan, 2011 WI App 104, 335 Wis. 2d 234, 801 N.W.2d 772, 10-1228.

Under Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, a lawful roadside stop "ordinarily" begins when a vehicle is pulled over for a traffic violation and ends when the police no longer have further need to control the scene, at which time the driver and passengers are free to leave. Johnson does not create a bright-line rule that police always have the authority to detain passengers for the duration of a roadside stop. Johnson leaves the door open for exceptions to the general rule that passengers are reasonably detained for the duration of a stop. Nonetheless, the stop in this case was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Salonen, 2011 WI App 157, 338 Wis. 2d 104, 808 N.W.2d 162, 10-2504.

The plain view doctrine did not justify opening opaque cylinders that were in plain view, but the contents were not, and the containers, as indicated by their size or shape, could hold a weapon. State v. Sutton, 2012 WI App 7, 338 Wis. 2d 338, 808 N.W.2d 411, 11-0036.

If a third party has mutual use of a property and joint access or control for most purposes, then the third party may consent to a search of the property regardless of whether he or she owns the property. While a mere guest in a home may not ordinarily consent to a search of the premises, the analysis is different when the guest is more than a casual visitor but instead has the run of the house. A weekend house guest who was permitted to stay in the home by herself and had the authority to receive people into the home had the authority to permit an officer to enter. Similarly, when the defendant gave his guest permission to use his computer, the guest had the authority to consent to the officer's search and seizure of that item. State v. Sutton, 2012 WI App 7, 338 Wis. 2d 338, 808 N.W.2d 411, 11-0036.

The possible use of a premises for an illicit commercial enterprise does not necessarily trump an otherwise legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. State v. Guard, 2012 WI App 8, 338 Wis. 2d 385, 808 N.W.2d 718, 11-0072.

When police have probable cause to arrest before an unlawful entry and warrantless arrest from a defendant's home, this violation of Payton, 445 U.S. 573, does not require the suppression of evidence obtained from a defendant outside of the home. This rule applies when the only illegal police conduct is an unlawful entry and arrest in violation of Payton, not when the evidence may be tied to an unlawful search by police. State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775, 10-0346.

Under the totality of the circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that the defendant was driving based on reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity may be afoot." The police had the requisite reasonable suspicion primarily based on the reliability of their final informant and the information provided by him when the information was supported by the prior tips to police. While the initial tips were of limited reliability, the final informant and his tips had significant indicia of reliability because the informant provided self-identifying information that made him more reliable than a truly anonymous informant and the final informant provided details and accurate future predictions that police were able to corroborate. State v. Miller, 2012 WI 61, 341 Wis. 2d 307, 815 N.W.2d 349, 10-0557.

A warrantless, non-exigent, felony arrest in public was constitutional despite the opportunity to obtain a warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411.

When a driver was stopped because of expired license plates, a police order to get out of the car was reasonable and a subsequent "pat down" based on an observed bulge under the driver's jacket resulted in the legal seizure of an unlicensed revolver. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).

A burning building clearly presents an exigency rendering a warrantless entry reasonable, and fire officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the fire after it is extinguished. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978)

The warrantless installation of a pen register, that recorded telephone numbers called but not the contents of the calls, did not violate the 4th amendment. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

A warrantless search of a suitcase in the trunk of a taxi was unconstitutional. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).

Police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

That police had lawful possession of pornographic film boxes did not give them authority to search their contents. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).

An officer who accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).

Officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).

When an officer, after stopping a defendant's car at a routine driver's license checkpoint, saw a tied-off party balloon in plain sight, the officer had probable cause to believe the balloon contained an illicit substance. Hence, a warrantless seizure of the balloon was legal. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).

A warrantless search by arson investigators of the defendant's fire-damaged home that was not a continuation of an earlier search was unconstitutional. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984).

When a damaged shipping package was examined by company employees who discovered white powder, a subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).

The "open fields" doctrine is discussed. Oliver v. U.S. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).

The warrantless, nighttime entry of the defendant's home for arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under the "hot pursuit" doctrine or the preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).

School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student. The legality of the search depends on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. New Jersey v. T. L. O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

When officers were entitled to seize packages in a vehicle and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, a warrantless search of the packages 3 days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).

The vehicle exception for warrantless searches applies to motor homes. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).

The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when an officer reasonably relies upon a statute allowing a warrantless administrative search that was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).

A protective sweep of a residence in conjunction with an arrest is permissible if police reasonably believe that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990).

Inadvertence is not a necessary condition to a "plain view" seizure. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990).

For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or when force is absent, submission to an officer's "show of authority." California v. Hodari D. 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).

A determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest generally meets the promptness requirement. If a hearing is held more than 48 hours following the arrest the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate an emergency or extraordinary circumstances. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991).

There shall be one rule governing all automobile searches. The police may search the car and all containers within it without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained in either. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991).

If during a lawful weapons pat down an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993).

An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997).

Persons observed through a window in a home where they were not overnight guests but were present for a short period to engage in a primarily commercial illegal drug transaction, had no expectation of privacy in the home and the observation of those persons was not a constitutionally prohibited search. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998).

The issuance of a traffic citation without an arrest did not authorize a full search of the vehicle. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998).

When there is probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband officers may examine containers in the vehicle without a showing of individualized probable cause for each container. The container may be searched whether or not it's owner is present as a passenger, or otherwise, because it may contain contraband that the officers reasonably believe is in the car. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999).

Police need not obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999).

The exception to the requirement of a warrant for automobiles does not require a separate finding of exigency, in addition to a finding of probable cause. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).

When there is probable cause to search a motor vehicle, the search is not unreasonable if the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, although a warrant was not obtained. No separate finding of exigent circumstances is required. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).

There is no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 145 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1999).

Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).

An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, is insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of a person. The tip must bear indicia of reliability. Reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of criminal activity, not just in its tendency to to identify a person. Florida v. J.L. 529 U.S. 266, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000).

Stopping vehicles at highway checkpoints without any individualized suspicion to interdict illegal drugs was an unreasonable seizure under the 4th amendment because the primary purpose was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, unlike checkpoints to check for drunk driving or illegal immigrants. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000).

The police acted reasonably when, with probable cause to believe that the defendant had hidden drugs in his home, they prevented the man from entering the home for about 2 hours until a search warrant could be obtained. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 148 LEd2d 838 (2001).

A state hospital could not test maternity patients for cocaine and then turn the results over to law enforcement authorities without patient consent. The interest of using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine does not justify a departure from the rule that a nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a warrant. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 525 U.S. 67, 149 LEd 2d 205 (2001).