343.305(10)(f)
(f) The department may make any order which the court is authorized or required to make under this subsection if the court fails to do so.
343.305(10)(g)
(g) The court or department shall provide that the period of suspension or revocation imposed under this subsection or under
sub. (7) shall be reduced by any period of suspension or revocation previously served under
s. 343.30 (1p) or
(1q) if both suspensions or revocations arose out of the same incident or occurrence. The court or department shall order that the period of suspension or revocation imposed under this subsection or
sub. (7) run concurrently with any time remaining on a suspension or revocation imposed under
s. 343.30 (1p) or
(1q) arising out of the same incident or occurrence.
343.305(10g)
(10g) Suspensions and revocations; extensions. For any suspension or revocation the court orders under
sub. (10), the court shall extend the suspension or revocation period by the number of days to which the court sentences the person to imprisonment in a jail or prison.
343.305(10m)
(10m) Refusals; ignition interlock of a motor vehicle. The requirements and procedures for installation of an ignition interlock device under
s. 343.301 apply when an operating privilege is revoked under
sub. (10).
343.305(11)
(11) Rules. The department shall promulgate rules under
ch. 227 necessary to administer this section. The rules shall include provisions relating to the expeditious exchange of information under this section between the department and law enforcement agencies, circuit courts, municipal courts, attorneys who represent municipalities, district attorneys, and driver licensing agencies of other jurisdictions. The rules may not affect any provisions relating to court procedure.
343.305 History
History: 1987 a. 3,
27,
399;
1989 a. 7,
31,
56,
105,
359;
1991 a. 39,
251,
277;
1993 a. 16,
105,
315,
317,
491;
1995 a. 27 ss.
6412cnL,
9126 (19);
1995 a. 113,
269,
425,
426,
436,
448;
1997 a. 35,
84,
107,
191,
237,
290;
1999 a. 9,
32,
109;
2001 a. 16 ss.
3421m to
3423j,
4060gk,
4060hw,
4060hy;
2001 a. 104;
2003 a. 97,
199;
2005 a. 332,
413;
2007 a. 20 ss.
3303 to
3315,
9121 (6) (a);
2007 a. 136;
2009 a. 100,
103,
163;
2011 a. 120,
242;
2013 a. 36,
224.
343.305 Cross-reference
Cross-reference: See also chs.
DHS 62 and
Trans 107 and
113, Wis. adm. code.
343.305 Annotation
Administration of a blood or breathalyzer test does not violate a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Driver,
59 Wis. 2d 35,
207 N.W.2d 850 (1973).
343.305 Annotation
The implied consent law must be liberally construed to effectuate its policies since it was intended to facilitate the taking of tests for intoxication and not to inhibit the ability of the state to remove drunken drivers from the highway. Scales v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 485,
219 N.W.2d 286 (1974).
343.305 Annotation
Miranda warnings are not required when an arrested driver is asked to submit to a test for intoxication under the implied consent statute. State v. Bunders,
68 Wis. 2d 129,
227 N.W.2d 727 (1975).
343.305 Annotation
There is no right to counsel prior to submitting to an intoxication test. A driver is obliged to promptly take or refuse the test. State v. Neitzel,
95 Wis. 2d 191,
289 N.W.2d 828 (1980).
343.305 Annotation
The state need not prove that notices were sent to state officers under sub. (3) (b), 1985 stats. [now sub. (9) (a)]. State v. Polinski,
96 Wis. 2d 43,
291 N.W.2d 465 (1980).
343.305 Annotation
When an officer initially requested a breath test, it was not an irrevocable election preventing the officer from requesting a urine test instead. The driver's refusal to submit urine justified revocation of his driver's license. State v. Pawlow,
98 Wis. 2d 703,
298 N.W.2d 220 (Ct. App. 1980).
343.305 Annotation
The state need not affirmatively prove compliance with administrative code procedures as a foundation for admission of a breathalyzer test. City of New Berlin v. Wertz,
105 Wis. 2d 670,
314 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1981).
343.305 Annotation
When a driver pled guilty to the underlying OWI charge, a charge of refusing a test under s. 343.305, 1979 stats., was properly dismissed as unnecessary. State v. Brooks,
113 Wis. 2d 347,
335 N.W.2d 354 (1983).
343.305 Annotation
A breathalyzer approved in the administrative code has a prima facie presumption of accuracy. State v. Dwinell,
119 Wis. 2d 305,
349 N.W.2d 739 (Ct. App. 1984).
343.305 Annotation
When blood alcohol content is tested under statutory procedures, the results of the test are mandatorily admissible. The physical sample tested is not evidence intended, required, or even susceptible of being produced by state under s. 971.23. State v. Ehlen,
119 Wis. 2d 451,
351 N.W.2d 503 (1984).
343.305 Annotation
A judge's erroneous exclusion of a defendant's explanation for a refusal to take a blood test was not harmless error. State v. Bolstad,
124 Wis. 2d 576,
370 N.W.2d 257 (1985).
343.305 Annotation
At a revocation hearing under sub. (3) (b) 5., 1985 stats. [now sub. (9) (a) 5.], the state need not establish to a reasonable certainty that the defendant was the actual driver of the vehicle stopped by the police. The probable cause standard satisfies due process. State v. Nordness,
128 Wis. 2d 15,
381 N.W.2d 300 (1986).
343.305 Annotation
In sub. (2) (c), 1985 stats. [now sub. (3) (b)], "not capable of withdrawing consent," must be construed narrowly and applied infrequently. State v. Disch,
129 Wis. 2d 225,
385 N.W.2d 140 (1986).
343.305 Annotation
Under the facts of the case, the state's refusal to provide an alternative blood alcohol test did not violate due process. State v. McCrossen,
129 Wis. 2d 277,
385 N.W.2d 161 (1986).
343.305 Annotation
An arresting officer need not inform an accused that a test refusal can be used against the accused at trial. State v. Crandall,
133 Wis. 2d 251,
394 N.W.2d 905 (1986).
343.305 Annotation
A mental disorder cannot justify a test refusal unless it is severe enough that the driver is deemed under sub. (3) (b) not to have refused at all. State v. Hagaman,
133 Wis. 2d 381,
395 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1986).
343.305 Annotation
The implied consent law does not prevent the state from obtaining chemical test evidence by alternative constitutional means. State v. Zielke,
137 Wis. 2d 39,
403 N.W.2d 427 (1987).
343.305 Annotation
Appeal of an oral revocation order under sub. (10) may not be taken under s. 808.03 (1). State v. Borowski,
164 Wis. 2d 730,
476 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1991).
343.305 Annotation
Evidence of refusal was not admissible when the defendant was not fully informed of the consequences in accordance with (former) sub. (4). State v. Algaier,
165 Wis. 2d 515,
478 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1991).
343.305 Annotation
Substantial compliance with the requirements of (former) sub. (4) when the defendant was actually informed of all rights and penalties relating to him was sufficient. State v. Piskula,
168 Wis. 2d 135,
483 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1992). See also Village of Oregon v. Bryant,
188 Wis. 2d 680,
524 N.W.2d 635 (1994).
343.305 Annotation
The sub. (9) (a) requirement that a notice of intent to revoke be prepared and served immediately is directory and not mandatory. State v. Moline,
170 Wis. 2d 531,
489 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1992).
343.305 Annotation
An accused's request under sub. (5) (a) for his or her own test only requires the arresting agency to make the accused available to obtain the test, not to take an active part in obtaining the test. State v. Vincent,
171 Wis. 2d 124,
490 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1992).
343.305 Annotation
When an officer knew the defendant was licensed as a commercial operator and the ensuing revocation revoked all operating privileges, the commercial operator warnings, under (former) sub. (4) were required. State v. Geraldson,
176 Wis. 2d 487,
500 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1993).
343.305 Annotation
Overstatement of the potential penalties for refusal to submit to a chemical test was substantial compliance with (former) sub. (4) and not grounds for reversing a revocation for refusal. State v. Sutton,
177 Wis. 2d 709,
503 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1993).
343.305 Annotation
There was no error in informing a driver of all warnings under (former) sub. (4), including those applying to only commercial operators and those applying to only noncommercial operators, regardless of the driver's status. Village of Elm Grove v. Landowski,
181 Wis. 2d 137,
510 N.W.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1993).
343.305 Annotation
Sub. (5) (b) requires a person drawing blood "under the direction of a physician" to have general authorization from the physician rather than a specific order in each case. State v. Penzkofer,
184 Wis. 2d 262,
516 N.W.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1994).
343.305 Annotation
The state's burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing is significantly greater than at a refusal hearing. Consequently a defendant is not precluded from relitigating the issue of probable cause at a suppression hearing. State v. Wille,
185 Wis. 2d 673 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994).
343.305 Annotation
Once a suspect has refused a second alternate blood alcohol test, there is no continuing obligation to accommodate future requests for an alternate test. State v. Stary,
187 Wis. 2d 266,
522 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1994).
343.305 Annotation
Refusal to submit to a field sobriety test was properly admitted as evidence to determine probable cause for arrest for intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle. State v. Babbit,
188 Wis. 2d 349,
525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994).
343.305 Annotation
A suspect must be properly informed under the implied consent law before evidence of a refusal may be admitted at a subsequent trial, but the state is not prevented from using the evidence if a revocation hearing is not held. State v. Donner,
192 Wis. 2d 305,
531 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1995).
343.305 Annotation
A driver's "subjective confusion" over the right not to take the chemical test is not grounds for challenging the propriety of the warnings given prior to administering the test. There is a 3-part standard to be applied in determining the adequacy of the warnings. County of Ozaukee v. Quelle,
198 Wis. 2d 269,
542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995),
95-1074. But see Washburn County v. Smith,
2008 WI 23,
308 Wis. 2d 65,
746 N.W.2d 243,
06-3163.
343.305 Annotation
The implied consent law does not expressly require a suspect's written consent to the blood alcohol test. A consent form will be liberally construed to determine whether it misinforms the suspect of the law. State v. Spring,
204 Wis. 2d 343,
555 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1996),
96-3565.
343.305 Annotation
Criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content subsequent to an administrative suspension of a driver's operating privileges in the same case does not constitute multiple punishment and does not constitute double jeopardy. State v. McMaster,
206 Wis. 2d 30,
556 N.W.2d 673 (1996),
95-1159.
343.305 Annotation
A finding in an administrative review under sub. (8) that there was no probable cause for an arrest does not preclude the consideration of the same issue in a criminal proceeding. State v. Kasian,
207 Wis. 2d 611,
558 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996),
96-1603.
343.305 Annotation
When an officer exceeds the duty to give warnings prior to administering the test and gives erroneous information, it is the defendant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the erroneous information caused the defendant's refusal. State v. Ludwigson,
212 Wis. 2d 871,
569 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1997),
97-0417.
343.305 Annotation
Willingness to submit to a blood alcohol test, subsequent to an earlier refusal, does not cure the refusal. State v. Rydeski,
214 Wis. 2d 101,
571 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1997),
97-0169.
343.305 Annotation
A verbal refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test is not required to find a refusal. Conduct may serve as the basis for finding a refusal. State v. Rydeski,
214 Wis. 2d 101,
571 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1997),
97-0169.
343.305 Annotation
The chief of the DOT chemical test section is given authority to determine the procedures for evaluation of breath testing instruments. The consideration of modifications made to a new model of a previously tested machine and determination that the 2 models were analytically the same was sufficient testing. State v. Busch,
217 Wis. 2d 429,
576 N.W.2d 904 (1998),
96-2822.
343.305 Annotation
When a defendant submitted to a blood test prior to being placed under arrest, the test was not made pursuant to this section. As such, there was no right to an alternative test under sub. (5). State v. Thurk,
224 Wis. 2d 662,
592 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999),
98-0251.
343.305 Annotation
There is no constitutional duty to inform suspected drunk drivers that the right to counsel does not attach to the implied consent statute. State v. Reitter,
227 Wis. 2d 213,
595 N.W.2d 646 (1999),
98-0915.
343.305 Annotation
A warrantless blood draw is permissible when: 1) the blood is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested; 2) there is a clear indication that evidence of intoxication will be produced; 3) the method used is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection. State v. Thorstad,
2000 WI App 199,
238 Wis. 2d 666,
618 N.W.2d 240,
99-1765.
343.305 Annotation
Although a notice of intent to revoke operating privileges under sub. (9) (a) did not contain "substantially all" of the statutorily required information, it provided meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard. As such the error was technical and required a finding of prejudice for dismissal of the action. State v. Gautschi,
2000 WI App 274,
240 Wis. 2d 83,
622 N.W.2d 24,
99-3065.
343.305 Annotation
The notice under sub. (4) regarding the consequences for failing to submit to a blood alcohol does not violate due process. It does not mislead accused persons regarding taking or refusing the blood alcohol test. State v. Nord,
2001 WI App 48,
241 Wis. 2d 387,
625 N.W.2d 302,
00-1529.
343.305 Annotation
In giving the warnings required under sub (4), an officer is required to utilize methods that, according to the circumstances at the time, are reasonable and will convey the warnings. Whether the accused driver comprehends the warnings is not part of the inquiry. A driver's hearing impairment must be taken into account and accommodated as is reasonably possible under the circumstances. State v. Piddington,
2001 WI 24,
241 Wis. 2d 754,
623 N.W.2d 528,
99-1250.
343.305 Annotation
Drivers have no right to refuse a chemical test and need not consent to a test. When there is a refusal, the implied consent law does not preclude police from pursuing other constitutional avenues for collecting evidence. State v. Gibson,
2001 WI App 71,
242 Wis. 2d 267,
626 N.W.2d 73,
00-2399.
343.305 Annotation
That a person agreed to a breath test but not a blood test, did not render police insistence on a blood test unreasonable. State v. Wodenjak,
247 Wis. 2d 554,
634 N.W.2d 867.
343.305 Annotation
By consenting to the taking of a blood sample, the defendant also consented to the chemical analysis of the sample. These are not separate events for warrant requirement purposes. State v. VanLaarhoven,
2001 WI App 275,
248 Wis. 2d 881,
637 N.W.2d 411,
01-0222.
343.305 Annotation
A warrantless blood draw by a physician in a jail setting may be unreasonable if it invites an unjustified element of personal risk of pain and infection. Absent evidence of those risks, a blood draw under those circumstances was reasonable. State v. Daggett,
2002 WI App 32,
250 Wis. 2d 112,
640 N.W.2d 546,
01-1417.
343.305 Annotation
The circuits court's improper denial of a hearing requested under sub. (8) as the result of its miscalculation of time that resulted in a suspension without a hearing was not a fundamental error entitling the defendant to dismissal of the conviction against him when the court, on realizing the error, conducted a hearing and found that the defendant's refusal was improper and a license suspension was in order. State v. Carlson,
2002 WI App 44,
250 Wis. 2d 562,
641 N.W.2d 451,
01-1088.
343.305 Annotation
Sub. (9) (a) does not provide the exclusive option when faced with an arrestee who refuses to submit to s chemical test. An officer may acknowledge the refusal, complete the sub. (9) (a) intent to revoke form, and then proceed with an involuntary blood test, using reasonable force to withdraw blood from a noncompliant suspect. The officer may necessarily inform a suspect that such a procedure is a possibility upon his or her refusal. State v. Marshall,
2002 WI App 73,
251 Wis. 2d 408,
642 N.W.2d 571,
01-1403.
343.305 Annotation
When the arresting officer makes no specific threats beyond what arises under this section, the threat of lost driving privileges does not constitute a coercive measure that invalidates a defendant's consent for 4th amendment purposes. An arresting officer, by reading the informing the accused form, simply states the truth: refusal to submit to a chemical test will result in driving privileges being revoked. Officers are entitled to make true statements. Village of Little Chute v. Walitalo,
2002 WI App 211,
256 Wis. 2d 1032,
650 N.W.2d 891,
01-3060. See also, State v. Wintlend,
2002 WI App 314,
258 Wis. 2d 875,
655 N.W.2d 745,
02-0965.
343.305 Annotation
If an officer explicitly assures or implicitly suggests that a custodial defendant has a right to consult counsel before deciding whether to submit to the test, the defendant relied on the offering, and the officer nonetheless marked a refusal despite the defendant's reliance, then the refusal was reasonably made. State v. Verkler,
2003 WI App 37,
260 Wis. 2d 391,
659 N.W.2d 137,
02-1545.
343.305 Annotation
This section does not require that test results must be suppressed when there is a failure to reasonably convey the implied consent warnings to an apprehended driver. Under the circumstances of this case on remand the defendant was entitled to pursue an order prohibiting the automatic admissibility of the blood test result pursuant to s. 885.235, which if granted would require the state to establish the admissibility of the blood test, including establishing a foundation. State v. Begicevic,
2004 WI App 57,
270 Wis. 2d 675,
678 N.W.2d 293,
03-1223.
343.305 Annotation
The approval of an instrument under sub. (6) (b) without promulgation of an administrative rule under ch. 227 did not constitute creation of an invalid administrative rule. County of Dane v. Winsand,
2004 WI App 86,
271 Wis. 2d 786,
679 N.W.2d 885,
03-2004.
343.305 Annotation
When police have informed a suspect of his or her right to an alternative test at agency expense, the suspect has ample opportunity to make a request, the suspect makes no request, and the suspect is released from custody and leaves the presence of custodial police, a subsequent request for an alternative test at agency expense is not a request within the meaning of sub. (5) (a). State v. Fahey,
2005 WI App 171,
285 Wis. 2d 679,
702 N.W.2d 400,
04-0102.
343.305 Annotation
There is no right to counsel at the refusal hearing because such a hearing is civil, not criminal, in nature and therefore there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Krause,
2006 WI App 43,
289 Wis. 2d 573,
712 N.W.2d 67,
05-0472.
343.305 Annotation
Giving
Miranda warnings prior to reading Informing the Accused warnings under this section does not lead to a conclusion that the officer explicitly assured or implicitly suggested that a defendant has a right to consult counsel or to stand silent in the face of the implied consent warnings. Such a conclusion requires that the accused must be told he or she has the right to consult with counsel before deciding to submit to chemical testing and that the accused relied on the assurance or suggestion when responding to the request for a chemical test. State v. Kliss,
2007 WI App 13,
298 Wis. 2d 275,
728 N.W.2d 9,
06-0113.
343.305 Annotation
There cannot be substantial compliance with sub. (4) when the law enforcement officer fails to give the defendant the statutorily required information about penalties. If the circuit court determines that the officer failed to inform the accused in compliance with the statute, the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the person's refusal to take the test in question. This does not apply misstatements of information beyond the required information, which are governed by
Ludwigson. Washburn County v. Smith,
2008 WI 23,
308 Wis. 2d 65,
746 N.W.2d 243,
06-3163.
343.305 Annotation
When law enforcement invokes this section to obtain a primary test for intoxication, it must: 1) provide the primary test of its choice at its own expense; 2) provide an opportunity for a second test of its choice at agency expense; and 3) if the second test is refused by the suspect in favor of one at his or her own expense, it must provide a reasonable opportunity for a test of the suspect's choice at the suspect's expense. State v. Batt,
2010 WI App 155,
330 Wis. 2d 159,
793 N.W.2d 104,
09-3069.
343.305 Annotation
Sub. (9) (a) 5. a. does not limit the circuit court to considering whether, based on all the evidence gathered up until the moment of the arrest, the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was operating while under the influence of an intoxicant. A defendant may also contest whether he or she was lawfully placed under arrest. As part of this inquiry, the circuit court may entertain an argument that the arrest was unlawful because the traffic stop that preceded it was not justified by either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. State v. Anagnos,
2012 WI 64,
341 Wis. 2d 576,
815 N.W.2d 675,
10-1812.
343.305 Annotation
Under
Brooks, a circuit court has the discretionary authority to dismiss a refusal charge only if the defendant has already pleaded guilty to the underlying OWI or OWI-related charge by the time of his or her refusal hearing, which was timely requested. Extending
Brooks to allow circuit courts the discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges in cases in which a defendant has pleaded not guilty to the underlying OWI, PAC, or other related charge would contravene the purpose of this section. State v. Bentdahl,
2013 WI 106,
351 Wis. 2d 739,
840 N.W.2d 704,
12-1426.
343.305 Annotation
It is incorrect to say that a driver who consents to a blood draw after receiving the advisement contained in the "Informing the Accused" form has given "implied consent." If a driver consents under that circumstance, that consent is actual consent, not implied consent. If the driver refuses to consent, he or she thereby withdraws "implied consent" and accepts the consequences of that choice. The implied consent law is explicitly designed to allow the driver, and not the police officer, to make the choice as to whether the driver will give or decline to give actual consent to a blood draw when put to the choice between consent or automatic sanctions. State v. Padley,
2014 WI App 65,
354 Wis. 2d 545,
849 N.W.2d 867,
13-0852.
343.305 Annotation
Sub. (3) (ar) 2. is not facially unconstitutional. It does not authorize law enforcement to compel an unreasonable search, as it does not authorize searches. It authorizes law enforcement to require a driver to choose between giving actual consent to a blood draw, or withdrawing "implied consent" and suffering implied-consent-law sanctions. State v. Padley,
2014 WI App 65,
354 Wis. 2d 545,
849 N.W.2d 867,
13-0852.
343.305 Annotation
The "reason to believe" standard in sub. (3) (ar) 2. requires that the law enforcement officer have a "minimal suspicion" that the defendant has committed a traffic violation. State v. Padley,
2014 WI App 65,
354 Wis. 2d 545,
849 N.W.2d 867,
13-0852.
343.305 Annotation
When a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an unconscious person is guilty of driving while intoxicated, a blood sample may be taken, and the test results are admissible in evidence and may not be excluded by the trial court. 59 Atty. Gen. 183.
343.305 Annotation
Implied consent is discussed. 62 Atty. Gen. 174.
343.305 Annotation
The method by which a law enforcement agency may provide 2 tests for blood alcohol content under sub. (1), 1985 stats. [now sub. (2)] is discussed. The agency is not required to actually own or physically possess the testing devices. 63 Atty. Gen. 119.
343.305 Annotation
Under s. 343.305 (1) and (4), 1985 stats., hospital personnel must administer tests and report results at the request of officers, subject to penalty under 946.40. 68 Atty. Gen. 209.
343.305 Annotation
Federal law requiring confidentiality of patient records has no application to the taking of a blood sample under this section.
73 Atty. Gen. 45.
343.305 Annotation
A law enforcement officer may use physical restraint, subject to constitutional limitations, in order to draw a legally justified blood sample. Refusal by a health professional to comply with a law enforcement officer's authorized request to take a blood sample from a person whom the officer has legally restrained by force constitutes refusal to aid an officer under s. 946.40.
74 Atty. Gen. 123.
343.305 AnnotationRefusal hearings under this section are discussed.
77 Atty. Gen. 4.
343.305 Annotation
A Massachusetts implied consent law that mandates suspension of a license for refusal to take a breath-analysis test did not violate the due process clause. Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. 1 (1979).
343.305 Annotation
The admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test did not deny the right against self-incrimination. South Dakota v. Neville,
459 U.S. 553 (1983).
343.305 Annotation
Wisconsin's new administrative suspension statute. 72 MLR 120 (1988).
343.305 Annotation
The new OMVWI law: Wisconsin changes its approach to the problem of drinking and driving. Hammer, WBB April, May 1982.
343.305 Annotation
Technical problems corrected: Operating while intoxicated. Hancock and Maassen. WBB Apr. 1987.
343.305 Annotation
Wisconsin's breath testing program. Booker. WBB Oct. 1988.
343.305 Annotation
Rethinking Refusal: Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law. Lotke. Wis. Law. July 1993.
343.307
343.307
Prior convictions, suspensions or revocations to be counted as offenses.
