346.63 Annotation
Intent to drive or move a motor vehicle is not required to find an accused guilty of operating the vehicle while under influence of intoxicant. Milwaukee County v. Proegler,
95 Wis. 2d 614,
291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980).
346.63 Annotation
The court properly instructed the jury that it could infer from a subsequent breathalyzer reading of .13 percent that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the stop. Alcohol absorption is discussed. State v. Vick,
104 Wis. 2d 678,
312 N.W.2d 489 (1981).
346.63 Annotation
A previous conviction for operating while intoxicated is a penalty enhancer, not an element of the crime. State v. McAllister,
107 Wis. 2d 532,
319 N.W.2d 865 (1982). But as to operating with a prohibited blood alcohol count, see the note to State v. Ludeking,
195 Wis. 2d 132,
536 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995),
94-1527.
346.63 Annotation
Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show the physical manifestation of the defendant driver's intoxication. State v. Haefer,
110 Wis. 2d 381,
328 N.W.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1982).
346.63 Annotation
The trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence a blood alcohol chart produced by the department of transportation showing the amount of alcohol burned up over time. State v. Hinz,
121 Wis. 2d 282,
360 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1984).
346.63 Annotation
The definitions of “under the influence" in this section and in s. 939.22 are equivalent. State v. Waalen,
130 Wis. 2d 18,
386 N.W.2d 47 (1986).
346.63 Annotation
Sub. (1) (b) establishes a per se rule that it is a violation to operate a motor vehicle with a specified breath alcohol content, regardless of the individual's “
partition ratio." The provision is constitutional. State v. McManus,
152 Wis. 2d 113,
447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).
346.63 Annotation
First offender OMVWI prosecution is a civil offense, and jeopardy does not attach to prevent a subsequent criminal prosecution. State v. Lawton,
167 Wis. 2d 461,
482 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1992).
346.63 Annotation
Because there is no privilege under s. 905.04 (4) (f) for chemical tests for intoxication, results of a test taken for diagnostic purposes are admissible in an OMVWI trial without patient approval. City of Muskego v. Godec,
167 Wis. 2d 536,
482 N.W.2d 79 (1992).
346.63 Annotation
When a municipal court found the defendant guilty of OWI and dismissed a blood alcohol count charge without finding guilt, the defendant's appeal of the OWI conviction under s. 800.14 (1) did not give the circuit court jurisdiction to hear the BAC charge absent an appeal of the dismissal. Town of Menasha v. Bastian,
178 Wis. 2d 191,
503 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1993).
346.63 Annotation
Prior convictions are an element of sub. (1) (b) and evidence of the convictions is required regardless of potential prejudice. State v. Ludeking,
195 Wis. 2d 132,
536 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995),
94-1527.
346.63 Annotation
Failure to timely notify a person of the right to an alternative blood alcohol test does not affect the presumption of the validity of a properly given blood test and is not grounds for suppressing the test results. County of Dane v. Granum,
203 Wis. 2d 252,
551 N.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1996),
95-3470.
346.63 Annotation
A request to perform field sobriety tests does not convert an otherwise lawful investigatory stop into an arrest requiring probable cause. County of Dane v. Campshure,
204 Wis. 2d 27,
552 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1996),
96-0474.
346.63 Annotation
Immobility of a vehicle does not preclude a finding that the vehicle was being operated. Movement is not necessary for operation. State v. Modory,
204 Wis. 2d 538,
555 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996),
96-0241.
346.63 Annotation
Criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content subsequent to administrative suspension of a driver's operating privileges does not constitute multiple punishment and double jeopardy. State v. McMaster,
206 Wis. 2d 30,
556 N.W.2d 673 (1996),
95-1159.
346.63 Annotation
Evidence of a refusal that follows an inadequate warning under s. 343.305 (4) violates due process, but admission is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Schirmang,
210 Wis. 2d 324,
565 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-2008.
346.63 Annotation
A defendant's refusal to submit to a field sobriety test is not protected by the right against self-incrimination and is admissible as evidence. State v. Mallick,
210 Wis. 2d 427,
565 N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-3048.
346.63 Annotation
While prior convictions are an element of a violation of sub. (1) (b), admitting evidence of that element may not be proper. Admitting any evidence of prior convictions and submitting the element of the defendant's status as a prior offender to the jury when the defendant admitted to the element was an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Alexander,
214 Wis.2d 628,
571 N.W.2d 662 (1997),
96-1973. See also State v. Diehl,
2020 WI App 16,
391 Wis. 2d 353,
941 N.W.2d 272,
19-1176.
346.63 Annotation
Prosecution under both sub. (1) (a) and (b) does not violate double jeopardy because there can only be one conviction and one punishment. Dual prosecution also does not violate due process. State v. Raddeman,
2000 WI App 190,
238 Wis. 2d 628,
618 N.W.2d 258,
00-0143.
346.63 Annotation
A warrantless blood draw is permissible when: 1) the blood is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested; 2) there is a clear indication that evidence of intoxication will be produced; 3) the method used is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection. State v. Thorstad,
2000 WI App 199,
238 Wis. 2d 666,
618 N.W.2d 240,
99-1765.
346.63 Annotation
A department of transportation driving record abstract presented at a preliminary examination to show prior convictions was sufficient to establish probable cause of prior offenses. State v. Lindholm,
2000 WI App 225,
239 Wis. 2d 167,
619 N.W.2d 267,
99-2298.
346.63 Annotation
Sub. (1), operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol count, is not a lesser included offense of sub. (2) (a), injury-related operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol count. State v. Smits,
2001 WI App 45,
241 Wis. 2d 374,
626 N.W.2d 42,
00-1158.
346.63 Annotation
By consenting to the taking of a blood sample, the defendant also consented to the chemical analysis of the sample. Those are not separate events for warrant requirement purposes. State v. VanLaarhoven,
2001 WI App 275,
248 Wis. 2d 881,
637 N.W.2d 411,
01-0222.
346.63 Annotation
Probation is permitted under s. 973.09 (1) (d) for 4th and subsequent OWI violations, as long as the probation requires confinement for at least the mandatory minimum time period under this section. State v. Eckola,
2001 WI App 295,
249 Wis. 2d 276,
638 N.W.2d 903,
01-1044.
346.63 Annotation
The analysis of blood taken in a warrantless nonconsensual draw, constitutional under
Krajewski, is the examination of evidence obtained pursuant to a valid search and not a second search requiring a warrant. State v. Riedel,
2003 WI App 18,
259 Wis. 2d 921,
656 N.W.2d 789,
02-1772.
346.63 Annotation
Evidence from a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw is admissible when: 1) the blood is drawn to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a drunk-driving related violation; 2) there is a clear indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication; 3) the method used to take the blood sample is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection to the blood draw. In the absence of an arrest, probable cause to believe blood currently contains evidence of a drunk-driving-related violation satisfies the first and second prong. State v. Erickson,
2003 WI App 43,
260 Wis. 2d 279,
659 N.W.2d 407,
01-3367.
346.63 Annotation
A DOT certified driving transcript was admissible evidence that established the defendant's repeater status as an element of the PAC offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Van Riper,
2003 WI App 237,
267 Wis. 2d 759,
672 N.W.2d 156,
03-0385.
346.63 Annotation
Field sobriety tests are not scientific tests but are observational tools that law enforcement officers commonly use to assist them in discerning various indicia of intoxication, the perception of which is necessarily subjective. The procedures an officer employs in determining probable cause for intoxication go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. City of West Bend v. Wilkens,
2005 WI App 36,
278 Wis. 2d 643,
693 N.W.2d 324,
04-1871.
346.63 Annotation
The per se ban on driving or operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in one's blood under sub. (1) (am) bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the goal of regulating the safety of roadways and is not fundamentally unfair such that there is a due process violation, nor does the statute offend principles of equal protection. State v. Smet,
2005 WI App 263,
288 Wis. 2d 525,
709 N.W.2d 474,
05-0690.
346.63 Annotation
A defendant was not operating a vehicle under this section by merely sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle, although the engine was running, when the uncontested evidence showed that the defendant was not the person who left the engine running, had never physically manipulated or activated the controls necessary to put the vehicle in motion, and there was no circumstantial evidence that the defendant recently operated the vehicle, while another person had operated the vehicle. Village of Cross Plains v. Haanstad,
2006 WI 16,
288 Wis. 2d 573,
709 N.W.2d 447,
04-2232.
346.63 Annotation
Weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of a vehicle. The reasonableness of a stop must be determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances. State v. Post,
2007 WI 60,
301 Wis. 2d 1,
733 N.W.2d 634,
05-2778.
346.63 Annotation
Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove operation of a motor vehicle. While the motor in this case was not running, the keys were in the ignition and the parking and dash lights were on. Even absent a running motor, the jury was entitled to consider the circumstantial evidence to determine how and when the car arrived where it did and whether it was the defendant who operated it. State v. Mertes,
2008 WI App 179,
315 Wis. 2d 756,
762 N.W.2d 813,
07-2757.
346.63 Annotation
Although evidence of intoxicant usage, such as odors, an admission, or containers, ordinarily exists in drunk driving cases and strengthens the existence of probable cause, such evidence is not required. The totality of the circumstances is the test. State v. Lange,
2009 WI 49,
317 Wis. 2d 383,
766 N.W.2d 551,
08-0882.
346.63 Annotation
The legislature meant to make the crime of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) one that requires a person to have the PAC at the time he or she drove or operated the motor vehicle. A defendant who has two countable OWI convictions at the time of arrest has a BAC limit of 0.08 percent. Accordingly, the state could not properly charge him with a PAC based on a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.048 percent. The circuit court properly dismissed the charge of fourth offense PAC although a 3rd OWI conviction was entered subsequent to the arrest. State v. Sowatzke,
2010 WI App 81,
326 Wis. 2d 227,
784 N.W.2d 700,
09-1990.
346.63 Annotation
A “motor bicycle" as defined in s. 340.01 (30) is a “motor vehicle" as defined in s. 340.01 (35) and used in sub. (1), at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled. State v. Koeppen,
2014 WI App 94,
356 Wis. 2d 812,
854 N.W.2d 849,
13-2539.
346.63 Annotation
In light of
Missouri v. McNeely, the holding in
State v. Bohling,
173 Wis. 2d 529, that the rapid dissipation of alcohol alone constitutes an exigent circumstance sufficient for law enforcement officers to order a warrantless investigatory blood draw, is no longer an accurate interpretation of the 4th amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The rapid dissipation of alcohol alone no longer constitutes a per se exigent circumstance. Exigent circumstances, sufficient to justify a warrantless investigatory blood draw of a drunk-driving suspect, are to be determined on a case-by-case totality of the circumstances analysis. State v. Kennedy,
2014 WI 132,
359 Wis. 2d 454,
856 N.W.2d 834,
12-0523.
346.63 Annotation
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the deputy reasonably responded to an accident, secured the scene, investigated the matter, and ultimately was left with a very narrow time frame in which the defendant's blood could be drawn so as to produce reliable evidence of intoxication. This sort of “now or never" moment is the epitome of an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless blood draw. State v. Tullberg,
2014 WI 134,
359 Wis. 2d 421,
857 N.W.2d 120,
12-1593.
346.63 Annotation
Operation of a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood under sub. (1) (am) is a strict liability offense that does not require scienter and is constitutional. State v. Weissinger,
2015 WI 42, 362 Wis. 2d 1,
863 N.W.2d 592,
13-1737.
346.63 Annotation
A court of appeals' decision remanding the case to the circuit court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for operating with a prohibited alcohol content (PAC) as a 7th offense and impose sentence for a 7th offense violated the defendant's right to due process after the defendant entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a 6th offense. Because a 7th offense carries a greater range of punishment than does a 6th offense, the court of appeals' remedy rendered the plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. State v. Chamblis,
2015 WI 53,
362 Wis. 2d 370,
864 N.W.2d 806,
12-2782.
346.63 Annotation
Upon his or her lawful arrest for drunk driving, a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to take a breathalyzer test and the state can comment at trial on the defendant's improper refusal to take the test. State v. Lemberger,
2017 WI 39,
374 Wis. 2d 617,
893 N.W.2d 232,
15-1452.
346.63 Annotation
Sub. (2) (am) 2. to 7. (2011) clearly provided for increasing fines and terms of imprisonment based on the number of convictions amassed by the defendant. Sub. (2) (am) 6. provided that an individual convicted of 9 OWIs was guilty of a Class G (now Class F) felony and subject to the penalty for that class of felony. State v. Wortman,
2017 WI App 61,
378 Wis. 2d 105,
902 N.W.2d 561,
16-1144.
346.63 Annotation
In this case, the defendant's riding lawn mower was not an “all-terrain vehicle" under s. 340.01 (2g) because it did not satisfy the requirement of having a straddle seat. It was, however, a “motor vehicle" under s. 340.01 (35), and the defendant therefore was validly prosecuted for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of sub. (1) (a). State v. Shoeder,
2019 WI App 60,
389 Wis. 2d 244,
936 N.W.2d 172,
18-0997.
346.63 Annotation
Under the facts of this case, there was a reasonable likelihood that the state was effectively relieved of its burden to prove that the defendant was “under the influence" of cocaine and marijuana while driving, in violation of the defendant's right to due process of law. The jury instruction was incomplete and therefore ambiguous to the extent that it failed to inform the jury of two related propositions: 1) not every person who has consumed cocaine and THC is under the influence; and 2) a person is not under the influence unless the person has consumed a sufficient amount of cocaine and THC to cause the person to be less able to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle and control a motor vehicle. The jury here was not explicitly informed that it could not find the defendant guilty of operating while intoxicated under sub. (1) (a) based merely on a finding that the defendant had consumed cocaine and THC before driving. State v. McAdory,
2021 WI App 89,
400 Wis. 2d 215,
968 N.W.2d 770,
20-2001.
346.63 Annotation
Natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. Consistent with general 4th amendment principles, exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. Missouri v. McNeely,
569 U.S. 141,
133 S. Ct. 1552,
185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013).
346.63 Annotation
First offense violations of sub. (1) (a) are assimilated under federal Assimilative Crimes Act when committed on federal enclave. U.S. v. Manning,
700 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
346.63 Annotation
Offense definition in Wisconsin's impaired driving statutes. Hammer. 69 MLR 165 (1986).
346.63 Annotation
Alcohol and other drugs in Wisconsin drivers: The laboratory perspective. Field. 69 MLR 235 (1986).
346.63 Annotation
Effective Use of Expert Testimony in the Defense of Drunk Driving Cases. Olson. WBB Dec. 1981.
346.63 Annotation
The new OMVWI law: Wisconsin changes its approach to the problem of drinking and driving: Part I. Hammer. WBB Apr. 1982.
346.63 Annotation
The new OMVWI law: Wisconsin changes its approach to the problem of drinking and driving: Part II. Hammer. WBB May 1982.
346.63 Annotation
Double Jeopardy: A New Tool in the Arsenal of Drunk Driving Defenses. Sines & Ekman. Wis. Law. Dec. 1995.
346.63 Annotation
Wisconsin's New OWI Law. Mishlove & Stuckert. Wis. Law. June 2010.
346.635
346.635
Report arrest or out-of-service order to department. Whenever a law enforcement officer arrests a person for a violation of s.
346.63 (1),
(5) or
(7), or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, or s.
346.63 (2) or
(6) or
940.25, or s.
940.09 where the offense involved the use of a vehicle, the officer shall notify the department of the arrest and of issuance of an out-of-service order under s.
343.305 (7) (b) or
(9) (am) as soon as practicable.
346.635 History
History: 1981 c. 20;
1989 a. 105.
346.637
346.637
Driver awareness program. The department shall conduct a campaign to educate drivers in this state concerning:
346.637(1)
(1) The laws relating to operating a motor vehicle and drinking alcohol, using controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, or using any combination of alcohol, controlled substances and controlled substance analogs.
346.637(2)
(2) The effects of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, or the use of them in any combination, on a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle.
346.637 History
History: 1981 c. 20;
1995 a. 448.
346.64
346.64
Employment of drunken operators. 346.64(1)(1)
No person who owns or has direct control of a commercial motor vehicle or any vehicle operated upon a highway for the conveyance of passengers for hire shall employ as an operator of such vehicle and retain in the person's employment any person who is addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor or to the use of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under ch.
961. In addition to being subject to fine or imprisonment as prescribed by law, such person shall forfeit $5 for each day such operator is retained in the person's employ.
346.64(2)
(2) Upon conviction of an operator of a commercial motor vehicle or any vehicle operated for the conveyance of passengers for hire, for driving or operating such vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, the owner or person having direct control of such vehicle shall discharge such operator from such employment. No person shall employ or retain in employment as an operator of a commercial motor vehicle or a vehicle operated upon a highway for the conveyance of passengers for hire any person who has been so convicted within the preceding 6-month period or any person during a period of disqualification under s.
343.315, unless s.
343.055 (2) applies. In addition to being subject to fine or imprisonment as prescribed by law, such person shall forfeit $5 for each day such operator is retained in the person's employ contrary to the provisions of this subsection.
346.65
346.65
Penalty for violating sections 346.62 to 346.64. 346.65(1)(a)
(a) May be required to forfeit not less than $25 nor more than $200, except as provided in par.
(b).
346.65(1)(b)
(b) May be fined not less than $50 nor more than $500 or imprisoned for not more than one year in the county jail or both if the total of convictions under s.
346.62 (2) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith or a law of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state in conformity with s.
346.62 (2) equals 2 or more in a 4-year period. The 4-year period shall be measured from the dates of the violations which resulted in the convictions.
346.65(2)(am)1.
1. Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor more than $300, except as provided in subds.
2. to
7. and par.
(f).
346.65(2)(am)2.
2. Except as provided in pars.
(bm) and
(f), shall be fined not less than $350 nor more than $1,100 and imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1) within a 10-year period, equals 2, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.
346.65(2)(am)3.
3. Except as provided in pars.
(cm),
(f), and
(g), shall be fined not less than $600 nor more than $2,000 and imprisoned for not less than 45 days nor more than one year in the county jail if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1), equals 3, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.
346.65(2)(am)4.
4. Except as provided in pars.
(dm),
(f), and
(g), is guilty of a Class H felony and shall be fined not less than $600 and imprisoned for not less than 60 days if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1), equals 4, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.
346.65(2)(am)5.
5. Except as provided in pars.
(f) and
(g), is guilty of a Class G felony and shall be fined not less than $600 if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1), equals 5 or 6, except that suspensions, revocations or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. The court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s.
973.01, and the confinement portion of the bifurcated sentence imposed on the person shall be not less than one year and 6 months. The court may impose a term of confinement that is less than one year and 6 months if the court finds that the best interests of the community will be served and the public will not be harmed and if the court places its reasons on the record.
346.65(2)(am)6.
6. Except as provided in par.
(f), is guilty of a Class F felony if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1), equals 7, 8, or 9, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. The court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s.
973.01 and the confinement portion of the bifurcated sentence imposed on the person shall be not less than 3 years.
346.65(2)(am)7.
7. Except as provided in par.
(f), is guilty of a Class E felony if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1), equals 10 or more except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one. The court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s.
973.01 and the confinement portion of the bifurcated sentence imposed on the person shall be not less than 4 years.
346.65(2)(bm)
(bm) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1) within a 10-year period, equals 2, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par.
(am) 2., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 5 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 5 nor more than 7 days. A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par.
(cm) or
(dm) or sub.
(2j) (bm),
(cm), or
(cr) or
(3r) once in his or her lifetime.
346.65(2)(cm)
(cm) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1) equals 3, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par.
(am) 3., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 45 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 14 days. A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par.
(bm) or
(dm) or sub.
(2j) (bm),
(cm), or
(cr) or
(3r) once in his or her lifetime.
346.65(2)(dm)
(dm) In any county that opts to offer a reduced minimum period of imprisonment for the successful completion of a probation period that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, if the number of convictions under ss.
940.09 (1) and
940.25 in the person's lifetime, plus the total number of suspensions, revocations, and other convictions counted under s.
343.307 (1) equals 4, except that suspensions, revocations, or convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one, the fine shall be the same as under par.
(am) 4., but the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 60 days, except that if the person successfully completes a period of probation that includes alcohol and other drug treatment, the period of imprisonment shall be not less than 29 days. A person may be sentenced under this paragraph or under par.
(bm) or
(cm) or sub.
(2j) (bm),
(cm), or
(cr) or
(3r) once in his or her lifetime.
346.65(2)(f)1.1. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s.
346.63 (1), the person shall be fined not less than $350 nor more than $1,100 and imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months, except as provided in subd.
2. 346.65(2)(f)2.
2. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the violation that gave rise to the conviction under s.
346.63 (1), the applicable minimum and maximum fines and imprisonment under par.
(am) 2. to
7. for the conviction are doubled. An offense under s.
346.63 (1) that subjects a person to a penalty under par.
(am) 3.,
4.,
5.,
6., or
7. when there is a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle is a felony and the place of imprisonment shall be determined under s.
973.02.
346.65(2)(g)1.1. If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.17 to 0.199, the applicable minimum and maximum fines under par.
(am) 3. to
5. are doubled.
346.65(2)(g)2.
2. If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.20 to 0.249, the applicable minimum and maximum fines under par.
(am) 3. to
5. are tripled.
346.65(2)(g)3.
3. If a person convicted had an alcohol concentration of 0.25 or above, the applicable minimum and maximum fines under par.
(am) 3. to
5. are quadrupled.
346.65(2c)
(2c) In sub.
(2) (am) 2.,
3.,
4.,
5.,
6., and
7., the time period shall be measured from the dates of the refusals or violations that resulted in the revocation or convictions. If a person has a suspension, revocation, or conviction for any offense under a local ordinance or a state statute of another state that would be counted under s.
343.307 (1), that suspension, revocation, or conviction shall count as a prior suspension, revocation, or conviction under sub.
(2) (am) 2.,
3.,
4.,
5.,
6., and
7. 346.65(2e)
(2e) If the court determines that a person does not have the ability to pay the costs and fine or forfeiture imposed under sub.
(2) (am),
(f), or
(g), the court may reduce the costs, fine, and forfeiture imposed and order the person to pay, toward the cost of the assessment and driver safety plan imposed under s.
343.30 (1q) (c), the difference between the amount of the reduced costs and fine or forfeiture and the amount of costs and fine or forfeiture imposed under sub.
(2) (am),
(f), or
(g).
